
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On the Psychology of Military Incompetence

By Norman F. Dixon



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Preface

This book is not an attack upon the Armed Forces nor upon the vast majority of senior military commanders, who, in time of war, succeeding in a task which would make the running of a large commercial enterprise seem like child's play by comparison.

It is, however, an attempt to explain how a minority of individuals come to inflict upon their fellow men depths of misery and pain virtually unknown in other walks of life.

The book involves a putting together of contributions from a great many people --historians, sociologist, psychologists and of course Soldiers and Sailors. It is hoped that none of these will feel misrepresented in the final picture which their contributions made. For errors of fact, and for the opinions expressed, I alone take full responsibility.

In the writing in this book, I a look very great debt of gratitude to all those who gave generously of their time to reading in discussing earlier drafts. Their encouragement, criticisms and advice have been in valuable. In particular I would like to thank Mr. Ronald Littleton, Captain Donald McIntyre, R.N., Brigadier Shelford Bidwell, Dr. Penelope Dixon and Dr. Hugh L'Etang for the many sorts of help they gave at every stage.

For the long hour she spent tearing out research, checking contents, and assisting with the index I owe a great deal of gratitude to Dr. S. H. A. Henley.

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For permission to quote extracts from works in which they hold copyright I am most grateful to: Russell Braddon, Jonathan Cape Ltd. and the Viking Press Inc. for The Siege by Russell Braddon; Alan Clark, for his The Donkeys; and Simon Raven and *Encounter*, for "*Perish by the Sword*" by Simon Raven.

Finally, I owe a debt of gratitude to that handful of people (who would probably preferred to remain nameless) whose hostility and dismay that anyone to write a book on military incompetence provided considerable, if unlooked-for, confirmation of the relationship between militarism and human psychopathology.

1975 N.F.D

Foreword

One day, I hope, someone will write the history of the impact of science on the conduct of war for and also a what are loosely called "*defense studies*". When he does, I am certain that he will find this book by Dr. Norman Dixon, for which I am privileged to write a foreword, to have been an important landmark. Norman Dixon is specifically concerned with the subject of leadership on the highest level, or "*generalship*", which he seeks to illuminate by bringing his own branch of science, experimental psychology to bear; but before discussing his theme from the point-of-view of a military professional student it might clear the ground, perhaps, if I adumbrated, or anticipated, the history of the relationship of scientists and Soldiers.

We should begin by reminding ourselves that war is only partly a rational activity directed at useful goals or benefits, such as survival, or the acquisition of desirable territory. The classical military historian sees political or religious causes playing their part as irritants; the Marxist sees purely economic factors; while others, perhaps, see the cause & conduct of war as embedded in, and the consequence of specific cultures. The study of warfare is, perhaps, a branch of sociology.

youtube.com/playlist?list=PL9660110F4F3BE1BE



To satisfy ourselves on his last point, we do not have to go very far back in history or even to leave the present. Wars are not fought on solely with "*victory*" as the object-victory being defined, presumably, as a net gain of benefits over costs-but for "*glory*". To achieve "*glory*" the war had to be conducted according to certain rules, using only certain honorable weapons and between Soldiers dressed in bizarre and often unsuitable costumes. [EDITOR: today this is seen by the light infantry narcissists who insist that peace in Iraq/Afghanistan must only come about by flooding the areas with American or indigenous "*boots-on-the-ground*"--because as a Sub-National Conflict they insist that this is the ONLY way it can be done; tanks are for Nation-State War stampedes to capital cities etc.] The bayonet, the saber and the lance were more noble than the firearm (one British cavalry regiment on being issued with carbines in the first time in the mid-nineteenth

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century ceremonially put the first consignment into a barrow and tipped it onto the stable dung pile).

The leaders of such armies were chosen from a corps of officers who were not recruited primarily for prowess or intelligence, but **because they conformed to certain social criteria**. They, for instance, had to be noble, or to profess a certain religion, or, where nobility was not a passport to rank, to belong to the appropriate class or caste. This is why successful generals when they emerge appear to be "*freaks or mavericks*"; and also, perhaps why such a maverick as Wellington found it necessary to convert himself into a British aristocrat in that course of his ascent to fame. It also accounts for the sudden appearance of a plethora of **competent** generals when the mould of a society is broken as it was by the French and Russian revolutions, or when a new, classless and caste-less society evolves, as it did in United States and the 19th-century. The best generals on both sides in the American Civil War could probably have beaten any comparable team from Europe, for the war made the profession of generalship a career open to talent and freed it from the rule of the authoritarians who flourish in rigid societies.

The "*scientific*" breakthrough really came in the early part of this century, and I would like to do well on this for a moment in spite of the fact that it lies in the province of applied science and engineering--rather than that of behavioral sciences. "*Science*" was useful, but that there could be a "*science*" of war in the sense that scientific modes of thought could be used in strategic problems was incomprehensible. Navies remained rigidly authoritarian in outlook and hierarchical in structure, but at the same time our Royal Navy, for instance, was extraordinarily open-minded and imaginative in the purely technical field. The great battleships of 1914 had highly sophisticated systems of fire control, equipped, even, with military analog computers; the importance of the submarine was grasped; and naval aviation pioneered. Unfortunately, on land in the First World War, the tactics of Malplaquet or Borodino were combined with the killing power of modern technology, with the bloodiest of results. This tragedy did not arise solely from incompetence: the march of science so for had provided weapons to kill--but not the essential apparatus for command-and-control. Scientists were still only asked for *tools*. No one then dreamt of asking the question "*How shall we do it?*" -- to receive the teasing, or baffling, question in response "*Why do you want to do*

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it at all?" Not until the Second World War, did we see the birth of "*operational analysis*" and men of the quality of Lindermann, to Tizard and Blackett and, later on, in the 1960s, Zuckermann, brought in for the purpose of pure *thinking*.

The application of the behavioral sciences followed exactly the same cycle one-year later. "*Psychology*" was shrouded with myth and its application blocked by subconscious fears. It was confused with psychiatry, and psychiatrists were concerned with "*mad*" people and moreover, were soft on discipline. To allow them to participate in leader selection, asking awkward questions about *sex*, was repugnant to many officers and the resistance offered by military commanders to their use was naturally deep and obdurate. Only the insistence of the most enlightened men ever to occupy the post of the Adjutant-General of the British Army, General Sir Ronald Adam overcame these obstacles. Between 1939 and 1945 Army psychiatrists, and subsequently psychologists, made the most valuable contributions, quite outside a purely clinical field, to the question of training, officer selection, "*job satisfaction*" and discipline. Both the Royal Air Force and United States Air Force make good use of both branches of the science in the field of the effects of stress and motivation, which hitherto had been dominated by purely moral and unscientific assumptions. By the end of the Second World War, we knew a great deal about the nature of leadership on the level of pilots and platoon commanders. But no one so far had the temerity to apply the same criteria to the General's; and this is why I think Norman Dixon's book is by way of being a landmark.

He is a bold man. The subject of generalship is peculiarly the province of military historians of "*classical*" outlook, who are perfectly ready to fall on each other, let alone any outsider who may trespass therein, and also the new wave of social scientists and professors of international relationships and politics whose minds are not necessarily any more open than those of their military colleagues. Norman Dixon is therefore likely to come under a hot fire from several quarters. Fortunately, he's accustomed to heat. As a former regular officer in the Royal Engineers, including nine years in bomb disposal, he was moulded in the corps where intellectual habitually meets danger and he has exchanged his old discipline for a new one to become an experimental psychologist. I cannot think of anyone better qualified to attempt this synthesis.

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It must be emphasized that this book is neither yet another fashionable attack on British generals, nor one of those fascinating, but immature exercises in arranging the heroes of the military pantheon in order-of-merit, as if picking a world class cricket team. Psychologists (he argues) can identify a distinct personality type in whom a fundamental conflict between the dictates of conscience and the need for aggression may seriously interfere with the open-mindedness, imagination and intellect needed to reach correct decisions. Obviously, the human personality is far too complex to be represented by a simple stereotype, but Norman Dixon's approach is to use the well-documented "*authoritarian*" personality as a template against which to measure some famous commanders.

In my view, at any rate, Norman Dixon's theme does not upset the "*classical*" appreciation of the characteristics of a successful general. Surely, he resolves the problem of conflicting qualities: ruthlessness and consideration, relentless pursuit of the aim and flexibility of approach, which so confuse the old-fashioned historian. He speaks in modern terms, of the "*noise*" with the general must filter out from the total input of information he receives in the stress and confusion of battle. But in classical terms, this is old and familiar to us; was it not once said of Massena that "*his mental faculties redoubled amid the roar of cannon*"?

I believe this book should be required reading at all places where future officers are selected, trained or prepared for higher command. Both professional Soldiers and the equally useful generation of young academic students of warfare will find new knowledge and valuable insights in this challenging study of how some men in high command may react when under the appalling stresses of war.

Shelford Bidwell

PART ONE

"*Competence, then, is the free exercise of dexterity and intelligence in the completion of tasks, unimpaired by infantile inferiority*"

--E. H. Erickson, Youth, Change and Challenge

"*With 2000 years of examples behind us we have no excuse when fighting, for not fighting well*"

--T.E. Lawrence, letter, in Liddell-Hart, Memoirs

"*No general ever won a war whose conscience troubled him or who did not want to 'beat his enemy too much*"

--Brigadier Shelford Bidwell, Modern Warfare

Chapter 1

Introduction

"...*We only wish to represent things as they are, and to expose the error of believing that a mere bravo without intellect can make himself distinguished in war*"

--C. von Clausewitz, On War

By now most people have become accustomed to, what might almost say blase' about, military incompetence. Like the common cold, flat feet or the British climate, it is accepted as a part of life--faintly ludicrous but quite unavoidable. Surely there can be nothing left to say about the subject?

In fact, military incompetence is a largely preventable, tragically expensive and quite absorbing segment of human behavior. It also follows certain laws. The first intimation of this came to the writer during desultory reading about notorious military disasters. These moving, often horrific, accounts evoked a curious *deja vu* experience. For there was something about these apparently senseless goings-on which sent one's thought along new channels, making contact with phenomenon from quite other, hitherto, unrelated, contexts; and then back again to senseless facts, not now quite so senseless, until gradually a **theme, continuous as a hairline crack, could be discerned throughout the stirring tales of daring-do**.

If this pattern was real, and meant what it seemed to mean, certain predictions would follow. These were tested and found correct. Yet other pieces began falling into place, until gradually the mosaic of elements took on the semblance of a theory. This book is about that theory. It is concerned with placing aspects of military behavior in the context of general psychological principles.

This sounds fine -- a cheerful marriage of history and psychology. Unfortunate, however, such a unit may not be entirely agreeable to

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some of the potential in-laws. Judging from the attitude of some historians, a putting together of psychology and history is, to say the least, bad form, while a putting together of psychology and *military* history is positively indecent. There at least two reasons for this anxiety. The first is that since there are few things more annoying than having one's behavior *explained*, there exists a natural distaste for explanations of historical figures with whom one perhaps identifies.

The second reason is a distrust of reductionism -- of the idea that anything so complex as a military disaster could possibly be *reduced* to explanations in terms of the workings of the human mind, and this by a psychologist (of all people).

In answer one can only say that that of course, historians know more about history than do psychologists. Of course historical events are determined by a complex set of variables -- political, economic, geographical, climatic and sociological. But ultimately history is made by human beings, and whatever other factors may have contributed to the military disaster, one of these was the **minds** of those who were there, and another the behavior to which these minds gave rise. Now these are complex variables; hence it *has* been necessary to play down the other factors in order to focus upon more clearly upon possible psychological determinants. Consider the analogous case of aircraft accidents. Nobody would deny that airplanes crash for number of different reasons, sometimes working independently, sometimes in unison; this does not mean that the selecting out for particular study a single factor, such as metal fatigue, necessitates dwelling on such other variables as bad weather, indifferent navigation, or too much alcohol in the bloodstream of the pilot.

The case for a reductionist approach, however, also rests upon another consideration: namely that the nature of military incompetence and those characteristics which distinguish competent from incompetent, senior commanders have shown a significant lack of variation over the years, despite changes in the other factors which shape the course of history. Whether they are well-equipped or ill-equipped, whether they are in control of men who were armed with spears or men with tanks and rockets, whether they are English, Russian, German, Zulu, American, or French, good commanders remain pretty much the same. Likewise, bad commanders have much in common with each other.

One rewarding by-product of writing this book has been the many enjoyable conversations I have had with people in the armed services.

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Here again, however, a very small minority viewed the enterprise with dismay, as something lacking in taste if not actually bordering on the sacrilegious.*

To this understandable sensitivity, I can only say that no insult is intended. In point of fact, for devotees of the military to take exception to a study a military incompetence is as unjustified as it would be for admirers of teeth to complain about book on dental caries. In an imperfect world, the activities of professional fighters are presumably as necessary to society as those of the police, prostitutes, sewage disposers and psychologists. It is just because we cannot do without these callings (except, possibly, the last) that any serious attempt to understand their peculiarities should be welcomed and, indeed taken, as a compliment. For it is a token of their importance that they should merit such attention. Moreover, it is only by contemplation of the incompetent that we can appreciate the difficulties and accomplishments of the competent. If there were no incompetent generals it might appear that the direction of armies and the waging of war were easy -- a task well within the compass of all who had the good fortune to reach the highest levels of military organizations.

However, it is not only when contrasted with the inept that great commanders look their best, but also when seen in the context of the organizations to which they belong. The thesis will be developed that the possibility of incompetence springs in large measure from the unfortunate if unavoidable side effects of creating armies and navies. The most part these tend to produce a leveling-down of human capability, at once encouraging to the mediocre--but cramping to the gifted. Viewed in this light, those where performed brilliantly in the carrying of arms may be considered twice blessed, for they achieved success *despite* the stultifying **bad features of the organization to which they happened to belong**. This alone would seem to justify an unabashed excursion into the realms of military incompetence. But there are additional grounds, if anything more pressing. They concern the related issues of cost and probability.

While few would dispute that the *cost* grows exponentially with the growth of technology, so that the price of wrong decisions must now be reckoned in mega-deaths, the *chance* of military incompetence

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* It is fair to add that certain common characteristics of those civilians and servicemen who took the extreme view you provided a very useful clue as to the possible origins of military incompetence.

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remains a matter for debate. We might hope that this would be a declining function of better education, more realistic values, greater fear of immeasurably worse consequences, and the decrease in jingoism. But there are strong grounds for taking the pessimistic view that the chance, like the cost, continues to increase with positive acceleration.

Several reasons may be advanced for this depressing hypothesis. Firstly, the gap between the capabilities of the human mind and intellectual demands of modern war far continues that expansion which started in the 18th century. It is probably opening from both sides. While modern war because its new becomes increasingly swift and deadly, and the means by which it is waged increasingly complex, the intellectual level of those entering the armed services as officers could well be on the wane. This tentative supposition is based on the fact that **fewer and fewer of the young consider the military to be worthwhile career**. One has only to look at contemporary recruiting advertisements to realize the evident difficulties of finding officer-material. They spare nothing in their efforts to convince an un-responsive youth. The services are depicted as glittering toy shops, where handsome young man enjoy themselves with tanks and missiles while basking in the respect of lower ranks hardly less godlike than themselves. In their eagerness to drum up applicants, these calls-to-arms attempt the mental contortion of presenting the services as a classless society in which officers nevertheless remain gentlemen. The clear implication of such expensive pleading can surely be only that the market for a military career is shrinking, to say the least. To meet this fall-off in officer recruitment insufficient has been done, in the writer's opinion, to improve the real as opposed to the advertised incentive-value of a military career.

Needless to say, perceived declining in the attractiveness of a military career may actually deter those who might otherwise have opted for one. According to Alexis de Tocqueville, this is particularly so in democratic armies during times of peace. "*When a military spirit forsakes a people, that profession of arms immediately ceases to be held in honor, and military men fall to the lowest rank of public servants; they are little esteemed and no longer understood... Hence arises a circle of cause and consequence from which it is difficult to escape-- the best part of the nation shuns the military profession because that profession is not honored, and the profession is not honored because the best part of the nation has ceased to follow it*"

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In short, possibly *less* able people are being called upon to carry out a *more* difficult task with a *heavier* price to pay for error; and at the highest levels their responsibilities are staggering.

In the Vietnam War alone, military commanders responsible for executing policies which cost United States $300 billion dollars. They were responsible for releasing 13,000,000 tons of high explosives (more than six times the weight of bombs dropped by the USA in all theaters during the whole of the Second World War). They were responsible for the delivery of 90,000 tons of gas and herbicides. And they were responsible for the deaths of between 1 and 2 million people. These are great responsibilities. Errors of generalship on this scale would be very costly.

Of course, many of the arguments put forward in this book or equally applicable to other human enterprises. Indeed, there is no reason to suppose incompetence occurs more frequently in military subculture than it does in politics, commerce or universities. There are, however, apart from the heavy cost of military disasters, special reasons for studying cases of military ineptitude.

The first is that military organizations may have a particular propensity for attracting a minority of individuals who might prove a menace at high levels of command, and the second is that the nature of militarism serves to accentuate those very traits which may ultimately prove disastrous. In theory, then, errors of generalship could be prevented by attention to these causes.

Thirdly, the public has, at least in the democracies, some real say as to who should make its political decisions. This control does not apply to generals. Even the *worst* government and the *most* inept Prime Minister, come up for possible dismissal every so often. This is not true of armies and navies. We may have governments we deserve--but we sometimes had military minds which we did not.

Fourthly, if one of the main differences between military and political organizations is in the degree of public control, that between the military and commerce lies in decision pay-offs*. A wrong decision by company Chairman or Board of Directors may cost a great deal of money and depress a sizable population of shareholders but military errors have cost hundreds of thousands of lives and untold misery to civilians and Soldiers alike.

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* As relatively trivial and unimportant are most academic decisions that it would be arrogant to discuss them in the same breath. But similar principles apply.

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But the case for a study of military competence also rests upon other issues. Not the least of these is the need to examine a view of military behavior diametrically opposed to, though in its way no less extreme then, that of people who would vehemently defended senior commanders against even the faintest breath of criticism.

This other, hypocritical stance seems remarkably widespread. Thus, for many people with whom the author discussed the central topic of this book, the notion of military incompetence struck an immediate and responsive chord. Rejoinders range from "*You'll have no shortage of data*" to "*Surely that's the whole of military history!*".

But when pressed for details there was a tendency to become vague, and retire behind a "*1066 and all that*" attitude to the subject. [EDITOR: Battle of Hastings] Psychological causes were usually reduced to a single factor: low intelligence or, as one historian has put it "*the bloody fool theory*" of military history. Doubtless this view has been contributed to by such recent books on military ineptitude as Alan Clark's The Donkeys, an abrasive critique of generals in the First World War. Certainly its title, taken from the famous conversation between Ludendorff and Hoffman* and such captions "*Donkey decorates lion*" (below a photograph of a general pinning a medal on a Lance Corporal) seemed to suggest an equation of incompetence with mulish stupidity. The contents of the book apply, however, that while stupidity may possibly have played a part, limited intelligence was **not** the cause of the behavior of which the generals have been criticized. Judging from the spate of books among which The Donkeys have appeared, it looked as if a taboo has been lifted on peering into the military wood shed. But mixing our rural metaphors, the erstwhile sacred cows were once more been transmogrified into nothing more than very unsacred *asses*. Thus one historian has ascribed a series of military mishaps to "*bone-headed*" leadership[2], another spoke of "*the long gallery of military imbecility*"[3], while a third has said of British Soldiers that "*their fate was decided for them by idiots*"[4]. The view taken here is that besides being unkind, these views are probably invalid.

The hypothesis of intellectual incapacity at least leaves two questions quite unanswered. How, if they are so lacking in intelligence, do people

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* According to the memoirs of Field Marshal von Falkenhayn (cited by Alan Clark), Field Marshal von Ludendorff's comment "*The English Soldiers fight like Lions*" was greeted by Major General Max Hoffman with, "*True, but don't we know they are lions led by donkeys?*"

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become senior military commanders? And what is it about military organization is that they should attract, promote and ultimately tolerate those whose performance at the highest levels may bring appropriate premium upon the organizations which they represent?"

To answer these questions, however, its first necessary discover what the job of generalship details, and how it could come to be done so badly or so well. This, the bare-bones of good and bad generalship, is examined in the next chapter in terms of **information theory**.

The main part of the book is divided into two halves. The first is concerned with case histories -- examples of military ineptitude over a period of some 100 years or so years. Much of this material will, no doubt, be all too familiar to the reader. Its included here, and the selections made, with two main purposes in mind -- to provide an *aide-memoire'*, and because it is believed that the common denominators of military competence emerge most clearly when looked at in a longitudinal study. One special virtue of a disparate approach is that it highlights the influence (or, more often, regrettable lack of influence) of earlier upon later events.

The most part, cases of incompetence have been taken from British military history. Far from being unpatriotic, this apparently one-sided approach springs from a sentimental regard for the forces of the Crown, whose record of valor and fighting ability is second-to-none, and whose ability to rise above the most intense provocation, either from a civilian population, as in Northern Ireland today, or from the lapses of their top leadership in days gone by, most surely occupy a unique position in the history of warfare. Because it is exceptionally well-documented, and has been going on for rather longer than most, British military endeavor also provides a particular useful datum for a comparative study. Finally, it is surely no more than a common courtesy that a critical analysis of one's own "*beams*" should take precedence over a listing of the other fellow's "*motes*".

The second half of the book is devoted to discussion and explanation. It is subdivided into two parts, the first concerned with the social psychology of military organizations, and the second with the psychopathology of individual commanders.

The approach here is essentially eclectic. Drawing upon as the logical psychoanalytic and behaviorist theories, it tends to explain military ineptitude in the light of five inescapable, if unfortunate, features of human psychology. These are:

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1. Man shares with lower animals certain powerful instincts.

2. Unlike lower animals, most men learn to control frustrate, direct and subliminate these instinctual energies.

3. While by far the largest part of this learning occurs in early childhood, its effects upon the adult personality are profound and long-lasting.

4. Residues of this early learning, and in particular unresolved conflict between infantile desires and the demands of punitive morality, may remain wholly unconscious yet provide a canker of inexhaustible anxiety.

5. When **this anxiety becomes the driving force in life's endeavors, the fragile edifices of reason & competence are placed in jeopardy**.

In due course, we shall examine the scientific basis for these propositions and their relevance to a theory a military incompetence.

Because this is a book about incompetence rather than competence, about disasters rather than successes, these chapters may appear to take an unnecessarily jaundiced view of the military profession and to dwell more upon what is bad--rather than what is good in man's attempts to professionalize violence. But without taking out and enlarging upon the less pleasant features of a multi-faceted phenomenon, there could be no theory to account for those human aberrations which have cost so much unnecessary suffering in war. As Clausewitz wrote of war "***this is the way in which the matter must be viewed, and it is to no purpose, it is even against one's better interest, to turn away from the considerations of the affair the real nature of the affair because the horror of its elements excites repugnance***"[5]. To the reader who recoils in disgust from these chapters, I can only say that the theory they advance is based upon the emergence of a pattern, of which each small piece may seem in itself trivial, possibly ludicrous, even noxious, but which, one put together with other pieces, begins to make sense. This interdependence between the parts necessitates keeping an open mind, and, however much one may dislike or disbelieve the existence of individual trees, postponing judgment until the wood is seen in its entirety. The reader who is obsessed with trees, and thinks history should be left to historians, ideas about Soldiering to Soldiers, and the psychological theorizing should never go below the belt, this is the moment to stop reading and save yourself some irritation.

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PART ONE

Author's note

For a longtime attempts to write this book were deterred by what seemed insurmountable difficulty, that of knowing how to present the raw data. Should they be confined to a table of errors appear to recur in military disasters (backed up by an extensive bibliography) or should they be allowed to emerge gradually from long and detailed histories of the events in question? The first approach (when tried) seemed arid, and would have left the average reader with the onerous task of plowing through a vast amount of military history. The second approach to admit this book would have run to several volumes. Faced with this dilemma, the writer adopted the uneasy compromise of attempting to precis well-known accounts of military disasters in the pious hope that certain **common denominators** of these events would become apparent and, no less important, that the discerning reader would acquire a sort of feel for the psychological processes involved.

Since the object of the exercise is not the writing of another military history--but rather something more analogous to the detecting of weak signals in a noisy background, these precis are deliberately selective and deliberately superficial of the treatment of surrounding context; for it is only by amplifying the signals and playing down the noise that the pattern (if there is one) comes to light.

Obviously, this approach will be anathema to trained historians. They will no doubt raise scholarly eyebrows at flimsy descriptions of momentous battles and deplore the fact that the prolonged agony of the Crimean war, or say, Operation MARKET-GARDEN should be reduced to a mere handful of ignoble pages.

To them I say skip to page 149.

Chapter 2

Generalship

"*War is the province of uncertainty; three-fourths of those things upon which action in war must be calculated, or hidden more or less in the clouds of great uncertainty*"

--C. von Clausewitz, On War

"*In a situation where the consequences of wrong decisions are so awesome, where a single bit of irrationality can set a whole train of traumatic events in motion, I do not think that we can be satisfied with the assurance that 'most people behave rationally most of the time'*"

--C. E. Osgood

War is primarily concerned with two sorts of activity -- the delivering of energy in the communication of information. Most combatants are involved with the former, a few -- channels among them -- with the latter.

In war, each side is kept busy turning its wealth into energy which is then delivered, three, *gratis* and for nothing, to the other side. Such energy may be muscular, thermal, kinetic or chemical. Wars are only possible because the recipients of this energy are ill-prepared to receive it and convert it into a useful form for their own economy. If, by means of said, say, impossibly large funnels and gigantic reservoirs, they could capture and store the energy flung at them by the other side, the recipients of this unsolicited gift would be so rich, and the other side so poor, that future warfare would be a necessary for them and impossible for their opponents.

Unfortunately, such levels of technology have not been reached. [EDITOR: the Illuminati would not want this!] In the Vietnam War alone, the United States delivered to Indochina enough energy to displace 3.4 billion cubic yards of earth--10 times the amount dug out for the canals of Suez and Panama combined [1]

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and enough raw materials in the shape of fuels, metals and other chemicals to keep several major industries supplied for years. In fact, a part from a little slum clearance this abundance of energy was wasted -- consumed in the making of 26 million craters, the laying waste of 20,000 km² of forest, and the destruction of enough crops to feed 2 million people for a year. However, while the *reception* of energy still totally uncontrolled this is certainly not true of its direction and delivery. Indeed, these become a matter of some sophistication in the prime concern of military and naval commanders: theirs is the job of deciding how, when and where to dispose of the energy which their sides make available. They do this by occupying nodal points on a complex communications network.

In other words, the ideal senior commander may be viewed as a device for receiving, processing and transmitting information in a way which will yield the maximum gain for the minimum cost. [EDITOR: According to RACKET THEORY, the "*maximum gain*" would be a problem kept-in-play at MAXIMUM cost. Dixon is defining what a MORAL, non-racketeering general's job **should** be] Whatever else he may be; he is part telephone exchange and part computer. These, the common denominators of generalship, are depicted in figure 1. For those who don't relish flow diagrams, let it suffice to say that on the basis of a vast conglomerate of facts to do with the enemy, his own side, geography, whether eccentrically coupled with his own long-term store of past experience and specialist knowledge, the senior commander makes decisions that, ideally, a accord with the directives with which he has been programmed.

Ideally. But these ideals are hard to me. For this there are two main reasons. First, is a senior commanders often have to fill a number of incompatible roles. According to Maurice Janowitz these include "*heroic*" leader, military manager and technocrat. To these we would add politician, public relations man, father figure and psychotherapist. The second reason for breakdown is what communication engineers call "*noise-in-the-system*". "*Noise*" is what interferes with the smooth flow of information. Its destructive power hinges on the fact that senior commanders, like any other device for processing information are channels of limited capacity. If they want to deal with more information, they will take longer about it. If they don't take longer, they will make mistakes. Here we are using the term "*information*" in a special, and perhaps its most important, sense as "*that which reduces uncertainty*". Let us expand this a little. *

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* in this discussion the concepts of information theory are used descriptively and somewhat loosely 2

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


Figure 1. *Generalship as a communication channel of limited capacity*

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Acquiring knowledge involves the reduction of ignorance through the acquisition of facts; but ignorance is rarely absolute and its reduction rarely total. Hence, reducing ignorance can be regarded as reducing uncertainty about a given state of affairs. It follows, an unlikely unexpected fact contains more information (i.e., reduces more uncertainty) than one which is already expected. But an unexpected fact is less readily absorbed than one which was expected. If this is less than crystal clear, consider the following example, caste is a suitably military context. The message in this case consists of an intelligence report which states: "*enemy preparing for counterattack*". It goes on to detail strength, disposition, date and likely sector for attack.

Now this message, factually so simple, contains amounts of information which differ greatly from commander-to-commander. To General A, who anticipated such counterattack, it conveys very little; it merely confirms a hypothesis which he had or he held. In fact, since he had already made extensive preparation for a counter-attack the intelligence report when it came was largely redundant. In the case of General B., however, the same message was quite unexpected. So little had he anticipated any counterattack that the news was charged with information. It reduced a great deal of ignorance and uncertainty. It gave him plenty to occupy his mind--and much to do.

Finally, we have General C., for whom the message was so totally unexpected, that he chose to ignore it, with disastrous results. **It conflicted with his preconceptions. It clashed with his wishes**. It emanated, (so he thought) from an "*unreliable source*". Since his mind was closed to its reception, he **found** plenty of reasons for refusing to believe it. Like what British Generals did after the Battle of Cambrai, or American generals before the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes in 1944, he ignored it at his cost. Its information content was just too high for his channel of limited capacity.

One particularly hazardous aspect of the relationship between information and decision processes concerns the revising of decisions. It seems that having gradually (and perhaps painfully) accumulated information in support of the decision people become progressively more loath to accept contrary evidence. As Edwards and his colleagues have shown, the greater the impact of the new information the more strenuously will it be resisted. There are several reasons for this disastrous dangerous conservatism. "*New*" information has, by definition, **high**

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informational content, and therefore firstly, it will require greater processing capacity, secondly it threatens to return to an earlier state of knowing uncertainty, and thoroughly it confronts the decision maker with the nasty thought that he may have been wrong. No wonder he tends to turn a blind eye!

So much for a broad description of this most vital dimension of knowledge; it's prior improbability. Let us now return to the other side-of-the-coin, the problem over "*noise*." "*Noise*", as we saw, is the enemy of information. "*Noise*" takes up channel space and thereby disrupts the flow of information. The more limited the channel capacity, the greater the disrupting effects of "*noise*". The more "*noise*", the less information that can be handled. [Top bureaucrats like the U.S. Army's Chief of Staff are no doubt surrounded by a flood of BS "*noise*" coming from yes-man bureaucrats within trying to protect their crap]

A glance back at figure 1 suggested not only does a senior military commander receive more than his fair share of information, but the communication system of which he forms apart it peculiarly susceptible to noise. This may be external in origin, ranging from static on a radio link to the delusions of Chief of Staff. Or it may be internal, ranging from such peripheral sources as poor eyesight (a common feature of generals during the Crimean war) to such central and usually more disastrous causes is defective memory, brain disease, neurosis and alcoholism.

"*Noise*" from all these sources may act upon the flow of information through a general's head and eventuate in decisions of varying in gravity from the mildly inept to the utterly catastrophic. But decisions hinge upon more than normally available information. They also depend upon "*pay-offs*" -- the anticipated consequences of choosing one course-of-action (CoA) rather than another. Pay-offs may be positive (+) or negative (-); beneficial or costly. The are the criteria according to which decisions are made. Obviously, if a commander gets his criteria wrong--the possible loss of self-esteem or social approval, or fear of offending a superior authority, is given greater weighting than more rational considerations --the scene is set for calamity.

The possibility of this happening is increased by the fact that the "*fog of war*", unlike the uncertainties which attach to most civilian enterprises, extends not only to the input--but also to the pay-offs. Not only does the general have to make decisions on the basis of a great volume of dubious information and meet a program of perhaps questionable validity; he may also not know the costs and benefits of what he does propose. He's like a man who places a bet

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without knowing the odds or where the bookie might be found when once the race is over. [4]

As well as those problems which are inherent in any communication system, the human decision maker is the victim of another hazard -- namely that attention, perception, memory and thinking are all liable to distortion or bias by emotion and motivation. The potential for the state affairs depicted in figure 2 which shows the human operator represented by two inter-locking feedback loops. This outline represents individuals interaction with his environment -- perception leading to response. The broken line represents an internal, that between need satiation. The latter acts upon the former. As needs arise, whether they be so sure biological, neurotic or adaptive, so the act upon the way a man perceives external world, what attends to, the source of memories which he conjures up in the decisions which he makes.

He is like a computer which not only has to receive, store, process and deliver information but also has to postpone sleep, cope with hunger, resist fear, control anger, sublimate sex and keep-up-with-the-Joneses. When it is considered that the capacity for perception and response, for memory and thought, presumably evolved for the satisfaction of needs, it is a remarkable achievement at the best of times to keep these informational processes of mind free from bias by the needs which was they were originally designed to serve. In war, such an achievement borders on the miraculous and this for one very simple reason: the effects of needs upon cognition are *maximized* when the needs are very strong and external reality ambiguous or confused. It is under such conditions that need and emotion have the greatest freedom of maneuver, the greatest capacity for imposing themselves upon the uncertainties of thought. These are the conditions which obtain in war.

Contemplation of what is involved in generalship may well occasion surprise that incompetence is not absolutely inevitable, that anyone can do job at all. Particularly is this so when one considers that military decisions are often made under conditions of enormous stress, when actual noise, fatigue, lack of sleep, poor food and grinding responsibility add their quotas to the ever-present threat of total annihilation. Indeed, the foregoing analysis of generalship prompts the thought that it might be better to scrap generals and leave decision-making aspects of war to computers.

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


Figure 2: The Way in which individual perceives and acts towards his environment is partly determined by the quality and strength of his motives, needs, attitudes and emotions

a similar argument has been advanced in connection with medicine. Why leave diagnosis and therapeutic decisions to fallible human brains when a computer could make them with far less chance of air? The answer, he is of course -- and this no doubt contributes much to the relief of journals and doctors -- that computers make poor leaders and in-different father figures. They may be quick inefficient, un-pre-

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prejudiced, sober and alert; but with all remain cold fish. They do not inspire affection, with its consequent desire to please, nor do they exude a bedside manner. Paradoxically, they are also perhaps just *too* infallible. They are, moreover (as far as we know) devoid of feelings and, what is worse, quite indifferent to the outcome of their decisions. But while all this militates against computers as leaders-of-men, so-called leadership qualities in military commanders are just as dependent upon the various factors outlined in our flow chart as are any of the other responses which a general makes. Prejudice, ignorance, fear of failure, over-conformity, and sheer stupidity may disrupt leadership decisions as surely as they interfere with planning or technical decisions. All are products of the same brain.

One last point. A senior military able commander does not indeed cannot, act in lonely isolation but is fettered by the organization to which he belongs. He is like a computer or telephone exchange whose *modus operandi* is based on rules which may have little relevance to the task it is called upon to form. Imagine the telephone exchange that, for the honor of the post office, has to follow the rule that all telephonists should have red hair, 38-inch busts and heavily-lidden eyes, and one has some idea to restricting effects which an organization may have upon its own functioning.



The Stereotypical Secretary

In the chapters that follow we shall be examining some well-known cases of military incompetence, to discover it possible the precise reasons for, and common denominators of, these events. For the moment however, let us consider one brief and less well-known incident which illustrates how the smooth flow of information through the brains of senior commanders may be so distorted that their decisions prove catastrophic. The culprits, in this instance, are naval, not military, commanders.

The place is Samoa and the date 1889. [5] 7 warships -- 3 American, 3 German and one British -- are lying at anchor in the harbor of Apia. They are there as a naval and military presence to watch over the interests of the various governments in the political upheavals that are taking place ashore. Accordingly, the anchor in what has been described as one of the most dangerous anchorages in the world, for to call Apia a harbor at all is at best an unfortunate euphemism. Largely occupied by coral reefs, this saucer-shaped indentation lies wide open to the north, whence the great Pacific rollers come sweeping in. In fair weather, Apia provides an uneasy resting-place

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for no more than 4 medium-size ships. For 7 large ships and numerous smaller craft, under adverse conditions it is a death trap.

This was a situation which the 7 men of war witnessed the first bleak portents of an approaching typhoon. Even to landsman a rapidly darkening sky and falling glass, scully gusts of wind, and then a lull, would bode ill. For 7 naval captains the signs were unmistakable. They knew they were in a regional the world materially subject to typhoons, which, in a matter of minutes, could lash the sea into a furious hell of boiling water. They knew that such storms generate wins traveling at upwards 100 knots, gusts that could snap masts like carrots, reduce deck fittings to match wood and throw ships onto their beam ends. They knew that it was the worst month of the year and they also knew that only 3 years before every ship in Apia had been sunk by such a storm. In short, and in the terms of our flowchart, their stored information coupled with present import wanted to only one decision: to get up and get out. And, as if this was not enough, the urgency of weighing anchor and putting to sea was respectively suggested by subordinate officers.

But the captains of the ship were also naval officers and so they denied the undeniable and stayed where they were. Their behavior has been described as "*and error of judgment that will forever remain at paradox in human psychology*".

When the Guards and the infantry were brought cast revolution. Without sea cover, there was no hope of navigating under the shadow of the Russian sea, their hulls and rigging crushed by the fury of the wind. 3 of the wrecktips collided before being swept on to the jagged reefs of coral. Another sank in deep water. 2 more went aground up on the beach. Of all the ships in the fleet only some of which, 5 either broke apart or came to its present position, and it's eventually scuttled in the Crimean sea.

Why did senior naval commanders, versed in the ways of the sea and provided with ample warning, thus hazard their ships and the lives of their men? A superficial answer might be pride, or fear of appearing cowardly in fear of criticism from their superiors. These are matters to be pursued in later chapters. For the moment, but apparently incomplete behavior of these men illustrates how decision processes can be thrown into disarray by noise of internal origin and how, in this instance anyway, incompetence cannot be attributed to ignorance or ordinary stupidity.


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Chapter 3

The Crimean War

"As far as concerns a military art, the Crimean war is usually regarded as worthy of remembrance only as perhaps the most ill-managed campaign in English history"

-Encyclopedia Britannica, 1960 edition



The Crimean War, 1853-6

There must be few who would dispute the general tenor of the view quoted above. While Field Marshal Montgomery concedes that there may be runners up – "*One of the most ill-managed campaigns in all recorded history*" – *David Devine takes an even more extreme position "... The campaign plumly levels of incompetence and never before tempted.* One hesitates to challenge the Encyclopedia Britannica, but it is necessary to *question the word perhaps*". As in the precise "levels plumbed", the Crimean, representing an inclusive inquiry, is even more explicit. "The Crimean War touched the nadir of stupidity".[1]

Nadir or not, the Crimean War certainly marked an exceedingly low point in British military history. The poor quality of the officers most of whom had bought their commissions and for whom no standard of education was required, stood in marked contrast to the excellence of the men, describe a one observer as "*the finest Soldiers I ever saw in stature, physique in appearance*".[2]





Amongst the officers are seem to be an **inverse relationship between rank and efficiency**. The more senior they were, the less competent they appeared. At the apex of this pyramid of mediocrity stood (or rather sat, for he was always on his horse or in his quarters, and, being inordinately shy, rarely walked amongst his men) Lord Raglan. His qualifications for leading a British Expeditionary Force appeared to have been his age – 67, his lineage – he was the youngest of the Duke of Beaufort's 11 sons, and his experience – 25

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years as military secretary to the Duke of Wellington, and then Master General of the Ordnance. No one could accuse him of having a mind cluttered by any previous experience of command, for he had none – not even of a company. His appointment, however, was not wholly inappropriate, for him it was said: "*His chief merit was that despite his incurable habit throughout the campaign of referring to us as the 'French', he was extremely adapted to lessen the friction in coalition wars*".[3] For in fact, Raglan seemed to agree with most French proposals. It was characteristic of the inevitable to hated conflict.



At the next lower level were the members of Raglan's headquarters staff. Their role it was to edit and pass on such gems of military wisdom as might be uttered by their commander-in-chief. On paper "*rest of excellent*", as they were sometimes known, might have looked a well-knit, closely integrated group, especially since 5 of them were blood relations of their Chief. Unfortunately, this reaction was not based upon the possessing of any military expertise. Their contribution to the smooth running of the campaign seems to have been somewhat abysmal.

If Raglan and his staff can shudder[ed] the nerve-center of the Army in the Crimea, the armies comprised a field force of 5 infantry and 2 Cavalry divisions under commanders, who for the most part, did little to inspire confidence. Here too, the problem was partly one of age. Apart from the 30-year-old Duke of Cambridge, cousin to the Queen, all the senior commanders were between 60 and 70, with Sir John Burgoyne, Chief Engineer, topping the list at 70! Certainly it could be said of them is what they lacked in experience they made out for in years.

In the words of George Maude, a highly capable officer: "*There is an old commander-in-chief, an old engineer, old brigadiers — in fact everything old at the top. This makes everything sluggish*" In light of the events, this was something of an understatement.


At was an often been the case, the next lower level of command did contain some leaders of vigor with a talent for war. Such a one was Sir Colin Campbell. His command unfortunately was no larger than a brigade.

As usual in those days, the cream of the Army was the Cavalry, commanded in this instance by Lord Lucan, an impulsive man of moderate intellect and lacking in experience. Directly under Lucan, in

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and change of the Heavy and Light Brigades respectively, were James Scarlet and Lord Cardigan. The arrangement was not a happy one. To select Cardigan for position subservient to his brother-in-law Lucan was hardly less felicitous in them subcultivating a mongoose to a snake. In terms of the concepts introduced in the previous chapter, the mutual dislike which existed between these noble lords was such as to constitute severe "noise" in any system of communication which involved the part of them. It was in fact, a major factor in that breakdown of communications which resulted in what some would regard as a the single biggest blunder in military British military history – The Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava.

Documentary



The shortcomings of those administered the Crimean campaign were not long in making themselves felt. The first into trouble came with their arrival on Russian soil.



Even the gross incompetence of those responsible for the transportation and disembarkation of troops for the Dardanelles expedition in 1915, or 40 years later, those who cannot out comparable arrangements during the Suez Crisis (on both occasions most unseemly reported stories have been thoughtfully packed at the bottom of the hold) were be nothing beside that shown by the Crimean embarkage. It was hardly comparable to the British force who landed many years later upon a foreign shore more more inadequately equipped for invasion.[4] The men were put ashore with no more than each could carry. They spent the first night without tents or blankets, soaked to the skin by the incessant rain, their soldiers artillery whipped by an icy wind.

The March South (Note: the Campaign Began at the Landings at Arma at the top--but not shown)



Such conditions compared unfavorably with those enjoyed by their allies, the French and the Turks, who had excellent tents, medical supplies[5] and transport. Considering Britain's infinitely superior maritime resources, some the entire part of which would have sufficed to carry what was needed, the contrast is as remarkable as it was inexcusable.

For those who wish to occupate the military command it might be thought these deficiencies could be laid at the door of a tight-fisted Treasury. But as one writer has put it:

In the ultimate resort a commander-in-chief had in his power

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[5] One British army surgeon, with the backing of his commander, did in fact submit a report on the lack of medical supplies for a hospital that was full of cholera and diarrhea. His complaint, however, was judged to be "*frivolous*" by General Army, the new Quartermaster General.

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to **force the government's hands by threat of resignation**. No such threat came from Lord Raglan. On the other hand, it may be the that such manners were to deliberately concealed from him in pursuance of the policy adopted by staff and cynically explained to Captain Adye on taking up his appointment: "*Never trouble Lord Raglan more than is absolutely necessary with details, learn carefully to his remarks, try to anticipate his wishes–and of all these make up as few possible difficulties.*"[6]


This advice from a member of his staff reflects what was perhaps the prime characteristic of Lord Raglan, is almost compulsive non-participation. Aristocratic, courteous and aloof, he seemed to display many of the characteristics of the extreme introvert. He disdainful was it have any direct contact with his fellow men, that he could hardly bear to issue an order, and when he did so it was couched in such a way as to insure a vast gulf between the wishes and comprehension of those for whom it was intended. Combined with his never failing courtesy, this idiosyncrasy often rendered his role upon the battlefield rather less effective than that of the regimental mascot.

The Battle of Arma (Note: Maps are Upside-Down; Troops Actually Moved South with Water to the West)



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Thus, in the first battle the campaign, that of Arma, he issued only one order–to advance until the Arma was crossed.



The lack of further guidance might not have mattered had the generals under his command shown some spark of military ability. Unfortunately some did not, as the following excerpt from an account of the battle illustrates



Buller – "*Gentlemen George*" – was not a general of distinction. The weight of the responsibilities for the left flank of the Army seems to have numbed his faculties. Having led his brigade across the Alma with less difficult than Codrington because in his path there were fewer obstacles, he seems to have been content to become comprised with the command not to stop 'til across the river. About his next step, he was so much in the dark that he actually turned for enlightenment to his juvenile A.D.C. (Aide-de-Camp), Henry Clifford, who advised an advance similar to Codrington's on the right.

Another passage from the same description of the battle exemplifies only too well, the sort of effects that might be expected when the commander-in-chief refuses to take part. This time it is a problem of consolidating and exploiting a position gained.

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exhaustingly and perilous attack, it was inevitable that tension must relax... The moment that his victorious troops were in the Great Redoubt, the controlling and directing hand of the great commander-in-chief should have been evidence. Now should supports be arriving to reinforce the victors and to fortify and inspire them against counter-measures. But as the wearied Light Divisions looked back they saw nothing on the long slow slope leading up from the Alma, but the dead and wounded. Only the glint on the glacis? As they pushed the Great Redoubt, the enclosed was seen more discouragingly. To the right and left were make columns of Russian soldiers both whose threats center in hung-stretched waiting arrival? the ominous precursor to some desperate venture. It was the moment when nerves are easily lost, and perception is blunted and crisically ranges unprimitized. A frantic figure of a staff officer on horseback, perhaps misled – that at least is the most charitable explanation – by the Russian failure to fire, came galloping online the rank shouting. "*Don't fire! Don't fire – the columns Friends!*"

Few stopped to see themselves how the French could have moved to the British front from having been not half an hour earlier on their right flank, nor how they came to be dressed in long grey overcoats reaching to their ankles. Obediently one bugler after another from left-to-right sounded the "Cease-Fire" followed by "Retreat". To Colonel Chester of the Fusiliers, the bugle calls, "*rang out clear, but to my ear, with a discordant harsh note*." They were his last words and they were unheeded.[7]

Despite the fact that Raglan, "*had no idea*," as he put it in his own words, himself, was a victory for the Allies, thanks to the courage and superb fighting qualities of Soldiers and their junior officers. "*Through one observer described as a "the great want of generalship", the victory was achieved with much unnecessary loss of life and, even worse, because of the total failure to follow it up*, denied few if any dividends for the campaign as a whole.

There is one final point of some relevance to the theme of this book. It concerns the matter of intelligence. Lack of direction from those at the apex of hierarchy and confusion and ignorance prevails a natural dilemma for those at lower levels in the chain of command. Confronted with an absence of clear cut orders, what are they to do? If they take

the law into their own hands they run the risk of being accused of subordination, particularly if they are plans happen to miscarry, but if they do not show initiative, then they are equally liable to suffer for not having done so. At Alma, the field officers, for want of higher direction, used their own initiative with considerable success. In so doing, they saved the day, if not the campaign. Curiously, not one was mentioned in Raglan's dispatches. It is one thing to let your juniors do the thinking and take the risks–but quite another to admit the fact.

Like a cutderless ship, that bumps and grates from one reef to the next, the Army lurched from the hazards of Arma to the more disastrous ones of Balaclava. As touched on earlier, trouble started in dividing command between the two generals, Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan. Individually neither was fitted to his post, together they were a disaster. As one of their fellow officers wrote in his diary: "*The rank I see of Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan in the incapacity I despise them. Both class ignorance and such overbearing temper*."[8]


Of the two, Lucan was the more competent, but he was also the more unpopular. Cardigan, on the other hand, was popular with his men. Not only did he allow Cardigan to bring his private yacht into Balaclava, where he weeks it took off valuable space in the congested harbor, but he also permitted him to live on board even while his brigade and division commander were roughing it ashore, on shore, under canvas. By forfeiting the position of authority and exacerbating the already bitter enmity between his subordinates, Raglan's laissez-faire leading of these relatively minor matters sowed the seeds of the ultimate disaster, the destruction of the Light Brigade.

As said later, so much as been written about their ill-fated charged that it would be superfluous to recount the details here. There are however, several points exactly appraise to the subject matter of this book. Firstly, the way it was treated in subsequent accounts did much to strengthen those very forms of blind obedience] tradition which pulls such an incapacitating stranglehold on military endeavor for the next 80 or so years. By the same token, this understandable consolation for those who lost so much did, by laying undue emphasis on the magnificence of the charge, tend to obscure some crucial issues. For behind color and the glory, behind the valor and the death, the charge

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of the Light Brigade was a **blunder** of monumental portions and an object lesson in what can happen when the promotional machinery of military organization is such as to put the troops at the mercy of men like Raglan, Lucan and Cardigan.

Their ineptitude was manifested in 2 successive stages of the battle. The first started immediately after the successful charge of the Heavy Brigade under the Honorable James Scarlet. Again, it was a matter of failing to exploit a position gained.



To grasp how incomplete was Scarlet's triumph it is only necessary to ask one question: what was the Light Brigade doing when the Russian Cavalry wheeled out of the North Valley and passing right across its field, went down to engage the heavens? Not 500 yards separated Cardigan's men from Ratcliff's. Every moment the "parley" expected this incomparable chance of a flank attack to be seized. To the dullest the brains there seemed no other possible course for this brilliant, dashing– and eager brigade to take. But to the amazement of the spectators and the fury of the Brigade nothing of the kind was attempted.[9]

The explanation of this curious lacks hinges upon the fact Lucan Lucan had impressed upon Cardigan that his job was to stay put and defend the position, attacking only such enemy forces as came within reach. Under the circumstances, Cardigan determined that he could not give his brother-in-law the slightest ground for making a complaint should the attack fail. If it did, then Lucan should take the blame. Lucan had ordered him to defend the position and defend it he would, even if it cost him his life.

However, this missed opportunity, which might have sealed the Russian's fate, receives into unimportance when compared with what happened next.

It seems that the charge of the Light Brigade, in which only 10% of the original force of 673 rode back, was the end result of faulty communication between 5 men: Raglan, his Quarter-Master-General Airey, Lords Lucan and Cardigan, and the impetuous Captain Nolan. "[10] Raglan's contribution was that he issued orders the precise meaning of which was has remained a matter for debate". The fourth and more disastrous of these orders Airey wrote out a Airey

* The third order a copy of which was retained by Raglan, read:

"*Cavalry to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights. They will be supported by the infantry which have been ordered to advance on 2 fronts.*" But by the time it reached Lucan, the final words had been changed to "*They will be supported by the infantry which have been ordered to advance on 2 fronts.*"

The fourth order read:

"Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front – the enemy and try to prevent the enemy carrying way the guns. Troop horse artillery may accompany French Cavalry in on your left, immediate.

[Signed] Airey."

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piece of paper. In so doing, he made not attempt to unravel the enigma posed by the words of his master. Which front? What guns? In its new written form, the order was then passed to the unbalanced Captain Nolan, who loathed both Lucan and Cardigan. This glittering young officer of the 15th Hussars, who made up in arrogance what he lacked in perspicacity, delivered the order to Lord Lucan. Lucan, whose comprehension of Raglan's wishes seems to have been minimal but who was not going to demean himself by bandying words with Nolan, conveyed *his* interpretation of the order to Cardigan. Cardigan, to give him his due, realizing that he was being asked to charge the Russian guns down a valley flanked by enemy artillery, expressed considerable astonishment at what would so evidently be the *coup de grace* for his brigade. But once again, communication foundered on the rocks of mutual dislike, pride and jealousy.

Joined, and then overtaken, by the irrepressible Nolan, Cardigan lead his brigade into the "*Jaws of Death*".



As is usually the case after national disaster of such proportions, the final stage in this sorry tale concerns the apportioning of blame -- the means by which society obtains a modicum of revenge for the wrong is suffered, expiates its own guilt for such responsibility as it may have had for the event in question, and finally seeks to prevent repetition of the disaster. Of these only the last is in anyway ennobling; for it is only thus that the disaster can be turned to good account.

It is a sad feature of authoritarian organizations that their nature inevitably militates against the possibility of learning from experience through the apportioning of blame. The reason is not hard to find. Since authoritarianism itself is the product of psychological defenses, authoritarian organizations are past masters at deflecting blame. They do so by denial, by rationalization, by making scapegoats, or by some mixture of the three. However it is achieved, the net result is that

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no real admission of failure or incompetence is ever made by those who were really responsible; hence nothing can be done about preventing a recurrence. In this instance, as in many others to be considered presently, scapegoat were found. One of these was Captain Nolan, an easy choice since he had, very considerately, allowed himself to be killed.

If Alma was remarkable for a paucity of orders, and Balaclava for their confused nature, then Inkerman, the next battle in the campaign, has the distinction of being fought in a fog without any direction at all. One diarist, an officer, wrote: "*No orders were given from first-to-last, but to advance. No attempts to reform shattered battalions, no plan of operations*". The same writer, a certain Major Patullo said: "*I feel gratitude to the courageous British Soldier who fought all day, replenishing his ammunition from his wounded comrade's pouch without direction or hint from superior authority, only the example of his officer who was left equally without guidance, not to the generals who in my opinion have not distinguished themselves.*" [12]

Clearly such opinions make a mockery of the dispatches and later the honors which succeeded the battles. To Raglan came the baton of a Field Marshal, and to staff, whether or not they had been within range of Russian guns, a step in brevet rank.

However, the Crimean mismanagement reached its apogee, not in the battles so far considered, but in the winter which followed them. **Despite the fact that between October 1854 in April 1855 there was no fighting whatsoever, Raglan's Army suffered a 35% decline is active strength**. This loss was due to total disregard for the Army's physical welfare, in refusal to ameliorate the cold and wet of the Russian winner. Men died of cholera of exposure, of malnutrition. They died of untreated wounds, of scurvy, gangrene and dysentery. As one surgeon observed of earlier losses at Balaclava:

"*We [now] bury 3 times the number of men every week and think nothing of it!*"

They died because there was no issue of fuel and stores.

Now, on logical--if not humanitarian grounds, it would seem an inescapable fact that a general's prime responsibility is the welfare of his men. [NOTE: this means NOT the welfare of the bureaucracy!] All his skills as leader and military planner will avail him nothing if, for one reason or another, there is no one left to do the fighting (!). Assuming, then, that the physical and mental welfare troops is the

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sine qua non of successful military endeavor, how did it happen that the British Army in the Crimean campaign was **virtually destroyed by something other than the enemy**?

Several reasons may be given. Firstly, there was that unrealistic overconfidence in rapid victory which characterized so many military adventures. As we shall see, it was a notable feature of the Boer War, of the First World War, of the Second World War and even, through what was by now a quite extraordinary incapacity to profit from experience, of the Suez Crisis and Bay of Pigs fiasco. In the present context, Lord Raglan was so confident that Sebastopol would fall before the winter of 1854, no plans had been made to house and maintain his Army on the high ground above the town. How anyone as ungifted in the waging of the three preceding battles could have clung with such childlike innocence to the myth of speedy success against the "*inferior*" Russians is remarkable, to say the least.

Secondly, after he the wrong, Brandon and his staff, unlike the French, who managed to improvise tolerable conditions, seems incapable of adapting to the circumstances thrust upon them. This inertia and inflexibility were routed partly in ignorance (thus, no one seems to have had the remotest idea cold it could get during a Crimean winter), partly in red tape, and partly in **refusal to admit that things were not as they should be**.

The shortcomings of the high command are particularly well illustrated in connection with the fuel crisis. According to one writer: "*What killed more men than Russian bullets, what made life miserable, what sent men in the hundreds to hospital tent or the grave -- they were frequently synonymous -- was the want of firewood. Without it, not only were men never warm, not only could they never cook their ration of 'cold grunter' that they were never dry.*" One of Raglan's Colonels wrote: "*They go down to the trenches, wet, come back wet, go into the hospital wet, die the same night and are buried in their wet blankets the next morning.*" And an Army surgeon wrote: "*I never thought this human subject would endure so much privation and suffering*". Even at this remove these accounts are deeply moving in the scenes they conjure up too painful to contemplate. But, condemnatory though they are, these tragic statements reject the real enormity, namely that the shortage of firewood could have been easily rectified.

Just across the Black Sea lay the forests of Anatolia. A little foresight, a breadth of leadership, an iota of compassion, and two or three ships

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could have brought back in a firewood to last everyone the winter through. But there was none, and they did not. Instead, men soaked to the skin, and dropping with fatigue from long hours in the trenches, had to forage far and wide for meager sticks of brushwood and, when this failed, grub up their sodden roots.

This disinclination to take even the simplest steps to mitigate the hardships of the troops or to seek on their behalf any assistance from elsewhere was no less apparent when it came to the matter of sleeping accommodation. The the most part this consisted of wet blankets and mud. By January 1855, even the blankets and acquired such survival value they could no longer be spared for shrouds. A corporal wrote: "*They bury our men quite naked and throw him [sic] into the grave like a dog. I wonder what the people in England would think if they were to see it.*"

The chief engineer, Sir John Burgoyne, suggested that the Turks, that "*nation of carpenters*", should be asked to make floorboards for the tents. Any difficulty Raglan might have met with in arranging this would have been speedily resolved by our ambassador in Constantinople. But suggestion, which might have saved thousands of lives was ignored. Even in the so-called hospital tents "*men lay on the bare grass and died*".

There were other areas of appalling neglect. On food and clothes Laffin has this to say:

> In the Crimea, as elsewhere before and after, the Soldiers suffered from poor food and poor clothing. The clothing was good enough for parades in Britain, lamentable for field service. Some units did not even possess greatcoats and suffered terribly from the intense cold. Most uniforems were in rags and tatters within a few months.
>
> Often the food was literally rotten and some in other ways not fit to be eaten. The whole catering system was inept and inadequate and was even worse in the hospitals than in the camps. [13]



Far from agitating for reform in attempting to ameliorate the effects of these deficiencies, the military high command did their best to preserve the *status quo*. In their treatment of Florence Nightingale and her zealous helper, the London chef Alexis Soyer, the relatively well-fed generals betrayed a lack of compassion that was scarcely credible. With his army dying of malnutrition, General

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Eyre said of Soyer and his new cooking stove: "*Soldiers don't require such good messes as these while campaigning. You will improve the cook but spoil the Soldier.*" [14]

That men who had survived Alma and Inkerman, and even the charged at Balaclava, were now dying in their thousands through the gross incompetence of their own headquarters staff created something of a vicious circle, for which every death there were fewer left to construct and man the trenches. But there were other vicious circles. While Raglan and his staff enjoyed the comfort of warm beds and well-cooked food, their rapidly reducing labor force not only had to work for longer hours but even suffered more serious malnutrition than hitherto. This was because the combination of fatigue, damp and cold caused their gums to become so inflamed that they could not eat their standby, the biscuit. As a result, for lack of nourishment, they became even less capable or resisting the cold. By the end of January the British Army could muster only 11,000 men, it's sick and wounded totaling **23,000**.

Eventually, after winter of terrible privation, Raglan's army came to the last battles of the war-- those of the Redan. They involved the storming and capture of a fortress on the outskirts of Sebastopol.



It seems that little had been learned. Again, there was gross underestimation of the enemy's ability. Indeed, the forthcoming engagement was regarded with such equanimity that it attracted a large assembly of sightseers. While the band of the Rifle Brigade played light music, an audience of officers wives, "*traveling gentlemen*", and even a number of serving Soldiers, took up a position on the surrounding hills.

Raglan, with his mind closed to all that had gone on before and an enduring overconfidence in his army, chose only 400 of his 25,000 men for the first stage of the battle: the occupation of some quarries, from which the assault on the Redan would be mounted. This proud economy in manpower was his mistate. They occupied the quarries but at considerable and unnecessary cost -- more than half the attacking force, including a large number of junior officers. In fact, the whole affair nearly ended in disaster. Staff work at been poor, with orders confused and often contradictory. Raglan's staff had miscalculated the strength needed to occupy the quarries and to repel counter-attacks. Reserves had been inadequate, and unavailable when most needed. Little thought had been given to selecting the

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troops to be used. The proportion of veterans was low. Many of the officers, although unquestionably brave, were young and inexperienced.

But it was with the second stage in the battle, the main assault, that things went really wrong. Again, Raglan and other high-ranking officers under-estimated the enemy's strength and overestimated the effects of the artillery bombardment meant with which had proceeded the attack -- nor did he appreciate that between the bombardment of the Russian fort and the dawn attack, forced upon him by the French commander, the enemy would be well able to repair their defenses and resist their guns.

In theory, the attack was to consist of 3-pronged charge, with Soldiers on the left, right in center of the British front converging on the enemy position. In theory, this sudden synchronized assault from 3 sides would sweep away all opposition. In theory, the Russian artillery would have been obliterated by the preceding bombardment. And, in theory, the British ladder parties would have no difficulty in porting their 18-foot-long loads across the 450 yards of rising ground to the walls of Redan. In practice, things went rather differently. For a start, the general in charge of one of the 3 assault parties mistook the starting signal and dispatched his men half an hour too early. Even without this mistake, any possibility of a concerted simultaneous assault was ruled out because no one had arranged any means whereby the attackers could rise from their trenches in unison. There was nothing for them to stand on. At the best they came out in ones and twos. Under the circumstances it was hardly surprising that the great volume of fire from the "*obliterated Russian guns*" brought the British attack to very bloody halt. It was at this moment, just when it was most needed, that Raglan's artillery received an order to cease firing. It was this last blunder which transformed an aborted attack into a massacre. No longer intimidated, enemy muskets poured a hail of lead into Raglan's stricken Army. The ladder parties moving like snails beneath their loads were mowed down as they struggled up the slope.

Thus ended the first battle for the Redan -- until then the most disastrous of the war. Raglan's army have no illusions as to the incompetence of their general and his staff. A staff officer wrote: "*We had been told from Headquarters other high authority that success was certain; that the arrangements for the plan of attack were so perfect that they must succeed; when put to the test it turned out to be so*

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execrably bad that failure was inevitable." Others describe the battle as "*mismanaged*", "*botched*", "*bungled*", "*feeble and ill-conducted*", "*bad business*," "*a bungling, disgracefully childish failure*".

Later Lord Wolseley wrote: "*Upon this occasion what we asked from them was beyond the power of men to give. Our plan to for the attack was simply idiotic and was bound to fail.*" Another writer has this to say "*Not only was it a question of defective tactics. At headquarters there was not merely ignorance but an entire lack of perspicacity. How is it possible that Raglan and those about him, knowing as they ought by this time the remarkable Russian ability to repair damage overnight, could believe that 2,000 Soldiers would be able to advance over a shell-swept glacis 250 yards in length, thread their way through an undestroyed abattis, cross a ditch 20 foot wide and then assail an escarpment all without preliminary bombardment?* [15] How indeed!

For the student of psychosomatic disease the aftermath of the battle is not without significance. Immediately following the defeat, Raglan was seen "*to age visibly*". Within a few days he'd contracted cholera and before 10 days had passed he was dead. Two of his generals were similarly stricken. Raglan's demise added little to the depression of the Army. Had they known that his replacement would be 63-year-old General Simpson, their grief might have been rather more acute.

It was not that Simpson was a harsh taskmaster. On the contrary, he was a gentle man but a very mediocre ability. He was as devoid of usable experience as had been his predecessors. His methods were rather simple than those of Raglan's. Presumably to avoid giving a wrong order he gave *no* orders at all and he devised *no* plan. In the words of one observer: "*He did not command the Army.*" On the day of his promotion, he is credited with saying: "*They must be indeed hard up when they appointed an old man like me*" [16]

In fact, the Government was not so hard up that they had no action to entrust the Army to the gout-stricken old general. A far better choice would have been the energetic and outspoken Sir Colin Campbell, a man of considerable ability and wide experience. But Campbell was a maverick and as such unpopular with the military establishment. He also came from a relatively humble background.*

Under Simpson's wavering and ineffectual hand the second battle

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* it was another two years before Campbell became Commander-in-Chief in Bengal, during the Indian Mutiny.

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for the Redan, the last battle the war, proved even more disastrous than the first. Once again a massive compartment was followed by a frontal assault across a heavily defended triangle of ground flanked by Russian guns. But this time the troops were younger and greener, and despite all their training on the parade grounds of Aldershot less inclined to valar than discretion. Having sustained 2,447 casualties in 2 hours of fighting, they turned tail and fled, thus adding humiliation to defeat. But the fault lay with their commander, whose planning, in the words of Lord Wolseley, was "*as faulty in every detail as it was puerile in conception*".

As an example protracted military incompetence at high levels of command, the Crimean War is not, unfortunately, unique. It was, however, the prototype for subsequent ineptitude. Though small in number in comparison with those of later wars, the 18,000 who died owed their untimely demise to an admixture of poor planning, unclear orders, lack of intelligence (in both senses of the word) and fatal acquiescence to social pressures on the part of their commander. They died because they were mismanagement by men whose positions in the military hierarchy owed less to their ability than to their wealth, their place in society, or their reputation for "*fitting in*". They died because Soldiers were too readily regarded as expendable objects.

The Crimean War was fought at a time of the greatest prosperity this country had ever known, when British efficiency, inventiveness and sheer entrepreneurial vigor new no pounds. Why then was it fought so badly?...so badly that the casual observer might have been forgiven for thinking that, at some level, we do not really want to win? Of course there are some obvious and immediate reasons. Governmental stinginess clearly paid a part, as did the deliberate policy of trusting military matters to an aristocratic, rich, but essentially amateur, elite: this on the grounds that such a class have neither the motivation, nor indeed the skill, to turn upon the State.

But this is only to touch the surface of the problem. Such reasons do not explain the passivity and non-participation, the monumental errors of judgment, the ludicrous appointments, the paralytic inability to improvise or innovate. The do not explain the staggering and ultimately self-destroying wastage of manpower, which seemed to have its origin in a curiously detached attitude towards human suffering.

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Finally, they no not explain the even greater depth of incompetence shown on this occasion by the enemy, of whom it has been said: "*The Russians, with more men in the field and immense potential reserves, were even bigger muddlers than their invaders, and seemed to move in vague dream of battle.*" [17]

And what of the man who led the Crimean Army --the aloof yet courteous Raglan? Christopher Hibbert, was written the most sympathetic of biographies in defense of Raglan, makes 3 points which as we shall see have considerable significance for the theory advanced later in this book. Firstly, Raglan had "*emotional antipathy*" towards the use of spies. Secondly, he nursed an intense dislike of the press and shunned publicity. Thirdly, he lacked enthusiasm for intellectual pursuits.

> He cared little to the changing world outside it [the Army]. Science and mechanics, which were already beginning to change the whole life of Europe, meant nothing to him. Nor did painting, nor music; nor did books. In fact, in the great mass of his personal correspondence only once does he mention having read one. It was The Count on Monte Cristo. "*So far as I have got in it,*" he confessed, "*I find it is tiresome--very poisonous*" [18]

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Chapter 4


The Boer War

"it was seen some the second failure of a military machine"

--David Devine, The Blunted Sword





The most extraordinary thing about the events of the Boer War was that they could have occurred not only after those of the Crimean War, but also after those of the first Boer War of 1880-1881.

In terms of psychological jargon the Boer War showed very little evidence of positive transfer (positive transfer being nearly what happens when something learned in one situation is utilized successfully in some subsequent, similar situation) and this was odd because there were many striking similarities between it and the Crimean War. Among most actions of the Victorian army, both were against white races. Both were waged far from home, in what were, to say the least, trying climates -- too cold in one sense, too hot in the other. There were, however, two great differences, and it was these which were largely responsible for depths of military incompetence on the British side that stretch credulity to the breaking point.

The first difference was one of the available technology. Thanks to Maxim's invention of an efficient machine gun in the 1880s and Armstrong's production of breech-loading rifled field guns, Soldiers at the time in the Boer War could (in theory anyway) kill each other in larger numbers with greater accuracy and over much longer distances than ever before. The transition from the old smooth-bore "*Brown Besses*" (later replaced by Minie' rifles) of the Crimean War to the high-powered, rapid-firing rifles, using smokeless powder, that were available by 1890 constituted what is probably the single greatest advance in firepower since the invention of gunpowder.

youtube.com/playlist?list=PLE00EB446B4064A8F



The second difference was in the nature of the adversary. While the

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Russians at Sebastapol had been resolute and courageous fighters, they, like the British troops, or regimented in disciplined to act in unison without opportunity for thought or personal initiative. The Boers, however, were a very different proposition -- in their motivation, style of fighting and expertise. As one observer remarked, the Boer Army consisted of "*35,000 generals*", each combatant his own master defending his homeland. They were also good marksmen, agile horsemen, and determined members of a flexible, knowledgeable guerrilla force.

These two differences between the wars would not have mattered had those who ran the British Army managed to keep up with the times in their thinking, and shaken off habits acquired over the preceding 500 years. This they seemed unable to do. For a start, officers were still too busy being gentleman, in or out of gorgeous uniforms, that they had little time for their men and a total absence of concern for the latter's welfare. Even as late as 1902, according to Sir Evelyn Wood, commanding officers in Southern Command did not even though the whereabouts of the Soldiers latrines, much less their condition. It was this attitude of mind, in conjunction with climatic conditions, that accounted for the fact that out of 22,000 British dead, 16,000 died of **disease**.

Progress in adopting new military techniques was also conspicuous by its absence. Right up to the outbreak of war, training maneuvers were characterized by disregard for new weapons. "*The accent was on solid line formations, mechanical precision, rigid dependence on order, firing strictly in volleys at a word-of-command.*" [1]

The position as regards artillery was little better. According to one writer: "*the artillery doctrine of the time was older than the guns, older almost than the Crimea. The artillery galloped smartly into action, unlimbered into the open (for it had no notion of indirect fire) and opened fire over primitive sights with no vestige of a gunshield to protect its crews.*" [2]

Considering its inadequate handling of the Crimean war, **one might have expected that the high command would try to rehabilitate itself with a vigorous training program during the ensuing years of peace**. Evidently, it did not. According to Krueger: "*Only two months a year were spent training. The rest a man was parading.*" [3]

As for new in mentions, the war office was sporting rather than pragmatic. Machine-guns like the Maxim, which in its modified

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form became the Vickers of the First World War, were written off as suitable only for the destruction of savages and hardly suitable for use against white men.

It was in decisions of this sort that the generals showed a curious illogicality. On the one hand, the color of the Boer Soldiers elevated them from the level of savages, thereby saving their white skins from exposure to machine-guns, but on the other they were regarded, in terms of their believed military expertise, as no better than savages. Of all the factors which contributed to the succession of disasters which mark the war this underestimation of the enemy was perhaps most important. Largely because they eschewed any form of sartorial elegance and preferred the wearing of civilian attire, dark cloaks and floppy hats to the sorts of uniforms affected by the British, the Boers were dubbed a rabble of illiterate peasants and their army utterly ludicrous. In reality, as events would prove, it was the British--not the Boers who despite their smart appearance showed up in a far from satisfactory light.

The Soldiers themselves were not to blame; they were victims of the system. As Pemberton points out: "*So far as British politicians were concerned, in might also be said the greater the inefficiency of the Army (except on military parades and on military tournaments) the greater there contentment.*" [4] According to the same writer: "*Ours was an army of amateurs; for officers a congenial club.*" Any sign of keenness or desire for self-improvement in military matters was frowned on as not "*good form*". Those who signified a wish to attend a staff college were likely to be told: "*Isn't the Regiment good enough?*" Polo and the highly symbolic sport of pig-sticking were the applauded occupations and any sort of the book-work quite beyond the pale.

So absorbed were the generals by the [false] equation which they made between military appearance and fighting efficiency that their contempt for the Boers was matched only by the neglect of most ordinary training exercises for their own men. As Lord Roberts was to remark: the men were not trained to use their eyes or estimate distance; in his opinion far too much attention was given to order & regularity and far too little to developing individuality. One further and related factor which plagued British military thinking then, as at other times, was the tendancy to equate war with sport. The notion that certain acts were "*not cricket*" was carried to such absurd lengths that the

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
trooper was given no training in the "*cowardly*" art of building defensive positions or head cover.



Actual dug-in position used during the Boer War to protect against the increasingly more lethal fires encountered

To this mixture potentially disastrous attitudes was added one other -- a self-righteous indignation towards the other side. This came to the fore when it was discovered that the British methods of running the war fell short of those practiced by the Boers. As Lord Kitchener said: "*The Boers are not like the Sudanese who stood up to a fair fight. They are always running away on their little ponies... there are a good many foreigners among the Boers but they are easily shot as they do not slink about like the Boer themselves.*" "*A fair fight*" was evidently one in which primitive tribesmen of (from a poor country) by standing their ground obligingly presented an easy target for the Soldiers of what was then the richest nation on earth. By the same token, disengagement in an action against superior numbers, in order to fight again another day, was deemed "*cowardly* and a "*poor show*".

This then was the background of attitudes and expertise which the British Army brought to the Boer War. Any residual doubts about its unfittedness for the expedition tend to dissipate when one considers the behavior of the generals put in charge.



Buller

The leading character was the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Redvers Buller. According to a contemporary description there could be no finer choice for our South African adventure: "*There is no stronger commander in the British Army than this remote, almost grimly resolute, completely independent, utterly fearless, steadfast and vigorous man. Big bone, square jaw, strong-minded, strong-headed... Smartness... sagacity...administrative capacity...He was born to be a Soldier of the very best English-type, needless-to-say, the best type of all.*" [5]

Unfortunately, this assessment was at variance with the facts in all but two particulars. Firstly, he was indeed big. Secondly, though sadly lacking in moral courage, he was undoubtedly brave when it came to physical danger. In this respect, as in many others, he was not unlike Raglan of the Crimean War, and indeed some other commanders of subsequent years.

Of Sir "*Reverse*" Buller, as he came to be known by his troops, Rayne Kruger writes: "*At the risk of marring [the] contemporary description...it should be mentioned that his big bones were particularly well-covered, especially in the region of the stomach, and*

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this square jaw was not especially apparent above the double chin. He had entered the Army with no disadvantage, his mother being a Howard and niece of the Duke of Norfolk, and he was very wealthy, which was fortunate in view of his preference for a diet of ample good and champagne." [6]

Krueger attest to his bravery. "*His record was something to conjure with. Since the age of 21 he had fought in five campaigns, including the Zululand wars when he was the dashing leader of the regular calvary. A winner of the Victoria Cross, he had such a reputation in the many people thought he and not Wolseley should have been head of the British Army.*" [7]

Never has a nation been more wrong-headed in its selection of a general. Never has a general been more disastrous in the execution of his duties. Like Ragland, Buller had no experience commanding a large body men. For the previous decade he had held a number of different posts in the War Office. According to contemporary accounts he was berift of creative imagination and totally lacking in discrimination. He was also without the gift of intuition which impels a good general to choose the right Course of Action (CoA).

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http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/perspicacity

per·spi·cac·i·ty

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http://dictionary.reference.com/help/luna/IPA_pron_key.html

Show Spelled[pur-spi-kas-i-tee]

http://dictionary.reference.com/help/luna/Spell_pron_key.html

Show IPA noun

1. keenness of mental perception and understanding; discernment; penetration.
2. Archaic . keen vision.

His first step toward disaster was to shelve the official British strategy. This was to capture Bloemfonteine and then Pretoria, thus knocking out those centers of the Boer movement, the Orange Free State in Natal. Instead, distracted by the siege of Ladysmith and Kimberly, he split his army into 3 unequal parts, for the simultaneous relief of these beleaguered towns and the capture of Stormberg Junction. While his motives for this move are not entirely clear, it was certainly consistent with 3 characteristics of the man. Firstly, he was a kind and gentle creature, and therefore undone only distressed at what he imagined was going on behind the sieges. Secondly, he lacked confidence, particularly for the role of active Supreme Commander. As remarked to Lord Landsdowne: "*I have always considered that I was better as second in a complex military affair than as an officer in chief command... I had never been in a position where the whole load of responsibility fell on me*". Lastly, he lacked singleness of mind. Contrary to popular belief at the time, which was based on 2 grossly misleading clues --his appearance and his bravery--he was in fact the antithesis of the son of Mars: irresolute, indecisive and without faith in his own plans.

As a consequence of the traits, Buller lost no time in trying to rid

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himself of any direct responsibility for the conduct of the war, by handing over the reins to subordinate commanders to needy no further directed. This abdication, as opposed a delegation, might have passed unnoticed at the subordinate spending a great ability. Unfortunately they were not. As a consequence, within five days three battles have been lost.

Since the principal reasons for this "impossible state of affairs -- or in a large army of professional Soldiers to be defeated three times in quick succession by handful of " on tutored presence -- they are on the central theme of this book, we must outline the nature of these engagements. However, to appreciate the factors which led to these of these we should first consider an account which immediately preceded them. This was about eligible as subordinate, General Matheson, with 8000 man was very nearly defeated by 3000 ports.

Methodist objective was to monitor river, a natural defense line for the boards. Accordingly, without any reconnaissance he ordered his troops to make a frontal attack. Since he could not see the enemy he wrongly assume that no enemy was there. Led by their officers to men advanced across the flat and open bill pours a river. All went well until they were written and easy range the boards, it concealed themselves, with what was subsequently described as being dished cunning, below the deep banks of the river.

Those in the things Army who would not killed outright by the sudden blast of fire from the invisible boar spent the day lying prostrate under a scorching sun. In temperature hundred degrees, unable to move forward or back, today, including the 70 wounded, suffered extreme discomfort from Thurston slowly blistering skin. The finish remedy was the direct heavy artillery fire onto the Boer positions. Thanks to the latter's use of cover of this barrage had very little influence on the course of events, apart from killing a number of his own troops to faulty range finding.

It was only under the cover of darkness to the British eventually withdrew, the bind firemen are dead and wounded. Because the Boer's also used tonight to pull back their line, to do matter of Weinstein Range behind the river, math in claimed the action as a victory. Others were not so sure. Court into one observer, nothing quotation are failed to display a much higher degree of generalship than a promising young softball trunk straight from Sandhurst. According to another: " everyone here is

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Various with nothing for his bad generalship. He does slat bang at the position with a frontal assault and never thinks of turning the flanks. In others noted the nothing in its study the studiously ignored to sound, if obvious, observations by Lower Roberts, one of the great generals of that time. The first was that modern weapons make frontal attacks over open ground impossible. The second was at the first duty of the commanders reconnaissance.

All this may seem obvious, it evidently did not occur to nothing. But if you within a few days of his performance in monitor river he confirm the worst fears of his critics in the even more disastrous battle a Magers longtime.

On the quite unjustified assumptions to pours occupying a Magers Weinstein heels he subjected their deserted slopes to an intense artillery barrage it can several expensive British taxpayer. Total any casualties from this enterprise for three boar's killed. Without confidence born of ignorance he then ordered a frontal assault by the highly Brigade. This may the Don, following at night march.

Unknown to nothing, the bull worst were concealed Enderle trenches some distance in front of his objective. As it monitor river to wait patiently until the British came within easy range. Surprise was complete. When they opened fire at Halo bled swept through the ranks of the highly Brigade. Within minutes to ground was carpeted with did Soldiers, including the highly commander, general walk Hopi. It was too much for the remainder; despite the trading in the discipline, despite the honor of the regiment, despite all those factors which the high command finally believed would induce an educational to sacrifice themselves for the shortcomings of their generals, they broke ranks, turned tail and black. As he did so they were further pounded into moralize by Kidder to undetected batteries of boar artillery very

From his position will bind Martin, it should have been clear to nothing that the only way to save the day was to outflank the boar positions. This he refused to do. He could only order for word and fall word the high lenders, and then, like some latter Day continued, watched the rising tide of the as the high lenders fell back. The battle ended with the Army, less 1000 dead and wounded, back at the starting line.

Is worth comparing the celebrations of the British command with those of the bull worst. When due, despite his very recent experience in monitor river, could still respond only when frontal

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line they were delighted to find they had suffered only 90 casualties, Their euphoria was short-lived, for a second count revealed that "*by a mere oversight*". 600 British Soldiers had been left behind on the enemy-held hills. Since nobody had told them to retreat, they became prisoners of the Boers. As for other blunders by senior commanders in this and other wars, a cover story was soon put out to preserve the general's reputation. On this occasion Gatacre had been "*treacherously led into an ambush*".

In mitigation it might be claimed that since attack is more difficult than defence men like Methuen and Gatacre were disadvantaged in their conflict with an enemy who were, after all, defending their oven terrain against an invading army. Two points, however, deserve to be made. Firstly, British Army training up to that time had always laid great stress on attack, with an almost total neglect of defensive tactics. As we shall see, there are good psychological reasons for this one-sided preparation for war, a bias in training for which this country paid dearly in subsequent conflicts. In the Boer War, the Army was doing what it had been trained for. The other point is this. While in the battles so far described, British troops were on the offensive, there *were* other military events in which they occupied a defensive role, as for example in the sieges of Ladysmith and Mafeking.

This makes it possible to examine the suggestion that military incompetence was confined to the handling of offensive rather than defensive actions. When we do so, however, the hypothesis is found untenable. Even in defence, incompetence still reigned. The best example is that afforded by Sir George White, V.C., Commander-in-Chief Natal, who, in trying to resist the enemy, failed to carry out the most elementary precautions. Like some deranged householder who refuses to lock his door when he knows burglars are about, White omitted to carry out any measures to deny the Boers use of their most valuable mode of access-the railway. He failed to mine passes, block tunnels, blow up bridges, or in any way destroy their prime means of transportation. Of this serious dereliction, The Times History comments "*The least damaging explanation is that Sir George White never realized fully that the Boers were civilized opponents who could make use of a railway for military purposes.*"*

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* Sir George White, whose statue can be seen near Broadcasting House in **London, was subsequently made a field-marshal and Companion** of Honour (against the advice of A. J. Balfour).

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As we shall see, there are remarkable parallels between this lapse and the events which preceded the fall of Singapore in 1942. In both cases the generals in charge were responsible for the safety of an English civilian population. In both cases, they seriously underestimated the ability of the enemy, and this in the face of overwhelming evidence. And in both cases they lacked the imagination to carry out the most elementary and obvious of precautions.* In short, the argument that they failed to be efficient only because of the difficulties attending attack scarcely holds water.

It is at this point that it becomes necessary to introduce another concept which is relevant to the conduct of the South African War. It is that of the effects of psychological stress upon decision-making. It is perhaps in their resistance to stress, in their ability to carry on when things go wrong, that good generals are most easily distinguished from poor ones.

By this standard General Buller, physically so huge, failed dismally. Irresolute from the outset, the three defeats at Magersfontein, Stormberg Junction and Colenso sapped whatever confidence he ever had. From being weak and fearful he became a veritable jelly of indecision. His plans became vague and indefinite, and his specific orders scarcely more enlightening. His lack of moral courage in the face of adversity revealed itself most clearly in his propensity for making scapegoats of his unfortunate subordinates, those admittedly incompetent generals who had blundered on without direction or assistance from above, while taking none of the blame himself. `Nothing in his despatches at the time, or later in his evidence before the Royal Commission [convened to investigate the reasons for the series of defeats] suggests that, even in the most roundabout way, he who planned the whole [campaign] was in any manner responsible for its failure. The nearest he came to such an admission was a reference to "*bad luck*"."

Bad luck it may have been, but worse luck was to follow in the shape of that I,400-foot monument to military ineptitude, Spion Kop. The totally unnecessary storming of this mini-mountain was to the Boer War what the charge of the Light Brigade had been to the Crimean War. The details are as follows. While still numbed by the series of

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* *The fact that in the case of Singapore even greater errors of judgment had been made by politicians and Army leaders before the war is immaterial to this argument.

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defeats just recounted, Buller's army of 29,000 infantry, 2,600 mounted men, 8 field batteries and 10 naval guns was enriched, if that is the word, by the arrival of a fresh division commanded by Sir Charge Warren, R.E. Together these two forces, under the supreme command of Buller, were employed to try and lift the siege of Ladysmith. Unfortunately, and despite their immense superiority in men and equipment, they failed to do so.

So far as the British were concerned, the operation involved crossing the river Tugela and then closing on Ladysmith via a complex o small hills and ranges of high ground. There were two places at which the river could be forded. Buller ordered Warren to lead the assault across one of these "*drifts*", while another force, under another general Lyttleton, created a diversionary crossing at the other. For success, the plan depended upon speed of movement, surprise and synchronizing the two crossings. Ideally, Warren and his force, on the left flank should have been over the river and well on their way to Ladysmith while Lyttleton was still occupying the Boers' attention on the right flank.

The plan went wrong for several reasons. In the first place, Warren's division was far too small for the main attack. As to why Buller should have used an attacking force whose size, in comparison with the total number of troops he had available, constituted a mere pinprick, it suffices to note that it accorded with his general policy of avoiding any direct responsibility for whatever might transpire. If the worst happened it would be Warren's army, not his, that would carry the blame. In due course we shall examine two deeper reasons for this particular form of military incompetence.

The second reason for disaster lay in the character of Warren, who has been described as "*dilatory yet fidgety, over-cautious yet irresolute and totally ignorant regarding the use of cavalry*". He was also obsessive obstinate, self-opinionated and excessively bad-tempered.

While Lyttleton crossed the Tugela with his diversionary force and successfully convinced the Boers that this was Buller's line of advance Warren failed to exploit the situation. Instead of crossing the river with all speed he seemed `to give way to certain fads and fancies'. These included an obsession with his enormous baggage train* and the feae

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* One of the factors which slowed up Buller's military movement in the Boer War was the quantity of the baggage with which officers went on active service According to Kruger this might well include pianos, long-homed gramophones chests of drawers, polo sticks, and in Buller's case an iron bathroom and well-equipped kitchen.

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that it might be destroyed by non-existent enemy guns on the small mountain Spion Kop. So concerned was he with his baggage that he spent twenty-six hours personally supervising its transfer across the river. The delay was invaluable to the Boers.

It was at this point that mere tardiness and inefficiency gave way to something more approaching madness. Under the mounting strain of inactivity a curious *folie a' deux* seemed to descend upon Buller. and his subordinate. In chronological order the events were as follows:

1. A cavalry reconnoitre by Lord Dundonald of the territory beyond the river revealed an obvious line of advance for Warren's army .

2. Warren was furious that Dundonald should have used his cavalry to make the recce.

3. Partly through his obsession with the baggage train and partly because of the unsolicited and unwelcome information from Dundonald, Warren rejected the projected movement and opted instead for a direct advance across the Tabanyama range, directly to his front. Unfortunately no recce had been made of this area.

4. It was at this point that Buller began describing Warren's behaviour as "*aimless and irresolute*"'. Nevertheless, he still refused to assume command.

5. Warren's assault on the Tabanyama range was hardly a success. This was because he found the Boers well dug in on a second crest of whose existence he had been ignorant. He still refused to outflank the Boer positions.

6. Buller, who was becoming increasingly restless, rode over to proffer criticism and advice. He still refrained from giving any orders to Warren.

7. Warren's eye now lit upon the cone-shaped eminence of Spion Kop. He knew instantly that it must be captured. Buller readily agreed, and this though neither general had previously considered such a course of action, let alone worked out what it would entail.

8. The job of attacking what has been called "*an unknown mountain on a dark night against a determined enemy of unknown strength*" was given to General Talbot-Coke. His "*qualifications*" for the venture

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were that he had only just arrived and was seriously affected by a game leg. At least he was no more ignorant of Spion Kop than were any of his colleagues, for they knew nothing about its summit-its extent or suitability for defence. No one wondered why the Boers had no guns up there, nor did it occur to anyone that the Boers might resent its occupation by the British. Hence no diversionary tactics were employed.

And so, while the generals stayed below, the men were ordered up the steeply sloping mountainside, into a fog hardly less dense than that which clouded the minds of their commanders. When, in almost zero visibility, they thought they had reached the summit, the assault force halted, congratulated themselves on the total absence of opposition, raised the Union Jack and tried to entrench. The operative word is "*tried*", for the top was much like the rest of the mountain, solid rock. Nobody had warned them of this. They decided to use sandbags, only to find that no one had remembered to bring them. While the mists cleared they did the best they could with pieces of rock and clods of earth, only too well aware that this flimsy protection provided no head cover whatsoever.

If this gave them food for thought there was more to follow, for with a further improvement in visibility they made a second disquieting discovery. They were not where they thought they were. Instead of the summit they found themselves on a small plateau some way below the mountain top: 1,700 men on a piece-of-ground 400 x 500 yards, and above them, on three sides, the Boers. The enemy opened fire. Within minutes the ground was littered with corpses, many with bullet-holes in the side of the head or body. Owing to the lack of head cover the losses from shrapnel were even greater. Trapped in this seemingly hopeless position without any guidance or directives from their general, two hundred *Lancashire Fusiliers* laid down their arms and surrendered to the Boers. Their place was taken by reinforcements sent up from below.

Meanwhile, Warren and Buller did nothing to help the hard-pressed troops. No doubt appalled by what was happening to his army on the heights above, Warren, supine at the best of times, went into a state that has been described as paralytic. Only once did he try to interfere with the course of events. This was to stop his battery of naval guns from shelling Boer positions on a neighboring peak. He did so in the mistaken belief that the troops they were shelling were British.

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Although possessing the necessary equipment, he had failed to establish telegraphic communication with his troops on Spion Kop. Had he done so this particular costly error would never have occurred.

As to why he, the commanding general, should deliberately cut himself off from the main source of intelligence, his own front-line troops, one can only surmise that, at some level, he just did not want to know. This hypothesis, that Warren was using what is technically known as the mechanism of denial, receives support from another curious incident. A war correspondent who had witnessed the dire events on the top of the mountain hurried down to the commanding general. But instead of receiving this, admittedly unsolicited, information with gratitude, Warren flew into a rage and demanded that the journalist should be arrested for insolence. The war correspondent in question was Winston Churchill.

But Warren's behaviour, as we have said, was only part of a *folie a deux*. No less extraordinary was that of his commander-in-chief. Buller's contribution was violently to resist the pleas of his subordinate commanders for an attack upon those positions from which the Boers were so assiduously shelling his troops. He even went so far as to recall such units as had managed to reach peaks held by the enemy. Had they been allowed to remain, the massacre of British troops would have been substantially reduced.

When night came, those who had survived the constant shelling and rifle fire decided to seek permission to withdraw. Unfortunately their lines of communication were again disrupted, this time because they had not been given sufficient oil for their signalling lamps. Maintaining communications within his army was -not Warren's strongest suit. He did, however, order General Talbot-Coke to go up the mountain and bring back news. But once again he took great pains to avoid hearing the worst. For a start, he selected as his messenger a lame man who did not know the country; then, just in case he did succeed in struggling up and down the mountain, Warren took the ultimate precaution of shifting his H.Q. to a new location. Since he did this in Talbot-Coke's absence, and without a word to anyone, he managed to sustain his ignorance.

So ended the battle. Having lost 243 dead and 100 wounded, the army withdrew. The following day found 20,00 sullen men marching back the way they had come. For all their superiority in numbers, for all their training on the drill squares of Aldershot, they had achieved

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nothing. Once again the rigid Goliath had been ousted by the astute, but non-conformist David.

This, the last of their disastrous battles, showed up the weaknesses of the high command with blazing clarity. As one Should war artillery officer Mark: "if your men had our generals where should the Boers be? Those slight compared to what let in store for them years later the cost was immense by contemporary standards: 20,000 British did in only 31 months in a bill to the nation all 22,000,000 lbs.

As with other generals and other wars, mean to blowers hitherto inconspicuous energies down the outlet not in the battlefield afterwards in making scapegoats of his subordinates. In this case he was the unfortunate weren't bore the bruntin him*

The nonlinear nice example is one place in Crimean war wars in the same perspective. Both present picture of what appears to be under leave stupidity, the more interesting is a psychological pattern of these advance. There was enriching a nation anxious to assert its rights, first in Russia and then in South Africa. What did do in what did do not send out how a regimen armies which endeavored to make up encourage, discipline and visual splendor what the lacking relevant training, technology and adequate leadership? Asked to the latter, in each case the commander-in-chief was selected who despite his deficiencies remained importantly popular with its troops were far longer than deserved. Both men were genial, courteous and kind. Both were inexperienced, a resolute and lacking more urge. Both derision well-connected, a both, when the occasion demand, it only to ready to do best themselves of all responsibility to errors which they had made. And M1 seemed quite unable to learn mistakes of the other.

So strange are these phenomenal but was forced to consider the office is that some level in the minds of those each recognition aggression the launch the contrary note, I need to pulp punches. Since man is no species with its to his ability to tell at a distance cannot abatements all of those automatic inhibitors of interest species aggression which are commonplace of other animals, it is possible that he quite unconsciously uses other means to keep about

* Buller was dismissed in the Army in 1901. The following year the government publishes dispatches. These protein to have been incompetent blundering, defeatist.

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And soon for Sperry deployment of such men as fraction and blow or certainly constitute such other means Sperry

Up a development of this thesis is reserved for later chapters. The moment it might prove helpful to keep in mind certain characteristics of the incompetent just described. Include:

1. An underestimation, sometimes bordering on the art in, of the enemy.

2. And Clinton on or what's more.

3. An inability to profit from past experience.

4. ole or carry a resistance to adopting an exporting and payable technology and novel tactics.

5. An aversion to reconnaissance, coupled with just like intelligence (and both senses of the were very

6. Great physical bravery but little moral courage.

7. An apparent imperviousness by commanders to loss of life and human suffering amongst the rank-and-file, or (its converse and irrational into vast and incapacitated and state compassion.

8. This heat and in decisiveness and senior commanders.

9. A tendency to lay the blame on others.

10. Can carry a lull the little salt very

11. A lull both quotation marble, smartness, precision and strike preservation of " the military pecking order.

12. I regard tradition and other aspects of conservatism.

13 carry a lack of creativity, improvisation, indebtedness and open-mindedness.

14. A tendency to eschew moderate risks for tasks so difficult that failure might seem excusable.

15. Procrastination.

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Chapter 5

Indian interlude

To consider so for afterthought that military incompetence and confined to interracial complex -- one because my very importantly, as adjusted by the following account of a minor incident at the time of the Indian mutiny, this particular pledged prediction is not know very good comes to interracial complex the pattern of incompetence is little chance. Here's the story of four who yet as we cannot invite me. Scott O'Connor:

In the to all pole, who, it appears, had never before held independent command, was were to leading expedition up the left bank of the Ganges from luck now to roll the planned, to clear the rebels out of that part of the country. They set out from Lucknow and some of April, eat-in 58, and on the morning of the 15th found itself in the vicinity of Fort we are. The troops at March 9 mi. a morning; but Wall pole, anxious to win disburse the least possible delay, said his force immediately to the assault.

Before his residents of a rebel land holder named narcotics seen. He had but 300 followers that is command; but, taking amazing troubles was beset the British in India in the dark days of eat-in 57, he unfurled the flag of rebellion and we are invade the government defines.

Destroy mobile nothing very formidable. Once northern and eastern faces it was trying defended by a high money Wall and abroad in the ditch, and covered by dense jungle; but from the west and south it was open to attack, as Wall and those sides was but a few feet high, the defenders relying mainly Monday chichi L., the waters of which laughed before, to protect them from their enemies coming from that direction. Never to gates to the four, in these open inside just mentioned; and is no doubt that had General Walpole delivered the assault from the that direction before must have been quickly reduced, without a fraction of the council these which actually occurred. He was the month of April, and the water of the genteel was everywhere very shallow, and in many places dried out, so that the only obstacle to assault imparted from that side was lacking

The General Walpole to no trouble direct in order; and, without even a cursory examination of the position, launched his men in a blundering and haphazard manner against strongbefore.

The rebels, it was reported, were prepared to evacuate the place after five a few rounds; but when they saw the British advancing against the face which could be defended, they change their minds and determined to show fight.

Now Walpole, and mistaken impression that there was a gate on east side of war, directed Captain Ross Grove advancing company of the 42nd Islanders through the wood in that direction, to hold a gate and prevent the enemy from escaping. The company advanced in skirmishing worth of the jungle before them; and dashing across open space a ground which lay between the force and four, found a progress impeded by the ditch, which had a till then been invisible. There was no alternative but to lie down on the edge of the Congress are; and as when they are were only of people paces between them in the enemy, and no shelter whatsoever, they were exposed to a galling fire and suffered severely. They held onto the position, however, in most road manner, awaiting the development of the attack in other direction; but finding, after a time, but no other attack is being made, Grove city word to the jungle to tell him that there was no gate, and requested scaling latter spurring escalate. Meanwhile Captain Cafe, fully unaware of the ditch which it checked Grove in his advance came up with this seeks and cash into it. No ladders to help them out again, they were shot down without mercy by the enemy...

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No said his reach Grove, nor were the scaling lattice for comments, so a second messenger was dispatched to the general, asking for reinforcements. The general, apparently now alarmed the consequences of his own rations, hastily sent any guns around to the west, in order bombardment of the four from that side.

And very natural result all. Some of the balls from the guns, going over the four, fell among our men in the other side, for the not yet been withdrawn. A report the discomfort was carried to Adrian Holt, let once wrote often and all pole, but from what followed it appears the latter bill doubted the accuracy of the statement, for hope immediately returned see for yourself.

"Good God! General, exclaimed growth, unseen him " this is no place for you. You must lie down. The becoming morning came too late for even at that moment hope fell back into the speakers bonds, shot to the chest. Soon after came the order to retire in general Wall pole road back to camp. Under cover of the

Under cover of the darkness that night the rebels lookdown before and make good turns gate.

A lots the country sustained by the death of will be, of Douglas, a branding, of everything, and of the hundred and odd man out uselessly sacrifice before we got was great; but the loss of Adrian Hope was a cause for national sorrow. His death was more than spot by every man in the camp. Allowed indeed were the invectives against the opposite stupidity which had caused it. One

The Teleport we are speaks for itself. There's little to add beyond pointing out that the trace the behavior of the unfortunate general Wall pole cannot depart significantly from those of commanders in the Russian in South African complaints.

The general Wall pole so happy expedition was not the first disaster the bald British Army in India. 16 years previously, in 1842, the catastrophe occurred beside which the event support you really do seen steadily worse a mentioned.

Around with string with the mangled corpses of their comrades and stench of death was in the air -- all along the route they had been passing little groups of Bald, starving, across Britain, and many of them in a state of juniper in idiocy. Without

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Afghans, not probably kill the stragglers, is simply stripped them and left cold to do its work and now poor riches were hotly together naked in the snow, strident hopelessly to keep warm by the heat of their own bodies. Their women and children among men, the pianist Lee stretched out their hands for soccer... Later the Afghans were to report with relish that the unhappy fugitive, in their blind instinct and preserve like little Ingres, had been reduced to eating the corpses of their fellows. But the all died in the end. Number two

The British retreat from couple of the first act on war has been described by Field Marshal Sir Gerald Temple or as the " the most disgraceful emulating episode in artistry of war against Asia in the enemy up to that time. Just into the details of our British Army and 4000 fire under men was wiped out by what was, in comparison with the British strength, handful of Afghan tribesmen, the Field Marshal's words or nothing of an overstatement.

For events leading up to disastrous retreat the readers referred to signal catastrophe by Patrick McCurry. Suffice it to say that in 1842 British Army was stationed in couple, the capital Afghanistan, for the purpose of supporting the public ruler shots to sue shot. This unwise move was motivated by the believed that without a pro-British ruler in Afghanistan that country in India might be loss to Russia.

From the outset the situation in couple not bode well, nor were conditions such as to inspire confidence. Copper media by some of the worse country in the world -- towering cracks interspersed with deeper beans and now passes -- the Army's lines of communication can hardly have been more vulnerable. In the train was hostile to peace of mind, the climate was even more so. Temperatures, depending on the place and time of year, range from 120° to 40° below freezing. Death from heat stroke by death from exposure permit unlucky enough to Soldier in such a place. As of this was not enough, their worthy kill the Allies, the close of the ashes and Elizabeth, describing one witness is as savages from the remotest recesses of the mountainous districts... Many of them giants informing strength, promiscuous Lee armed with sword and shield, bows and arrows, Mass. Locks, rifles, spears in under wonder buses... Prepared to slide, wonder and destroy, for the sake of God and his profit, the eye enlightened infidels of the pin job.

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each amiable creatures, and in particular the deal deal owls, apparently impervious to the rigors of nature, swarmed above the British lines of indication light color wasps above a rebel left upon.

Surveying the scene from strong linkable and conscious of the fact that the vast majority of Afghans do not want shops to show, disliked British and resented the Army of occupation, any prescient military commander might have been forgiven for taking every precaution against native uprising.

But the British, by pro-choice, were not in a strongly fortified position, from which we may draw of the not unreasonable conclusion that they were short on depressions. The reasons to find a simple explanation they chose to cite themselves in 101 stretch of low-lying snow around a mile outside the town. As Lieutenant (later General Sir Vincent I. air remarked: per " it must always remain a wonder that any government, or any officer or set of officers, who had either science or experience in the field, shouldn't Hathcock or country fixed air forces and so extraordinary and injudicious a military position. Full

In his worst possible cite the British laid out To the worst possible design. The only was a two-mile perimeter, a purely nominal obstacle consisting of a low wall on narrow ditch, for two on to be defended by the numbers in close, but the hole was opened as northern into compound of dwellings for the British envoy staff. This hodgepodge of houses was out positively invited infiltration by even the least intrepid enemies. To complete this encourage behavior there had been one final act of such unbelievable stupidity that is repercussions for to lead the death of an Army. But were as the commanding onto, Willoughby Cotton, the armies, Center at stores were constructed in a quarter of a my outside containment. The consequences of this incision were tragic and inevitable. When Afghans only rose against the British, the Army were promptly Kut off from their supplies. House he was that under the threat of starvation the ultimate capitulated to out work on, the Afghan leader, and began the retreat which cost them all their lives.

There was us could cost feel uneasy about the situation can bull. It still might have been saying however, had the Army at this time in blast incompetent leadership.

Unfortunately it was not. Thanks to pressure from none other than the future lower practicing, the Government of India chose this moment

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Elphinstone

2. Major General William George Key Elphinstone as commander-in-chief Afghanistan. He was, to say Belize, an unfortunate candidate, described at the time as the " in the most incompetent Soldier that was to be found among the officers of the requisite rank very even necessary, disqualification for certain not sufficient. There were that he was of good you, gentlemanly manners and out aristocratic connections. Yet lasting active service at Waterloo, 25 years previously, and since been on half-day. He was elderly and so stricken down he could scarcely moved.

By General Sir Denver's blower half a century later Elphinstone and no illusions about his unfitness for job, and pleaded that his health median quite unseeded to the demands it would be made upon them. But Lord Auckland, big governor general, was adamant, and sold the gentle, courteous Elphinstone was shipped off shipped off to can bull.

Once there, whatever shreds of self-confidence in Manhattan were speaks people he removed: firstly by the ludicrous nature of the armies cantonment and secondly by encountering for the first time his new second in command, Brigadier Shelton, a Roth route of uncertain temper. So appalled was Elphinstone by the armies location did he offered to buy up surrounding land so he could been clear suitable fields-of-fire. Is there for generous offer was refused. About Shelton he could do nothing.

The dissidents accelerated towards upon catastrophe. Aware loadout the British were weekly lead, Afghan resentment blossomed into rubble. Sporadic attacks on British personnel culminated in the assassination of the British resident and stacking of the residency. This these unpleasant fact, General Elphinstone sinking estate of numbing indecision. Consume my doubts, needled by his cantankerous second in command, he cast about him for it buys from everyone within reach, even down to the most genius of alternates.

Finally, he was make no, the British envoy, a civilian, became a plan. Each suggested a force under Shelton should withdraw nonsense in neighboring fortress of Dow are House this hour. Classing at his brainwave, Elphinstone ordered Shelton to march on the fortress. No sooner had his were been received, Bell, then it was countermanded. Shelton, unimpressed by the stock/build policy, retorted sharply that " it there was in insurrection in the city it was not a moment for indecision, and recommended him right Elphinstone at once to decide upon what measure he would adopt.

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
Elphinstone and countermanded his countermanded in once more ordered Shelton to march at once to tell artists hour. The barely had Shelton started before he was overtaken by another order to the fact that he should halt and remain where he was. No sooner had this ordered undersea, reducing the Second Amendment command to estate approaching and was all but inevitable, or there is seen that he was after all, to proceed with his men to the poor. And a surprisingly, he did.

Meanwhile, Elphinstone was canvassing opinions as to what to do next. She and her can bull imports depressed insurrection or would be more prudent Jermaine Morton will us? Should he reinforced, sorry at which contained all the armies supplies or should he withdraw its small garrison into the main cantonment? The date was wasted in field today -- a day in which the insurrection, incurs barbarous paralysis, grew a pace. Initially Elphinstone did act, it was a case of two little and too late. With Afghans rounding to the cause an ever-increasing numbers, it soon became impossible even to reach can bull. Similarly, through Elphinstone's procrastination, any question as to whether or not he should reinforced commissary became purely academic; if Bell lock, stock and barrel into the hands of the insurgents.

Determined leadership might still, however have won the day; but this only leadership is not to be found in Elphinstone. He considered launching a full-scale attack upon the Afghans, but just as quickly dropped the idea. You state of mind is reflected in letter which he been wrote to the envoy: "... If you just look to the consequences of fire, in this case I know not how we are to subsist or from want the provisions, to retreat. You should therefore consider what chance there is making terms, if we are driven to this extremity. DOS already, only three day since the on the men's murder of the British resident, the commander-in-chief was ready to accept a fee.

Having settled for the necessity of capitulation, he packed it out with you found a delusion that his Army is running short of ammunition. Once more things went from bad to worse, having satisfied himself that the Army could not, a rather would not, fight to defend itself make not uncommon to British envoy, urged on by Elphinstone, entered into negotiations. In these terms were quite uncompromising. They demanded a speech into withdraw the British from

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Afghanistan. The rest of any military backing, the envoy had to accept, and a draft treaty which dropped drama. In the Nottingham, a braver man in Elphinstone, then tried to doublecross the Afghans and was murdered for his pains. Purely unmoved by the second killing our British government official, and wholly a first initiating reprisals, Elphinstone became were ingratiate and to never towards his poor mentors.

Well range, and the thirst for revenge, consume the lower ranks of the Army, those at the top became increasingly in decisive and anxious to a peace. Inevitably draft and surrender terms to you, until finally Elphinstone, in response to empty promises of said conduct, found himself agreeing that his Army without its ordinance but unencumbered I 12,000 noncombatants, including many women and children, would go back the way they come.

Having decide upon the disastrous planet on the reach allow up at into doubts a winner, across mountain ranges infested with hostile Tristate, healthy Stone proceeded to make matters worse by further procrastination. Right after January 6, 1842, he remains in an agony of mind as to whether or not he should commit his Army to march, and when, on that people day, they've initially set off he changed his mind when have to force were a underway. He tried to stop them but now is ordered to halt was this a day; recorder ill the die was cast. It was for ill. With peace known ground, 19 just Elton well below freezing, and blunt there's the Afghans return default on them as they traversed the narrow passes, the only hope successfully reaching job at lightning speed of movement. 10 about on this fearful Germany could only need gas and exposed those managed to avoid That the hands of the rotting guilt laws.

To achieve their purpose to British at the move, and fast, preferred by night when the narrow confines of the passes. But speed was denied in. Firstar, noted bother to reconnoiter a suitable route. Secondly, elf in Stone and refused to cancel the construction of a bridge across capable river despite the fact, as was one that and, the waterway was portable in several places. Since known indicator feet wet, they all conversion the bridge, to produce such among minimal bottleneck is delayed the margin columns by many hours. Finally, elf in Stone, fearful of moving by night, tactic only halted the end of each day.

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Without letter would, food or any shelter beyond that provided by holes scraped in the snow, many died each night. By day, as they traversed the grim passes of word to bull, to do lock and again the Mac, thousands more died at the hands and the murderous guilt laws. And into four days, with 70 mi. ~Bill only lead and 50 remained of the original 4500 Soldiers. Buddy and 10 paid the number had been reduce the foreign and 50.

Profitable venture, Elphinstone, despite the trail of corpses which lay behind them, retained pathetic and wholly unjustified faith in the Afghan leaders promise of said conduct.

But into the day the total off as the Soldiers and civilians had risen to 12,000. As one officer a one officer described: " there was literally a continuous land of poor wretched, men, women, and children dead or dying in the cold and into, unable to move, in trade their comrades to kill them and put in into their misery.

Well is painfully prolong disaster to be attributed to many factors -- including national greed and anxiety which resulted in the invasion of Afghanistan in first place, political ineptitude in the choice military leaders, and governmental stinginess and denying sufficient funds for the extension of the British for vacations and can bull -- this year at Normandy of the catastrophe which was not bulging must be laid Elphinstone's door.

This finding gentle preacher manifested what at first sight may appear Doom be sure some curiously inconsistent characteristics. His own admission, he saw " the bubble reputation in India and yet, when given informing command, shrink from the responsibilities which entail. He was hopelessly in decisive, lacking immoral curtains adjustable, get could come on occasions, manifest irrational pigheadedness. He well pulled and should confirm, it was rigid when he should having flexible. Finally, he was purchasing time, retaining the affection many of his followers right Dien, you could be totally lacking compassion for many of those would suffer that his hands.

Isn't flexibility is highlighted by his refusal to into the for a bell Firstar, even though his suffering columns of Soldiers and civilians passed close to this at this underway to July Lebed. Of this episode report rewrites:

The danger, Lawrence bracket officers of healthy Stone staff still halt

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against hope that the 11th hour Alpine stunned would come to his senses and or the Army to more straight in an occupied that will stronghold before the Afghans could rally to prevent them. The eldest and was not the man to be cable such an audacious change of plan. The crossroads were reached, the advance guard turn left worked allow a bad and the bowel artists are died away in the winter dots behind them. By [5]

Is to lack a compassion shown in the following incident:

To the misery of hunger was added to misery of coal, was bitter Afghan winter had descended upon the wretched inhabitants of the cantonment. Before the end of November, sleek and snow became a daily occurrence, with a moment or at freezing point, and from mid-December to onward the ground was inches deep and snow. Indian troops suffered traditionally from the call, but although there was a complete winter stock of firing virus were not allowed. Stir pressed eldest elements still could at least fires may be printed nights, so the men coming off duty from the ramparts might worm themselves and tried across encrusted close, but nothing was done in the miserable troops tanks sank deeper and apathy and non-despair. [6]

In some significance for matters to be dealt with later, there is the following incident on the subject of dress:

The danger, who had noticed that as soon as the firstall every Afghan. In his legs "s wafting racks, not versatile horse blanket should be caught into strips which achieves could roll petite fashion around her feet and legs. The sensible suggestion presuming soon-to-be the high command to the high command post lovingly and unsalted, for nothing was done, and trends were left to the misery of the hard leather boots. With minute a few hours of the start of the marched across the done its work in hundreds were suffering agonies of frost bitten feet. [7]

Finally there is the case the hostages. When he Afghan sheep out more can offered protection to hostages L. Alpine stunned took the opportunity of sending Allies not only all minute in children but also their mental. However: " no one supposed for moment he was referring to any but the British wives and children, no Allies

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Any plea to the mall for more numerous wives and children of deceitful ace and can't all... These were native and expendable and the

Alpine stunned concern that officers Wendy should also benefit from protection did not extend to Wendy other ranks, the work apparently of no account. These attitudes, which in the present instance stabilized several British women and their officer husbands what cost Allies of thousands of lesser mortals, it is, as we shall see, not without significance but there is a military incompetence.

To conclude this account of the total disillusionment Army: on January 13, 1842, Soldiers on guard at the British war in July Lebed saw a single horsemen riding porcelain, with all speed it is maimed and we're not worse could muster. It was a surgeon Dr. Brighton, the only man, it seemed, to survive the fearful journey thinkable. * when news of the disaster reached London and Indian, much mental energy which are voted to discovery of scapegoat. The two favorites for this roll workshops to.com accused by his critics of treachery, and Alpine stones in the deceitful ace. In either case worthy accusations justified. Stir just had in fact remain loyal to the last. As for the sea poise, the drag from the warmth of their native India to fight another man's war in the freezing climate of Afghanistan, then, if anything, thought more bravely in dirt what were for them particularly adverse conditions more still leaving any other unit of help in stones Army. But they are convenient scapegoats, because they were dead.

For a fitting epitaph to these men there is the following description for the subsequent relief force:

Pollock's force was marching back a long line developing stones disaster should treat... And every point became upon ghastly evidence of the fate of the couple force. Rotting corpses and skeletons picked clean by carrying met them at every turn. And teasing it down a pile of 1500 corpses of Alpine stones sea poise in camp followers, we distributed by the Afghans left to die and snow. In the court to ball pass, wrote Captain Black worse, the site of the remains of the

* pricing was the only European to arrive until a bad, but in the days after his arrival a few Indian Soldiers of the number of followers also completed the journey. Alvin stones self-guided dysentery after being made To buy out more con.

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
Unfortunate callable floors with spear for lead heart writing. They lay in each the fifties in hundreds, are done wheels passing over and crushing skulls and other bones of hour late comrades at almost every yard. [9]

A rather more accurate leveling and blame men that applied by armchair critics came from a manually been there, the tenant loans. Hour All Army Terrace, sacrificed to the incompetence, people miss, and want to skill and resolution of the military leaders. Can

To conclude this are to elders lease one point in some significance. When he heard of the trouble suitable toward Auckland shows as Commander of relief force a certain Major General moment. Like Alvin Stone, women made up and gentle manners and courtesy went lacking driver physical stamina. Porsche he was so L. and so decrepit that is Dr. drill the could not possibly assume the role that Auckland had wished upon them. It's another was chosen in his place.


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British Military Reform: Lord Haldane



In the aftermath of the Boer War, there was some effort to reform the British military lead by Lord Haldane.

Retired U.S. Army Colonel Douglas Macgregor, himself very much a military innovator, offers the following insights in addition to the power point slide above taken from his U.S. Army Command & General Staff College (CGSC) Presentation:



In 1914, when Field Marshal Horatio Herbert Kitchener, the newly appointed British war minister, told the British cabinet that its decision to go to war with Germany and Austria-Hungary would require the British Empire to field an army of millions, that the war would last for at least three years and that it would be decided on the European continent and not at sea, the cabinet ministers were astonished. For reasons that seem incomprehensible today, Britain's political leaders, including Winston Churchill, first lord of the Admiralty, believed a war with Germany would be short and that the Royal Navy — not the combined national strength of the British, French, Russian and eventually U.S. armies — would decide its outcome in a great sea battle with the German surface fleet. The possibility that Germany would decline to fight on Britain's terms — at sea — and that the war on land would consume Britain's national wealth and manpower, seems not to have occurred to Britain's leaders until Kitchener made his presentation.

To read the rest of his U.S. military reform thoughts go to the Fabius Maximus blog:

http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2012/05/10/38404/

Chapter 6

The First World War

"The opposing lines concealed, was solitary the chosen both sides stared at those these impotently and without understanding. They went on staring nearly four years.

--A. J. P. Taylor, The First World War

Only knows blinkered to deny that the First World War exemplified every aspect of high-level military incompetence. Per-share lack of imaginative leisure, inept decisions, ignoring a military intelligence, and estimation of the enemy, delusional optimism and money minute wastage and human resources it has surely never had is equal.

In ace and witches become fashionable to question authority, it may well seen strains of their 60 years ago millions of ordinary man, living in this tribal conditions, could, with courage, fortitude in cheerfulness past human comprehension, mythically carry out lethal decisions of well fed generals covertly house many miles behind place where the orders were being translated into to several kinds of pointless death.

Apologist for this. At the good things to say of some of the general to depart. We're told you get the best he could, given conditions of the Western front, that he was rock like into nations. Offer a saving grace, so it's been said, was that he was a skilled politician canoeing and not prestige to dominate branches Allies. And, A. J. P. Taylor: " even surge on ranch dispose supposed for some time to be a great military leader".

Other views have been less charitable: " stupid, op. Cit. Blimps, launchers, also find brains and donkeys are just a few of the unkind

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After that's what you been applied to those people or upon their immaculate shoulders the responsibility of committing a generation of young men to various forms mutilation on the battlefield. A contemporary expression of this point of view puts us: " this hard for costs or a badge and should, surveying the great wastes of World War I, to single out anyone Commander is especially all. There were dozens of them on both sides. [1]

Certainly, of some general's (and admirals, such as those engaged in the delightfully the *, the show to paralysis of leadership which approached in severity that displayed by Buller and before him healthy Stone, the blue dyes and is possible.

Notwithstanding the apologist, the first world war highlighted as never before the contrast between the muscles in the brains of the armed services. The muscles were superb, the brains with a few notable exceptions -- such as Plummer, Smith -- Doreen, Allenby and no -- -- were not so good. As a result, be armies resembled this are ends of a bygone age, huge and strength, massive been body, by control by nervous system so sluggish in extended in the organism could suffer fearful damage before the tiny distant rank takeoff, well-known initiate, and adequate response.

Incompetence took several forms. These included:

1. The opposing creation of a plan for the disposition of the British expeditionary force this may devise three years before the outbreak of hostilities and remained on modified in the light of subsequent demands.

2. The tenacious clinging to the age-old practice of final salts, usually gets enemy strongest point. The following lines from war correspondent in the boar were suggested in this disrespect learning from past experience was not the forte of the high command: " the been a charge of a few years back is as dead as the jerk Greece in balance -- the court fire rifle is change the face of war... For 19 Currie monster great English people had been held in check by a handful of farmers, simply because English fault claim to all traditions as Stone crabs cling to seaweed in storm time... To me it was simply incomprehensible that they did not evolve in the process of attack which would notify the natural advantage in the astuteness of the boars. To there is wondrous back in which one Mike world this report on its applied generalization to the throw the great English people. In fact there's never been nations so inventive and self are all in its technical

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Innovations as English at that time. But the military war, and still were 12 years later, Stone crabs indeed.

3. And underuse and misuse of available technology. Ace opinion that to machine guns per Battalion would be quite sufficient and the attitude of some reactionary elements to development of the tank are cases in point. *

4. A growing believe in the value poll on bombardment before lunching an attack. Besides being enormously expensive, such compartments necessarily sacrificed the vital element of surprise, made intervening ground almost impassable to the subsequent assaulting infantry, and provided numerous convenient craters to which enemy machine gun as might be take themselves, from their antique dugouts, after the Holocaust result, Holocaust was over, there to wait slowly moving ranks attacking infantry.

5. Attendance in the part of the high command to ignore evidence as to not fit in with their wishes or preconceptions.

6. A terrible crippling obedience. There was that even this highest levels of command and attitude of mine so pathological unrealistic that, on occasions, even Army commanders dare not expressed her doubts about the viability of a particular order or venture, preferring to conceal evidence from the superiors rather than be out of wanting encourage or loyalty. As the Dow Hart wrote of the third Battle of Eucharist: " it would seem to none of the Army commanders ventured to press contrary views of the strength that the facts demand. One of the lessons of the war exemplified a passion Dale is certainly the need of allowing more latitude in the military system for intellectual honesty and moral Kurds. [3]

7. A readiness to accept enormous casualties. In terms of the number of lives lost, well to the ground game, the actions of the first world war may dismal reason. The first two hours of the Battle of lose lots more men than were lost by all services together in the whole duty day 1944. When first aid some offensive the British Army suffered 57,000 casualties -- the biggest loss ever suffered by any Army in a single day. And yet, as one-story displayed, to see the ground game when these magnifying glass and large-scale map.

Postwar critics attended to ascribe the setbacks to blundering

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* these offloaded examples reflect the state military conservatism that was, in fact, for more probably in the armies of France and Germany.

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Stupidity on the part of the controlling generals. The testis can only be a partial truth, were behind me. Stupidity lay some rather more important factors -- personal ambition, jealousy and the relationship in men's minds between ground (and materiel, lives in reputations. One aspect of this relationship has been described as fact service tendency of mind which ultimately value spends more than lives, its tendency which may have its foundation intelligent Tilton isn't, but is also accentuated by the peacetime shortage material, and the penalties attach to any loss of it. The artillery men's lulled obvious guns, and readiness to sacrifice his life to avert the disgrace of losing them, is parallel by the set sailors adoration initiate... It hinders bracket them from adopting the common sense views Bishkek, like a shall, is merely a weapon to be expanded profitably. Or another aspect is implied in any. J. P.. Taylor's comment, but those British genitals the prolonged slaughter kept their posts and one promotion. I

As for ground, even a few yards of blood-soaked mud must never be yielded, thickly noted or another, like zippers or done., of almost mystical significance.

Together such attitudes account for much the carnage in the first world war.

However, since the purpose of this book is the analysis of certain psychological tendencies associated with wearing behavior and not the reconstruction and military history, will to specific incidents will be testifying, and he's out the briefly.

The first concerns case a jealousy in the price paid for disobedience -- that a General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.



The story begins in August 1914 Smith Dorrien, commanding second Corps of the deep. He. Aft., in contact with the enemy at lockout so, and his commander-in-chief surge on French installed edge each cheese 35 mi. on the minds.

Sore Horace said in order to retreat.com realizing the to do so would jeopardize the hull of the BET aft, he ignored the HQ and acting on his own initiative, in case the enemy.

This delay action paid off. Instead of being enveloped, the Army was able to withdraw, we're rebut intact, to fight another day, that's rescuing surge on French from the wooded been the results of his own incompetence.

Now for reasons which went deeper, and further back in time, surge on French, weak, Iraq's couple, trustee, and indifferent and inefficient, nursed any

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Jealous dislike of this competent Corps commander. Under the circumstances is hardly surprising that Smith-Dorrien stand at Lee So would scarcely calculated to evoke one feelings of gratitude and his cheek. But worse was to follow.

It seems that, totally out of touch with what was going on at front (having withdrawn his headquarters of further 35 mi. in the scene of enemy activity, and envisage quite incorrectly that Smith -- Gordon's troops were fleeing from an enemy in hot pursuit, French ordered all spare ammunition in officers kits should be banned.

To Sir Horace, the man on the spot, the order, pieces that was on false promise, conserve no possible advantage. Indeed, as its effect upon the row premises in the days when officers had by all their own kit would be wholly back. He chose to ignore it.

Only kill well where this Corps Commander had, the second time, same thing from his own ineptitude, Sir John was none to please. Understandable in gratitude he dressed himself to them p* removing those troublesome subordinate. This chance came upon nine months later when the Germans attacked at one per as with a new weapon -- chlorine nerve gas.

Despite considerable evidence from many sources that the enemy were about to use this new weapon, near the Frenchman the British high command prepared to meet. No nearly forgiven, no precautions taken. In the event, casualties were small white later standards but in the nature singularly unpleasant. Seriously, the fallen back of troops on either flank left British second Army surrounded on three sides in and sentimentalize death track on they press sound selling. Under the circumstances, Smith -- Doran, now in command of second Army, wrote an appreciation of the situation in which he stressed the high cost of life in a further contacts and advocated a withdrawal to new defense line Westview press.

This was all that French needed. On the ground Smith -- Doran and displayed his orders and was now a source of dangerous pessimism, he forced resignation from one of his and listen most valuable channels -- one in making itself a congratulated on his saving them to be. He. After. At least Total nine months earlier.

A few days after source had been relieved of his command and sent home (on the pretext of ill health, Sir John's authorized the very withdrawal which is subordinate had advocated. Another in the words of day

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And contemporary writer: "there is no accounting for how a man in so high position could behave DOS, or how man capable of such behavior could have been placed in so high position. [6] fortunately Sir John's record of an attitude Koppel thing. At the Battle of lose his failure to position reserves were they could be of any possible assistance, and the discrepancy between what he said he died in what he in fact had done cost the British Army 60,000 casualties and himself his job

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Chapter 7

Cambrai

"Accusing as I do without exception all the great Allied offensive in 1914, 1916 in 1917, as needless and wrongly conceived operations of infinite cost, I am bound to reply to the question -- what else could be done? The answer it, pointing to the battle of Cambrai, 'this could have been done'. This in many variants, this in larger and better forms ought to have been done, and would have been done if only the generals had not been content to fight machine gun bullets with the breasts gallant men, and think that that was waging war"

-- Winston Churchill, The World Crisis

"*in the case of the tanks a constant war had to be waged against the apathy, incredulity and shortsightedness of GHQ*"

-- Stephen Foot, Three lives

In 1912, a private civilian inventor, E. L. de Mole of Adelaide, presented the war office with a design for a tracked vehicle, which, to put it at its simplest, would help to solve the major tactical problem of the First World War: how to get Soldiers across No Man's Land, barbed wire and enemy trenches--without being shot. The War Office looked at de Mole's design, and laid it on one side.

In 1915, through a total lack of personal protection, British Soldiers on the Western front were dying at the rate of thousands day. De Mole was moved to resubmit his invention; again, it was ignored.


In 1919, after the war was over, the Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors said of de Mole: "*He is entitled to the greatest credit for having made and reduced to practical shape, as far back as the year 1912, a very brilliant invention which anticipated, and in some respects surpassed, that actually put into use in the year 1916. It was this*

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claimant's misfortune and not his fault that his invention was in advance of his time, and failed to be appreciated and was put aside because the occasion for its use had not then arisen." [1]

While one must congratulate de Mole on receiving, if not financial reward, at least some delayed credit for his ingenuity, there are one or two inconsistencies in the Royal Commission's statement. In first place, the idea of an armored fighting vehicle [AFV] was neither new--nor ahead of its time. Forerunners of the tank can be traced back to Caesar's invasion of Britain. Leonardo da Vinci had designed an armored fighting vehicle in the 16th century, and the concept was advanced by H.G. Wells in his book, The Land Ironclads, published in 1903.

Read Land Ironclads here:



reocities.com/armorhistory/landironclads.htm

Secondly, there had already been every justification for using tanks both in the Boer War and in the First World War *prior* to de Mole's second submission of his plans.




Photo courtesy of *national-army-museum.ac.uk/pages/boer.html*

Soldiers and their baggage towed by steam traction engine 1900(c); Steam traction engines were used to move heavy loads along roads and across countryside, thereby helping to conserve draught animals, which had only a short life expectancy in South Africa. A similar fate awaited the majority of horses used by the mounted troops. These animals were all too frequently put to work un-acclimatized, ill-fed and ill-cared for. During the course of the War, some 350,000 horses and 50,000 mules perished.

It might be concluded, therefore, that his invention was put aside not just because it was a new idea, which it was not, nor because it was not needed, which it was, because the conflicted with the mystical believe in the virtues of horse cavalry in the power of a prolonged artillery barrage. [2012 Editor: don't forget the French virility-affirming "*spirit of the bayonet*" that dismounted, exposed infantry can conquer everything that has been handed down to the narcissistic U.S. Army and marines] Any residual doubts as to the reactionary nature of the motives underlying the non-acceptance of armored fighting vehicles may be dispelled by the fact that anything approaching wholehearted adoption of tanks by the British High command not occur until well into the Second World War.

2012 EDITOR: Military incompetence today: Deja Vu Fatal, Feel-Good Narcissism and the Wheeled "*horse cavalry*" for the lazy--failing dismally in Iraq/Afghanistan

The American volunteer but amateur military has in recent years had a series of easy victories over weak opponents using large quantities of feel-good light infantry on foot and in rubber-tired trucks. To appeal to American youth we have offered this marine and Army Lightfighter image of a steely-jawed guy in a sexy uniform to get volunteers. In Iraq/Afghanistan, amateurs in trucks and on foot are no match for a barricaded or high-ground-holding enemy who is cornered and fighting for his homeland, we need professional adults with quality who do what's needed to get the job done. Slapping armor onto HMMWV trucks or buying expensive *Stryker* or MRAP trucks to try to maintain a sexy image of riding fast on rubber-tired wheels is exactly how we tried to make horse cavalry--work despite horrendous losses in World Wars I and II. Now we have horrendous losses in Iraq/Afghanistan: 6,000+ dead and 60,000+ wounded. The truth is that you need to be in TRACKED armored fighting vehicles--tanks---so you can avoid having your mount shot out from under you, just like the IDF and even the U.N. does when it goes into a hot zone. Chest muscles and biceps do not stop bullets, RPGs and land mines even if they are directed by amateur minds with computer "*Revolution in Military Affairs*" mental gadgets. Planet Earth swept by weapons even more deadly than those in WWI demands tracked armored tanks;

yet the current crop of narcissistic authoritarian generals long for a simpler time when we just threw thousands of men's bodies at bullets.

The whole HMMWV/*Stryker* wheeled mentality is based on lazy people who don't want to be chalant and warfight. They don't want to warfight and do "*extreme*" things like operate tracked armored fighting vehicles. The HMMWV mentality preceded the *Stryker* mentality. We are now passing this BS on to the Iraqis. The *Stryker* is an attempt to make a quasi-armored, rubber-tired truck so we can be lazy and non-chalant--hopefully pinching pennies and at the same time have some minimalist armor protection so we don't get BBQed. It's what inept BUREAUCRATS want.

The Army and marines are BS organizations right now filled with weak economic/self-esteem co-dependants tyranized by narcissistic egomaniacs (AKA: Toxic Bureaucrats) who don't know squat about warfighting because they spend their time promoting their careers and playing the garrison military game. They cannot wait for Iraq/Afghanistan to end so we can go back to morning sports PT, complaining about uniforms/haircuts and walking around and keeping those of lesser rank in their place amidst endless maintenance inspections, gear counts and staff meetings. They cannot wait to rip off all the armament and armor that has been reluctantly slapped onto current trucks and tracks to get them back to BS garrison "10/20" appearances.

This narcissistic light infantry egotism of holding a rifle in your hand is all you need to have military force has been passed onto the new Iraqi/Afghan Army and now hundreds of them are dead.

More will follow if they follow our "*training*" in how to be stupid--and get yourself killed.

There is a part of the Army that without the fanfare and egotism that employs light, medium and heavy tracked armored vehicles that was built years before the current light infantry narcissists took over that can withstand the roadside bombs the brass have tried to cover their ass by calling them a new buzzword "IEwhatevers" when they really are command-detonated landmines--which we adapted and over came partially years ago by riding in cross-country-mobile tanks. Much more hardening needs to be done but with the majority of the Army's money going towards sexy narcissistic mental gadgets the "*threat from below*" has been ignored at the cost of thousands of lives. The "*heavy*" parts of our Army have saved the day in Iraq and kept that country together yet the light parts have refused to permanently change themselves and employ some of the thousands of light and medium armored tracks we have in storage that in the case of the former, weigh exactly as the cargo trucks they ride around in. What's heavier, a 22,000 pound M113A3 *Gavin* armored track or a 22,000 pound unarmored FMTV truck? A track is 28% more space and weight efficient than any wheeled vehicle; and its tracks will not go flat and burn as rubber does. Why doesn't our marines and light infantry use them instead of rubber tired trucks?

Because we have narcissistic amateurs and adding more of them as Tom White and Rick Shinseki wanted to do will only make the situation worse by giving the enemy more easy, unarmored Soldier/marine bodies to kill. Fallujah was successful only because the foot-infantry narcissists were bolstered by the armored tracks of those Army troops who they look down on. However, this is just a Band-Aid; as soon as Iraq is over, permanent re-equipping of marines and army light forces with air-transportable, amphibious tracked armor with multiple armor layers and gunshields will not take place because it doesn't fit into their narcissistic image of themselves and the generals allegedly leading them. This is why we need to really clean house and get rid of the current crop of generals and build an All Professional Force composed of strong adults--not cowed by a tyrannical UCMJ to conform to BS and military incompetence; exactly what Haldane, Hore-Belisha, Fuller, Liddell-Hart, Churchill, Hobart and other heroes had to do to save their country--and what the IDF has now!

And perhaps de Mole's greatest misfortune was that he was "*only*" a civilian in 1912 and "*only*" a private in 1915. But, fortunately for those who had to do the fighting, he was not alone in his enthusiasm. Notwithstanding the resistance of such senior functionaries as the Director of Artillery and the Assistant Director of Transport, there was a handful of visionaries who took up the cause and, in the face of steady opposition, agitated for the adoption and construction of tanks. For those who seek to excuse military incompetence on the grounds that generals are only the helpless tools of their political masters, it should be pointed out that in this instance it was senior "*professional*" Soldiers *not* the politicians, who were against the use of armored fighting vehicles. While Churchill and Lord George were enthusiastic supporters of the tanks, Master-General of the Ordinance General Von Donop, remained implacably opposed to any such development. In the services, the major proponents of tank development included, ironically, a small group of *naval* officers. The fact the Admiralty

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felt less "*threatened*" by tanks than did the War Office was strikingly illustrated and one of those demonstrations wherein proponents of a new idea strive to convert skeptics by confrontation with the evidence of their senses. After impeccable display, in which prototype tanks cut through barbed wire, cross trenches, slithered through mud and clawed their way out of craters, a naval officer was heard to remark: "*We ought to order 3,000 now!*" But the War Office contingent remained cool, one senior general reporting: "*Who is this damned naval man saying we will want 3000 tanks? He talks like Napoleon.*" [2012 EDITOR: No, he talks like a DECENT HUMAN BEING connected to OBJECTIVE REALITY--who wants to SAVE THOUSANDS OF LIVES and WIN THE WAR.]



So much for the first stage in the adoption of tanks. In the second rather different class of error came to the fore -- that of premature application. The occasion was the third phase of Haig's Somme offensive, an operation so dismal that, as one writer put it: "Even the commanders most eager for this kind of warfare were shocked.[2] Haig himself, to his eternal credit, had always been enthusiastic rather than obstructionist in his attitude towards tank development, but now, carried away by his own enthusiasm, decided to throw in the first few tanks been available. Opinions are divided, but some consider this an unwise decision. As Churchill said in his war memoirs: "The ruthless desire for a decision at all costs lead in September to a most improvident disclosure of the Caterpillar vehicles." Likewise. Lord George considered their use in such small numbers premature. But Haig was nothing if not obstinate. If few tanks then available were thrown in -- not en masse, but piecemeal.

Even so, compared with what had done before, they achieved a small but spectacular success. The because they were too few in number, and their breakthrough not adequately exploited, the tanks were unable to prevent the offense the from being, in the end, a cost defeat. Cooper writes:

The snow apart played by the tanks, however successful on the local scale, but was overlooked indigenous since the failure... *Doubts which many staff officers had previously expressed as to the value of tanks turned to scorn. Instead of trying to plan an intelligent use of the superior weapon that had been put in their hands, the military leaders could only make criticisms of minor details.* They conveniently forgot that it was they who had ordered so few tanks to be built in the first place, and it was Haig's own decision, against the

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advice of those who were beginning to understand the nature of tank warfare, to order them into battle before their crews had been properly trained and before they were available in sufficient numbers to make a worthwhile contribution. [3] (italics mine)

Frustrated by failure, and unable to admit their own contribution to defeat, they did what the highly prejudiced do in such a circumstance, vented their feelings upon the original object of their prejudice, and in so doing precluded any chance of learning from the exercise. As Liddell-Hart put it: "Criticism fastened on faulty details and particular failures, with little sense of proportion, and still less imagination." A year later the price of prejudice was paid in full.

If anything, the premature use of tanks, on the Somme and later at Third Ypres, sharpened the conflict between those progresses who had now seen with their own eyes what tanks could do (at St. Julien alone in was estimated that they saved over a 1, 000 casualties) and the reactionaries, including Haig's Chief of Staff, who did everything they could to curtail their use. Thus, a thousand tanks were ordered, but then the Army Council canceled the order. Fortunately Lloyd George stepped in and cancelled the cancellation. Then Fuller produced a pamphlet on tank tactics which, because it stressed the advances of surprise and a short bombardment, was promptly withdrawn by GHQ. Since the Third Army Commander of Artillery was sympathetic towards Fuller, he too was withdrawn! Finally Swinton, would had probably done more for development for developing the tank than any other single man, was removed from his post as Tank Commander, large because GHQ, deplored the lack of discipline in tank crews -- they looked too dirty! Swinton was replaced by a General Anley, whose job it was to "inject discipline into the tank corps". Anley went on record with the reassuring comment that he "was not interested in tanks".

Meanwhile the futile Third Battle of Ypres continued to consume the lives of infantrymen at the rate of more than 2000 a day. Never at loss, GHQ blamed this waste of life upon the few tanks that *had* been used. It seems they disappeared into the mud along with everything else.

But the forces of progress were still at work. Despite the gloomy resistance a senior staff officers at GHQ, Haig was persuaded to let the Tank Corps try again, on ground of its own choosing.

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The Cambrai tank offensive on November 20, 1917, occurred in three stages. The first was imminently successful. 380 tanks operating on ground suited to Caterpillar tracks achieved a spectacular success, overrunning three strongly held lines of enemy trenches. Whereas previous offenses have been measured in yards gained for tens of thousands of lives lost, the Cambrai advance was 4 and a half miles on a 6 mile front with negligible casualties.

But if the the first stage was an unprecedented victory, the second showed a beginning of the rot which was to turn victory into disaster. There were various contributory factors.

The first was General Harper, whose 51st Highland Division had been given the task of capturing a key objective in the center of the attack -- the village of Flesquieres. Unfortunately Harper, who has been described as a "a narrow-minded Soldier of the old school", was one of those who disapproved of tanks. Consequently not only were his troops given little training in working with the new weapon, but they were instructed in tactics contrary to those recommended by the Tank Corps. Even worse, Harper delayed his assault by one hour because he did not believe that the first objective, the Hindenburg Main Line, would be captured so quickly. In the event, the Hindenburg line was crossed at 8:30 a.m. but Harper's timetable for the next stage had been fixed for 9:30 a.m. and this, despite the evidence and the senses, he resolutely refused to change. The unnecessary delay allowed the Germans an hour in which to bring up and sight six field guns on the Flesquieres Ridge. Here's one description of what followed:

... The tanks continued blithely onto the crest of the ridge, in-line abreast as instructed. They came to the top, huge dark shaped silhouetted against the skyline. And there before them were the German field guns. Had the infantrymen been close behind the tanks as Fuller had planned, they could easily have dealt with these guns in a matter of minutes, but the infantry were far behind; not only held up by having to find their way through the wire but because of the machine gun fire which was causing heavy casualties. The tanks were on their own.

With such perfect targets the German gunners opened fire. One by one the tanks were hit, while crews worked desperately at the cumbersome gears to drive a zigzag course and the gunners tried to return fire. But taking accurate aim in all the pitching

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and tossing was virtually impossible. It was some minutes before the German guns were put out of action... but by this time 16 tanks had been destroyed, with huge gaping holes in their sides. Most were on fire, and those crew members who had not been killed outright by the blasting shells were burned-to-death. There were no survivors. [4]

Woollcombe, whose grandfather was a corps commander in the Cambrai offensive, has, has in his account of the tank battle, presented General Harper in a rather more charitable light. His strongest argument against criticism of Harper is that since the corps commander was renowned for being a strict disciplinarian, it is inconceivable that he would have allowed Harper to deviate in training or tactics from what had been laid down.

Be that as it many, the following facts suggested that the hold up at Flesquieres had its origins in the prejudices of a reactionary General. Firstly, Harper's assault was one hour later than it need have been. Secondly, it was only in his sector of the front that the infantry failed to follow closely upon the mobile armor. Thirdly, Harper had already gained a reputation for obstinacy and the possession of a closed mine, by his unbelievable opposition, well into the war, to development of the machine gun. Finally, Harper and his division enthusiastically supported the legend of a mythical German artillery officer who single-handedly, destroyed all the tanks on the ridge. This legend, which served to exonerate Harper by finding another reason for the hold up, gained significant impetus from those who still managed to sustain the belief that artillery and cavalry would always prove superior to tanks. Anyway, whatever its origin, the hold up played a significant part in the next stage of the battle.

This was to have been an exploitation of the favorable situation created by the tanks. The force destined for this task was three divisions of cavalry. For what one observer described as "*our medieval Soldiers*" it was the opportunity for which they been waiting since the outbreak of the war. They failed for three reasons. Firstly, the delay at Flesquieres robbed the offensive of its momentum, thereby losing the possibility of a German rout. Secondly, because they were under the control of a headquarters far behind the front line, the local calvalry commanders were unable to act promptly in the changing situation. While they hung about waiting for orders, the Germans brought up

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reserves and regrouped. Thirdly, it was proved, if proof was necessary, that when slowed down by wire or difficult ground there are few easier and more vulnerable targets for enemy machine guns than a horse. Add to this fact that, owing to the enormous losses in the Ypres offensive, there were no infantry reinforcements for Cambrai and it is not surprising that the battle ground to a halt. Through a pious and mistaken believed the value of horse cavalry, and paralysis of thought occaaioned by years of trench warfare, the brilliant breakthrough by the tanks was thrown way.

Some 10 days later the Germans counterattacked. In a matter of hours they recovered much of the ground originally lots. The British Third Army, commanded by General Sir Julian Bying , lost 6000 men taken prisoner, some thousands killed or wounded, and a vast quantity of guns and other equipment.

The magnitude of this disaster was directly attributable to a feature of high-level military incompetence seen all too often: the ignoring of intelligence reports which do not fit in with preconceived ideas. Before the German attack, Bying had received evidence from local commanders that the Germans were massing reinforcements for counter-offensive, but this information was ignored. No attempts were made to strengthen British positions. Requests from local commanders for artillery support to disrupt German preparations were refused. British tanks were restaurant and prepared for enrailment to rear areas.

That the attack, when it came, was not more disastrous can be attributed to the initiative of some local commanders who, despite a total lack of encouragement from GHQ, took what precautions they could to stem the threatened onslaught. It was also thanks to the resourcefulness of certain young Tank Corps Commanders who, on their own initiative, when the German onslaught started, halted the entrainment of tanks and made them ready for the battle. This resourcefulness, combined with the irreproachable bravery and superb fighting qualities of NCOs and men, turned what might have been a rout into a costly and serious setback.

We now come to the last, perhaps saddest, stage of the Cambrai affair, the discovery of scapegoats. This process, to be efficient, most white wash the true culprits, (and their friends) while effectively muzzling those who might be a position to question this action. This muzzling is a subtle process, the main inducement to silence being the unspoken

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threat that any attempt to undo the "scapegoating" might put the undoers in jeopardy. Secondly, it must "discover" scapegoats who are not only plausible "causes" but also unable to answer back. Thirdly, it must impute to the scapegoats undesirable behavior *different* from that which actually brought about the necessity of finding a scapegoat. By so doing distracts attention from the real reason for the disaster and therefore the real culprits.

Using these criteria as a yard stick, the apportioning of blame which followed the Cambrai debacle makes Raglan's treatment of Nolan, and Buller's of Warren, amateurish to say the least. When news of the disaster reached Britain, it was naturally assume that the generals had failed again. Haig's reputation, already low, sank to vanishing point. The War Cabinet demanded an immediate explanation.

Haig's response was to endorse a report from General Byng that the Third Army had not been taken by surprise and that the failure to stem the German breakthrough was due to shortcomings of those junior officers, NCO's and men who had been involved in the fighting. In the face of such contrary evidence, these views did not impress the critics. Byng was asked to explain why no reinforcements had been sent up to that part of the line was the enemy had chosen for his breakthrough. He replied in many been asked for, and that he and his commanders had considered that no further troops were needed. Again, Haig supported these palpable untruths and opined that no criticism should attach to a senior commanders.

2004 EDITOR: this is exactly the kind of lying BS generals in Iraq are saying now that no one has requested more tracked armor when we know for a FACT junior commanders are asking for them.

To stifle further debate, the War Cabinet called in General Smuts. Not very surprisingly, this "great operator of fraudulent idealism" came down the sides of the generals. After studying all the reports from divisional commanders and above, while studiously ignoring the fact that the VII Corps Commander had warned GHQ of the impending attack and had received no response to this or to is request for reinforcements, Smuts said: "Higher Command Army or Corps Command were not to blame -- everything had been done to me such an attack." He went on to say that the fault lay either with local commanders who might have lost their heads are with those lower down -- junior officers, NCO's and men. Of these two alternatives each preferred the latter explanation. And so smuts, in the fashion of the day, blamed those least able to answer back -- the youthful, the junior and the dead.

All in all, this black episode raises several matters of great relevance

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to the theory of military incompetence presented later in this book. Stupidity does not explain the behavior of these generals. So great was their fear of loss of self-esteem, and so imperative their need for social approval, that they could resort to tactics beyond the reach of any self-respecting "donkey". From their shameless self-interest, **lack of loyalty to their subordinates** and apparent indifference to the verdict of posterity, a picture emerges of personalities deficient in something other than intellectual acumen.

As to how they look to contemporary chronicler, there is the following passage:

And so the white-washing went on, to protect armchair generals who in the main had little conception the what the front line was like -- and had no intention of going and find out. One of those infantrymen so blamed was J. H. Everest. During the two days when he and his fellow Soldiers were being pushed back by the Germans, they had no water to drink and no food to eat. At the end of the second day, while waiting entrenched for a renewed attack, Everest went up to his company commander and asked for permission to search for water. "My request was refused" Everest wrote later. "Nevertheless, I went over the top and found some water in a mud hole, thus ending two days of torture." Shortly afterwards Everest was wounded and found himself in the Australian General Hospital at Abbeville... But the most bitter pill all on top of all this was to be blamed for their commander's own mistakes. [5]

One of the consequences of these and other comparable and events in the First World War was that they almost certainly terminated for all-time been hitherto forever reverential and blind faith which troops had in the generals. In an organization renowned for striking loyalties between men in junior ranks, and in a war whose frightfulness was relieved only by comradeship and altruism in dangers shared, this betrayal by senior commanders cannot but have produced a lasting cynicism.

It could, of course, be argued that this was the one good which came out of the Cambrai affair. The same might also be said of the next example from the First World War, except that so few survived to tell the tale.

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Chapter 8

The Siege of Kut

If the degree of military incompetence is indicated by the ratio of achievement the cost, any activities of " expeditionary for the good command of Major General Sir Charles Townshend merit examination. Firstly, there was a 250 mi. Dick scrap and see between what it was designed to do and what it tried to do. Secondly, the cost of this discrepancy was large. Therese Scott cost Townshend 7000 casualties; terrain in sitting siege of further 1600 died; attempt to leave his force account for another 23,000 casualties; when he eventually surrendered to the Turks, 13,000 of his troops went into captivity and of those 7000 died well prisoners of war. All this one for nothing, not 1 in. of ground or any political again, nothing, that is, beyond corpses, suffering and really reputation's.

The story starts in 1914, with the Indian government, under pressure from Whitehall, sending a small force to protect British while interest in missile pertaining. In 1915, with turkeys entry into war, the threat of an attack on the out of lots have began pipeline and increased to such extent, began under pressure from London, the Viceroy, Lord hard inch, and the commander-in-chief India, Sir Beauchamp.com increase the missile pertaining of force to divisional straight. Thanks to miss you nations of four men -- hard inch; DOS; the missile pertaining an army commander, Nixon; and the leader of the firstly constituted expeditionary Force, Major General Townshend -- this modest venture led to the British military disaster so totally it unnecessary, so futile get expensive, but it slide did not occur again in ~follow Singapore in 1942

Because we are primarily concerned with the more human aspects

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Of these events, what follows is been based largely upon Russell Bradleys boat, the siege, all work which has the advantage of being based upon eyewitness accounts by the survivors of Kut and the writings, orders, communiques and telegrams of their commander. As such, it provides assorted detail essential to a psychological analysis. One

Its animated above, a story starts with fatal discrepancy, between the object of the campaign as laid down by the British government and what the Army actually did. Whereas Whitehall's purpose was to protect oil refinery at the dead with its pipeline to the coast, the Army was in busily engaged in trying to capture Baghdad. In terms of difficulty, distances involved in straight required, this discrepancy between its instructions and its endeavors was comparable to that of between having a bath in trying to land the channel. From the pointed it disembarkation had does not to have began is about 30 mi.; from f to Baghdad is close on 300 mi.. The force provided to protect oil installations to rise one division -- 10,000 men -- and that required to capture Baghdad was at least 24 -- upwards of 30,000 men. While the lines of communication for the intended task is compatible with the supplies required in transport available, those entailed by intent on Baghdad were totally inadequate. This inadequacy resided in the fact that there were no roads between Baz ran Baghdad, only the Tigers, a tortuous and uncharted river of recent sand banks formed by marshes and improbable desert. It resided in the fact that an army penetrates into enemy territory needs its needs increase exponentially. More and more has to be carried farther and farther. In resided in the fact that as they stretch, lines indication become increasingly vulnerable to enemy attack. In missile pertaining of there were for enemies: the Turkish army, rotting Arabs, the terrain and the climate. All floor played their part in hazarding the lines of communication and bringing about a defeat which cost much and gained nothing. But the real cause is the instigators of the tragedy were neither climate in order, either Turks nor Arabs, but three General's: Sir Beauchamp.com commander-in-chief India, General Nixon, army commander, Baz ran and Major General Townshend, commander of six division. To it at mixture of self-interest, personal ambition, ignorance, cost to see inch aircraft stupidity this trio sealed fate of some thousands of British and Indian Soldiers.

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it was in part a case of the appetite the aunt in management. Nixon, a two made up in ambition for what he lacked intelligence, ordered Townshend to capture on raw a township on the Tigers somewhat hundred miles north of Baz wrote. Townshend, equally ambitious but by no means stupid, did as he was bid. In so doing in Nixon were it already exceeding directive of the British government.

As well as occupying out of raw, Townshend struck West words and took NASA riding. Nixon's appetite for glory was wedded by these easy victories; with no thought to the risks involved, he pressed Townshend to continue his advance of further 90 mi. to Kut. In this he was backed by DOS, who would never visited most obtain and had no idea the conditions prevailing there. But Townshend had. He wrote to Sir General James Wolf Murray in England:

I believe I'm to advance her mom Iraq to Kut raw.dot.... The question is, a where we going to stop missile pertaining?... We have certainly not got good enough troops to make certain of taking Baghdad... A more to divisions, mining, the sixth, is complete: the 12th rather see score range has no guns! Or divisional troops! And Nixon takes them from me and listen to a raw inch when he has to go anywhere.

I consider we are a whole pulley got... As long as we are held up, as we are, in the Darden else, All these offense of operations in secondary theaters are dreadful errors and strategy: the Darden else, Egypt, missile pertaining a, East Africa -- I will under and wander as such expeditions being permitted in violation of all the great fundamental principles of war, especially that of economy of force. Such violations is always punishing history.

I'm afraid we are out of cold here. The missile pertaining operations are little does, though we are fighting the same and Amy as you have in the Darden else, plus an appalling heat... The hardships in France are nothing to that.

I received great praise... And have established a record in the way of proceeds...

In the light of some squid advance this letter by Townshend is of interest. All but Bratton writes: " the latter was completely in character. It revealed the gift for strategic appreciation accounting almost two precedents. It revealed Townshend's chronic tendency to criticize his superiors, and is go heat obsession with his own affairs to the exclusion off

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All others. It revealed as a digital lack of generosity to colleagues -- whom he raised only if they were of inferior rank himself -- he's tendency to lying in his almost embarrassing in modesty. To

But the most extraordinary feature of the letter was it for all its strategic precedents it bore little relationship to Townshend's subsequent behavior. Though we clearly realized he was being asked to undertake a major operation with the logistics of the subsidiary defensive operation, he said nothing of this to his superiors. New,

70 days after ready to Murray Townshend not only enthusiastically excepted Nixon's old or but he should advance to further 90 mi. to Kut but also, are entirely off his own bat, talked of pursuing the enemy another 190 mi. to just want, and possibly beyond that to Baghdad. " as to why he did so, there is no evidence all -- except his character. Indisputably, he was a man in dishes to the point egomaniac: mental or a promotion and coated throughout his career to such incest intriguing and import to fortunate letter writing that he was he had incurred costs nothing in rebuke, you had persisted. To such demand, the smallest of condemnation seemed enthusiastic approval. Three

Closing his mind to his own forebodings, Townshend and is unsuspecting troops pressed on. Once again the Turks were defeated, and the British occupied Kut. But this time, though a remarkable achievement, Townshend's victory was not entirely free of blemishes. Two features in particular cast, shadow over future events. Those suffering in cavities, but Turkish army was not destroyed escape to fight another day. Then there were the British wounded. Townshend had estimated for 6% as suffered 12%. The differential showed up and underline those inadequacies obvious lines of communication which were to prove so costly. What this man in human terms is described as follows:

The wounded suffered frightfully. Unintended, Bailey freezing all night -- some District and murdered by Arabs -- and when daylight came, were placed on the supply cards, unsprung, Myers landed, and drawn across a truly uneven surface to the river bank. There, if your son, they languished until they could be crammed onto the taxable iron barges and killed very slowly downstream two-time raw. What little water there were given was seemed here. What little treatment they could be given was ineffective.

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There was lead gangrene he is... And then he lay in a morass of the Roman blood in excretion. Is sailed by millions of lives. Quite unnecessarily, many of them died.

Sir John Nixon and Sir Beauchamp off had more important things with which to concern themselves in the plight of main wounded in action it would have been wiser never to a thought. Their obsession was Baghdad. [4]

It was that this stage in the campaign to Townshend's earlier pessimism returned with renewed force. Don't have logically ambitious and your drip trip egocentric, he was neither stupid nor ignorant. It now begins obvious to him that to advance beyond Kut would be wholeheartedly and quite unjustified in view of the smallness of his force and there are hopelessly inadequate lines of communication. By, like the sorcerer's apprentice, he seemed incapable halting the flow of events that Woods be so soon destroyed not only his reputation but also Allies of his men. One thing, he was powerless to question desire for glory which is earlier talk and kindled in the mind of the equally ambitious but lest talented Nixon. For another, he was despite his appraisal realities, little to relinquish his own dream of becoming Lt. General Sir Charles Townshend, Lord of Baghdad. And and so, grossly under-equipped, he marshes been beyond the point of no return pours Baghdad. He never reached at table city. For assistive on an army of 13,000 Turks lay across his bat.

Meanwhile, while there were still might have been time to turn back and abandoned a suicidal mission, New Jersey's intelligence to the second Turkish army 30 dozen strong and led by the redoubtable Kalil passion was also converging upon assistive on. Because this news did not record of his desires, Nixon chose to ignore the report as untrue. The battle assistive on mark the end of Townshend's luck. Though it is conduct to fight was exemplary and not Bryant, he sustained 4000 casualties and, again, did not succeed in routing or destroying enemy. This to advance was in large part due to a Turkish counterattack by the very reinforcements which Nixon had dismissed as nonexistent -- but Nixon and his entourage that now returned to the same free safety of Basra were so spare confrontation with the results of their on wisdom

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as for Townshend, this reversal of his fortune had a predictable effect upon the mind already preoccupied with delusions of grandeur. He withdrew his force to Kut some corn Kut, which he knew to be without defense; Kut, which he had described in Murray as a position undesirable to remote from vase raw; Kut, which he now described as a " strategic point we are bound to hold. According to Bradley, Townshend's newfound illusion regarding the virtues of Kut may well have its origins in a much earlier event, the siege of chip role. This is a highly plausible hypothesis. You when intractable desires are thwarted by reality there is a tendency to heart back to the memory of burly ramifications, and chip role epitomizes for Townshend just such a gratification. Here, as young officer in the Indian army, he had withdrawn into a four and contact Into small forces route 46 days of siege. What eventually he did emerge, it was to find himself a hero beloved by cleaning country.

For men of Townshend's temperament this had been a wish fulfillment not easily forgotten in time a stress, and so it was now his ideal upon Kut cash the nearest thing to chip role. The longer did he could now overlook the shortcomings of Kut and see in the smelly collection of mind has to keep ultimate success. Kut became the strong point from which is four-week per day brigades, more than a match for the entire Turkish army, what once again emerge victorious and, with the help of mythical reinforcements in England, fulfill his dream of taking Baghdad.

Another feature of delusions power by insatiable needs is that day yield neither to reason market knowledge acquired in calmer times. The prized by Brigadier General Remington, TOC at Kut, that it would be difficult to entrenched the northern approach to cot as it would be to keep the light (leave force from the South, Townshend retorted it was cot or nothing. This trend, he said, were too exhausted to retreat one step further. This, of course, was nonsense, for they were evidently not too exhausted to dig 6 mi. of trenches and then in the aged determine enemy who outnumbered them by 3 to 1.

The other inconsistency in Townshend's behavior is that he had always private himself upon the fact that he drew upon the lessons of history. It didn't find himself, as the occasion demented, with such great captains as Hannibal, Napoleon and Wellington, there was nothing he light better" the precepts of famous military

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Commanders. To such presents were " to make orders to attack and " movement is the law strategy. But here was Townshend as he'd list of better do great as he was tapped to the Council of Marshall full. For bottling soap opera come was to assume opposite posture of defense is stationary as it was passive. And it was unnecessary, for there were still time to fall back on the safety of armor on, were reinforcements from Boster a mind in due course region. To have marched his force back to armor all what shortages lines of communication and linked in those of the Turks. But he did not do so cannot be ascribed to stupidity or to ignorance of the principles of war, for Townshend was neither stupid or ignorant.

This behavior during an excellent 47 days with what was that a man who, while sliding inexorably toward the press at this a so making, is into someone will not only stuff for the greatest of all but he then the prized for having done so.

Disbursement were chasing his rescue so to manipulate his would-be rescuers the ditto compelled to try and relieve the siege before they were ready. Thus he persuaded his army commander at Boster a associate only amongst supply of food for his British troops, and early relief is essential. To sustain the supply and force Nixon's hand, utility refrain from rationing either his British were is Indian troops, toward eating make any attempt to unearth the stocks of air grinding concealed within the town.

This letter usually Townshend's " inaccuracies and careful for his own reputation as the man partly responsible for the present debacle, Nixon ordered the unfortunately 10 general all mark to break through the Turkish defenses and relieve coat.

Thus began a series of costly and futile attempt to defeat those Turkish forces which, having bypass crude, had taken depositions to Norfolk armor all. While more was handicap at two factors. Firstly, since the Turkish lines when from the Tigers on the right flank to an impassable marsh on the left, they could be taken only by a frontal assault, but only had neither the strength are sufficient supplies to mount a successful attack of this kind. Secondly, he received no help from Townshend.

The lack of necessary supplies is directly at Trimble to Nixon, this demonstration of docking arrangements at Basra had been sold at this some only inefficient that the Indian government sent him a harbor expert, Sir George Buchanan, to get supplies moving. But Nixon

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Presented help from experts. Preferring to chip should be kept waiting three weeks before being unloaded, he " argued so bitterly with Sir George, and defined for him so few duties that the latter return to discuss to India -- thereto reported Boster is docking arrangements were off "s the most primitive order, situated in any"patient marks huge quagmire, and looking as if for CDs bracket towns in sports had arrived"only last week rather than a year ago. Five

Starve the material in good by Nixon in the hopelessly premature attacks, Palmer sought help from Townshend. Is eminently reasonable request was at the Kut forces should diversionary sorties to coincide with his, Palmer's attacks. But this Townshend steadfastly refused to do, despite the fact of preaching yards of war he had always emphasize the value of paints. As a whiny now become sorties by his own troops, is! That since every sort he would have to terminate and withdraw, this would look like failure and lower morale. And so, not very surprisingly, Alder failed timing began to achieve the impossible. Thanks to the combined efforts of the man he was trying to rescue and those of Nixon, the man largely responsible for rescue being necessary, the relief for supper 23,000 counter what she's, nearly twice the number of those invested.

Those not fortunate enough to be killed outright, or, less aptly, to die slowly of their wounded exposure during days and nights spent lying out in the battlefield in the rainy cold the missile pertaining winner, sitcoms through the shortcomings of Army medical services. Lacking the ruthless humanitarianism of late Florence Nightingale, there were some respect rather worse off than the wounded of the Crimean war. Began are changed, Dolphin Nixon were the culprits: hard inch because he lied when entering inquiries by Whitehall as to the state of those medical services were seen in government were supposed to provide. His claims all is well ignored the fact that Force be with 17 medical officers and 50 assistant surgeons understrength. As for Nixon, the following accounts as all that is needed. It starts with an exchange between Secretary of State for India and Army commander, Boster. Joseph Chamberlain cabled:"on arrival wounded Ostrow please telegraph urgently particulars and progress". Nixon replied: will wounded satisfactorily disposed of many likely to recover... Medical services under circumstances of considerable difficulty worked splendidly. Six

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But Nixon, too, had lied, 40 just witnessed the arrival of 4000 wounded from systems on Poland

The May she, with 600 casualties on board and to grant lighter Zito, had raised Boster office tuned with its black tights have excreted, and exiting his station was offensive from a distance of 100 yd.. She had labored downstream for 13 days and nights. Our decks, and on the exposed decks are lighters, mainly huddled in pools of blood, urine and feces, their bodies lined with excrement, their wounds crawling with maggots, their shattered bone splinted in wood from whiskey crates and handles drenching tools, and their thighs, packs and buttocks left wrist with sewers. [7]

It those who like to find excuses for the behavior of bad genitals in a for some pleasure discover that lifting the siege was rendered doubly difficult by another factor -- the weather. Once again mixing managed to make a bad situation worse. For his policy was to stand each new batch of reinforcements on a 14 day march upstream, dispatching their equipment after them, the first line transport after their equipment, and a second line transport (which included their blankets and medical supplies (after that. Sleeping cold in the missile pertaining wonder for 14 successive nights, many of the troops who should have strengthened owners relieve force were soon in hospital instead! Eight

But it's time to get back to town Center, safely locked up include. Over the period of the siege even several characteristics of some significance. First, there was his line. In his cables to all more and to Nixon, he continue to live us food supplies. From the outset, as we saw earlier, he maintained he had food for only a few days; but as today's became weeks and months, this initial calcification meaning something of an embarrassment, particularly when it was moot kid that without food he would have to break out. This he did not in the least Wanna do. It was one thing to pressure rise to Alma into a premature and costly rescue the quite another for him to risk a break out. Hence it was not surprising when he suddenly discovered this supplies which stretched to 56 days, there was a wholly unexpected when he later raise limits to 84. In all, the figures seem to suggest that the more dismaying any more food remained!

In his efforts to manipulate Alma, towns and also falsified his

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estimates of Turkish strength, thereby encouraging his rescuers to throw themselves upon an enemy must stronger than they had been told to expect.

Townshend's communications were not, however, confined to those outside Kut. During the siege he devoted much attention to the issuing of communiques to his troops. These remarkable for three features: a flagrant disloyalty to worsen criticism of his superiors, a thinly veiled contempt for the diet but unsuccessful relieve force, and a total absence of gratitude towards those were losing their lives in trying to rescue him.

Even less attractive as the hypocrisy of his behavior towards his troops. Ostensibly he was a devoted, jolly father figure of his beloved six division, and this is how they saw and, but, in small things as in big, his deeds be lied this image. Although the woodwork to signals urge to death tapping out an endless stream of trivial messages to his friends in London, not one of his other ranks was ever permitted to send a message true to his family in England, and this despite the fact that they received no must mail whatsoever during entire. The siege. When military aircraft to drop supplies to the beleaguered force, such essentials as pollsters, which could have been improvised, were given prairie over letters from home, which could not.

As for big things, the worst is way he been in his troops one in eventually came -- but this is a matter to which we shall return presently.

Further insight into Townshend's mind comes from contemplation of his more personally oriented behavior,

The leading all Townshend's communiques and messages to Kut, it can legitimately be deduce after February 7 at the seas when he had first asked Nixon to recommend his promotion to Lt. General (, Townshend was always prepared to abandon his beloved command in the interest of either his own release or his own advancement. On March 5 he had began requested promotion. One April 9, for the second time, he had suggested that he should attempt to escape from Kut and it is division to stay. Three times its suggested negotiation to exchange Kut and its guns under release of himself and his men, though he must have known that only he would be allowed to go. Twice he had

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Sent ingratiating letters to the commanding the commander in the field: and once he insisted that no one can be made on the life of an enemy field marshal. [9]



Any doubts as to correct interpretation of these unedifying facts are dispel by three subsequent events. The first is a minor when, but nonetheless revealing. When Townshend learned in all her successor range have been promoted to Lt. General he burst into tears and what upon the shoulder of a shrinking a sub all turn, because he knew the Greens promotion met none for him. The second is it in the did, in fact, leave is division to die is prisoners of the Turks. The third is it needed then nor later did he so much as lift a finger to ameliorate their plight.

For present purposes little remains to be said. After 147 days, Townshend's food supplies, which it originally stayed with only last month, ran out very confident from his exchange with the Turkish commando commander that he would be treated generously, he capitulate on April 19, 1916, and hit it is weak in starting men over to the not so tender mercy of the Turks. It was there perhaps to first. While the was transported in the greatest comfort to Baghdad and Nancy Constantinople, is 13 dozen men began their to 1200 mi. march across the air wastes and freezing heights of Asia minor. And while he was winding time, honored in entertained as a personal guests at the Turkish commander-in-chief, his men died in their thousands of starvation, dysentery, Colorado tied this, and from the widths of their bed tempered Curtis stand guards. They died a did he by day in a poll by night. They died because the weary disdain Allied -- dropping out of the column, to be set upon by Moroccan Arabs pool, having Rabin, Gilder mouse was standing stones. In all, 70% of the British and 50% of the mean troops perished in captivity. The Townshend was spared the sordid details for he

Travel by train arrived at Constantinople on June 3, to be met by the TOC of the Turkish army, his staff, members of the war off his attic router respected disrespectful locals... He felt very flattered: and was even more flattered to be entertained later at Constantinople's best restaurant, then escorted by a detachment of Calgary... To the waterfront, were enable tenants we became. His baggage, staff in-service aboard, he

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sale 10 mi. down the Seymour Morrow to the fashionable island overhauled key, where, high on a cliff, he took up residence in a comfortable Villa... That same day, in the building that Turks called a hospital, those bracket of Townshend's troops bracket still too ill to march from some Morrow were being allowed by the captors to die in agony. There was no treatment for them and very little food, and those who fouled their beds forgiven injection of brandy colored fluid after which they stopped fouling the beds because there are dead... My that same day, Mormon third of the British troops doing Townshend had vowed that he was leading nimble only to procure their racket creation at died. [10]

As a person most responsible for the disaster of Kut and for that Ms. Early misery inflicted upon his troops, Townshend might well of expiration tried exp saintly some other, guilt. That he did not raises several interesting issues, not the least of which being the suggestion that membership of hierarchical authoritarian organization in some way up solves individual from being hampered in his actions by this tiresome a motion. In the present instance, for example, Townshend was by no means unique in being apparently the void of the sentiment which most people experience. Nixon, too, seen quite unmoved at what his bid for Gloria Costas Soldiers under him. There was Nixon out of fashion. Is superior Sir Beauchamp top, commander-in-chief India, was similarly minded. This unbecoming trait showed itself most clearly when he forbade British exchange prisoners*from Kut to publicize the suffering of those they had left behind. In this connection Bradley makes interesting point that will by making public the fearful conditions suffered by Japanese prisoners of war in Thailand, the British government bracket in 1943 bracket procured for them and almost immediate ameliorate: in 1916, by saying nothing, and by Muslim those who wanted to speak, Townshend and doubts condemned 10,000 of their troops to months of agony and death. [11]

In considering these data one is forced to the conclusion that the behavior of the generals has something in common with that Eichman initiation, blue, as we know, were able to carry other job without apparently experiencing guilt or compassion.

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* of the thousands of prisoners, 345 were exchanged one equals number of Turkish prisoners.

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It's as to what that hope something called might be, a suggested clues provided by another facet of the Kut of their to which Brandon draws attention. It concerns extraordinary fact of all the senior officers and Townshend's force only one shows to share the fate of the man is a Martian `captivity, and this was Major General malice -- a general is different from Townshend, Nixon and off as Christ was different from varices. (not that there was anything over the Christlike about malice. On the contrary, his reputation for swearing and bloodthirsty, reckless Kurds was second to none in higher than most. The rough times in blister Linley outspoken, malice nursed a great compassion for his men and used is not in considerable powers of invective to bully the Turks and improving conditions for their captives. (

Not so Townshend and his other senior officers, who know, no doubt regretfully in some cases, allowed their loyal troops to go one way -- to adapt well, while they want another, to a life of compared easing comfort. Why? One reason is that the Queens Jane's regulations did not stipulate that officers to go in the captivity with their men. Had Townshend's officers been ordered to stay with the troops, doubtless they would have done so. But they are not an still be did not, in Kings regulations can doing their flouting of the old precept: " no privilege without responsibility vote *

In conclusion, one .demands particular emphasis. In the mismanagement of the missile pertaining campaign sheer stupidity played a rather relatively minor role. Certainly doth was no genius and Dixon was unintelligent, the Townshend was not. This page were decided for them not so much by " idiots " as by commanders with marked cycle pathic traits. Stupidity and interstate may have been there may have been, but it was the ambitious striding of disturbed personalities which accounted for the loss of Townshend's force.

In such matters as vanity, personal ambition, dishonesty and lack of compassion, Townshend was not unique. Where he differed from others wasn't assessing charm, intelligence and professional expertise. In a world of the square, the pompous in the desperately unfunny, Townshend had a refreshingly light touch and could read he that bomb on me what you're in for him to sober quit " a lovely man ". It was

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* as pilgrimage shown in his studies of obedience (see page 269 (, even the most inhumane of acts may be carried through by the nicest of people without restraint from guilt provided they are sanctioned by the trappings of authority.

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Me the possessions of these qualities which so endeared him to his men that they were prepared to be of the most all his faults. The suggestion scratch that the evidence suggests that he was not so popular with his fellow officers, who thought him will French applied ". It is possible that some awareness of this veiled criticism only served to sharpen his appetite for enhancement. For underneath the agreeable the near or lay a fatal flaw which showed itself into revenues, self-destructive hunger for popular acclaim. Though its origin remains obscure, Townshend gave the impression of a man was sometime had suffered traumatic damage to his self-esteem which resulted in an everlasting need to be loved. This hypothesis gains strength from an instant accounted by Brad which, those trivial in itself, is curiously revealing. It concerns the generals talk, spot.

That night, on debt, and tempting to sleep, but lobbyists [Townshend's Batman] shivered more than usual: and Townshend top Townshend's dog was so cold that he crept up the bogus and smuggled against them. Each warming the other, they fell asleep

Boca so wonderful yell pink and found Townshend crashing his dog. Struggling upright, he demanded, quotation " what are you doing that forced her? "

"he was sleeping with you! " Townshend snarled, still thrashing. "he's my dog and he's got to learn. "

"he's a harsh bastard, " Bill Gates decided. But he was puzzled nonetheless. Townshend was devoted to spot, as he was to his course. [12]

Bogus was right in crediting his general with devotion for spot. When Kut to pass related, Townshend's concern for the welfare of his dog was considerably more evidence than that for his troops. He then made a successful appeal to the Turkish commander that the animal should be spared the rigors of attack captivity in return to Basra.

The published need hardly have been puzzled. The pathological jealousy which cleared up in an assault upon the below the spot and overrode in the feelings of compassion he might otherwise have had for the two frozen creatures lying outside his door was quite consistent with Townshend's other characteristics.

The air we shall illustrate certain qualities of the personality by reference to particular top ranking Nazis. While not for a moment suggesting equation between the people concerned in the military incompetence

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The {these pages, the fact remains as some of the Nazi leadership, exhibited, I'll be in extreme in protest the terrible form, some of personality traits of or more in net military commanders. Using this yardstick for measure of Townshend, is personality approximates most nearly to that of boring. Like to write Marshall, he exceeded bomb Amin, was sipper retic in his tastes and universally popular with his compatriots. But underneath the OK all fellow whale met " exterior lurk that same preoccupation with the fruits of power the consume the stout German. Like Goring Townshend was professional, pray the narcissistic, and like Goring his goals were selfish rather than ideological. Goring and content usually referred to grow this ideological nonsense " and was on the shame in the in for it for what he could get out. Likewise, Townshend betrayed by his deeds in the countless letters which he wrote to those who might pull strings on his behalf that he too was " in it " for the pickings. But Townshend also possessed one trade quite pointed Goring, the president and large commander measure in other members of the Nazi elite: a totally unrealistic appraisal of the effect of his actions might have on the opinion of others. Bastard he simply cannot grasp the people would fail to be amused by his amending the troops who would serve them so loyally. He could not understand that speech which he made when he was a patriot, a speech in which he referred to themselves as having been will be honored guest of the Turks ", would hardly in. The friends and relatives of the 7000 who died in captivity. The one so anxious for love and social approval and personal esteem, he was curiously unrealistic. And afterwards, when subject to the cool breath of official disapproval, he still persisted in writing to those whom he thought would help them to a new position of power. He never, never could take no for an answer.

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*a common characteristic of psychopathy.

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Chapter 9

Between the Wars

"The British Soldier can stand up to anything except the British war office"

--George Bernard Shaw, The Devil's Disciple

In theory, a major Washington for benefits on the Armed Forces of the victor.

Since have been learned, new technologies developed and new confidence now. Thus equipped, they should have a head start on preparations for the next war. In practice, the reverse seems to be the case, in this was never in more so than after the First World War.

During this period, preparations for future conflict seemed to spring from a nostalgic urge to respectable or war. It was not happy. The Armed Forces of the ground and estrangement ladies settled on their share cheeks. There are several reasons for this.

As noted earlier, military stock is never lower than at the end of a costly war. With one million dead, stock societies appetite for aggression and is waged. People were wary of were entire Soldiering. The military, the truth truth was robbed in by swinging Kuts in many materiel. From being the most important members of the community they were not relegated to a very minor role.

This very paling gratitude had three effects upon the military. With the worse yet self consoling cry: " now we can get back to some real Soldiering, " they withdrew into cocoons the professional impotence. In accord with the principle that the more Florida aspects militarism are defenses against threat to self-esteem, there was appalling back upon the rights to the Barrick Square. Renewed attention to should do in polish helped to sponsor last traces of the mud of Flanders.

At higher levels of the military hierarchy, service thinking was embodied in an extract from a paper on Imperial Defense today June

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22nd, 1926: " the size of the forces of the ground maintained by Great Britain is governed by various conditions peculiar to each service, and is not arrived at by any calculation of the requirements of foreign-policy, nor is it possible that they should ever be so calculated."

To this statement, which he describes as COA careless jam for the connoisseurs collection code, a contemporary critic has written:

The British chiefs of staff advanced the proposition which, in spite of its inspired lunacy, has remained to this day at the heart of much of what passes for military thinking in this country... We are, in other words, here because where he or because were here.

Those of screw subscribed to the varied on forces should be designed to implement the nations chosen external policies should therefore rid their minds such childish delusions; it is a size and shape of the on forces, their recruiting rate, their equipment and their conditions of service which matter, and those charge of the formulation of foreign and defense policy had better order their payers accordingly. [1]

In the period between the wars the shaping equipment, if not a size, the on forces were partly determined by number of curious military attitudes. He centered predicament around three instruments of warfare: tanks, planes and horses.

Describing a tank attack which he had witnessed in 1916, General Sir Richard Gale tells how the British command tried to exploit with Calvert. Apparently they fail, as is borne out by the grand sight of writer Liz forces returning Wednesday at common. Of this experience he writes: oh I was as impressed by the potential of the tank as I was unimpressed by the employment of worse calorie in modern war for conditions. It after all our experiences in that war it took us a further 20 years to mechanize her calorie. The lesson was as clear in 1916 as in 1936. We'll in truth it was not 1936 to 1941 before the British began to implement the lessons of 1916.

What happened between the wars show the alarming extent to which reactionary elements can drop a wrong conclusions will not the most people would seem quite an ambiguous packs. Rather than recognize potential the tank, they drew the conclusion that innovation in progress are inherently dangerous and therefore to be issued. The symptom is not without precedent, or confined

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To the Army. One naval maneuvers in 1893 and will try and wish to about-face two parallel columns of battleships. From his flagship you order to do to columns to reverse course by turning inwards. Unfortunately, the combined turning circles of the ships was greater than the distance between them. With mathematical inevitability, HMS Victorian was ran by HMS camber town and sank with great loss of life. Other opposite servers had seen what was going to happen but dared not question orders. The lesson from his disaster seemed fairly clear. At low should base decisions upon information supplied by their staff, and junior officers should not be afraid of speaking up when their knowledge (he. He., are the turning circles of naval craft (and her special abilities privacy ski. She period, superior eyesight and greater capacity for mental arithmetic (led them to believe that a given order would and and calamity. The argument seems sound enough. Indeed, even the most junior char lady at the Admiralty, at Sea pondered the facts, could hardly have failed to draw the same conclusion. But this was not the conclusion reached by her lords and masters. For them, try and slaps just want to show that it never pays to try anything new!

To return to the tank, success success of chiefs of the Imperial General staff between 1918 and 19, the support of other senior officers, did not exert themselves to mechanize the Army. Some were actively obstructionist. On the guess these reaction on it right net reactionary elements stood a handful progressive army officers and a few like-minded civilians. the progresses, who is simulated in convertible evidence from the preceding war with germany and more only too well aware of hitler's preparation for the decks, major views known through books, essays and lectures, and by word-of-mouth. these news were countered by the military military establishment in two ways. firstly, they resisted the dissemination of progressively sure; secondly, they did their best to curtail the careers of those who question their own obsolete ideas. for example, when floor, and earlier protagonist of neck one that are you as i gold medal for his essay on tanks, and later produced a book on the same topic, he was castigated by success of chiefs of staff, remained unemployed and 90 major general for three years, i was it forcibly retired, in 1933.

in the course of these advanced to cips, lord, and how my appetite is important bullet were about 800 years out of date to note officers should be allowed to writable. not to be

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outdone, his successor, field marshal and only Massingberd, delivered himself of the diatribe against bullers books, while admitting that he'd never read them because it would making so angry if he did estimation marked

equally unambiguous was the treatment meted out to dell heart, an indescribable brass as the " most important military thinker of the age of mechanization in any country ". over the years light l. heart produced a number of articles and books and mechanization, our new infantry tactics, and on strategic and tactical use of armor. his efforts encountered extreme possibility in resistance from the british general staff. when he submitted his essay on"mechanization of the army " for military competition, he was rejected in favor of an entry on will limitations of the town will. the judges were field marshal, a general and a colonel.

unfortunately did a horse entry was not entirely lost to view. a lot among stressed that a lot of other products of his pan, it was enthusiastically studied by Hitler's plans are general, bulgarian, and became required reading of the journal german general staff.

what does this fellow protagonist, little hearts army career for prematurely kut short by the military establishment, the case is germane to the thesis of this book. here is a man who was cultured, loose blue, listed, i intelligent and, that rare combination, a Soldier who was also first-class military historian, no news advice in military matters was frequent and sought by said civilian leaders as Hore-Bellisha and Winston Churchill, we do course became military correspondent of the daily telegraph and subsequently the times, chosen by these papers in preference to a number retired generals who applied the same job. here was a man using writings were easily studied in act upon by many foreign powers including germany, russia, france in israel, these prophecies in the military spear were borne out time and time again, and who live to see his ideas on mechanization tank tactics used against us by germany in 1940. here was the man still deplore by the british military establishment that lord gore, chief of the imperial general staff the outbreak of the war, tell me to say during lecture to 400 officers of the territorial army: "Kindly remember that Liddell-Hart does not occupy a room at the war office."

it was the same Lord Gort, the army stop inanity outbreak of the war, the more bullish at described as " utterly brainless and unable

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to grasp the simplest problem vote, and evidently said, and that upon another location:" and never could have believed that people could be so dishonest. " clearly there was something wrong somewhere.

in their suppression of Fuller and Liddell-Hart, the military leaders said interwar years did the country, and themselves, a great disservice. as for the other proponents of the tank, some not immediately obvious reasons for curtailing their military careers were conveniently discovered: rod was two quarrels, pothole to dashing, apple bork had been involved in a divorce! with adele hart remarked: " if a Soldier advocates in a new idea of real importance he builds up such a wall of obstruction -- compounded of resentment, suspicion and inertia -- that the idea only succeeds at the sacrifice of himself: as a wall finally has the pressure of the new idea also crunches him." [2]

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spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWbelisha.htm

Leslie Hore-Belisha was born in Devonport in 1893. Educated at Clifton College and Oxford University he served as a major in the British Army during the First World War.Hore-Belisha, a member of the Liberal Party, worked as a journalist and lawyer before entering the House of Commons for Devonport in 1923. In 1931 Hore-Belisha supported James Ramsay MacDonald and the National Government and became chairman of the National Liberal Party. MacDonald rewarded Hore-Belisha by appointing him Financial Secretary of the Treasury. In 1934 he became Minister of Transport. He successfully reduced the number of road accidents by introducing Belisha becons at pedestrian crossings, a new highway code and driving tests for motorists.In 1937 Neville Chamberlain appointed Hore-Belisha as Secretary of State for War. This was a controversial decision as the former holder of the post, Alfred Duff Cooper, was popular with the British armed forces. Hore-Belisha introduced a series of reforms to improve recruitment. Pay and promotion prospects were improved for all ranks, together with more generous pensions. He also introduced modernised barracks with showers and recreation rooms. Married men over the age of twenty-one were now allowed to live with their families. Hore-Belisha upset the Army Council by replacing three senior members with younger and more flexible men. He also upset Neville Chamberlain by suggesting the introduction of military conscription during his negotiations with Adolf Hitler in 1938. His attempts to persuade Chamberlain to rapidly increase spending on the armed forces was also unsuccessful.In the House of Commons the Conservative Party MP Archibald Ramsay was the main critic of having Jews in the government. In 1938 he began a campaign to have Hore-Belisha sacked as Secretary of War. In one speech on 27th April he warned that Hore-Belisha "will lead us to war with our blood-brothers of the Nordic race in order to make way for a Bolshevised Europe." Hore-Belisha had a poor relationship with General John Gort, Chief of the Imperial General Staff. By the outbreak of the Second World War the two men were not on speaking terms. In May 1939 Archibald Ramsay founded a secret society called the Right-Club. This was an attempt to unify all the different right-wing groups in Britain. In his autobiography The Nameless War Ramsay argued: "The main object of the secret society was to oppose and expose the activities of Organized Jewry... Our first objective was to clear the Conservative Party of Jewish influence." Ramsay continued his campaign against Hore-Belisha and even distributed in Parliament free copies of right-wing magazines that included articles attacking the Secretary of War. Neville Chamberlain eventually decided to remove Hore-Belisha as Secretary of State for War and appoint him as Minister of Information. Lord Halifacts objected, claiming that it was "inappropriate to have a Jew in charge of publicity." In January 1940 Hore-Belisha was sacked as Secretary of State for War. In 1945 Winston Churchill appointed Hore-Belisha as Minister of National Insurance. However, he lost office when the Labour Party won the 1945 General Election. Leslie Hore-Belisha, who lost his seat in the election, died in 1957.

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in mitigation the military shortcomings it's been customary to blame the politicians, this in the ground the Soldiers, sailors and airmen, however senior men may be, or ultimately subservient civil government. in very, prime ministers in war ministers see to it that the armed forces are not run by incompetence, or, as clements output:"war is to serious business to be left to the generals. while but in practice, because they profess specialist knowledge, and because, in times and national emergency, there is an understandable dependency upon upon them, some military leaders, even in the democracies, have become adapted manipulating their civilian bosses. such was the case over the issue of war minister were bell shut. they seems that he was not appreciated by the military establishment. five reasons, relevant to our general. military incompetence, maybe advanced for this antipathy. firstly, he was probably brighter than some of the senior offers with an ideal. secondly, his ideas for the army were progress. thirdly he made no bones about using Liddell-Hart as his military adviser. fourthly, he was, with every justification, critical of the generals whose job it was to prepare the British army in France against the German assault on the west in 1940. thirdly, he was a Jew.

Neville Chamberlain

it was for a mixture of these reasons to the journal staff persuading Chamberlain to sack demand would probably done more for the army and the fans in any other single person during Hitler's rise to power. a time when this ng inability were most sorely needed, or bell shut down in south nose and the war ministry to the board of trade.

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another progressive civilian, Jeffrey Pike, described by the times is one of the most original and unrecognized figures of the past century, phone on until 1948, then committed suicide will from despair of official bones imperviousness to new ideas will.

to understand the psychology of these reactionary elements in the military establishment, a man who chose to make army their career, and painstakingly pains-takingly worked their way out the hierarchy to the highest positions, then behave in such manner as to insure that they are remembered all it will be only for their conservatism, needs must have recourse to eagle psychology. this assumes that, in the present instance, military leaders like Devereaux, Montgomery-Massenberg, mill, iron side in port displayed behavior symptomatic of extremely weak egos very in this light, their behavior typifies neurotic paradox in which individuals need to be loved breeds, on the other hand, an insatiable desire for maturation with avoidance of criticism, and, on the other, and equally devouring urge for power and positions of dominance. the paradox is the these needs inevitably result in behavior so unrealistic as to the victim the very criticism which he'd been striving so hard to avoid terror. no

consider a few concrete examples of syndrome. were those who have despaired of anyone ever learning anything from the events of the first world war, 1933 brought a deleted gleam appalled with the publication to Kirke Committee report, which was not uncritical of the high command. he could hardly have been otherwise. but there were those for whom preservation of personal reputations counted for more than the need to avoid repetition of the senseless slaughter to which their direction had given rise. one such was Field-Marshal Montgomery-Massenberg, whose immediate response report was the block his dissemination throughout the army. * while looking under an assistant which would make it possible for one man to operate such censorship, the precise reason for his behavior is by no means of scare. in the lane as he then was proud deceased-massenburg was adopted adopted later print sees happened to be chief of staff of the fourth division during the battle the Somme.

our second examples rather more complex, concerning as it does that major obstacle to military development, but force. as the noble death

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* and abridged version was subsequently issued to headquarters of company squadrons and batteries [3]

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uncomprehending factor in military incompetence, this animal is much in evidence between wars.

upon reflection, is hardly surprising to horse became the st. paul non-of military life. per thousand years man found in innocent manages. it was nothing better for transportation and load hauling. forces raise morale and enhanced egos. forces took the weight off the enable people to go to war sitting down. when they lay down you can hide behind them. one was called you could borrow for all their wants, when they died you can eat them!

because it traditionally oral organs so many army officers in military families, horsemanship in the context of sports like hunting became one of the preferred leisure activities. since such sports is below, painstaking and in an earlier age, johnston only act out symbolic aspects of real or fair bar also associated with a higher social class, there is little wonder that they should find so much favor with those who chose the army is a career. the one all, it is not surprising to the calvary became the branch the army with the high status. forces surprising that they should have come the most be limited in denunciation of the tank, with missing as an old intrusive junior rather than air apparent".

the forces surprising the desire of the war office to placate the calvary with stranger on urban logic. not only did the veto any expansion of the tank or not, under direction montgomery massenburg, ruled that the new tank brigade should never be was reassembled, and this in the mid-1930s with hitler on density. such resistance to progress, in the face of gathering evidence as to German intentions, was not confined to serving Soldiers. during a common today to 1934, the labor and he for lee, mr. tinker, and sincerity to question the value of war scout. hardly any finished speaking the conservative and pete, brigadier making, spurred to the attack. having kut down the unfortunate mr. tinker, the brigadier concluded with use of the immortal words: " there must be no tinkering with calgary!"it seems unlikely that his weight was even deliberate.

forces also read their heads in army estimates. when happy coincidence, british army needs for 1935 to 36 published on the same day the Hitler announced that his will peacetime will army would comprise 36 divisions. to meet this threat montgomery massing for

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decided the amount spent on 4-h for forces should be increased from 44,000 lbs. to 100,000 lbs., and this in contrast to do some promoter fuel, which he considered should be raised from 12,000 lbs. to 121,000 lbs..

presumably to justify the rage, while the same time making amends for having mentioned petrol, the same field marshal lay down debt and future officer should be provided with two horses, and that forces should be provided for officers of the royal tank corps, presumably and a prophylactic role.

it would be unfair to suggest that the cips was alone in this romantic behavior. other shared his prejudices. just below the service was another voice no less reactionary hardly less influential, adult sir philip jet would, commander-in-chief india very despite the print success of tanks in the northwest frontier, this whole caliber been made surprising announcement pronouncement that the army in india would be unlikely to adopt tanks for a very long time, and then only to keep up the momentum of four-story x-men smart even more remarkable was his response to rumor that the germans had invented in armor piercing missile -- inventories over all-pro bullet * instead of greeting this vote news " with ramona, concern, jet would reacted like a schoolboy who just been told there will be no more lasted is because the school books had been destroyed in a classroom fire. here at last was agreeable evidence that he would be a waste of time to replace tanks with forces forces with tanks. the fact of worse presented a large and easily penetrated target to all descriptions of bullets, let alone the how corps ultra, conveniently escaped his notice.

no less forceful worship indication of general edmonds, chief of the military branch of the historical section of the committee of imperial the pants. having considered all the evidence, he wrote: " any tank which shows its nose wheel in my opinion be knocked out -- the worst you practically l. heart bracket and fuller imagine our past. for all this implied in version of the real chronology of military technology is surprising to say the least.

i hopes of armor piercing bullets, the military establishment, according to the l. heart, said store by the professed love of worse, backed up by citibank concepts as a carrying over into war of noble deeds on hunting field in the part which forces

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* according to live l. heart, this rumor was a deliberate blocking the part of Germany.

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plaguing the training and young officers. not everyone saw quite like this. as an observer mark: " a little dolores and hunting scenes to blunt all their reasoning faculties. while the others, taking conscience of the fact that horses suffer terribly in war, have noted the curious paradox did those who professed to grace lovell forces should be very ones with least regard for their welfare.

as for the ledge benefits of hunting, dr. cooper, though fond of the sport, take issue with the proposition to its sharp in the mind. in this experience, most hunting people were not particularly quick way. in his opinion, driving a car down the great west road was aquino testified this a decision in anything encountered in the hunting field.

one be wrong to suppose this Soldierly regard for forces was confined to britain and. before the second world war. according to general patton, the saddest day in his life is when watches low-calorie get marked by the last time in stacked or sabers, well as recently as 1960 general hackett observed cop:"it is unfortunate that almost total disappearance of the requirement for a quotation s. and military skills should have been thought to justify its abandonment as an aid to education of the officer... the growing technical complexity of war and the cannon circumstances of the battlefield have driven out the worst but they have also developed increasing requirement for balancing element in officers education which application amply provides."i

Do could take exception to the sentiments. No one would deny that horses are more lovable than tanks and require a greater sense of balance. What is extraordinary is that the love of horses should have apparently nullified any apprehension regarding immense in Germany during interwar period, and the way it is equanimity was sustained by the military establishment up to the 11th hour. Thus even in 1938 when the main preoccupation is a new CG CIPS, Lord Gore, was how to get rid of Major General bar, the specialist intent warfare. The movement war office, where he was Director military training, pull bar was eventually packed off to command a mobile division in Egypt. It was a case of out of the frying pan into the fire. The TRC Egypt, General court in the lesson, was another who do not believe in tanks. He agreed Hobart with,"I don't know what you come here for, and I don't issue anyway." [6]

Relating to these advance was at one other agreement ingredient a military incompetence

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Which can simple or in the 1930s -- deception, of self and others. A particular instance concerned that other great legacy of the first world war -- airpower. Between 1914 in 19 air team 18 arrow points have been using considerable success by both sides are constant, ground support and bombing sorties. At the time it seemed obvious that airpower would be decisive factor in future wars. Thanks to civilian enthusiasts in private industry to design performance of aircraft to improve rapidly from year-to-year. With no powerful engines and stronger airframes and greater (and more accurate (firepower and uncaring capacity. But for the Army and Navy the notion of military aircraft route little of busy hasn't, while that of the REI is an independent junior service was complete and Acoma.

For once the usual rivalry between the ultimate old arms sank beneath their mutual dislike of the new upstart. If anything, the admirals waxed rather more negative about airplanes than did the generals, whose minds, as Mason, or or a distant fitted by the issue of tank. As mechanization threatened forces, so aircraft written battleships. But unlike courses and military minds, now ships for only the last of the secession of obstacles to progress of naval thinking ground before battleships it in good, and before that sail,. Each revolution and transition hidden bitterly resented, Everly opposed, and productive of such irrational thinking as to curb and deeply dearly loves objects have to be renounced. When there was talk of iron replacing wood in the construction of ships one and was heard to market I was per pot idea was preposterous. Since I was very urban water ships would be down to sank excavation mark on this issue it has been calculated at

Of the 20 major technological developments which lie between the first Mmrine engine and the Polaris subletting, the adults in machine had to scourge, delay, obstructed or positively rejected 17. Essential unnecessary incorporation in these developments in the structure of modernization has been seen by individual and sometimes on discipline officers, by political and industrial pressures, or -- and most pregnant -- by the successful adoption in rival navies. Seven *

Abstract is fair to an outback, by allowing other navies to experiment with new technologies, the British tax payer was saying considerable expense.

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as for battleships, whose future usefulness and, indeed, there very existence was threatened by the advent of aircraft:

... To most admirals to respective value battleships and aircraft was not basically technological issue but more in the nature of the spiritual issue. They care is to bow fleet with a religious fervor, as an article all believed to find all scientific examination. A blindness of hardheaded cylinders sailors to realities that were obvious to dispatch would dispassionate observer is only inexplicable through understanding the placed " ships of the line will be old in their hearts. A battleship had long been to an adult what a cathedral is to a bit of a bishop. [8]

It was such strong emotional attachments that led the admirals to deceive their political masters. * the practical issue was whether or not battleships to defend themselves against aircraft. Having to the opinion that they could, the adults he decided to this point. In 1936 (well aircraft production by the Axis powers was getting a top-tier (, because invited to a demonstration in which naval ships would attempt to shoot down a radio-controlled all we equal target aircraft. Unfortunately demonstration to not go well. Despite affected upon Muslim into 280 mph and flew progress of provocatively up-and-down without joking, while the ships were given relatively were given a running start on parallel course, thereby reducing speed differential to something approaching 50 mi. an hour, not hit was scored. Dismayed that resourceful, the admirals played their last card, deliver the crash in the radio controlled plane into the sea -- thereby will prove" a considerable cost of British taxpayer the planes are no match for battleships when these are in the right hands.

Well we are on the subject of naval problems, it seems the deception as practiced by the adults he was a rather different order from that Manas bested by the war office. Although theoretically advantage by having to the quite literally on the ground, the military establishment displayed a quality of self deception (as opposed to deliver deception of other's (far in excess of that practiced by the Navy, pool, beneath their Morphin plastic protestations, did on occasion show any

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* the low standard of those RAF aircrew who made at the fleet air on, the refusal of the RAF to develop a dive bomber, and fair of Kuts and Navy estimates were other contributory factors. (personal communication from Donald McIntyre.) night

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Surprising streak of realism, postured perhaps by the age-old experience of being up against the hard facts of nature -- and the dangerously low poignancy of the human body.

This this contrast between the total obscurantism of the Army and underlying realism the Navy is typified by the case of most apparent in 1935 worsening relations with Italy and put the British fleet in Malta and serious risk of sudden air attack. Lacking your completed Pearl Harbor six years or later they were attempting target for an enemy very Army reactions is situation or typified by a letter to the hard from Sir Philip Kenwood, commander-in-chief India, whose vision on tanks we considered earlier.

He wrote: "you have evidently think land out, as I fear that both the government and the public at Hometown, by the air propaganda... There is only one way in which the air can we will or and that is by bombing women and children; and that will never bring a great nation to its knees, but only inferior people. You knoll perfectly well the teenage laughs at the air now. They have got protected decks, and with their blisters and multiple machine guns and multiple antiaircraft guns, they do not fear them in the slightest" can

However, notwithstanding the polled encouragement of far off, landlocked Sir Philip, the Admiralty, for all its protestations as to the invisibility of battleships, promptly and band in Malta will for fear of what it hadn't figured ". As the Del Hart said, it was remarkable how quickly the sea lowered the will to reality in swallow the previously disdainful views about the effect of airplanes.

In later years, particularly after disasters in 1940, it became fashionable among risers and cartoonist he ridicule upon the military leaders of this unhappy era. In fact they were the victims of three factors, at least two of which -- the economy and public attitudes to war, -- were beyond their control.

The third factor, as discussed later chapters, the something endemic to the military profession -- the over-control of aggression. It is epitomized in Boyle's description of free service chiefs as suffering from will meet your resoluteness", 19 best start its description of the same man as " this amiable 30".

I do not become clichés of the military cynical, one might wonder at the paradox which these epithets represent, for here were three professional in violence, ask top of their calling, doing their

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Level best to deny the forthcoming clash of bonds and it apparently Pentagon sacrificing military preparedness for fear of offending their colleagues. Yes, and a nervous tendency to safeguard their own reputations by sitting tight in doing nothing (but waged talisman of hallowed tradition is to were often holocaust (, seems strange, disable least.

What makes the nation of this landing like behavior has been given by divine. He draws attention to the interesting fact that in the field munitions technology called the tip of the sort " has always had to be blunted. A new gun is build bigger and more powerful than its predecessors but its barrel left on rifle; aircraft carriers are devolved equipped with hopelessly slow and obsolete aircraft; bombers are made with piano downloads; bonds are turned out with insufficient explosive power; gigantic " armor piercing " naval shells break up on impact asked her. Always the tip is left blunted. It is tempting see a parallel between these phenomena in the tendency to provide your outgrowth armies with commanders like Elphinstone, Ragland, Simpson, polar and French, made his forte it was to blunt the sort of mast aggression. Presently we shall discussed a fuller implication of this clue to military incompetence. The first there's another war to consider.*

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* much to the relief of the German mania javelin.

2004 EDITOR: surprisingly, Dixon omits the most-oft stated case of gross military incompetence between the world wars because it was a French failure: their aggressive waste of time/resources of the defensive fortifications, the "Maginot" line at the behest of a WWI Soldier by that name who wanted reform. Here, the modern French penchant for being too "effeminate" over-ruled what should have been obvious with the advent of the tracked tank: the deadlock of the trenches was over and the pattern of war had changed in favor of armored and aircraft enabled offensive maneuver. The warning here is that nations can also pro-actively "transform" themselves into the wrong military structures and be soundly and disastrously defeated: think Schoomaker/Shinseki's wheeled Stryker truck, narcissist, laissez fair "horse cavalry" that thinks it can mentally mouse click its way around any physical problems!

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Chapter 10

The Second World War

"Frankly we would welcome an attack... We are ready for anything that they may start...The British Army is the finest equipped Army in the world"

--General Sir Edmund Ironinside, C -- blunders were largely due to the prevalence of how DID is"

-- Liddell-Hart, History of the Second World War

After Nepal and start in which the Allies were outlawed, outmaneuvered and outstripped inequality their military thinking and equipment, the second world war produced the biggest transition to in military competence cysts days of Wellington. It was born necessity and may be said to have dated from Dunkirk. This chill to 100 years in military monitoring and 20 years of blind complacency its C3 lands. Within a space of days it shattered many long-held and dearly loved illusions about the nature of modern war. It hastened the eclipse of the old, the reactionary and the unchallenged. Finally, by rendering the Army temporarily impotent, Dunkirk put the most junior service at the center of the stage.

The very first time the continued existence of the Army in the Navy became totally dependent upon their protection by the RAF. Well the bitterness of their pill may have been massed at the time by the common threat, the inescapable facts of the Battle of Britain meant that things would never be the same again.

You afford to reason for the transition to greater competence was the heartfelt wish on the part of many seniors in your senior military commanders to

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avoid the terrible wastage manpower to characterize the first world war. This liable errs towards conservation of news lies found expression for more thorough planning, based upon a much more careful gathering Institute of intelligence that had occurred in previous wars.

As for the bad store, this was a legacy of factors touched on in the previous chapters: rigidity of thinking, overconfidence resulting from a pathetic believing antiquated weapons of warfare, and refusal to accept enemy intentions may confound the armchair profits. The following examples in the Del Hart's history of the second world war illustrate the shortcomings. They concern the capture of a German plan of attack, the attitude of the Allies to the use of Calgary, and evolved to broke. On January, 1940, a German aircraft carry delays on officer of second airplane lost its way and crash landed in Belgium. By an extraordinary chance the officer was in possession of the complete operational plan for Germany's attack on the West. He tried to burn the plan to failed to complete this task before you was captured. In this way its contents became known to the Allies. The others responsible is devising new plan, which involved attacking plans to the our dens rather than through Belgium as originally intended. This episode was damaging to the Allies for two reasons. Personally, in the believe that the capture plan was a deliberate deception, they failed to modify don't plans. Secondly, contrary to advise received years earlier, they clung to believe that the wooded area the our dens was impassable tanks. As a result, the strongest Allied forces remain poised for attack to Belgium while the Germans suffer little resistance to their outpointing tried to the our dens. When

One THE behavior of the Allied military planners was irrational. The Germans with an unlikely to practice a deliberate deception in this kind because, whether or not the Allies treated it as such, it could be used to strengthen their hands the Belgians. Further, since the Germans would not necessarily know whether he been taken as a deception, they would not know whether to Institute is second planners took to the old one, i.e., they would not know whether the Allies a taken the capture plan is genuine, as a bluff or as a double Bluff.

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In short, had the Germans pushed to the Allies in expecting an attack to Belgium, they would hardly have chosen a means so ambiguous in its possible results.

But the capture plan was not a deception than the Allies would not know for certain whether to Germans realize what it happened to the papers carried by their delays on officer. Under the circumstances taken only assume that the Germans would put the worst construction out what had happened in adopting new plan. Which is exactly what they did.

Whichever way one looks at, a policy of doing nothing was an inapt and, in its outcome, disastrous

We are more easily how local forces obstructed British tank development. Our allies were similarly afflicted. Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, the Polish military authorities hope still tender trust in the value the large mass of horse cavalry, and shares to pathetic believe in the possibility of carrying out how recharges. In that respect in my truly be said that their ideas were 80 years out of date, since the futility of Recharges have been shown as far back as the American Civil War -- although horse minded Soldiers contrived to shut their eyes to lessen."one in the man to Poland, for all or 40 divisions and 12 large covered brigades, was overrun by Germany and less than one month.

Likewise the French, though possessing many tanks which were as good as, if not better than, those of the Germans, were steadfast in their believed that horse cowrie to destroy German army in the our dens (for this reason they refused to accept a suggestion that they'll trees might be used the delayed the German advance (like the polls, they were sadly disillusioned about the outcome of the conflict between horses and tanks.

While Dunkirk certainly marked watershed in military endeavor, it's not, unfortunately, eradicate does fundamental causes of high-level military incompetence which are examined and later chapters of this book. Before the war was over their these apparently injuring future features a militarism major presence felt into further disasters of great psychological significance: Pope wrote in Singapore.

The British retreat from the guess I'll align in 1942 which resulted in a lawsuit brought, followed by headlong flight back in Egypt, was

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The second worst disaster of the war, after Dunkirk. Pope wrote cost Britain 35,000 casualties, an enormous losses in ground material.

Why did it happen? A popular explanation was the Royal had the advantage and equipment -- better tanks and guns. This excuse lax validity. The eighth army have Fort one advantage and tanks (including 400 and reserve (which were on average of superior quality to those of the pens are army, off three to to advantage and artillery, and 600 as opposed to 530 aircraft.

But your answer is inadequate generalship. The army commander, Major General Neil Ritchie, a fine looking man, has been described by his contemporaries in way strikingly reminiscent of Elphinstone, Ragland and Buller:

Ritchie was all haywire by then. All for counterattacking in this direction one day and another the next. Optimistic and try not to believe that we had taken a knock. What reported to stay at first armored division to him at a time when I was planning to use it for counterattack, he flew to see me and almost at the view that I was being subversive. What (General Meservey)

General Ritchie had a great air decisiveness, it was really rather indecisive. (General Goodwin Austin (to deceased according to the same core commander,"bracket key bracket and tendency to ask your vice and having received acting opposite way " (

Which he is not sufficiently quickwitted or imaginative. (Major General Borman -- Smith in a report to General can lack (

A fine robust looking man with German manner, but no or or. (general grandstand (

Confident and decisive in his speech, but one did not always feel he was quite so confident and decisive in his mind. (general miss survey (to

For an example of this indecision, reminiscent of that shown 100 years earlier by elf in stone before the treat the retreat from couple ran cynical:

I got vehicle or an order,: no account was L.L. Bean to be evacuated -- you were to fight it out to the lax. It was already

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Surrounded. I was told by no rain did these were the Army commanders personal orders. Then I had a message: it might be evacuated if I thought he couldn't be held. I said it was quite sure he cannot be held for long; it was told to pass his message on 2.9 Brigade. Then again another word -- the Army commanders says it must be held. Then yet another: that he was to be evacuated at the Brigade to get out. A test is on two Dennis Reed break bracket the Brigadier bracket, and they got out. This was an example of what was happening all the time. The deceased general miss survey) [3]

Under the ineffectual leadership of this big, kindly, courteous, I imaginative, apparently complacent it occasionally touchy general, the Army suffered decline in organization, discipline and arise. It became both lab he instead of tot, sluggish instead of a child".

Once again that fatal amalgum of overconfidence and over an underestimation of the enemy produced a dulling of military endeavor. Well in the military headquarters there was a comfortable assurance to the bracket Rommel bracket to be dealt with leisure, and was down to surrender. " for partly through inadequate intelligence (in the military since the were) and partly through an inherent distaste for Sumter huge, the Army command him on themselves to be duped by the proxy antics of the other side. On hampered by similar in ambitions,: professional and invented from necessity, normal comment, yet secession of paints, outflank loose, pitcher movements and encircled its, brand rings around his more powerful, honest courageous, but stole it is saw little movie adversary.

Well yourself, in his diary, described his success to the British election for frontal assault -- prayed cost the charges by small groups in which the attackers bang their heads time and time again against all down German answers.

This bullheaded approach, which whittled down the reserves of British tanks and 400 to a mere 170, was made worse by the policy ascending in the armor. Piecemeal, in " any packets,"-- a further example that curious pulling punches so avid in previous campaigns.

Another, more specific, reason for the disaster, which, if often lack had not held the Germans at Alameda, might have lost Britain the Middle East oil supplies and therefore the war, has been suggested -- the superiority of German and 19 guns the British solid shot

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two pounders, which were in its and incapable of penetrating the armor of the latest German tanks, study said contrast to the 50mm and 76mm (captured Russian guns) which to Germans appealed.

According to the hard this discrepancy between German and British antitank potential need not have been had had we taken a hit from the almost use of 88mm anti-aircraft guns as anti-tank weapons. This argument may be question onto Councilman: 1st, are excellent 3.7 in. and 19 guns did not, for technical reasons, lend itself like the 88 to antitank role; second, those 3.7 is been available were more urgently needed in the role for which they had been designed.

From the standpoint human behavior, human feelings, leadership and decision-making, events of 1942 North Africa exemplified in microcosm the major causes military and confidence. Underneath is robust exterior, Ritchie, like polar before him and else is tumbled for him, lack self-confidence and see more concerned with proving himself to himself none of prosecuting the war. The presiding over in general minimal folk committee meetings " through which the Army was Won, the seeking a vice in the not taking it, and the disingenuous way in which managed to convince commander-in-chief that he was protecting to report to rock while reality leaving it to the mercy of the Germans, on the actions of the man beset by inner doubts. These downs were skillfully but not perfectly concealed by his often inappropriate decade a monumental complacency. His relationship talking like he stood as rental turtles to the Winston -- the weeks on to the powerful father -- one minute constantly refusing to take sensible vice after (because to do so would be committee's dependency (, the next anxiously seeking guidance and reassurance.

Wonder then that Ritchie remained unfettered by the stolid and archaic attitudes of the military organization in which he rose to juncture, an organization in which, to " one contemporary historian " cleverness at the, push, ruthlessness, self-interest in ambition were considerably less prized than modesty, good manners, courage bracket and bracket a sense of duty"; five of an Army described the commander-in-chief, general often lack, as " to rigid and lacking in flexibility to be really adaptable to the conditions of modern quick moving

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*e.g., that the Army should fight as it had been trained, in divisions and not in bits and pieces.

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warfare in the desert, or even elsewhere called. Six on June 25 19.2, which he was relieved of his command. * to abrupt was a disaster

Tobruk was a disaster, but, in terms of human misery, not have so great as one which had unfolded a few months earlier, and another theater of the war.

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* in considering what has been said by others about Ritchie, including those comments reproduced here, and must be emphasized that this otherwise and subsequently highly competent officer was, by being appointed to command and Army in the middle of a battle, more sinned against the ensuing.

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Chapter 11

Singapore

"Note one to sum up by saying that those responsible for the conduct of the land campaign in the layout committed every conceivable blunder"

-- Major General Woodburn Kirby, Singapore: the chain of disaster

In the nine weeks between early December 1941 in made them for 1942, the called impregnable fortress " of Singapore, Europe's gateway to the East, the striding city, huge enable dockyard and strategically vital airfields, the lock, stock in peril into the hands of the Japanese. The invasion dishonest wrong with, the complete the feet of the combined British in Ostrow in garrison, with its Army, Navy and Air Force units, and the ultimate unconditional surrender of the whole area was so rapid even the Japanese were staggered, indeed one might almost say not lost, by the East, speed and then or many of their success.

In the long run, there is also disaster may be deemed in calculable. The myth of European supremacy over AC at People's was exploded forever, and the prestige incompetence of British military endeavor in eyes of the world in general, and Mayor and America in particular, were damaged beyond repair. In the short run, Britain lost her last the strongest foothold in the Far East -- an appalling setback for the global war effort. We lost thousands of lives, both military and civilian, but worse perhaps the loss of life, but military debacle content thousands more to Serena half years misery in Japanese internment camps. Finally the economic loss ran into hundreds of millions of pounds. We forfeited elaborate inexpensive dock installations, naval and other engineering facilities, military stores, fuel, the major port for exporting urgently needed rubber, and to do and first-class battleships. Most of these material assets fell virtually

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In attacking the hands of the enemy, thus it is that doubling the value of their loss to the Allies

Clearly there is much your dancers war. The dwarf the time netherworld advance, a follow Singapore constitutes a more remarkable and disturbing disturbing phenomenon than the siege of Kut, that is handling of the Crimean war or even the more recent Suez fiasco. Like the other cases we have discussed, that Singapore is essentially a human problem -- a product of human behavior, human intellect, human character in human error. No explanation in terms of geography, climate, broad political or military considerations can possibly do justice to facts. At bottom (and at the top spread sees we are confronted with issues are principally primarily psychological and which only reduction to psychological principles can possibly explain.

The state the problem in terms of a number of questions:

1. Why was his " in impregnable " fortress planned and serviced in such a way that while presenting a purely formal defenses on assault southern side, it's back, the northern shore, was no more of a resistance to would-be invader been the back of born amount?

2. Why was there at almost total lack of coordination and cooperation between those who have been entrusted with the job defending the island?

3. Why, what it was clear the Japanese could and would assault island from its northern side, was nothing done to her right defenses in their path?

4. Why did the general officer commanding Singapore, Lt. General Percival, ignore the urgent advice of his subordinate, Brigadier Simpson, in the superior, general wobble, to implement these defenses?

5. Why, on the other hand, was so little done to protect a the and against air raids and, on the other, so it's done to prevent their knowing the true facts of the situation as these unfolded?

6. Why General Percival persistent bleeding the Japanese would tack in the Northeast when confronted with overwhelming evidence that their assault would come from the Northwest?

7. Why did officer commanding the Australian forces on the island for bid is troops to escape, was secretly plotting his own get away from the island?

8. Finally, and runs the greatest interest, how did the man who

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to perpetuate is colossal errors of judgment ever reach a position where his was possible?

The strike to answer these questions

As intimated earlier, the loss of Singapore has origin in much earlier events. In 1925 the was a protracted an acrimonious argument between Army, Navy and Air Force chiefs as to how Singapore should be defended. While the older services prosper fortifications and heavy.txt guns to repel attack was the work, treasured but are a half advocated a large force of aircraft to repel any attack before could come within range of the island. Needless to say, but Army and Navy wonder case the expense of the more during your service. Heavy fixed armaments became the order of the day.

This debate, in which the RAF had to concede defeat, at three unfortunate consequences. Firstly, the island was left exposed an undefended honest northern side. Secondly, a senior Army commanders from that time on stubbornly clung to the dogma that no Japanese whatever advanced on Singapore down the Malay peninsula. Finally, the bitter interservice Corps all which ensued resulted in an almost total lack of coordination between the three services.

The continuation of the state of affairs was ensued was insured by citing the Army, Navy and Air Force headquarters in Singapore as far apart as possible. Just one, albeit fairly disastrous, consequence of this carefully planned lack of interaction was at the RAF began constructing airfields without consultation with the army he would have to defend them.

The guardians of Singapore defended the wrong decisions and a number of ways. One that was the import official lecturer's from England. Apparently oblivious of the skepticism of their civilian audiences, these will experts " tried to turn black in the light by reiterating that no Army, let alone a Japanese Army, could advanced or the impenetrable jungle the Malay peninsula, that this same jungle was quite impassable tanks, and the Japanese military machine was a primitive affair not to be taken seriously.

Local people, rubber planners and the light, a witty dish over the lecturer's from London of knowing something about the Malay peninsula and even brown something about the Japanese, question these assumptions but, presumably because they were only civilians, their objections went unheated.

The sorties, however, to become increasingly concerned to

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Prevent the civilian populace in discovering anything knew that might conflict with the official said of delusions which they themselves expounds.

Brooke-Popham

That's when the Malay Tribune published the news the Japanese transports had been citing off the southern tip of Indochina, the editor was immediately castigated by commander-in-chief of the Far East, Air Chief Marshal Sir Brooke-Popham, who said: " I consider it most improper to print such alarmist views at a time what the present... The position isn't have to assume serious as the Tribune makes it out. "

The form of his complaint is not without interest. Firstly, he did not deny the truth of the press release. Yardley code, since it originated in a report by Reuters which had been passed by the sensor in which undoubtedly was true. Secondly, he managed to plot all-in-one drafted the state situation was both not serious and yet likely because war. This is Carus, for the close proximity of Japanese forces was not serious and why should I truth or report to this effect be alarming question mark moreover, if it was alarming, because true, they must the been serious, in which case the sooner the civilian population nobody, and can learn to just a minute danger was threatened them, the better.

Finally, his words exemplify the Tendancy, seen all too often, to talk down to a civilian population as a group pool, Tucson weakness of intellect or lack of moral fiber, could not be trusted with information held by their elders and patterns.

The causes of this arrogance are not hard to see. By devoting information unprofessional in group may feel that is losing some of its mystique, thereby leaking its image in the isotope of its public, and this will this loss will be great greatest precisely when the in group is most at a loss as to what to do next.

The behavior may be likened to that of doctors are nurses who having taken a patience temperature, insist on keeping is interesting information to themselves. The rest of solid facts, the patient has to be satisfied with a condescending smile and a patronizing will don't worry, will soon have the open about again. " needless to say, this preservation of a mystique will be strongest in the more immature and less self-confident members of been in group.

The guardians of Singapore will prime exemplars of this motivation. After long history of wrong thinking that cannot afford to become mistaken. The more events proven to be wrong, the

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Stronger their defenses became begin submitting this to be the case. Like is secure doctors, be covered their refusal to disclose to true facts in two ways. These were in the nature of tendency is, one for themselves, the other for the patience -- in this case the civilian population of Singapore. It's for themselves and had the rationalization the disclosure of the true facts would be bad for civilian morale; and further " patients ", they supplied falls information.

Thus a commander-in-chief went on record as saying, albeit is hopelessly inadequate collection of obsolete aircraft: "we can get on all right with the Buffaloes [known to members of the Singapore flying club as "peanut specials"] here. They're quite good enough for millennia."

This particular inaccuracy seems to have been the product of stupidity, arrogance and dishonesty. Its arrogant in its underestimation of these yet fighting force, stupid in the wrong prognosis of its effects on the Singapore civilians, and dishonesty in that even a man like Brook pop them could hardly every strike of air Chief Marshal without knowing something about the aircraft under his command.

As Hitler's administration demonstrated, in a starkest form, suppression of the truth involves two procedures: on the one he and censorship, on the other digital communiqués. The high command of Singapore employed both measures. Take the were today released to the Malay tribune a bear two months before Singapore capitulate. It reads:

We are ready. We have had plenty of warning and our preparations are made in tested... We are confident. Our defense is a strong in our weapons efficient. Whatever are erased... We have one team in one only, it is defend these shores, to destroy such of our enemies as we sit flood on our soil... One of our enemy for summer we see before us to Japan trained for years by the exhausting claims of her walking on slot on China... The so remember that we here in the Far East form part of the great campaign in the world of truth and justice and freedom.

As the editor the Tribune said, it was hard to believe that any pity could deliberately tell so many allies.

It is that disappointed one encounters a curious paradox. In our culture is not more serious to choose a man of dishonesty then

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this

Of stupidity. The former is the individuals will fall ", the latter no more usable than is the linked of his feet. To accuse man of dishonesty is considered libelous, to accuse them of stupidity only on time or at the worst abusive. Yet these men at the very eight Exeter military careers opted for the most transparent of deceptions.

And maybe thought that all this is being unduly unsure rubble,; that they were hopelessly list misled by the serious shortcomings of their intelligence services; that when General Percival issued use communiques he generally if mistakenly believed their contents. Unfortunately this top offices does not stand up.

On Monday, December 8, 1941, she HQ issued its first war communique. This stated that the Japanese had failed in their attempt to land that code a barroom. This was all shortly after by a second communique which stated: oh all surface craft are retiring at high speed, and a few troops left on the beach being heavily machine gun."

Naturally this was heartening news for Singapore is less well-informed civilians. As mobile Arbor points out: oh it was not difficult for them to imagine (because this of course was what they wanted to imagine and this of course was what their military commanders wanted them to imagine (a moonlit beach, with a field taxi clad Japanese lefty Willard to their fate by cowardly comrades or bolting " at high speed call in their boats ". One (might at Alex. (

In fact communicate was essentially untrue and liberally misleading. Within the space of a few hours in the time the Japanese landing, code a bar route was firmly in enemy hands. Having deposited their assault troops, the Japanese trend ports did quite naturally returned bases fast as possible -- here was the grain of truth which GH you distorted for their own hands.

2004 EDITOR: today we call this "spin"; or more precisely SOPHISTRY. The U.S. Army does this today with its monstrous *Stryker* truck to prop up its "*wheeled laissez faire cavalry*"; when these road-bound, high-ground pressure trucks are easily predicted by the enemy where they go and blown up; the Army finds fantasy silver linings in the black smoke clouds rising from the burning *Stryker* hulks' 8 rubber tires; they praise that only a few men are killed and the wounded live...or that the vehicle was able to limp back if mine rollers pre-detonate a landmine, not mentioning that $3,000 of rubber tires were destroyed and now have to be replaced; a tracked M113 *Gavin* AFV pushing mine rollers/plows would have suffered **no damage and no $ financial loss**. This fact is conveniently missed/not reported by the Stryker propagandists working for an authoritarian, narcissist regime populated by weak egos. At this rate, sub-national terrorist group leader Bin Laden is correct, we will go bankrupt! See reocities.com/paratroop2000/strykerhorrors.htm for more details!

The to military were covering up their own derelict should duty receive support from general wobble, who in 1948 admitted to the erstwhile governor of Singapore that the " original Sin" for the lack of preparation and all that this led to must be placed on the heads of the military.

The same heads that many system answer for, not the least been the lack of information and training given to their own troops. Shortly before the Japanese invasion, and even as enemy tanks are preparing to roll down the Malay Peninsula, thousands of leaflets, neatly tied in bundles, or found in the comfort and military headquarters. They were official war applets giving non-technical device on how to

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Peel enemy tanks, a man relates to local troops seemed willfully inadequate.

Japanese very flimsy light tanks were vulnerable IF troops knew how and were equipped to defeat them

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It does not meet many guesses as to why they had never been distributed. Some other military leaders in the lighting a did not think that the Japanese would use tanks. Even had this turn out to be the case it is hard to see what harm would have been done in passing on the information. After all, you believe the enemy would use gas but this did not prevent the issue of gas masks. One can only assume that the antitank leaflets were left Mulder and a covered because they were attack was enough to proclaim the heresy. Is a feature a strongly held.must the day steadfastly resist not only on pliable troops but even the famous suggestion of the Bears possibility of the most tangential reference to unacceptable fact that it may should die insights cities be over on that sacred teaching should be found wanting.

After this point the impression may have been given to stupidity, opposite see an wrong decisions were the prerogative of Army commanders. This was not so was amply demonstrated by the Navy. The first start, Naval Chiefs had been the forefront of those responsible for the fact the Japanese the Singapore sold defenses were some text, see were facing 15 inch guns, backed up by a number of 9 inch guns for each of which their only 30 rounds of ammunition -- and after one round per done per day for a month.

But there was worse to follow. As a desperation measure, two battleships, the Prince of Wales and Repulse, were said to Singapore to create an 11th hour presence. There were under the command of at Moser, Phillips, in the words of one who met him " a real old see Donald Lofton top ". Unfortunately he to lack sufficient per space acidly. Despite strong warnings that he could not expected adequate air cover, he was soon off with his two ships will in search of trouble ". At first all wet wells ship steamed sweet reassuring the up the East Coast.

In pursuing this course of action and Phillips turn the proverbial blind eye to a second warning which reached them. This state quite categorically: " fighter protection... Will now, the not, the possible ". He felt safe because the weather was bad disguise overcast. But then, place suddenly, the skies cleared. With plaster produced the annual turn to ships and signal Singapore the river burning to banks. This was the last was ever heard from them.

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Tisch it seems that on his return journey he received a port (subsequently proved false) the Japanese had launched attack on the town of one can. Without informing Singapore he decided to will go in and help ". It was a fatal decision. He ships responded by the Japanese Air Force, torpedoed in some of loss to a loss of 840 officers and men. By all accounts those was a brave and conscientious offer officer. But his brain this bordered on full hardiness and his errors of judgment not only had a devastating effect on that which terrorist that much cherished can on commodity, the morale to Singapore civilians, but also sealed the fate of their city. Now there was nothing left which to protect it. Naturally was worse to ask how can a man so excellent in some aspects some respects but so limited in others ever could have recently decision to inflict such grievous loss upon his fellow countrymen?

So much for the Navy. In their chosen field the senior command of the aria it could themselves little better. Is sortie been seen how air Chief marshal Popham broke Popham underestimate shaft underestimated Japanese Japan's air strength in comparison with his own eels sorted group of obsolete aircraft. This same 63-year-old author, whose most noble characteristic was a tendency to follow sleep on the slightest pretext, showed such disastrous residency and in decision in his capacity as Commander in Chief that has official history was moved to state: oh it is possible that he did not fully realize the importance is speed... The need for a quick decision was not apparently realize that headquarters Malaya command. "

But it was in the matter of Japanese air raids to aria command deep first clear demonstration of its limitations. Although the inevitability of air raids must have been obvious for sometime, the first night rate was marred by complete absence of blackout or night fighters and this despite the fact that, as air Chief Marshal Maltby was later to admit, the RA asked at a clear 30 minutes warning of the approaching aircraft. It seems to Japanese they committed the unfortunate faux pas of attacking at night: unforgiving because he conflicted with the official dogma the Japanese were unable to fly their planes during the hours of darkness. This particular idea fix a cost Singapore 61 did in honor and 33 injured.

But the recklessness of the admirals in the dithering of the air marshals Perez nothing to do to to the did in transducer the general spirit is seen the nothing could moved in, not even the pleading other fellow officers. As mobile Arbor says in his book, sinister twilight:

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In Brigadier Simpson, the Chief engineer, which to see Major General Gordon Bennett print sees commanding the eight Australian division, he found it impossible to make them realize that there was an urgent need for antitank defenses. " at first he did not wish to discuss the matter at all, " Simpson noted after demeaning. Simpson was were far. Could not be Australian general understand that there was nothing on the long road to prevent the enemy reaching Joe or? Apparently Gordon Bennett could not, for in his very the night before he wrote, " Malaya command sent Brigadier Simpson to discuss the be the creation of antitank obstacles for use on the road... Personally I have little time for these obstacles... Preferring to stop and destroyed tanks with antitank weapons."

The wonder the Japanese never slow down, no wonder of the time after time... Troops were annihilate by skillful Japanese enveloped in tactics. When the British to decide wrong decisions were made. Communications broke down... Whole pockets of troops were cut off. The first Japanese a tanks appeared and vote came as a great surprise " to the British would not one single tank in Malaya. In the jungle country were the British had insisted tanks could never operate, the Japanese tanks moved easily between the spacious rose of rubber trees. [2]

Major General Gordon Bennett was not, to use the appropriate vernacular, and isolated pocket of resistance nor did hold the record of Ops fancy. In Barber's words: " temps tracked by Brigadier Simpson bracket to improve in and to defenses have been balked at every turn, largely by General Percival who seem to a fixation against such measures... Nothing in been done, nothing was being done despite many previous police. "

A hazard of long-range many rigidly authoritarian hierarchical organization is the ", from time to time, the individual, out of dire necessity or from strong personal conviction, feels compelled to apply pressures to those above them. Is a hazard, because the those of the organization, whether be a Victorian family, and English boarding school or the British Army, the man's pressure always amusing one-way only, downwards rather than upwards. To buck the system, by prodding those above, can have unpleasant consequences.

Percival before WWII

Use it is a measure of the seriousness from which Brigadier

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Simson regarded the situation to the made one last attempt to move his General.

He joined the Raven announced that he would like to take this opportunity of art are talk on the subject to defenses. Percival looked to tribal style but sat down with a tired expression and listened. The General was a difficult man to "warmup". Tall, thin, with super treating teeth, he was a completely negative personality and his first instant when faced with the problem was it couldn't be done -- in direct contrast to Simson news for balked was always " well "let's try." this was why Simson had elected to stay and risk all at the strange meeting in the deadline, and now he spoke with the passionate eloquence of the professional. Defenses were his job main job. He believed implicitly in their value which history entropy Lee proved in modern war. And yet all the materials to hand... He had to staff the materials, he said the Percival, the throw a fixed in semi-permanent defenses, and I think defenses, underwater obstacles, firetraps, mines, anchored but floating barbed wire, methods of looming the water at night... To Brigadier's dismay, the Percival refused his advice. [3]

It seems to Simson was passed taking no for an answer, for he said to the General: " Sir -- I must emphasize the urgency of doing everything to help or troops. There often only partially trained, there's tired in spirit. They been retreating for hundreds of miles. And please remembers costs are, the Japanese are better trained, better equipped, and their inspired by unbroken run of victories... And has to be done now, sir... Once to air it comes in the fire, civilian labor will vanish."

The plate was forceful, respectful and logical but, amazingly, the General remained unmoved. Simpson, his anger rising, said: go look here, General -- I've races question time after time. You've always refused. What's more, if only first used to give me any recent spirit at least only one thing -- why on earth are you taking the stand?"

At long last to general officer commanding the way it gave his answer. "I believe the defenses of the sort you want to throw up are bad for the morale of troops and civilians."

As Barber comments: "Simson was probed frankly horrified" and remember standing there in the room suddenly feeling quite cold, and

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realizing that, except for a miracle, Singapore was as good as lost. As he put on the stand around, Simpson could not for bear to make one last remark --"Sir, it's going to be much worse for morale at the Japanese start running all over the island "."

Percival during the debacle of Singapore

To most people, Percival's excuse for refusing the request of his chief engineer must seem to logical, disabled least. This a lower an airmen's morale to give them a parachute or a householder to stop a burglar a lock for his front door?

Barber has interesting footnotes on this issue: " why was general Percival so biased about defensive works? Simpson believes that, like some other commanders Himalayas were indifferent, folks somewhere in their military education such a dictum on morale had been impressed upon them or the possibly miss understood the true value defenses in the circumstances such as now existed. " [4]

Is certainly not beyond the bounds possibility. It but if so, why should a proper emphasis on the ports of morale during the teaching of other officers become an irreversible, on modified, conditioned reflex for every subservient subsequent situation however inappropriate? And why Al should commanders is the notion the defenses? After all, it does not really require any unusual feed of intellect to appreciate that is more difficult walk to Barb wire and across open country, than any held about why are renting the dishes becomes easier target than one without these impediments to progress, what is he should to repel waterborne invasion made under cover of darkness if the attacking forces can be blinded and illuminated by search lights?

With other observation by Barbara points up another curious feature of these phenomena and shows that they were by no means confined to the Singapore will campaign ". When for collection that was Secretary of War he visited the EF the 1939 and was aghast at the lack of defense works, and plainly showed his annoyance, with a result according to a starry of December 2, 1939, will Ironside CID has after his visit to be a half came steaming and with great emphasis told me that the officers were most upset of the criticisms made about lack of defenses... He said court was writing to do is not to resign. " by

It seems an inability to understand the value of defense was sorely not because many indifference to criticism. There's also sobering implication even the chief of the Imperial General staff evidently regarded the lack of defenses is rather less important

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Each in the fact military feelings had been hurt. Kennedy did somewhere in the minds of some professional military commanders to Larson Nash rolled the distaste for defensive responses were to mark

Defensive, as opposed offense of, responses rank low in military esteem. Defensive activity is protective, womanly, one might almost a maternal. In sacks, to use a particular trike that opposite metaphor, is a male who penetrates a fortress of the female; he is the attacker, she is the defender. For the male to carry out elaborate preparations for his own safety is to some extent in a minute, an admission of weakness. For the male who is doubts about his own guerrilla, whose life in choice of career are governed by unconscious doubts about his own masculinity and set a sexual adequacy, such in family activities maybe and have them out. The same token is possible there is an affinity between the behavior of the generals in Singapore and refusal on the part of male industrial workers to wear protective clothing, ear plugs and the like.

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* in both cases there is perhaps the feeling that is on masculine to defend yourself one South, the by so doing what appears to be assisting.

In the case of Percival Gordon Bennett, to rack defenses with them into admit to themselves the danger which they stood. In other words, they're perfect inside professed anxiety about civilian morale was really displaced from signee about their own morale. Looking further into the story of Singapore was struck by the compulsive element in his refusal to military to defend itself. Such compulsive behaviors typical menu present and authoritarian personality and ARCO reared " in an organization would traditionally deals with the or endangered by ritualistic means"-- " poll", drill, parades, except her combo devices are confounded aggression exhibiting ritual and display in many animals, their purpose being to keep interest PCs aggression within pounds. Contemplation of instant actual mechanisms in lower animals suggest yet another contributor you reason for the behavior of these jurors the inefficient general. It is that of helpless in resignation in the face of overwhelming same species aggression. Whereas the brown rat, the most ferocious of fighters, will turn and attack any large predator, it makes no such attempt to defend itself against concerted attack by fellow rats. Under the circumstances

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* according to Donald McIntyre, the deficit so many gunnery officers in the Royal Navy is to the fact they think it unmanly to wear your plugs [6]

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The alien rat which has unwittingly and fringed in territorial rights of another column he lets itself to beached to warn to shreds rather than fight back

Addison level such behavior could well be part and parcel of appeasement tendencies. Courting the Conrad Blair or lands these rich lies behavior patterns with distaste constitute appeasement gestures and involved in a large variety of animals as the ultimate defense against the otherwise lethal effects of interest PCs aggression. In trying to appease another member of the same species, General does everything to avoid stimulating its aggression. A kick lead for example, he lists aggression in another by displaying its colors, unfolding it spins are spreading its deal covers to exhibit its body contours as fully as possible. If the same fish and wishes to pieces superior pony it does exactly the opposite: it goes pale, drowsiness bands, displays the narrow side of its body and moves slowly, skillfully, literally stealing away all aggression eliciting stimuli.

The tendancy to appease, to "turn the other cheek", looms large in human affairs, whether in the "love your enemies" sense of Christian teaching or in the bowing of subordinates to their superiors, that there is no reason to suppose it does not also occur in certain sorts of military commanders when confronted by such seemingly hopeless odds and fighting far from home

But to continue to story: shortly after his conversation with Simson, General Percival was visited by the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Far East, General Sir Archibald Wavell. On this incident wobble road that he didn't " very much taken that nothing had been done " and, " speaking some ass. He ", demanded to know why. Percival gave the same answer but he'd given to Simpson: to preserve civilian morale. Wave over toward that it would be very much worse for morale to troops on the Peninsula were driven back onto the island.

The upshot is encounter was a directive from Churchill giving detailed instructions and how defend the North Shore. The measures listed were precisely those to the advocated by Simson. But despite these pressures, transmitted to him via wobble, Percival still do nothing. When he eventually issued a planning was are ready to Lake, the necessary civilian labor was no longer available.

On the disposition of his forces Percival sinking see no less deranged. The other men hold a force in reserve the could be rushed quickly to wear the Japanese eventually chose to land, he decided

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To spread is troops thinly over Longmont. In other words, he decided now will because it would be good for morale will just exactly what he refused to do earlier because it would be bad for morale. In his " battle of Singapore will order of the day, Percival may great player phrases like " the enemy within our Gates ", " lose stock "" rumor monger" count, RELATED to alarm civilians (for factor virtually was no fit column (. In this from the man who had laid much stress on the importance of civilian morale.

With us. Barbara rights: " and all the catalog of ineffectual leadership... Nothing is quite so puzzling as the virtual absence of any detail and action during the last purchase hours of daylight before the Japanese attack... Is hard to believe the modern General could so easily ignore was happening around them." [7]

By this time, and to everyone, including label, predicted quite correctly the Japanese attack would come from the Northwest. There were good reasons for this prediction, however, Percival immediately ordered the vast toward quantities of defense to worship be shifted from the Northwest to the northeast corner of Singapore, turn this despite the fact that reconnaissance is shown there were insuperable obstacles to attack in the northeast.

However, having the stores the northeast Percival then learned that the enemy was massing in the Northwest. He probably order all stores moved back again. But by now it was again to Lake.

For the Allies was week of chaos and confusion on the lead by any vestiges of competent generalship. Thanks in the absence of defenses, including of prior to use a search lights which have been assembled to blindly targets of the attackers as a prattle their way across to Joe Horst rights, the Japanese landed almost unmolested. Despite a devastating garage and Japanese artillery, this guns, instead of counting the enemy's point of embarkation, remained new, awaiting orders it never chain. Despite the weeks of warning, Allied ground forces were speedily outflank, encircled, caught off or routed.

In all this, Percival's want of journals that had this on the boss: " it seems evident, dwell Percival paid lip service to the need to team time, he failed to take the only step which might have enabled him to do so. I defenses been constructed interwar in December and early January, there might well have been a chance for Singapore

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to survive for sufficient time for the Australian Air Force and its reinforcements from the Middle East to arrive. The

In the event 138,708 British, Indian and Australian Soldiers either died or went into captivity.

With all the in Smith's instances of military incompetence considered in his book, it is the Paula Singapore which most clearly gives the lie to the so-called "bloody fool" theory of military ineptitude. Percival was in fact highly intelligent and showed himself in previous years to be a bright staff writer

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Chapter 12

Arnhem

"*All be accumulated evidence confirms that, like Gallipoli, this was a British disaster where naked courage lacked the bodyguard of competent planning, competent intelligence, competent technology. Yet wars object is victory, not the Victoria Cross, and it was shameful that by autumn 1944 we could still be so amateur*"


-- Ronald Lewin

"*It began to seem to me to the generals had got us into something they had no business doing.*"

-- A private Soldier on Arnhem

If it achieved nothing else, "Operation Market-Garden", Montgomery's plan to capture and hold a bridgehead crossed the Rhine in northern Holland, at least demolishes the myth that military incompetence stems from stupidity. For sheer initiative, quickness of mind, fortitude and selfless heroism, the conduct of those who actually fought the battle has never been surpassed. By the same token, the men who planned and administered the operation were probably as intellectually gifted, will trained, professional competent, dedicated and conscientious as any military planners have ever been. Yet the unfolding of "Market-Garden" revealed all the symptoms of high-level military incompetence.

youtube.com/watch?v=7WftY4JUHMo



In its conception, the plan was a high-risk venture which, if it had paid off, might have shortened the war by several months. A secondary feature the plan was that it promised to gratify Montgomery's wish this armies would win the race for Berlin. In the event this secondary incentive took precedence over the first, with calamities results.

The Market-Garden will was a two-stage operation. In the first stage a

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massive Airborne operation into northern Holland was timed to coincide with the invasion of southern Holland by land forces of British Second Army. In the second stage the paratroops and glider-borne forces of the 1st Airborne Division were to capture and hold the great road bridge at Arnhem while the tanks of second army's XXX Corps raced across the Holland to consolidate their gains. Success depended upon absence of serious enemy resistance in the Arnhem area; the capture of the bridge before the Germans the time to blow it up or bring up reinforcements; successive ways of airborne reinforcements from England, to back up the initial drop; and, finally, the arrival at Arnhem of XXX Corps *within 48 hours* of the drop.

The failure of the operation resulted from a concantation of the following factors:

1. As a result of his neglect to open up the port of Antwerp by clearing the Schelde estuary, Montgomery allowed the German 15th army to escape into northern Holland, where was it available to defend the approaches to Arnhem. [EDITOR: as an engineer Dixon should know that the Canadian Army and 79th Armoured Division with combat engineering devices and amphibious tanks/APCs were taking the western-most and hence soggiest Dutch terrain towards Antwerp as Market-Garden was going on. The point should be why didn't Montgomery ask his brother-in-law, General Hobart for just a few handfuls of swimming tanks/APCs that would have been all he needed to reinforce 1st Airborne and make the operation a success? Dixon suggests egotism here and we concur--we believe Monty didn't want Hobart to get the spotlight again like he had on D-Day where his "*funnies*" enabled the British to go 7-10 miles inland with light casualties while the foot-slogging, un-mechanized Americans were still stuck on Omaha beach with heavy casualties. We think Monty wanted to win at Arnhem using non-mechanized foot troops seizing bridges to showcase them as not needing tanks, with catastrophic results.]

2. The arrival at Arnhem of XXX Corps depended upon them advancing across 64 miles of enemy-held territory on a 1-tank front along elevated, unprotected highways, flanked by blind by a soft and sodden tank-proof landscape, interspersed with waterways. Any delay -- a blown bridge, an enemy ambush, a blocked road -- and the entire column would be stopped. Any delay and the Germans would have more time to bring up reinforcements. In the event it is hardly surprising that XXX Corps never did reach Arnhem--that they could not achieve even in nine days what had been scheduled to take 48 hours. [EDITOR: XXX Corps DID reach Arnhem 7 days late, Dixon is wrong about this. LVTs of 79th Armoured could also swim and drive across Dutch wetlands, see embedded video documentary]

3. As might have been expected from what is known of English autumns, the mist if not the mellow fruitfullness of an English late September delayed the departure of subsequent gliders and paratroops for the reinforcement of 1st Airborne Division.

4. What "Market-Garden", perhaps more than most military operations, necessitated good communications between the various units and commanders of the attacking force. But here technology failed them. Though it was now 50 years since Marconi had succeeded in sending messages by wireless, the radio sets carried by the invasion force proved useless. Unless within earshot of each other, no one knew what anyone else was doing.

5. Since the Airborne Assault was to take place in daylight, and because it was vital that XXX Corps should complete their journey

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within 48 hours, the whole enterprise depended upon an absence of strong German forces both in the Arnhem area and on the approach route from the South. Hence it came as something of a jolt when SHAEF received reports from the Dutch underground that two SS panzer divisions which had mysteriously "disappeared" sometime previously had now reappeared almost alongside the drop zone. This information, passed on to Montgomery, received support from British aerial photography of German tanks in the Arnhem area. Meanwhile forward troops of British Second Army reported a buildup of German forces along *their* intended line of advance.

This was the moment to reassess the risks involved. But since these ugly facts did not accord with what had been planned, they fell upon a succession of deaf years. Taking the lead from Montgomery, who had described the SHAEF report as ridiculous, British Second Army headquarters were quick to discount it also. When one of his intelligence officers showed him the aerial photographs of German armor, General Browning, at first British Airborne HQ retorted: "*I wouldn't trouble myself about these if I were you... They're probably not serviceable at any rate*". The Intelligence officer was then visited by the Corps medical officer, who suggested he should leave some leave because he was so obviously exhausted. And at First Allied Army HQ, the chief intelligence officer, British Lt. Col., decided there was no direct evidence that the Arnhem area contained "*much more than the considerable flak defenses already known to exist*". As Ryan puts it: "*all down the Allied line of command the evaluation of intelligence on the panzers in Arnhem area was magnificently bungled.*"

Finally, just in case there were any residual doubts, the intelligence staff of Second Army came up with the reassuring opinion that any German forces in Arhem area "*were weak, demoralized and likely to collapse entirely if confronted with a large airborne attack*".

"Market-Garden" went ahead-but not quite as planned. Instead of encountering a few old man who collapsed or ran away, 1st Airborne Division fell upon a Hornet's nest of German armor. Far from being demoralized, the enemy fought like tigers to defend the gateway to their homeland. And far from sweeping across Holland to aid the hard-pressed paratroops, the tanks of Second Army's XXX Corps were reduced to a crawl by the combination of unsuitable terrain and a determined opposition.

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Defeat was absolute and terrible. Short on everything but courage, the men of 1st Airborne Division held on until their numbers had been reduced from 10, 005 to less than a quarter of that figure. Total Allied losses -- in killed, wounded and missing -- **exceeded 17,000**, some 5, 000 more than those who became casualties on D-Day. Dutch civilian casualties from "Market-Garden" have been estimated at between 500 and 10,000.

Apart from what one American historian has described as a "*50-mile salient-- leading nowhere*", nothing had been gained beyond a lesson for posterity; though even this had its impact weakened by Field Marshal Montgomery's subsequent description of "*Market-Garden grow as a 90% success*, a sentiment which drew from Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands to comment: "*my country can never again afford the luxury of a Montgomery success*". [1]

The student military disasters, the attack on Arnhem ranks with Kut and the Bay of Pigs fiasco (see page 397). Through inappropriate risk-taking, under-estimation enemy, the neglect of unpalatable information and a failure of technology, military decisions by able brains, at high levels of command, brought down misery and chaos.

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PART TWO

"*Its better to struggle with a stallion when the problem is how to hold back, then to urge on a pole which refuses to budge.*"

--Israeli General Moshe Dyan

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Author's note

He's because of their juxtaposition, the preceding accounts military disasters may have given the impression that they are typical of military endeavor. This is not so. The very fact that they have provided material for so many books and plays attest of their comparative rarity. The same token, incompetent senior commanders are outnumbered by their competent Bradley. However, as we've seen, military incompetence, what does occur can be immensely costly; which is one annex part of this book was written with no holds barred. Just as a book on cancer cannot afford to be neatly not about malignancy, or gloss over the hazards of carcinogens and dangerous patterns of behavior, still work of military incompetence but not be worth the paper was written on if you do not guilty and expose what is unpleasant. The military incompetence, like cancer, is part of the price paid for complexity. Whatever else does, the analysis of the potential for military incompetence, my dad for cancer, serves to emphasize that most armies and eighties, but most bodies, perform the numerous and difficult functions with some efficiency most the time.

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Chapter 13

Is there a case to answer?

Not only of completed a survey can covering over 100 years of military mishaps, what conclusions can be drawn regarding the incidence of military incompetence?

In their number of possible answers. Firstly, it could be argued that so-called incompetence of high levels of command is really a pigment of the imagination of vindictive, inaccurate or untruthful historians. In (it might also be argued that if, on rare occasions, some commanders of show minor lapses in their generalship either not matters to be spoken of, let alone made subject to extensive analysis.

A second conclusion might be what seems to have been military incompetence was really due to other, nonmilitary factors, such as governmental stinginess, bigger ease of the weather and sheer padlock.

A fair conclusion might be distance every military action is an uncontrolled experiment, in since he can never be known what would have been the outcome had sued decisions been different, they're amazing almost on the national possibility that things like have been worse, that what was done did represent the least disastrous of possible outcomes open. Many of the costly actions of the First World War fall into this category.

No one would deny a nominal grain of truth in all these propositions. Facts do get distorted in the town. Disasters are indeed more newsworthy than successes. Writers undoubtedly do entertain worse possible picture of their particular bit and wants, many generals have had to contend with the ineptitude, uninformed

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Interference and stinginess of the political masters, and of course things might have been worse Berry

There are counter-arguments, however. Because they are they are surrogate father figures, people are only too many in anxious to love their admirals and generals, but shuttling time of war. One is only to read Lotus is fabulous channels to realize that even the most outrageous eccentricities (eccentricities which would not be tolerated in any other walk applied (are considered in using it not actually in gearing one part and parcel of something Mr. Warner. After all, even surge on French still has his circle of devoted admirers. As Albert asked puts it: " a very large part of military history is written, if not first rest purposes of supporting an Army's authority in prestige, at least with the intention of not hurting, not revealing its secrets, avoiding the betrayal of weakness, desolation or distemper". Historical record of warfare is thus dependent on the writers desire to preserve reputations. [1]

All in all men, the case for maintaining that there is a biased words exaggerating the incidence and extent of military incompetence is perhaps compensated for by some quite contrary tendencies.

Under the circumstances, this book takes the view that certain sorts of incompetence have been an endearing feature of the military scene and amongst the millions of officers and men who have fought to row clean viciously additionally, over often under the most time conditions, there have marched small but influential number was ability has fallen for sure of that required by the positions they held. Two questions and occur. Is there any common pattern to this in incompetence, and, if there is, once does it arise?

It's a first step towards answering these questions less try and summarized data contained in the foregoing chapters. In brief, then, military incompetence involves:

1. A serious wastage of human resources and fair to observe one of the first principles of war -- economy of force. This value to rise in part from the inability to make were swiftly. It also derives from certain attitude to mind which we shall consider presently.

2. A fundamental conservatism and clinging to outworn tradition, and inability to profit from past experience (owing in part to her refusal to admit past mistakes pregnancies. It also involves a failure to use her tendency to misuse available technology. Stryker

3. A tendency to reject or ignore information which is unflappable or which complex where preconceptions.

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4. And tendency to underestimate the enemy and overestimate the capability of one's own side.

5. In decisiveness and a tendency to add the gain from the role decision maker.

6. And opposite in persistence any given past despite strong contrary evidence. The

7. A failure to exploit a situation game and a tendency to pull punches rather than push home intact.

8. Failure to make adequate reconnaissance.

9. A per election for funnel salts, often against enemy strongest point.

10. A believe in brute force rather than the clever ruse.

11. A failure to make use of surprise or deception.

Well. An undue rating is to ice skate goes for military setbacks.

13. A suppression or distortion of news in the front, usually rationalize is necessary for morale or security.

14. A believe in mystical forces -- fate., padlock, etc..

Some or all of these several aspects of incompetence have played a significant part and military mishaps considered in earlier chapters.

Release now show they have common etiology and can be understood in terms of complex interaction between the nature of military organizations and certain features of human personality. There way of a starting point less first consider the question of wastage human resources. As we shall see, this perhaps the best single key to all what we need to understand.

On logical if not humanitarian grounds the maintenance of an efficient for should be the first consideration of a military commander. Other qualities of general ship will down than nothing in the as no one left to do dividing. Excess of loss of life in high casualty figures with Air Force and like a likely indicator of military incompetence. In reality to situation is far more complex. Ancestry situations have to be distinguished. Firstly, there are the well-known cases of what seemed to be purely administered of incompetence, as for example in what Lord laugh and has described as the missile all current expedition of 1809. The purpose of this expedition was to attack Antwerp, the troops were in fact that waiting for eight hours on unhealthy walker an island in season. In the event, and owing to the procrastination of military commander, lower chat them, and enable commander,

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Sir Richard Stratton (" a Dole hesitate incompetent pair"(, 7000 men died, 14,000 either health permanently ruined and thousands more became ill, mostly from Larry. Only 217 were killed in action. While dying the men were given no attention and little to eat. As laugh in remarks: all sick men were expendable. " [2]

The same genre was the appalling wastage and human life in the Crimean war. During his campaign the Army suffered 30% decline his strength through disease, malnutrition and exposure. Before main factors appear to have been ignorance, lack of initiative and inventiveness, killing disregard for the welfare of junior ranks, and the fear of offending higher authority. (the nearest approach to distant modern times was the bombing incompetence and callous indifference of London Boro counsels to the problem posed by air raids in the blitz of 1940 and 1941 and ascribed to laggard bureaucrats assessed only with their own prestige. [3]

A second-class manpower wastage is that involving casualties from enemy action as a result of the incompetent planning a senior military commanders. The men who piercing attack on for we are in the Indian mutiny, the thousands of casualties in the Germans use of gas in 1915, the 13,000 went into captivity following procedure Kut, the hundred 30 casualties in Singapore, the 8500 Americans who died in he our dens offensive of 1944 and a 17,000 British, American and polls Polish were killed wounded or reported missing at RM fall into this category.

There are of course several cases of gross wastage which fallen to both the aforementioned categories. Thus an ill-fated retreat from Kabul page 75 (the loss of an entire Army of 4000 far better men and 12,000 camp followers is partly trembled a climactic factors per the several thousand died of coal (the partly due to presentations by hostile tribesmen. In both cases their demise resulted from the monumental people does an indecision of the commander-in-chief, General Elphinstone.

The third in most cost the type of manpower wastage is that resulting from the deliver policy of attrition adopted by commanders who regard as Soldiers is wholly expendable; journals for whom the conservation and human life rank lower in importance to Darius other criteria which were covering their actions. A good early example does, is to be found in Napoleon campaigns, as suggested by his remark: " a man such as I am is not much concern over the lives of one million man ". The million or so no one Somme, and

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Were done in a Passchendale were victims of the same attitude of mine.

This former mobile but by no means exhaustive list of human Cassidy suggested over the years a handful of senior military commanders have become careless"-- to save least -- with the fighting forces with which they were entrusted. Upon closer analysis, however it seems that their failure to fulfill the primary function of the commander, the culprits fallen to two categories. Firstar of those like Alvin Stone, Ragland, buller and personable: mild, courteous and peaceful man who, though no doubt carry deeply about the fearful losses which their Army sufferers, seen quite incapable of any other rating situation.

Thus, Elphinstone could have occupied the Fortress about largest are. He could have allowed his troops to prevent frostbite by wearing makeshift goodies. He could have started the retreat earlier and completed it more quickly. Likewise Ragland could've exerted pressure on the government of the day to supply the crying needs of his troops. He could have taken direct action to procure firewood for the thousands who were dying of exposure. He couldn't galvanize to staff and some sort of remedial activity. He did not in these things, preferring to withdraw into the relative comfort of his farmhouse headquarters. Personal could've instituted defenses for jaw for an island of Singapore. He could've prepared adequate air raid defenses in shelters for the citizens of Singapore. He chose not to.

Buller, perhaps the most interesting case of all, could stabilize by a more generous deployment of his forces. So deeply did you feel for the suffering is mended carry the principal economy forces such legitimate curse ludicrous extent that thousands died for want to help from the tens of thousands Slightly standing by.

While the incompetence of these menacing spring from a crippling passivity and lack of what General Gordon Bennett has called progressive spirit world, they stood in sharp contrast to those of a second group would be setting Stan was overwhelming ambition coupled with the terrifying insensitivity to the suffering of others. These, men like a, Townshend, Walpole, Nixon, and jaw for it, seemed delegate to one goal dedicated to one goal -- self-advancement. Main, devious, steaming and dishonest, they were certainly not in active in the courses they pursued, nor of course were they necessarily without military towns.

In all of this we are anticipating a theory a military competence rather different from that held by proponents of the so-called " bloody to "

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Theory. Perhaps we are being too complicated -- perhaps intellectually Defense deficit could explain the doubt? Let us then, before considering the other factors contributing to military competence, first examined is older and more favored hypothesis.

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Chapter 14

The intellectual ability of senior military commanders

"I feel a fundamental crippling and curiousness about our officers. Too much body and too little head."

-- T.E. Lawrence

"Most British defeats have been caused by stupidity".

-- Karen Lee Barnett, The Desert Generals

What grounds are there, then, for the most popular explanation the military incompetence -- stupidity?

There is a suggestion that the Armed Forces did not attract the best brains. A recent column serving United States but the status of Army officers below that of protesters, positions, clergymen in school teachers. As Moorestown which remarks: " the liberal ideology... Bolted since war is essentially distracted, the best minds are attracted to more positive in numbers. Called Juan according to Field Marshal Montgomery this is been true for some time. Writing of 1787, he noted that the Army was the normal career of the less bright younger sons." to the end of 1907 he wrote: oh... In those days the Army did not attract the best brains in the country. Will

The gander is supposed to low quality of Officer cadets entered into services. According to Janowitz,: " the impression exist among educators the intellectual level of those entering the military profession via the service academies reflected the adequate effective and adequate minimum standards rather than any excessive concentration of students at the upper an of the intelligence continuing home three

The same writer knows dead in Britain 60% of all entrants

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to a military Academy are greatly before arrival is liked to make the below average officer. You grant

In training for generalship, it seems intellectual ability has not always count for very much. Even hate, will be educated Soldier, became commander-in-chief of the British Army in the first world war despite a poor academic record. This dour lowly Scout Scott, described by Duff Cooper as the done to the family, but Lloyd George as " utterly stupid", and by bring on as Pete to block, had been very greatest difficulty in passing the Sandhurst enters exam, and only with the help of a clamor this knowledge of the academy's methods virtually guaranteed a straight through even the Dulles candidate per search Henry Wilson, who later became CID has had the distinction of failing three times in his attempts to enter the RM see. And

In well light might well be asked why they bothered with the selection procedure which purported to test for intellectual ability was in purpose could still easily be circumvented. Major General floor, according to Sir John Smith, one to a clamor who had learned by rote the answers to 12 likely questions. Since 50% of the predicted questions came up in the examination to alert managed to record Mark 497 out of 500 explanation mark for so unaccustomed were the RM see examiners to any sort of intellectual effort than 11 get memorize to set block on the Peninsula are war he was accused of cheating!

That intellectual performance counter for little when it came to subsequent promotion the Army might seem suggested by the scholastic progress appeal Marshall's Montgomery and Acoma, both of whom scraped into and passed out Sandhurst with low marks.

Commenting on these phenomena, Smith makes the point that"he says quite a lot of the stiffness of the standard Sandhurst Entergy can, and for the high standard of competition well to college, the both of these very capable officers should have passed both in and out of college with such comparatively modest placing. " not he may be right, though in the light of other evidence a more logical explanation would be that the academic requirements of the RM sea are not wholly relevant to those actually required for competent generalship. Certainly, a very performance and military schools is no guarantee of subsequent ability pill it. General Coley, whose succession of the each culminated in 1881 in his own demise at much of the hill, and extinction of passing out of staff cause of the highest marks on record. You relevant so

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Early scholarship to subsequent generalship also find support in Napoleon in Wellington both of whom itchy very low grade school sex. A more recent times the very early academic brilliance of the to General Percival evidently impaled him little as Singapore

However, will military history is replete with examples have wanted the job stupidity, there are grounds for believing SS explanations merely reflect a preference for simple theories of what are really very complex phenomena. If the complex phenomena is unpleasant and the simple explanation abusive, then so much the better.

You taking here is it those intellectual shortcomings which appear to underlying military incompetence they have nothing whatsoever to do with intelligence, but usually result from the effect upon native ability of two aged and related traditions. The first of these originally founded in fact, is it fighting depends more upon muscle than brain, the second it a show of education is not only bad form but likely to be a positively in capacity. The problems of these traditions was mentioned by HM, some commissioners her Majesty's commissioners interrupt or upon the military bundling in the South African war. Though today take a pessimistic view of the educational standard and intellectual ability of officers from the Post Jr. to the most senior chemical council noted to their dismay that will keenness is out of fashion and not the correct form probe. Seven

One is only to read subsequent descriptions of military Naval training establishments proposition to realize that their words seem to fallen on deaf ears. In such places as size, muscle and probably said games still constituted the main criteria by which a man was judged. When writing of personalities who passed to Sandhurst, Peter Smith, PC, dwells cheaply upon their physical attributes. He says afield Marshal Alexander the was a good long-distance runner; the cadet who won the sort of honor was a fine athlete and captain of the rotor team probe, an officer who was killed in 1915 will possessed a fine physique and was conspicuous in every sport he took up". Eight in light of these and similar comments the uninitiated might be forgiven for thinking that the main purpose of the Royal military college was a turnout athletes or male models Ottoman brains capable of mastering the intricacies of war.

For feeling there are some who have seen the threat to originality and intelligent thinking in this approach. As recently as 1955, at the sovereign spur rate, the Duke of Edinburgh tilted history to say:

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"finally, as you grow older, you try not to be afraid of new ideas. New or original ideas can be as bad as well as good, the war as an intelligent man with an open mind can demolish a bad idea by reasoned argument, those who allow their brains atrophy resort to meaningless catch phrases, to derision and finally to anger in the face of anything new. " nine

Intellectual level of future military leaders is below the average for other comparable professions, it seems a subsequent training did little to redress the balance. There have been locations for believing in a conspiracy to keep that way. In 19 wanted the acres Douglas committee, inquiring into RMA affairs, advocated doing away entirely with civilian instructors and using only Army officers. Is inbreeding of the uneducated was, however, resisted by the later may seek committee, will, depressed by what they found, considered that:

1. The general education of cadet should be continued (and impossible state of affairs of the instructors were themselves on educate (.

2. Few young officer showed any capacity for command.

3. there was too much drill, to acknowledge rigid discipline and too much cramming for marks.

4. The instructors were mediocre and selected for prowess games and smartest rather been further knowledge of the subject they had to teach or their qualifications as teachers.

Much the same picture has been painted brick Canyon, forerunner of the Royal Naval college at Dartmouth. Again, the emphasis was on blind obedience, sport in ceremonial, which can regard to intellectual pursuits and little pride in knowing one's job.

The Cantonese which produced a man whose incompetence has sometimes cost society gear cannot be entirely held the blame for the eat those and I is which they maintain. Equally culpable or those who incurred them. Even as recently as 1949, after a war which was nearly lost to the effect of the cerebral Millstone of archaic tradition, Admiral to fleet the Earl of core can or, having taken the salute of Dartmouth, urged the cadets to " absorb tradition" -- rather as one might a juror a suffer from rheumatoid rheumatism to absorb some ancient well tried limit. Even Army there is the account of how one famous general, after suspecting the Royal military Academy, confined himself to praising the drill rather entirely on the importance of knowing the job of modern Soldiering.

Perhaps the clearest indication of the intellectual abyss created

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Officer Training comes from rule full comments by the men themselves. SGS Brand remarked of Dartmouth College: " unhappily, in spite of all the air average the * were not well educated in contrast to the public school get cadets whose outlook and knowledge were so much broader than my own., "s can in this context, Janowitz makes the point that only the most exceptional senior commanders can allow themselves to question your choice of the military career. This General Robert E. Lee admitted that " the greatest mistake of my life was taking a military education ", and General Stillwell said "it is common knowledge that Army ops or as a warning track mind, these personally interested in stirring up or so he can get promotion and be decorated and that he has an extraordinarily limited education with no appreciation of the finer things of life."[11]

Even as recently as 1972 Sandhurst course for onto cadets was reduced from 2 years to 1, and inch which drew from Geoffrey sail, a former director studies at RMA, the comment: " the professionally trained officer corps cannon pretty juiced able to cope of all situations and understand aligned wherefore out his profession in 12 of 13 months is pretty fully is plainly ridiculous. It is to condemn the long-term officer was not a graduate to being semi educated, a worthy object of the BBC's characters."[12]

Whether or not intellectual shortcomings lie at the heart of much military incompetence, the facts remains the deliberate colt of anti-intellectual is a has characterized the armed services. Both were just relate, as we shall see, too much deeper reasons for military mishaps the near or ignorance or slowness of mine, the fact remains at its attacks have not been helpful. The generals and admirals between the wars denigrate progressive bankers and poor scorn on menu robots which challenged existing practices must surely have tended to stifle any exercise of the intellect by those who wanted to get on, and deterred the gifted from ever seeking a military career. As Robert McNamara once remarked " brains are like hearts, they go where they are appreciated."

Even as late as a second world war of the painful effects of anti-intellectual wasn't were taking a toll off much-needed brainpower. A classic examples that of Major General Dorrien-Smith. This outspoken but exceptionally gifted officer whose talents were appreciated

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* cadets entering direct from preparatory school.

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(in use (by such unequivocally great general says Walpole, often lack and O'Connor created such resentment of his intellectual abilities in the military establishment that when he was relieved of his post as deputy seeds the IDS Cairo after the first battle on our main his ball with final. While there was no recovery. All those in Army who bore him ill will, that never forgiven him his brilliance and on orthodoxy, sought to that... The Word quietly filtered through the military "establishment called the Dorrien-Smith was not to be given a chance to rebuild his career". [13]

The status feature of NI intellectualism is it often reflects an actual suppression of intellectual activity rather than any lack of ability. This is suggested by the rapidity with which so many military men rushed into print as soon as they are retired. Evidently evidently there was something waiting to get out. Unfortunately as were the heart points out, a lifetime of having occurred the expression of original pot it accumulates so often in their being nothing left to express. Recent research on the relationship between mental activity and cerebral blood flow [14] at exploit to the old believed of the blame, when muscle atrophies from prolonged disuse. Perhaps this touches upon the real cost military incompetence -- age? Since traditionally promotion has demanded depended upon seniority, commanders, generals and appalled have tended to be old, and suspension, memory, intelligence and special census all deteriorate with age, and maybe bad generals are just old generals? Certainly can be said that age will intensify most effects of the mind, [15] and over the years equality of generals has seemed not unrelated to retiring age. And no point was as more and evidence tendering the Crimean war (page 37 (and then again in the 1930s. Another contribution to incompetence tied with age was the on healthful tendency to satcom forcibly retire or otherwise curtail the promotion of the Zhang officers to unwise the fail to conceal their lights beneath bushels of conformity.

Such was the case of Major General J. After it sea. Four. On December 13, 1933, four, when the most intellectually gifted men ever served in the British army, was placed in retired list. This waste of talent resulted from the British prejudice aroused by is fully borne out prophecies, and the fact that he dared criticize those left gifted than himself.

Now at the time for had a champion in the men relatively juvenile general I inside, who recorded regarded the retirement as a scandal and opined

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The polar had the best brain Army. However, when however, I inside was the position to reinstate polar, immediately cried off, saying: 00, I couldn't do that -- it would upset to turn the promotion. " as little heart remark: " this was a sadly revealing example of how even the progress of the mind Soldier tended to be subservient to the laws of " W. Stern ". Internist Ironside should be added that 1939 he did try to means that for, but this time, just one year before the Army was nearly annihilate by the sort of Armed Forces which polar had been in advocating, the reinstatement was scotched by the war office.

Yet another way in which age determines incompetence is to the voluntary resignation of intelligent young officers. According to Janowitz, our recent study the US Army Lt. Suggested the Prater once resigned as soon as they have completed their obligation or is, while those less well-equipped remain. This natural selection would military begins finding the brighter people in the upper echelons of the military establishment.

The notwithstanding these considerations, age is far from being a complete explanation the military incompetence, whether been plenty of cable old generals and some remarkably inapt one's young ones. As factsed as noted: cop will generals of 80, generals who are sick of body and even them in mind, have one important victories. " moreover, but very complex nature of military incompetence defies any explanation as simple as that of civility. Indeed, there are grounds for guarding the age factor is a symptom rather than a cost. The those look at another aspect and what appears to be intellectual incompetence the urge to pontificate.

The relation between the roles of ignorance and modification in military incompetence is not entirely simple. Personally, in accordance with the principle that nature of or is a backing, ignorance tends to evoke pontificate shouldn't in those waste concealment acknowledged, or for whom ignorance of backs means that they feel free to express strong wheel believes of a contrary nature. For harmless enough examples of the first of these two classes of modification there is anecdote of the start of cocky debt due, when asked why I was 22/7, was told by his mentor: " is not for us to question the wisdom of the Admiralty. "

Simon Reagan is given an amusing and using illustration of the second-class

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of modification. " I have never forgotten the trouble I got into for contradicting a general who announced sodomy had rotten rotted the Roman Empire; the fact does officers clearly knew scarcely knew a word of Latin and by his own confession and never read Allied of given was held to be irrelevant." [16]

Rather more serious are those modifications which in to make nasty tax go away a magical process of emitting loud noises in the opposite direction. Here are some utterances of this kind.

Field Marshal Montgomery-Massenburg, she for the Imperial General staff 1926 to 1933: " there are certain critics in the press to say we should organize the Army again for a war in your. Character God is not likely to be used for big war in Europe for many years to come.

Sir Ronald Charles, Master General of organs: while there is no likelihood of war in our lifetime. " this was said at the time of Hitler's a session to power. In, also before last war, search you and owls, director of military training: " the Japanese are no danger to us and sheer for our friendship."

In column were the accuracy of communication be a matter of life or death, the predisposition to become pontificate is a dangerous liability. Partially such a predisposition disposition will be strongest and those like headmasters, judges, prison governors and senior military commanders in for too long have been a position to lord it over their fellowmen. Unfortunately such a predisposition will also be strongest in authoritarian organizations were the preservation of apparent on missions by those about may be deemed of more importance than the truth. * school maker Parker

In the important thing about pond bisque pontificate shin is that though an intellectual exercise its origins are emotional.

Closely allied to pontificate she and the less hazardous is cognitive cognitive dissonance. This uncontrolled mental uncomfortable mental state arises when a person possesses knowledge or believes which conflict with the decision is made. The following hypothetical situation should make a matter plane. A heavy smoker experience is dissonance because the knowledge that he smokes is inconsistent with the knowledge of smoking causes cancer. Justifies it impossible to get up cigarettes, he tries to reduce dissonance (i.e. tip the balance toward peace of mind proxies by concentrating

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* according to research by choppy, the fear of failure increases after middle-age [17]

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One justification super smoking and ignoring evidence for its risks. He may tell oneself to the revenue from tobacco helps the government (i.e. he is therefore been patriotic (, it helps keep his weight down and it is a manly, sociable habit. The same time he may well refrain from reading the latest report on the relationship between smoking and lung cancer. Many other hand he cannot avoid being confronted by tiresome statistics, he may well strive to reduce dissonance battalion itself (and others' (the correlation between smoking and cancer could just as well be taken to sickness by the people were going to get cancer anyway tend to smoke in order to war off the disease.

Since first since it was first pronounced by testing juror in 1957, dissonance there has given rise to large number of incurable studies. The precise nature of the underlying psychological process is far from clear, there are certain conclusions which could have serious implications for military decision-making. Then he summarized by saying that: " once the decision is been made in the person is committed to a given course of action, the psychological situation changes decisively. There is less emphasis on objectivity and there's more personality and bias in the way in which the person views and evaluates the alternatives. [18]

Another worse, decision-making may well be followed by a period of mental activity did to be described as at the very least somewhat one-sided. Since the extent of dissonance experience is a function of the importance of decision made, is likely to many military decisions eventually in fairly severe forms of mental disquiet. But military commander cannot afford to reduce dissonance when this involves closing is mine to or " reinterpreting " tolerable information. The dire consequences the might follow such an attempt were only two evident after the cabaret offensive and again during Townshend's advance on Crystal phone. In both instances to ostrich behavior senior officers cost the Army deer.

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* the same may be said the ordinance counterattack in 1944 and a Montgomery starter, in light of subsequent intelligent words to think twice about his decision to capture the bridge it or not.

While the cost of dissonance resolution by some military man baby and orderly high, the probability of these cost occurring is also

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* it being in the first instance and Nixon in the second.

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very high. There are three reasons. In the first place, military decisions are often Iraq erect a vocal but we're revocable. Secondly don't they involve large payouts -- no change in the outcome, including the reputation of the decision maker. Finally, those commanders weak egos, with over strong needs for approval and the most closed mines will be the very ones less able to tolerate the nagging doubts of cognitive dissonance. In other words it will be the least rational you'll be the most likely to reduce dissonance by ignoring on tolerable information. Research on individual differences in cognitive dissonance suggested its effects are likely to be strongest in those afflicted with chronic low self-esteem and general passivity. [19]

More recent research in cognitive dissonance has emphasized another variation of some consequence for military behavior; the degree of justification for the initial decision. Experiments by some Bardo and others are shown that the less justify the decision, the greater will be the dissonance and therefore the more vigorous as resolution. No better example of word than that of Townshend's occupation of Kut. Since his advance of the Tigers was totally unjustified by facts of which he was fully aware, is dissonance, when disaster struck, mustard in extreme and, to a man of his egg each adjustable nature, demanding of instant resolution. So, he did in the face of much contrary evidence, he withdrew in the Kut. The wise impossible course of retreating to bows route would have been a greater admission of the lack of justification for his previous decision. The same token, once inside Kut nothing would by Jim, because the breakout, even to assist those would been sent to release and, where the emphasized his lack of justification for being there in the first place. In short, in inability to met one is been in the wrong with the greater the more wrong one has been, and the more wrong one has been more bizarre will be subsequent attempts to justify the unjustifiable.

We cannot see the relationship between pontificate she and cognitive dissonance. Pontificate she is one of the ways in which people try to resolve the dissonance. By loudly asserting what is consistent with some decision to have made and ignoring what is contrary they can reduced or dissonance. Clearly this particular confrontation of intellectual processes to prove very hazardous and military context.

But there is another aspect of decision-making no less hazardous -- it's " risking us. Recent research has shown that people vary in the degree to which they adjust the riskiness of their decisions to the realities of the

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external situation. 20 individuals who become anxious under conditions of stress, or who are prone to be defensive and did not anything that threatens her self-esteem, tend to be padded judging whether the risks they take, whether cautioned a display, are justified by the possible outcomes the decision spirit per example., they might well adopt the same degree of cautioned whether placing small debt, adding married were starting a nuclear war. The sad irony about the state of affairs, for means those people or most sensitive to the successor starter of decision with the very ones to make the biggest mistakes. Conversely, a less anxious individuals lacked more rationally because they're able to devote greater attention to the realities with which they are confronted.

Obviously these findings have considerable alarming implications for the military scene. There is one psychologist is said: " under stress men are more likely to act irrationally, to strike out blindly, or even to reasons stupid immobility period, [21] others of remark: " the presence of relatively high levels of rationality and decision-making may characterize but a minority of men. Period. We are burdened by a nagging curiosity about how those persons controlling our destiny would distribute themselves within the personality groups outlined. [22] but why should anxious and defensive individuals. Vocal, those who have the most to lose, lacked more in irrationally than those less afflicted by neurosis? To reasons have been advance. Versus been well stated by Deutsche: " nervousness nests, the need to respond quickly because of fear but one will lose either the desire or ability to respond, in enhances the likelihood that response will be triggered off by insufficient stimuli, and thus makes for instability. Probe [23]

The second reason why a proportion of people will make your rational decisions whose richest riskiness is unrelated to reality is because, being Iraq they will strive to maintain image of themselves as either " Bolton daring " or as " careful and judicious decision makers ", indicators to sustain their particular conceit will take precedence over the need to behave realistically. Townshend's risky bid to capture Baghdad is consistent with this principle.

This chapter starter with the intention of examining the oldest area military confidence: the lead in net decisions cursor intellectual disabilities. The simplest form is there he is that some military commanders. The seas like some psychologist (are just plain stupid and their faulty decision spring from low intelligence.

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since decision-making is by definition, a cognitive process then obviously the oldest there he is in one cents a truism, but it by no means follows that the simple hypothesis of low intelligence fits the bill. On the contrary, by looking further and to major decision processes we are compelled to entertain another rather possible different possibility: namely, the deep air intellectual failings of some military commanders are do not the lack of intelligence but to their feelings. Cognitive dissonance, publication, denial, risk-taking and anti-intellectual-ism are all, in reality, more concerned with motion been with intelligence. The susceptibility to cognitive dissonance, the tendency to pontificate in the ability inability to adjust the riskiness of decisions to the real situation our product of Cessna Ron disabilities as extreme anxiety under stress, low self-esteem, nervousness is, the need for approval and general defensiveness. Nice, it seems, over and above his level of intelligence, or the factors which interfere with what a man decides to do a given situation.

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Chapter 15

Military organizations

"Everything is very simple and more, but the simplest thing is very difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce a friction which no man can imagine exactly who is not seen more very well

-- C. Von Clausewitz, On War

Military organizations make for military incompetence into a stash directly, the forcing their members to act in a fashion that is not always conducive to military success, and indirectly, by attracting, selecting and promoting a minority of people with particular defects of intellect and personality.

The root cause of all this is that since men are not by nature all that well-equipped for aggression on the grand scale, they have had to develop a complex of rules, conventions and ways of thinking which, in the course of time, I'll supply into outmoded tradition, there is ritual, inappropriate Don Knott and then been up some military organizations, irrelevant vote bull should ". We're talking out what militarism will, a subculture which, in Lind, may well hamper rather than facilitate warring behavior. Three factors contribute to its growth. The first is that the origins of fighting are instinctive -- so-called intros species aggression. The second is that fighting was originally more a trial is straight then of wits. And the third that is something which, in its original form, many lower species can do rather better than we can. Let's consider these points and a little more detail.

Probably speaking, human activities may be regarded as falling into want or the other of two main groups: those which are directly in schedule and those which are not. Into the first, which involves what have been succinctly described as the " three at its " -- beating, fighting and

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"reproduction and, -- all such robust press times as spewed dualism, professional plie, prostitution and Soldiering. Into the second group fall all those other locations which, though sometimes subservient the basic drives, do not have is there any product the original conciliatory response.

Besides his most important difference, been scheduled locations have three other characteristics which differentiate them from those in the second category. They may involve unlearn patterns of behavior, are motivated by crude powerful emotions -- fear, loss, rage -- and are designed to to culminate in the unlearn response a distinctly physical kind.

Now attempts to professionalize instincts may be comparatively easy, as in the case of by eating a prostitution, one fraught with difficulty, as in the case of fighting. Prostitution is easy because the transformation of an unlearn drive into moneymaking career is moreover matter of realizing a potential them seriously modifying nature. As [10] Lind Young's interviewees remark:, I'd been working in a factory five years before I realized I was sitting on a fortune all-time." one thenceforth been trot entrepreneurial woman of easy virtue as really to apply some sad, too clever things were for mascara, and the rest follows. Over the years the profession, like the art love, has changed little. But for professional Soldier, progress has hardly been so smooth, partly because, unlike prostitution, the conciliatory response is changed. The original purpose of intraspecies aggression is not destruction but distribution. In lower forms obliged instinct of aggression is controlled by language of signs and countersigned, so that everyone remains spread out with a minimum of bloodshed. Moreover, those animals best equipped to each other any injury are also those with the most effective controls against so doing. A dog tackles and up to encroach upon her rivals territory may become involved in a noisy scalpel but has only to drop his tail, rollover and urinate to terminate the attack upon his person, the most he loses his face, (and water (. But for human such natural state court's (besides being embarrassing (have proved rather less effective.*in the first place, being on diverse, they have not involve such foolproof aggression inhibitors as have the corn or spirited in the second place, they have made up for their lack of natural weapons by acquiring some four

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*the could be argued it in humans in voluntary urination input by fear cease to be effective as a gesture of appeasement with the invention of trousers!

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More deadly artificial ones. These have extended the killing distance far beyond the point at which any inborn signaling system could be expected to work (natural signs of appeasement depend upon proximity (, and have reduced to vanishing point the match was the instigators of aggression. Is much more difficult to feel spontaneous spontaneously hostile towards an enemy you cannot see.

Yet other difficulties have been posed by the sheer size of human warring groups. With the transition from small parties of hostile tribesman to large mercenary armies can problems of motivation and control. Just a history of warfare is largely doubt of the many, who, to poverty or the press gang, were forced to take up arms for cause which few could even comprehend, the evoking and direction of aggression called for special measures. These included devices to ensure group cohesion, to incite hostility, to enforce obedience and to suppress mutiny. They also included means whereby the intentions of leaders could be translated into a concerted action by followers. In short, it called for two other components militarism -- firstly, a system of awards and punishment, of rank, metals, battle emblems in prize money, of confidential reports, courts Marshal and the lash; and secondly, a system of orders and over learned drills whereby complex patterns of behavior could be set in motion by the Preakness of instructions.

The no less important for a very a military incompetence is the means whereby militarism is administered and its continuity insured. This is the problem of " who bosses who " in the military hierarchy, and sorts of criteria which determine a person's position in the pecking order.

Originally, since combat was largely a matter brute force, we must suppose that the strongest gain to the top. In fighting, as in prostitution, vital statistics Cate gained the day -- a sort of natural selection according to criteria that were east Edgley physical. But of course the time the growing number of personnel involved, and improvements in technique, records and revision of earlier criteria. A distinction between became necessary between organizers and organize, between the brains and Braun. To this and civil government might have been expected to construct armies in which such dichotomies obtained. One might expected that officers would've been chosen for their brains, and the hierarchy of command based upon Merit and professional expertise. In Britain, civil government did nothing of the

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kind. The very good reasons military power was vested in those who, became well satisfied with the position in some society, would do their best to maintain the status quo -- in short, the rich and the highly born. But the methods of purchasing nomination, the control of the Army was given over to men who, with nothing the gain from revolution, to remain the loyal, apolitical supporters of the existing régime. Professional ability, energy in dedication to the job accounted for little. If you are rich and well-connected you were eight; if you were not, you are not. This state affairs came to full fruition in the Victorian Army it was still in evidence at the outbreak of the first world war. It did little for military competence, but was eminently successful in other ways. Two countries can boast of such an absence of military chooses Britain.

However, a following the disaster contents of the primary war, there occurred a gradual change in the makeup of the British officer corps. The abolition of the purchase system and the growth of public schools produced a decline in the numbers are rich aristocrats seeking commissions, and arise in the numbers of officers drawn from the Brewers want to see very moreover, stand as a competence were improved by selection based upon examination. But while these reforms undoubtedly raised the quality expertise of those occupying tire positions in the military hierarchy, they did no violence to the old policy of confining military power to those without political aspiration, nor did they do much to change the class consciousness which is characterized not only to British Army since the time of Cromwell, but also be armed services of France and Germany.

The essential nature of militarism should not be clear. We see it as an ever-increasing Web rules, restrictions and constraints, presided over by an elite, one of his motives with the preserve the status quo. We see it, in the case of the older European bomb powers, as it natural product of a fundamentally jealous, class conscious hierarchy than just out to an basic conservatism insured at the present must always bear the hallmark of the past. And we see as a remarkably similar in many respects to get even those other prototypical Victorian upperclass family group, were absolute obedience and submission to authority are traded for security independence.

Obviously, there is much here to make for incompetence in warfare. But this incompetence is augmented by another factor, mainly the

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Characteristics of some of those attracted to the military. Let us examine this hypothesis.

The modern standards, and it from the outside, the nature of militarism may not seem very attractive, including as a dozen number of attributes which are positively repellent to those who value personal freedom, egalitarianism and creative as opposed to distract bands. This distaste is common to both CP Snow sculptures. It is as strongly voiced in Einstein's comment --"this subject brings me to that violinist offspring of the herd mind -- the odious militia. The man who enjoys marching in line and file to the strains of music falls below my contempt; he received his great brain by mistake -- the spinal cord would have been amply sufficient " to -- as it is in factories, -- " unmanned wont degree you removed from ABC with brain's sufficient to direct his powers of mischief and endurance may make distinguish Soldier. --

Why then do people join the army, and are there some characteristics of the military which are positively magnetic attraction for those who subsequent performance may be deemed incompetent?

Any answer to the first question would involve reasons would include reasons which range from mobility from the need for selfless devotion to duty and patriotic costs to desire for upward social mobility. It would include the need for an exciting and very career interspersed with plenty of leisure given over to gentlemanly pursuits, a penchant for violence and a propensity to follow and father's footsteps. * they would also concluded distaste for other professions of comparable social status

The second question is rather more difficult to answer but one might say that since at a deeper level of analysis militarism constitute constitutes a number of defenses against certain anxieties, people who share the same anxieties and have a predisposition toward similar sorts of defense will be drawn towards membership of the military, rather as an alcoholic might be drawn to join our Alcoholics Anonymous. In other words, an individual with particular problems on psychological kind they be expected to gravity gravitate towards a group which he recognizes not only as containing fellow sufferers, but also as having developed effective ways of dealing with the special needs of its members buried the therapeutic gain from such behavior during the second world war has been noted by Robert Holt. He wrote:

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* according to see be hotly, the single biggest occupational group from which Officer cadets, is the military profession.

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It was a common clinical observation during the lower but military service was an unusually good environment for men who lacked inner controls... The combination of absolute security, a strong institutional parents substitute on whom one could lean unobtrusively, and socially approved outlets for aggression provided a form of social control that allowed impulse is to be expressed in acceptable ways. [3]

In following this line of thought, we start with the apparent paradox that whereas the military way is concerned with defense against the external enemy, a large part militarism concerns defenses against the inside each aggressive impulses of its member subscribers. Much that we have discussed under the heading of militarism can be legitimately viewed as devices so as to control aggression that is projected only upon legitimate targets while keeping the other outlets blocked. In this respect are as close parallel between aspects of militarism and the group behavior of some subhuman species. Even a troop of the blues contrived the rigid dominance -- your hierarchy wherein each male noses place. S. K. Our. L. A halt remarks of these animals: " controlled aggression is a valuable survival -- characteristic in that is yours protection of the group and group cohesion. " [4]

In a human level calming, our major symbol be authoritarian family grew buried justice eat those upper-class Victorian family totally forbade any show of aggression by the child towards its parents, but encouraged organized aggression towards contemporaries in such school pursuits is boxing incident shall a sanctioned bullying, so in the Army the slightest hit up in subordination (i.e., aggression to war directed toward the superior (is severely punish, while aggression towards the enemy is encouraged in rewarded. Opposite each such redirection of aggression is entirely consistent with the purpose of military organizations. The same token, a tight rein on aggression is mandatory in a profession whose stock in trade in solution to most problems is physical violence. The meal I massacre is similar atrocities show only to clearly how quickly things can get out of hand. As I. L. Janus has remarked: " the military group provides powerful incentives for releasing forbidden impulses, in addition to Soldier to try out formerly inhibited asked which he rate rate originally regarded as morally repugnant. " five from psychological point you, therefore, militarism strives to maintain paradoxical state of affairs were feeling angry may well be totally split off from

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aggression, wanting which are Soldiers required to suppress his aggression towards his superiors will mean a low, while taking it upon a hypothetical enemy towards will be may well in entertainment loss to Felix.

Its situation from the possibility of breakdown. On the one and there is the anecdotal evidence is Soldiers who, in the heat of battle, should their own NCO was an officers in the back, or what barring standards on arrange turnaround asked the question without remembering the eastern finger on the trigger. Such mishaps suggested even the strongest defenses against tablet aggression they fracture under pressure. * when the other hand, there are those embarrassing locations, such as occurred during the American Civil War, when Soldiers sold for forget themselves as to become friendly with the enemy. The classic example of this unorthodox behavior occurred on Christmas Day, 1914, when British and German troops join together for can be the allergies in no man's land. Needless to stay, these group reprehensible flickering scud humanity were quickly stamped out by the generals on both sides. Fortunately (for the General's (no lasting harm was done, but the episode did not like the necessity for those aspects of militarism which insurers that aggression does not wilt true want to hate.

It is just because the business of the Soldiers destruction and violence that the need to take General precautions against disorder become so pressing. In this respect aspects of militarism are analogous to those precautions against heat, vibration or matter in the wrong place which might be taken by any imaginative explosives expert. The aspects aggression may be substituted under the general, it faintly impolite, heading of "Bullshit". So important is his couriers cannot carry his phenomena that he deserves a sanctioned to itself.

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* In the first six months of 1970 want more than 100 American officers were flagged by their man. According to one authority, but word for acting derives from the ordinary fragmentation grenade which troops used to booby trapped -- and maimed or killed -- officers in noncom's poor to keen to engage in combat ". [6]

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Chapter 16

Bullshit

"I have been in the Army for nearly five years and I cannot see how polishing brass, floors, and anything else the NCO thinks off, makes a man you, you're jumping to attention all the time, and marching around like a load of chorus girls and asking permission to go the toilet. The truth is that when you join the Army give up your freedom, both physical and mental, you are just to obey orders."

-- a regular Soldier

Why you the more striking features a militarism should be associated with both line each treat on remains a matter for debate. Certainly according to principal of disowning certain to sort of behavior by associating them with some other species or nationality. In this respect to "bull" shares the fate of "Dutch" Couric, "French leave" and "Swedish massage".

Them whom according to Eric Partridge, the word was coined by Australian Soldiers in 1916. Coming from a country whose Armed Forces have always been relatively free from this element a militarism, they were evidently so struck by the excessive spit and polish of the British Army the detailed move to give it a label. Going further back, it is possible that the expression has its origin in" the bull will, the false hairpiece warned by women between 1690 and 1770. This would be consistent with the fact that modern dictionary to find " bull " as a " ludicrous she asked, a self contradicted Tory statement, to Chi, empty talk, absurd fussiness overdress". Whatever its do not get into to men knowledgeable significance, such definitions certainly captured the nature of military " bull " -- one of the most astonishing, apparently irrational and yet significant aspects of militarism, one which can noted attitude of mine, a pattern of behavior and in product.

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As implied by the old jingle,

If it moves, salute.

If it doesn't move, picket out.

If you can picket out, paint it!

To some amount involved ritualistic observance of the dominance -- submission the relationships of the military hierarchy, extreme orderly this and preoccupation with outward appearances. In this latter respect it is the extension of commonplace tendency in most human societies -- that taking outward show as the criteria according to which most judgments are made. This reliance on externals and constant urge to " keep up appearances " may well have its origin in three features of early very curly childhood. The first is the perceptual ancestry processes matures shorter than those underlying the capacity to think. The second used that early unlearn responses, so-called instinct show patterns of behavior, are set in motion persist at Pacific features on the sensory impression to do not require anything in the nature of an intervening thought. And authorities the children adopted values and attitudes of their parents, the themselves set great store by appearances. Many people in issue their mates because of what they happen to look like. Huge industries are geared to the sustaining of this particular source of possible deception, which results may which may well and in the very antithesis of Tonya you'll bless.

In the military, manifestations of " bull range from such minor apparent uncertainties as the policy of the backs of Badges, through the blame tolling of trays for a forthcoming to General's inspection, to such grandiose schemes as the decor of spears right cancer right to cancel. For less pleasant manifestations there are those drills and uniforms which have played the life of Soldiers and, from time to time, inflicted rather more suffering upon them than the enemy. Classic examples are the stock, I latter caller which held the head like a vice, and the court to chip away, a stiff pigtail for which the scalp had to be dragged back so far as to prevent a man from closing as I use.

Beside its emphasis on appearances and skin straining aspect, " bull " also involved a compulsive concern of cleanliness. In this respect alone it may achieve impressive levels of irrationality. To make it light, webbing equipment may be boiled almost to destruction, while the blankets the Soldier sleeps in stay unwashed for weeks.

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There are, of course, good arguments for "bull": getting insurers a level of orderly this, cleanliness, disciplined, personal pride, obedience and morale which, so it seemed, could not be reached by any other means, i.e., by recent as opposed to compulsive behavior. The same token in achieve a level uniform even makes for sought of solidarity and group cohesiveness.

However, the case against it is also strong. It's time-consuming time wasting, excruciatingly boring for all those with more than the most meteor for intelligent Intel intellect., and a poor substitute for thought. Since it teams to govern behavior by set of rules and defines a rigid program for different locations, it cannot meet the unanticipated event. This may have fatal consequences, such as the possibility of admirals standing stiffly to attention, and that the salute, while the battleship sink slowly under them. But for " bull " they might have done something rather more in useful in their last remaining moments of Boise.

Like any compulsive cyst symptom, "bullshit" as close customs, ritual, dogma and superstition, at the themselves so far beyond recent thought the day create resistance to change in the acceptance of new ideas. Pick military drill. This starts is a skill adapted to reality situation. It develops and to rigid pattern of behavior which, by becoming iMac, takes the load off memory. Once learned, it is directed by processes of which we are scarcely conscious, and which Steve the Limited channel capacity of conscious experience mercifully free to deal with father and more pressing events. It is drill, in such ascent, which insure that most motorist left let off the hand brake before engaging the clutch, and that most speakers constructor sentences according to the rules of language.

Military drills started in this way. There were devices which could eventually well together a heterogeneous miscellany of uneducated peasants into a single corporate homogeneous machine they did as it was told.

This is all to the good but for one thing -- ritualization, implying to tendency to transform means intends. Just about drill one area becomes the ceremonial drill of another. We started as a functional useful maneuver becomes a highly stereotyped pattern of movements on the Barracks Square. In itself this may be no bad thing. Ceremonial can be pleasing dpi, and and all dying for taxpayers and even, on occasions, a device for raising charitable funds. But unfortunately ceremonial drill, like other forms of "bull", is addictive

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When and, by being so, you service the time and energy which should be devoted to other more adapted pastimes. It didn't becomes a substitute for doing something else, as when the conservative element in the Brigade of guards resisted the adopting of the new battle drill because it would interfere with their existing ceremonial procedures. What it is considered that it was the same new drill which is being studied by the journey German General staff and the Russian high command in preparation for last four, one can appreciate the price that may be paid land, to use military expression, "bullshit baffles brains!"

As a factor in fighting efficiency, "bull" has also been on helpful in the Navy. If we assume that what the main purposes of the Navy is to defeat the enemy, and that this, in the past anyway, was achieved by shell fire, it might be supposed that much time would have been spent on practicing gunnery. But in the British Navy in the years before the first world war, should commanders were actively discourage from gunnery practice because the smoke might marked up eight work in soil the gleaming backs. The price for this was paid at Jet land. Want

In (, it is no accident that " bull called Issel will closely linked to conservatism, for its very nature is to prevent change, to impose a pattern upon material and upon behavior, and to preserve the status quo weather is that of shiny brass or social structure or it is no accident that " bull called in civilian life, that of the boiler act, rolled umbrella and strike traffic, or that of the garden party, should splurge in those sections a society renowned to conservatism. P*

Natalie touched upon some of the more obvious manifestations of the phenomena, let us examine its deeper causes, and relevance to the central thesis of this book

First, it seems to be a natural product of authoritarianism, IRQ organizations. Secondly, the witch that were invisible signs are manifold, then every common denominators. The first is constraint; the second, deception; in the third, substitution for thought. It stands each follows from the or others others. Essentially it is essentially by constraint that " bull " seems to combat disorderliness, whether this be of appearance, conduct or thought, but in so doing it necessarily concealed what is merely the case. It is worth noting that this aspect of behavior marks

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* conservatism with a small "c" is not confined to the political right; "bull" is just as evident in some communist armies as it is in those of the West.

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yet another point similarity between the oldest profession, militarism and the second oldest, prostitution.

However, where there are similarities are also differences. Intrusion pulse air, like blank vote and Busby's, are both concerned with outward show, the reasons for the deception are obviously very different. Whereas those aides to beauty affected by a woman of easy virtue aim to attract custom and stimulate desire, those of the Soldier reflect a more complex set of motives.

Main as pointed out earlier (paid 170 (, in writing, like sexual behavior, is interstitial activity, and as such prone to control by what evil latte biologist called stimuli -- particular shades colors are patterns of response which are to specific to all members spread disease of water both sexes practice east of any given species than the us all Robinson have read brass, and all hearing goals have read spots upon their beaks. Such distinctive labels third a simple communications function, it is much as their presented by another member of the same species automatically releases in spiritual behavior appropriate to the sacks of the precipitate and the situation in which finds itself. For example, the read brass to the robin elicits aggressive behavior and another mail, but sexual response an female. For animals and small brains, and little capacity for learning or judgment, the possession of the simple labels is obviously of immense value. They are fast, certain, automatic in a function, and require no past experience of the situation in which they operate. To the disadvantages of in spiritual behavior are been is inflexible, in discerning and by no means foolproof. Even that will Faro of the village upon, the males statistical black, will attempt to mate with a block avoid having a per two persons on its lower side in preference to a pregnant female -- however startling her pull per two did -- who is distended a exact (the sign stimuli and (happens to be concealed.

I'm in the before considering the likely relevance of these phenomena to " bull", there is one final point. It has been shown with lower species the supernormal, or larger-than-life, sign stimuli have a greater capacity for releasing the appropriate in spiritual behavior than have the normal, naturally occurring versions of the same stimuli.

Not lease indicating humans are not entirely immune to the effects of such sign stimuli -- as, say, paired tea which may release up your response, or the shape of a baby space which releases maternal behavior, where the contours of the female for which release sexual responses in the mail -- then it is reasonable to regard certain forms of

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"bull" as a deliberate setting up of the supernormal sign stimuli.. The prostitute the pads out her bosom, were applies to rouge to her cheeks, has brass something in common was Soldiers to don tall hats and scarlet jackets. In both cases the little accurate aims to listed desire responses (lost in one case, fear any other (of a greater greater magnitude then would have occurred without lease the prosthetic extensions.

Take the case of threatening postures. Like the answer bought aides, we threatened by rotating our arms in words and raising our shoulders. With AIDS this response has the effect of lifting the hair on their shoulders, thereby making animal up more than usually fearsome. Tonight Show eight of owning Jerry shoulders, modern man discovered "padding" and the let. But these " supernormal stimuli " are overdetermined. Not only did they intimidate, they also decorate in flatter. Not only do they threaten the enemy, they also boost ego of the where. As well is making them look top, they make them feel top; and not why do they subserve aggression, they also serves sexual needs. Nelson to meet dislike of two French naval captains whom he found wearing a lax bears witness to the sexual symbolism of those overdetermined ornaments. He wrote: " they were fined outlets to which I think them Cox columns. I shall not port their acquaintance." to his choice of words, coupled with his own predisposition towards making amorous conquests, suggested he at least all the outlets as a competitive sexual display.

A similar response to it over determined aggressive -- calm sexual display has been noted by the period as. Turner when writing of British officers in the Peninsula reward. While the regimental observation not lack subjects firstborn. They despise Spanish officers who made their horses plants and character all before the ladies." [3]

And for more modern example there is the provocative arrangement of one long cylindrical parachute mind flanked by two red painted spherical C- which used to decorate the lawn outside the headquarters of a royal engineers bomb disposal unit during the last war.

Another overdetermined piece of "bull" is the military salute. According to want authority, the wording of this gesture was the simple act of lifting the visor once helmet, thereby putting oneself at the mercy of an opponent. As such it has much in common with those appeasement responses and lower species which involve presenting total parts of the anatomy to potential enemy. It would man,

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This straightforward communication Grill into a highly over-determined piece of ritual. Thus the military salute effectively combines the threat of the raised armed with the reassurance of the opening and in which no weapon could be concealed. A similar admixture of contrary motives occurs in the practice of present arms. The triggers towards turns trick the trigger is turned towards the enemy will enemy will there, but the gun remains firmly in the possession of the presenter.

Well in staple or instinct whole origins origins and over-determined nature of these sorts of behavior undoubtedly contribute contribute towards her tenacity, there are other factors rather more important. These can be substituted under the general heading of anxiety reduction.

Perhaps the single most important feature of "bull" is his capacity to delay anxiety. There are two components to dysfunction, Lon couches and rational and the other unconscious and proposal. Both operate to reduced to sorts of anxiety, the first social and the second instinct told

instinct told.

Since, at a construction is rational level, orderliness, cleanliness, punctuality in discipline clearly make for efficiency, the knowledge that one belongs to an organization which puts a premium on these laudable traits, the ones rifle fire editors exceed for the bully be tin, obviously makes for confidence. At conscious rational level, therefore, even those aspects of " bull " which reflected gross exaggeration of these traits must seem like steps in the right direction. This confidence may, of course be misplaced. The commander assist upon meticulous attention to detail, down the last shining button, is no guarantee that you strategic thinking is anything other than pure trial. Indeed, he would well be unwittingly substituting a lesser for more important area of generalship. Nevertheless, there are good grounds for believing did those situations in which "bull" flourishes are ones in which it reduces anxiety he goes orderliness is fairly vital to survival.

Again, the impose uniformity which is part parcel of "bull" obviously makes for group cohesiveness, and what and that " were all in together " feeling which combats fear. We must suppose, too, bed that heightened conformity which he imposes well, like other forms of perceived conformity, encourage people, through a diffusion of responsibility, to perform acts which they might otherwise avoid.

Yet another useful feature of "bull", so it's been said, is its role as a distractor in time killer. According to this theory, a mind preoccupied

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With buttons and to as little room for gloomy forebodings. The point is well made by a period be. Campbell one writing a naval customs: " in... It is the guiding principle on cable service to do ships Company should be constantly employed, and this is the reason -- apart from the necessity for scrupulous cleanliness -- why there is so much scrubbing of Jackson polishing a brightwork. " the him [4]

In the same context this writer compares naval and civilian routine. It is safe to say that in many short jobs would team destroys initiative -- this also applies to many factory workers, but it is not so in the Navy bracket where [every teen job builds on the is [a blue jackets black] character. 5 himand asked to lie enable a civilian characters should acquire such diametrically differ get different treatments, Campbell refers to the moments of danger which, occurred for the former but not the latter. This of course begs several questions**. It confuses lots of initiative and blind obedience with the building of character, and makes the unwarranted assumption that enable rating space greater danger than many civilians, including merchant seaman, staple jacks, racing motorist, known climbers, single Haiti.Smith, coal miners and matted doors, not one of whom has to fortify his character to my polishing brass or scrubbing wood.**

To arrest picture or to say that since the to call as in all oh Holmes called upon troops service tradition initiative, it'll thereby increased a feeling of dependency which they have to work their superiors. This in turn will increase their obedience and loyalty.

Finally, at a conscious rational wobble there are aspects of quilt bull full which may well helped to combat social anxieties and military men. Gorgeous uniforms, martial music, branching horses, and even being saluted, are obvious ball to tender egos and, by promoting Soldierly pride, too much to offset the hostility and ridicule to which the military are from time to time subjected by those in other walks of life.

But there is another, less obvious reason for quilt bull ", neatly did it serves to reduce deeper seated feelings of anxiety which may well have their origins in advance, on the related to the here and now, of which the subject remains blissfully unaware. Their spots in this case has the body and immediacy which is clearly not the product of conscious to liberation. The most extreme examples of this phenomenon occur in obsessive-compulsive the Ross is the roses, a condition in which the patient feels compelled to follow a pattern of ritualistic cots attacks. The does often includes as bizarre symptoms as compulsive handwashing,

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and preoccupation with timing and counting, recur it reunited premium remained near Munich room initiative ideas, stereotyped verbal arteries, and always standing with one's toes absolutely in-line, six has obvious significance for more military versions of the malaise. * one underlying feature of such symptoms is that they are repetitive, stereotyped and occur without seeing site into their origins. Another is a day center around cleanliness and orderliness. Finally, they are often defenses against the design 80 were suppressed anger. This is clear from the great distress which may be OK to buy their forcible prevention. The

such symptoms are not, of course confined to the chronic sick. Milder forms may well occur in the normal population during times of stress. The counting, but tapping and the melding of.mil or, like the compulsion to make these claims and tidy during periods of menstruation, well-known palliative's for distressed psyche. Seven

But why should compulsive ritual reduce anxiety, and what are these deeper anxieties?

Let's not been around the blush. At the risk offending those with delicate susceptibilities, or who themselves have problems in these areas, it must be said that they involved for matters of primary importance in every human life: Sex, elimination, leading in death.

Take Sex buried there seem to be too main worries here, that of not being what one wants to be, and that not being sure bet one is what one yes. As the first, a psychiatrist colleague once remarked: " all my patients have the same basic problem: the men all on the women, and the women want to be main. " it seems that being potentially her mapper.leave some people chronically dissatisfied with their particular position on the sexual continuum -- a sort of old grasses greener on the other side the defense " feeling.

For those who did not nurse and unconscious urge to be of the opposite Sex there is the other problem, equally worrisome, that of not being absolute started the day are what they think they are. As many men have serious doubts about their masculinity.

Of these " triumphs " of our culture and methods of child reading rearing our something to which we shall return in due course. Suffice it to say that they constitute just one of the major sources of anxiety which men carry to their graves. They may, moreover, constitute one of the factors which may motivate people towards perpetuating those

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*research as shown a correlation 000.8 between obsessed journal traits and symptoms in Iraq Soldiers.

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the aspects of cool bull will they could help to still these nagging doubts buried such trappings of aggressive masculinity as a three-foot so lowered or pair of pearl-handled revolvers dangling from the region of the crotch can hardly help but be reassuring for sufferers of this adult. [2004 EDITOR: today its the drop-leg pistol holster] The fact that men with high levels of c*tion anxiety (men whose early years were perhaps in live in from time to time by the maternal threat, well if you don't leave it alone, I'll chop it off, (have been shown to entertain an exaggerated fear of death as point to this conclusion for that military scene. The

But clearly the unique features "bull" called reflect something more fundamental than defenses against mere sexual anxieties. The greatest anxieties concerned data and unconstrained disorder. Since the two are inextricably related, a defense against Juan is a defense against the other also. This is perhaps the crux of the origins of "bull".

Let's approach this from another standpoint. Whatever its particular form, "bull" will result in state of affairs which is supposed to what many people would you regard as a primary source of delight: the natural diversity of nature. Port such diversity is in placable hostile buried is no exaggeration to say this aspect militarism is dedicated to the ironing out of differences buried the efficiency with which it destroys variety and imposes in uniform and he is match only by its demand for conformity.

To many people such answer and oven and of ammo. Indeed, most civilized cultures butter premium upon their opposite spirit with an instant wants the pouring on the reprehensible, but actually a plot individual differences. Whether in people, animals are plans, the variety of nature is regarded as a spiritual bonus. The animate and artificial arson merely regarded. Enclosed, cars and houses, uniqueness as market value. Not for nothing does current advertising for the"best car in the world, will make only one specific line -- that no two goals voices are alike. As for sexism, only the most pure tactically denied that variety is the very essence of enjoyment.

But will pull well invert these values. It were ships home and Jenny and frowns upon deviants. Whether it is, but is or dressing by the left, hair link, to inspection or marching feet, the quick to quintessence of perfection resides in conformity to a regulation pattern. This conformity is the product of constraint. That's even conversation in officers mass was confined for many years to topics other than women, religion, politics, Sachs or talking shop, a state affair of affairs which once drew

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from punch the acid comment `it would be very dirty indeed if officers whatever throwback upon their conversation!"

It seems that since old bull " is primarily concerned with substituting pattern for randomness, it evidently reduces anxiety by the reduction of uncertainty. **But why should the removal of uncertainty and trivial matters assuage anxiety for more important issues?**

How is it that uniformity contrast, cleaning rituals and predictability of exchanged compliments restore peace of mind in the enormous uncertainties of war? Why, in one of the most incompetently leased this world is ever known, what about to embark on a voyage to its ultimate destruction destruction in about all of pusher Shima, was at the case that " again and again we washed the gang ways with soap and water, we scrubbed bridges, touch of the paint, scoured the brass work. Issues instill colds were not forgotten... Cleanliness became a mania! Nine (a sailor in the rush showed Japanese war of 1904 (?

Anyone who doubts the soothing effects of " poll " has only to consider two other situations of rightfully frightening uncertainty -- marriage and death. If you look plate even a minor role in these advanced would deny the emotional support that comes from the time-honored ritual of weddings and funerals.

By way of trying to explain these effects to, two overlapping theories can be invoked. The first is that of entropy reduction. This maintains that called Bull will exemplifies the general principle, tall organisms, that of combating randomness.

The argument is simple -- living organisms are complex patterns which persist for time within the essential disorder from which they cane and which they will vote, with equal certainty, returned. To the notion that count conception, life-and-death represent stages in the process in its ad one other, namely that living is the process whereby the pattern endeavors to maintain itself in been, is a turtle isn't that this implies equally at microcosmic and macro cosmic levels. Whether it is a single cell, the integrated systems of the total organism, what external social order, there exists regulators, controls and constraints the spontaneity is to preserve the pattern, to keep this from that, to maintain purity and separatist, this holds true for the biological processes as it does for the construction of an urban sewage system. By these lights, social and environmental stress, extremes of Peter Cole, viruses, drugs or direct physical injury may be regarded as a forces which, because they threatened organism with the disillusioned called its

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Pattern, with mixing up of its constituent parts, call 41 or another of the cell preserving tendencies. Indeed, alike can be construed as a fight for orderliness in the course of which much behavior, both voluntary and involuntary, both external and internal, is directed towards this and. The law, and rules for hiking, pro the role prophylaxis, antibodies, ejection mechanisms, a tree limb secretion and new years resolutions are just some of the devices which been distended perpetual drift towards disorder.

It is, of course losing battle. As Oscar Wilde said, a: " good intentions are useless attempts to metal of the laws of nature. "one of these " lost " is it ultimately the forces of disillusioned increase beyond the capabilities of adaptive mechanisms told them in check, because the very processes whereby order is maintained (of which one is composed of Richard compulsive ritual (may themselves as soon destructive proportions. The notion has great generality. Just one special case of this destructive outcome is embodied in styles concept of the general adaptation syndrome. Can this refers to the fact that such internal bodily responses to stress as raise blood pressure may, in the end, precipitate irreversible tissue damage and data.

According to into this theory of entropy reduction, global " represents an extreme manifestation of the general and necessary propensity on the part of living systems to reservist randomness. This would account for the fact that the Sartori aspects of the syndrome are concerned with removing dirt (matter in the wrong place (, with maintaining separateness, with keeping green light keeping green green light light; while preserving the status quo -- keeping here sure, jet brass shiny and rifles clean; and with maintaining uniform meet by written orders, shattered commands and other behavioral constraints. But, like waking conscious this in contrast to the drain, abnormality in contrast to psychosis, will poll,"makes its effect by constraint upon the " creativity " alt.

Obviously, the constricting, information reducing aspects of cool bull will extend beyond individual and his immediate possessions to embrace the total social scene, thereby preserving the hierarchy of ranking status, separating kind from low, into a meeting what is, from what is not, appropriate behavior for every situation.

Just as the general adaptation syndrome is the body's response to the internal effects of stress, so cool bull " may be regarded as an organization response to the threat of its disintegration. In the military this thread as two sources: external enemy, and aggressive impulses

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Even a little members. *in either case, the greater the threat, the greater the constraints.

Thus the aforementioned and quit of the officers mass, which can find conversation to the utmost trivia, had its origins in the wholly rational avoidance of all topics which, in a profession liable to aggressive outbursts on the flimsiest preconceived pretext, might result in much wastage of life to delete.

So much for general theory. We coming out to the second, more specific theory, which aims to explain individual differences in a propensity for " poll ", and the relationship between compulsive cleanliness and a particular sort of personality

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*Joseph son has drawn attention to the fact of the is supposed hostility of an apparent submissive subordinate in authoritarian organization may result, perhaps without conscious intent in behavior is actually destructive the goals of the organization in question [11]

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Chapter 17

Socialization and Anal Character

"... A form of adaptation is dust achieved by narrowing in distorting the environment until one's conduct appears adequate to it, rather than by altering wants conduct in enlarging one's knowledge to want to cope with the larger, real environment. "

-- Kate. J. W. Crate, The Nature of Explanation

Line shooting, deceiving the false appearances, covering up, compulsive cleaning another mindless rituals are to be found the world over, and have presumably been so since Adam donned the fee to leave and he gave a first light polish to the apple.

The people are not born that way. For several years they show a sincerity and impressive disregard for all forms of cleanliness. They do not know the meaning of disgust, and are unmoved by disorder. On the contrary, they do their very best exemplify the second loft among dynamics that will enter peak always increases. "

Evidently, then, adult behavior and its accompanying attitudes come to socialization. Let's look at this processing connection with the development of the so-called renal character.

The precise details of the process whereby babies -- disorderly, demanding, self-indulgent and in continent -- are turned in to clean, dry, socially responsible adults is still a matter for debate. According to psychoanalytic theory, between the ages of 15 years to fear of losing parental affection, together with the threat of other dire consequences, moves the child towards nun habits for some rather bleak new ones. The latter of like to standards of the society in which he has been born.

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now those needs of the baby which result in sorts of behavior for which set socialization is required are in a fact, as Freud is pointed out, centered on three eroding as Jones zones of the human body; the lips and now, the genitals in the anus. In babies, as it adults, stimulation of these areas is evidently pleasurable. This relationship relationship between needed pleasure is hardly to be wondered at, inasmuch as it provides essential motivation for the three vital activities of eating, elimination and reproduction. Species which do not enjoy these things, by people with anorexia and are posted, would have a poor chance of survival. In its raw form, however, such enjoyment is hardly compatible with the those of adult society, which, in demanding some control of basic drives, it tends to curb their free expression. So begins a slow process of socialization in early childhood. It is a wearing down with the where it is a wearing time for one and all. Normally, however, and he gets apparently formidable odds, is hard-fought campaign draws to a satisfactory conclusion, with parent and child winning a harmonious victory over the dark forces of disorder.

I say "normally", for sometimes, so it's been suggested, there occurs a content teaching of factors which resulted lasting effects of great relevance to the subject matter of this chapter. They include an unduly strong attachment by the child to the pleasure it derives from its eroding as Jones, and unduly strong dictate distaste on the parent part for manifestations of the child underlying drives, and, as a consequence, the implementation implementing of an unduly strict training program. When these three factors or operate, the resulting situation, which approximates the Dad of an irresistible force pretty 'logic, probably reached his climax in. A pot (or as, some prefer to call it " toilet"(training. The nature and now, this process may be summarized as follows: small child obtains considerable pleasure from its bow movement, but when this pleasure is tempered by anxiety as a result of a harsh training schedule, theater result in reaction formation... " in extreme cases he becomes personal and he is, stingy, meticulous, punctual, tie down with pretty self-restraint. Everything is free, uncontrolled, spontaneous is dangerous. " *

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* according to clients excellent review of research in this area, two there is considerable support for this constellation of personality traits, and some for their origin in cable eroticism. But the docile gold methodological the logical difficulties have sold for precluded any clear picture of their personal precise relationship to toilet training. See also but lost three, and the beach. 4

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in other words, the individual resolves conflict by developing character trait which are the exact opposite of those he has had to renounce.

Now does not need any bass tragedy imagination to see more than a passing similarity between the success of traits in the practice of " bull vote. Both the ritualistic, concert and cleanliness and ordinance, and designed all down, and then cover up, impulses of the torrid opposite time. It scarcely meet adding that the latter half the word "bullshit", takes on a new significance in light of this comparison. The closeness of the relationship between these events of early childhood and aspects of militarism, moreover, conveyed by two other considerations.

The first concert of the matter of aggression. Socialization necessarily involves frustration, and frustration is, as we know, one of the main is the instigators of aggression; were not, the species once again have a poor chance of survival. But the sort appearance or cause there are spreading to develop obsessive rituals against there are also likely to be does it cannot tolerate any show of aggression. So who's to has to be suppressed a rather a place by safer, symbolic, outlet. One such, in humans as in lower animals, is ritualistic behavior. Just as the males tickle back who encounters a threatening opponent on the borders of his " territory displaces his aggression into the ritualistic punching punching the holes in the bed of the stream, so some units, made anxious by their own aggressive impulses, finally been such ritualistic axis a drumming with the fingers, counting or putting things in order. Hence, so-called obsessive traits may be regarded as defense is not only against dirt, but also against aggression -- the aggression which originally rose to frustration of infantile designers. * but " poll " also has a two prong purpose: to combat dirt and to prevent a legitimate kinds outburst of aggression (aggression, that is, thwart superiors -- the frustrating and potentially dangerous data " parent figures " (.

One last connection between " poll " and obsessive-compulsive symptoms is her tenacity and proliferation. Thus the individual whose compulsive handwashing increases from 10 to 50 times a day has something in common with the devote enough " poll " was light becomes increasingly occupied with unrealistic and an anachronistic

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* further support for this contention comes from a finding by the people of high scores on a test also show high levels of political aggression.

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London extensions of what are originally quite rational pieces of behavior.

At this stage in argument is necessary to issue a caution. We're not saying the military organizations are hotbeds of upset cirrhosis, nor the does given to " poll " are necessarily manifestation compulsive symptoms. On the contrary, all but we are tried to show is that in Sunbeam's IT reducing, aggression controlling into Nashua's nature of " poll " becomes a leased at least partly inexplicable in terms of two not mutually exclusive berries. As a secondary, content any of socialization is no more than a special, alert instance of the first, more general, principle that life depends upon the preservation of a minimal level orderliness. *

There are corollaries. Firstly, we would expect become plump and complement Terry relationship between perceived threat of destruction and the occurrence of competence and Terry devices to preserve or weakness. In this connection research has not only showed that psychological arousal is decreased by ritual. But also that, under threatening conditions, normal individuals behave like compulsive the rocks. Seven secondly, the competence and Tori devices are patterns of behavior might be expected to involve compulsive cleanliness in strict observance of a dominant submissive relationship because the threat of disorder which they are (unconsciously (designed to meet activates a much earlier threat of being overtaken by the forces of disorder in aggression, a threat which is overcome by cleanliness and obedience. Thirdly, since the original causes of these reactions to threat or lost to consciousness, the resulting behavior tends to resist rational modification. **For, since military organizations represent, par at salons, house or and consequentially defenses against aggression in disorder, they will tend to attract people have some difficulty in reconciling these conflicting needs, people overvalue aggression, order and obedience. This conclusion is supported by the finding the patients suffering from upset shoulder roses show improvement during military service**. [8]

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* the nature of these tendencies under potential usefulness can be illustrated in many ways buried the following instance exemplifies in extreme form of the sorts of behavior to which they might give rise.

It concerns the military commander whose marriage roll martial interests centered around the design in citing of the trains. This necessity, all body albeit tiny, segment of warfare absorbed his mind to the exclusion of all else. He lived, worked and slept the trains, and when a new what had been built, insisted on " Christian Inc., his brainchild under the steady gaze of his troops. Six

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


Figure 3. The role of "Bull" in military incompetence.

Combat (Day (produce prodigious several sorts of anxiety (be (. True disease anxiety spread disease and increase efficiency (, aspects of militarism (see (are developed. These reduced milk primarily anxiety (about " -- " -- Arrow (. The defenses against primary anxiety (see (necessarily make the rigidity of thinking, etc. (be (**. They also tend to attract individuals with personnel personal anxieties about dirt and aggression.**

Both aspects of tea may be expected to have two adverse effects. Firstly, they will direct the reduced military competence (be (, thereby increasing primary anxiety in the combat situation. Secondly, the evoke a number of secondary (social (anxiety spread disease (. Both these effects will tend to increase D., thereby constituting a vicious cycle circle of cause and effect.

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The way in which the psychological processes could result in behavior that might lead to military incompetence has been well stated by Charles Rycroft. Our drink and the position that out the tree possible responses to threat -- flight, submission or attack -- is the last which most closely corresponds to human obsessional defenses, he makes the point that

There is however a form of attack or mastery which must certainly be counted neurotic. This is the compulsion to control everyone and everything which is characteristic of those who are liable to develop obsessional to roses... In this way they hoped to avoid anxiety by eliminating the unpredictable element in human relationships. If taking attain self-control to the extent of never becoming beached being overcome by unexpected emotion and can control others said they can cease to be free agents capable of spontaneous and therefore unexpected actions, then, according to the logic of the obsessional defense, the unexpected will never happen in the unknown will never be encountered -- and anxiety will never arise. Nine

In other words, those very characteristics which are demanded by war -- the ability to tolerate uncertainty, spontaneity of thought and action, having a might open to the receipt of novel, and perhaps threatening, information -- are the antithesis of those possessed by people attracted to the controls, and orderliness, of militarism.

Here is the germ of terrible paradox. Those very people who, because they have adopted attack rather been submission or flight as their preferred psychological defense against threat, are in. The best suited to warring behavior, may be the very ones least well-equipped for other components of successful fighting.

Considered in this light industry unremarkable testimony to biological inefficiency is so many military leaders have performed so well.

There is another and related manner to which we must turn our attention -- the decks that question to military honor. As a device for maintaining orderliness, courtly anxiety and directing aggression into appropriate channels, honor is to officers what bullshit is too noncommissioned ranks. Or as a whole "bull" comprises an array of relatively mindless ax, honor is more concerned with a system of ideas, a code of thought instead of inhibitions. As can be seen from figure three, both for apparently inescapable products of large-scale

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Organized aggression. However, to appreciate the role that " character " and one of its options, military codes of honor, have played insert sorts of military incompetence we must first examine their more general psychological significance.

Note on Chapter 17

The author is only too well aware of the two suggested the General's personality may (like anyone else's (bear the hallmark obvious " potty training " reduces some people too nervous giggles. This being so, it may be helpful to consider the following propositions:

1. A person's psychological makeup is the resultant of only two factors -- his genetic inheritance and his life experiences.

2. Life experiences are most influential doing. The greatest elasticity in development, i.e., before the age of five.

3. Those experiences which are likely to have the greatest lasting effect we those which make the biggest impact of the time of their occurrence.

4. Before the age of five the most important of these are concerned with socialization.

5. A large part of socialization during this time is concerned with poorly trained. *

To the author, the logic of the simple propositions seems unassailable!

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* act notwithstanding, or Lansky has produced some cogent arguments to develop the development of the excess of personality depends less upon the visit to just what training than upon a wide variety of cultural situations. Likewise, vowels cites evidence for the view that aggressive behavior is reactive rather been activity.

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Chapter 18

Character and Honor

" why should unmanned in love with this batters, though goal"

-- Bacon, Essays: of death

"moderation in more easy this a lid in visit to baking facility"

-- McAuley

Whatever their profession, most people would subscribe quite happily to the notion that there are three components to the human psyche -- the instinct will, the intellectual and moral -- and that they developed in that were. Some physiologically minded psychologists put even go so far as to relate this tripartite organization to three general regions of the brain, with instinct being rooted in the activities of the old rank (suitably cited in the so-called basal areas (, intellect a product of the cerebral cortex, and moral qualities depending upon a proper contribution from higher centers in the frontal for brain. This crude topography accords with the effect of the Jews in the various different regions (e.g., damage to the frontal cortex predisposes towards a loss of moral about use rat disease and also with the facts of evolution. Thus, lower animals may be strong on aggression and sexually competent, but devoid of intellect and conscience, have lower brain areas much like cars but lacked the massive human for brain with its convoluted cortex.

For those who shrink from the idea but their strengths and weaknesses can be reduced to such an anatomical proportions a more acceptable description can be found in the concept concepts of psychoanalytic theory. According to this tripartite below you we start life with an EA -- importune it, rain the and aggressive; the choir and ego -- intelligent, perceptive and diplomatic; and then, if all goes well, become blast (or saddle to (with a superego -- the source of conscience and moral imperatives. Thou

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Functional relationships between East three components suggest a view of man which, according to one description, seemed particularly appropriate in the context of this book. Old Man is basically a battlefield... A dark seller in which a well bred Spencer Lady Anna sex craze monkey are forever engaged in mortal combat, the struggle being furry by a rather nervous Bancorp. " [1]

These preliminaries are not irrelevant or purpose, for along with all the other psychological problems which beset does business is organized violence is that of deciding whether to plumb for intellect or character as the means whereby instinct is controlled and discipline maintained. Generally speaking, the older military organizations have opted for character in the younger ones for intellect.

In the context of militarism the forces of conscience and of character manifest themselves in various guises; in media load notions of chauffeur, in codes of honor, such as the duel, and in the believed officers must be necessity must of necessity be gentlemen. As crawled the matter as shown in his history of the German officer corps, these notions of honor and civic chivalry product out and were themselves reinforced by a care to select officer material from the wrist lockers he and rural land owners -- a state of affairs reflected in contrast of snobby stoppage kindness stoppage is this, exclusiveness, sense of honor and lack of intellectual ability which obtained between the officer corps, drawn from the aristocratic junk or families on the greatest dates of pressure, and those more bullish wall elements from the industrialized southwest of Germany.

A code of honor is a set of rules for behavior. The rules are observed because to break then provoked a distressing emotions of guilt or shame. Whereas guilt is a product of knowing that one has aggressive therefore might be found out, shame results from actually being found out -- in military store polls traditionally the greater crime!

Is usually assumed that military codes of honor served to reduce their. This may well be so. Their primary object however, is to combat not so much fear as to the as the sort of behavior to which fear might otherwise give rise. In other words, they're designed to ensure that threatening situations are met by fight rather than flight. They do this by making the social consequences of light rather more unpleasant in the physical consequences of fight. Whereas the latter might lead to physical pain, mutilation and death, the former adventure waits with far greater certainty in personal guilt and public shame.

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One Soldier in action ceases life in immediate danger... Even the bravest will be ceased by a moment of fear. Biologically speaking, here is the natural reflex cessation of the instinct of self-preservation which dwells and within every man, heroes included. If victories to be one, this elementary physical sensation must be somehow artificially suppressed -- over compensated by a contrary reflex of a psychic and moral kind, converted into action. The negative content of discount reflex is the feeling ashamed. O. F. ", it says, " if you don't stand fast now run away, the others will laugh at you and despise you "...

Is Soldier last bracket therefore bracket be provided -- unless nature has done the job already -- with a set of automatic inhibitions that will save him in the moment of danger... from a collapse of his own morale. Discipline, of course, can holding steady from without; but is what moral defense against internal weakness is the sense of honor. To arouse this sense in the ordinary Soldier, cultivate and a bull ball, inspire it by his own example is the officer's highest duty; and to fulfill their duty he must itself have a sense of honor but is well developed, active and finely tuned. [2]

And to psychological standpoint these views are unexceptional, and moral point of view highly desirable; get the matter needs to be pursued further. To the extent the code of honor is reflexive, in the sense used by the matters so, so is inflexible, thereby leading on occasions to behavior is so irrational as the border on the insured. Just a surge in be seen from the needless waste of good officer material but occurred to the custom of dueling. So damaging was his practice in the German corps of officers to take 16 any state of Electra Frederick the second made dueling punishable by death.*in the British Army challenges to dueled were still being issued as late as 1880.

While dueling was responsible for limiting just those officers who sense of personal honor and physical occurs was of the highest order, other aspects of military honor could be just as irrational in the destruction of those who might will not be such a wholehearted parties to the code. The following example all the soul illustrates the juxtaposition of " bull " and " honor ". The year was 1755.

General Braddock it sat out with these two regiments -- the 44th and

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* the first Prussian law against dueling was dated 1652.

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fell 48 -- and 600 are regulars on a marsh to Fort to canvass. About 9 mi. from it he was ambushed by Indians led by French officers. The result was disastrous. The men in their scarlet uniforms and whites battered gaseous, marched in columns, was sort of target and ambush force dreams up. Helpless because they cannot see their enemies, some of the British troops broke for cover and fired from buying trees. This up all Braddock and his officers; they considered sculpting behind trees both undisciplined and unsoldierly buried solely to roll the Tommies back in the columns, where of course they were butchered... The whole episode was glad improved neither leaders nor the system under which they operated were worthy of the troops that used. Number three

But there are other more insidious dresses and strange to which honor can get arise. Since honor it may be both personal and collective, the to code may be in conflict. Thus the pagan origins of the medieval code ovary * it would since the attic of killing and battle above all else gave rise to collective honor in direct opposition to the personal trees based upon the teaching of Christ. In other words to knowledge that what is aggression, and therefore bound to the injunction " thou shall not kill ", and the knowledge that what is a member of a group that is even more forcibly down to the injunction " thou shalt kill " bar, disable lease, dissident cognitions, and therefore production productive of stress. For every conscientious objector the must be many whose participation in lethal activities cannot be quite so ordered as someone wish. Another difficulty with behavior directed solely by a sense of honor is that, if its incentive is no more been on mortal and avoidance ashamed, the resultant behavior may be irrational, and a very strictness of the code have quite unforeseen consequences for the military way. So unthinkable was at the Japanese Soldiers whatever surrender to the enemy that they were not instructed as to how they should come port themselves if they did. As a consequence Japanese POWs were a relatively fruitful source of information for allied interrogators. [4]

A code of honor may be likened to an endlessly prolonged invitation right initiation right. So long as the individual excesses demand sees proving himself

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* it could be argued did these features a medieval story described by cruising the, such as the concern to rescue virtues while they were still intact, where reactions against the violence and uncertainties of those days -- yet another example those responses to threaten disorder mentioned in Chapter 16

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Mentally in brave, a rightful member of the leak. **Moreover, the tougher the initiation, the greater will be his liking for the group, 5 and the more wilderness fears regarding personal adequacy, guerrilla the encourage be still. It is yet another aspect of militarism which will attract those who seek assurance on those counts.**

Furthermore, since the code of honor has tended to be associated with wealth and position, the long into a group which sets great store by honor the first labels social superiority. Just how important this can be is attested by the vigor with which military casts have resisted entry by individual's from humble backgrounds. Indeed, from the sometimes erroneous believed to the capacity for honored characterizes gentlemen, is only too easy to draw the unjustified conclusion that anyone who is not a gentleman must lacked his capacity -- hence the view, noted earlier that honor is to commission ranks what pullshit and punishment are to the other ranks. In fact, there is a considerable overlap. Privates are not without honor, and Field marshals are no strangers to " bull will. Moreover since global " can be a concrete manifestation of honor so, so honor maybe get " bull will which, in turn, reinforces honor. Degree of this escalation is **vanity**. Thus in Victorian army was a point of honor for commanding officers to try and outdo each other, not only in the splendor of their own accoutrements, but also in those of their troops:

The 11th Hussars were superb. They were overalls practical trousers bracket of cherry color, jackets of oil blue and Gold, spurred palaces, short coach Bora escapes, glittering with Boolean Bray and gold lace, high perhaps adorned with brilliant plumes... This gorgeousness was largely achieved it lowered cardigans expands. Is estimate it estimated he spent 10,000 lbs. A year on the 11th out of his private income. [6]

Lord Cardigans knows not unique in lavishing in any attention upon the appearance of his troops which, in a more enlightened age, might be reserved for the ladies of the Miss world competition. Nor was unique in being a senior Soldier who combined exquisite sense of honor with **overpowering vanity, and the renowned for skills and dueling with an almost total lack of intellect**.

Reference to cardigans naturally blames to mind another facet of some military organizations which is closely related to honor --

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There are unrepentant **snobbishness. According to the dictionary, a snob is a " a Bulger person who tapes to utility or truck polls to those of high-ranking position, or regards the claims of wealth and position within it exaggerated and contemptible respect. " very simply, a snob is one who is impressed by, and therefore tries to identify Web, those were higher up the social economic scale, while straining to disassociate himself with those lower down.** By these lights, such everyday affections as name dropping in paying society magazines to publish photographs of oneself were once near his family are obvious examples of snobbishness this. This may be immediately it explicable however, is much apparently snobbishness behavior in military circles. Why, for example, should Lord Cardigan, who had no reason to be snobbish, behave in such a way? Though extremely rich, with blood sufficiently blue by any standards, is the Tory astounding of those cold socially inferior " Indian army officers who had the misfortune to be in his regiment betrayed a streak of snobbishness bordering on the Bulger. Here as a man, with neither of those inferiority's which are traditionally suppose to underlie this unpleasant trait, displaying a form of its as for it went as that of any jump the nouveau reach.

The first and most immediate reason for this kind of behavior would seem to be that **some military organizations even to the present day actually cultivate the psychology of snobbishness missed as a substitute for merit. Higher ranks are cursed her guard lower ranks is socially inferior**.

To have heard that such archaic phenomena as a social exclusiveness of particular regiments, and the tendency for even allies apply ranking Soldiers to fill on comparable if forced to share position with those whose husbands are blower full year of military standing, are the result of age and once useful practices partly explains their tenacity.*

One is only to imagine the chaos and society which would result if all the great organizations confuse merit with class, and tried to reinforce positions on the working hierarchy by a system of snobbery

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* in amusing example the relationship between anxiety and military status has been recounted by Knoll Barber. It seems a during the fall Singapore Rob Scott, a civilian member of the government work Council, took to attending council meetings in his local defense corps uniform. This, however, proved too much for the general, Admiral and air Marshal members of the council, who were so embarrassed at having to share a table with a cool corporal " the date got moved to issue a " in mild takeoff". [7]

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To realize that there must be something quite special about military milieu which actually encourages such ways of thinking. To find out what this something may be, let us go back to first principles.

As a general rule, snobbish behavior be token some underlying feeling of superiority. It is a common characteristic of the social climber, of the individual low self-esteem, of the person who feels threatened or persecuted because of some real or imagined inadequacy. That there is an underlying pathology to the condition seems fairly obvious for two reasons. Firstly, those were emotionally secure are rarely snobbish. Secondly, the behavior is itself irrational, can also been self-defeating. After all, even the most hardened snob must know that other people were adapted seeing through his affections. There is nothing, for example, quite so transparent as name dropping or displaying indications. He must know at some level that is behavior per dot provokes it best amusement, at worst ridicule, contempt or even dislike, but he is nonetheless powerless to curb his snobbish business. Something deprives them on.

But why should the military be snobbish?

There are several obvious reasons and some not so obvious. Firstly, because, traditionally, top levels of the military hierarchy were occupied by the rich and highly poor, the notions the social economic and military status became into the sole related. To social status determine military status, so, in time, military status became spuriously equated with social status. While this undoubtedly provided an structure for snobbish behavior, he does not, of course account for the underlying motivation. The latter we have to examine a second reason: the anomalous position which the military hold in society, the plain fact that they're both loved in Haiti, admired and despise. This ambivalence, which ranges from ought fascination to cold dislike and which, as Kipling points out, fluctuate wildly from peace to war, as both conscious and unconscious components. At a conscious level society admires bravery, and joint pomp, is grateful for protection and proud conquest, what the same time disliking the authoritarianism, potential threat in enormous cost military organizations. And unconscious level many people undoubtedly project onto military organizations their own internalize conflicts over aggression, Ford is that what's fascinating in a poor to see others indulging in (and getting away with (behavior Good within oneself. The popularity of books and films dealing with four and

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Violinist (traditionally evident after a prolonged period of peace (, like that for pornography following an aged sexual repression, it tested a pleasure provided by the carry a satisfaction of hitherto frustrated drives. The breaking of taboos is also a threat to those internalize the defenses against one's own instinct roll impulses -- -- it's the ambivalence.

To this one must address the civilian population space to price for their military organizations, they will quite naturally expect value for their money and be critical of incompetence. As General Gordon Bennett wrote: "civilian sprout provide the manpower for huge armies. There is provide sons to fight. They make sacrifices, enormous sacrifices for the cost. Why does lose their husbands, children lose their fathers, fathers lose their breadwinner's. Families lose their breadwinners. They go short food, clothing and the conference there used to Perry they paid a heavy taxes required to fan a finance our war effort... Practically its bracket when they know that serious mistakes have been made that wanted a lot. After all day pay the cost of these mistakes. " [8]

Under the circumstances it would be very surprising if some awareness of these trends did not influence the military, leading and, the same lease, vaguely apprehensive at not downright defenses.

But there also stresses from within. To know that they have waited there lies to essentially destructive hands, the day shoulder great responsibilities, the day may be called upon to carry out tasked far beyond the capabilities, and the price of value is enormous, it's quite sufficient to initiate feelings of uneasiness. Even notions of retirement are fraught with stress. The knowledge that most ex officers have little value on the civilian labor market, that their lot is a total obscurity of genteel poverty, that the only the very best in very worst of fold journals and a bulb are likely to achieve immortality, and that **none of them will ever again command the absolute obedience to which they have grown accustomed, can hardly be described as reassuring. ***

To the factors underlying the South protective and compensating aspects of snobbishness must be added was perhaps the most important one of all: pre-existing doubts about the self. Since, as we noted earlier, **there is much in militarism to attract those with doubts about their masculinity and intellectual capacity, it would not be**

-- -- * according to keep. In. Carstairs, retired Army officers are among those professional groups of the highest rates of suicide. [9]

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surprising to find the number of main with problems over self-esteem will be discovered at all levels of the military hierarchy. Moreover, since, as we shall see, the desire to bolster sagging self-esteem is a great motivator, we might expect this percentage to work its way into the higher echelons.

One piece of corroborative evidence for these views comes from yet another characteristic many military organizations: their **notorious sensitivity to criticism**. A work, therefore, about this curious phenomenon.

In discussing origins of snobbishness is, the point was made it is usually the tokens some underlying sense of inferiority, that only the socially insecure need to be snobbish.

Applied to military, this may well seen difficult wallow. Snobbish they may be, but insecure -- never! **This understandable skepticism, by those who perhaps mistakenly equate physical mite with promotional stamina, and the gorgeous exterior with spiritual point quality, does, however, ignore one stallion feature of military organizations: they're great sensitivity to criticism and the fact did this because each you precisely at those buried plan, following upon a major war, the popularity of their calling seems to be on the wane.**

In Britain is sensitivity was activated by the blunders of the Crimean war, reemerge with the disasters of the Boer war, and reached a peak between the two world wars. Not very surprisingly, it seemed related to the numbers killed in each proceeding conflict. Judging

In Britain is sensitivity was activated by the blunders of the Crimean war, reemerge with the disasters of the Boer war, and reached a peak between the two world wars,. Not very surprisingly, it seemed related to the numbers killed in each preceding conflict. Judging from the goodwill and get advice among the low regarding which the Army was held after more world's campaigns, you can't that pathetic feelings may well relate more to losses that incompetence, into the feeling that even for great commanders, victory at any cost is hardly admissible.

In that tremendous combat bracket not compact bracket near upon 250,000 men were engaged, more than 30,000 of him were slain or wounded right deceased the Allies lost twice as many men as they killed a French, whom they conquered (: and this dreadful slaughter very likely to place because a great general's credit was shaking at home, and he thought to restore it by a victory. If such promoters which induced to Duke of more Boro to venture that prodigious stay, and desperately sacrificed 30,000 brave lives, so that he might figure once more in the Gazette, and hold his place his intentions of little longer,

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The events defeated the dreadful and selfish design, for the victory was purchased at cost which no nation, greedy of glory as it may be, would willingly pay for any triumph. [10]

Whatever mall boroughs motives, it was during the period following these advanced officers were detected, depending on their age and seniority, as either quilt rate waging Lipper snappers will or will doubt he tyrants will, men who had been tuned to a military career you is usually as a result of being cocked in flight grant the late till we will want out of mothers chambermaids well. It was the same Tory pamphlets air, Ned Ward, who wrote that a captaincy in the guards to be entertained by " getting some bodily consolation to an ancient lady well. [11] the Army has also stop erred in comparison with the Navy. As bond has written in Victorian times, will the Navy was the bulwark of the Constitution, and had need managed up seldom attracting public notice. By contrast, the Army flaunted its unwelcome presents everywhere..." [12]

And recently another reason for sensitivity to criticism has come to the four, namely the fact that the tearing of arms become what Abrams calls equal receding profession world. He describes this recession to a steady loss of the professions monopoly of knowledge relevant to the service is supposed to provide. 13 this state of affairs is an aggravated by growing confusion as to which role, coupled with an increasing lack of consensus among its members as to what membership should entail.

All in all, the military is often had good reason to feel sensitive about its image. **The fear of possible criticism has taken several forms -- the finding of scapegoats for military disasters, the whitewashing of senior commanders after military courts of inquiry, the watering down the bad news and official reports, unnecessary censorship, interference with the activities war correspondents, the refusal to promulgate the finding subcommittees interpret all coal of previous military enterprises, the curbing or come post or a retirement of officers who spoke out against effect of practices (and brass even worse actually suggested some improvements (, and the refusal to appoint made the key positions when the same individuals had been favorably compared by outsiders to less competent officers. According to backs, even the editing of history is not unusual. While to meet the requirements of their contemporaries and a posterity is inhabited generals and their staffs not only to edit the reports of battles but also to word their**

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others in such an irregular fashion that victory, he becomes, can be traced to damn, well failure, the pitfalls, can beast used as a missed reading by those lowering command. " [14] and Francis Gross is advice to officers, published in 1762, included this precept: " when it anytime there is a wondering or confusion in the maneuver, right in amongst the Soldiers and lay about you from left to right. This will convince people that it was not your fault! [15]

To these indications of sensitivity to real or implied criticism we must add another recent origin: the hostile post bags of those who had dared to record the less successful activities of senior commanders, often long since dead. One such was the urgent demand for a public apology which Russell Bratton received from a group of military gentlemen following publication of his book on the siege of caught up; another was obtained response up will the friends of French " to Smithers story of Smith Dorian's often grace period 16 it is not too difficult to see these hard feelings as evidence of the familiar identifications which obtained in military organizations, a sort of " don't be beastly about Father however much he is at fault ". The most striking examples of this response were in connection with general server Redvers Buller after his removal for incompetence during the boar war, and with Major General Gordon ban act panic, who wrecked his career by abandoning his troops after the fall of Singapore. Both blur and Gordon Bennett were defended by the protagonist long after their shortcomings had been widely proclaimed. In all these cases the lives and tabs of thousands of ordinary Soldiers were evidently considered less important than the reputations of their leaders. In talking of criticism it might seem that we were making a great deal of class about nothing. After all, nobody likes criticism, and as for complaints about military historians, it is only natural, in the laudable, to show loyalty to one's group. There are however, some special features of the phenomena in some military men which deserve attention. In the first place, their sensitivity seems out of all proportion to that of other public figures. **In terms of fame or notoriety, well known general store admirals are on the level with film stars, politicians and even newsworthy academics; hence one would expect that they might come to accept the possibility of negative publicity as part of the game, a small price to pay for the " perks " which they otherwise enjoy. This they seem unable to do. In fact, there is a distinctly paranoid alum in the way some senior commanders have**

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reacted to even the main dish rather criticism; to the biggest and most tactful suspicion of a raised eyebrow or clear trial -- almost as if they were being held personally responsible for everything that might go wrong. At three

in this the second place, it just like a criticism has, on occasion, been so intense as to lead to behavior diametrically opposed to the well-being of the organization which they represent. The refusal by Montgomery massing bird to disseminate the findings of the car committee on the first world war, and the blighting of the careers of progressive Soldiers like Hobart color, fall into this category. In the third place, the response to criticism has, upon occasions, like the aftermath of the can break take offense, been so blatantly sell damaging as to fit label will Iraq" (i.e., behavior which the individual cannot help even though he knows that it will be rebound upon itself (.

Dr. Cooper summed it all up when he described " the Soldiers at the top " as " shot off "" unlike other public men", but thirdly sensitive to criticism -- so thin-skinned. Instead of realizing the value of criticism and its publicity value to the Army it regarded any suggestion, a day had been some model, as a personal insult. 17

In touching upon the delicate matter we must not lose sight of its significance and relevance in the present context. Whatever else it may be, sensitivity to criticism is a measure of insecurity. It implies a leaky bill which, in turn, and by way of compensation, manifest itself in particularly particular character traits, one of which is snobbish business. Whether this bill this is due to some early shock the self-esteem, or feared the breakthrough of unacceptable urges impulses, or some combination of these two influences, the individual so afflicted developed certain defenses which helped minimize painful feelings. This fine support in yet another feature of military organizations -- their colt of antifeminist seat.

After a very important in exacerbating factor has been the regulations for bidding serving officers to write to the press to defend themselves against unfair and often in ill-informed criticism. In this writer's opinion, not being allowed to answerback prevents written us of those unpleasant feelings which criticism evokes.

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Chapter 19

Anti-enfemininancy

"Well let war ceased altogether and the nation will become economic"

-- General Chaffee

When discussing the various anxieties which militarism serves to reduce, brief mention was made of the years with which some may entertain about their masculinity. Thus it was pointing out privacy see page 185 (back, though primarily concert of combating the thread the dread of disorder and dissolution, certain star Tori aspects of whole poll " might also help to reassure opposing problems in this area.

In putting together the jig salt military incompetence, therefore, we can now take a one-piece which clearly has great relevance to this topic call call: the striking antipathy toward a feminist see which characterizes some military organizations, in this despite the fact that the female is usually regarded as " more deadly than the male "! Evidence of this antipathy is unnecessary excess of the circumstantial. It embraces such phenomena as:

1. The importance attached to such outward signs of sexual identification as hair length. Since the assistance on " short back and sides"seems correlated with those periods in history when sexual difference a patient was linked to hair length, we can dismiss excuses of neatness in 19 as rationalization. Field Marshal Board Wellesley State the true case when he said " it is very difficult to make an Englishman anytime look like a Soldier. He is fond of longer share... Here is the glory of a woman but the shame of a man. " one

2. Traditional taboos on certain topics and pastimes. Thus we find a Captain Foley, or are. In period, commander of retaining a naval training establishment for Officer cadets at Dartmouth, forbidding piano playing because he considered it defend it. Two and 1973 in car described the comparable incident in connection with a fellow officer Gerald Lang.

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In Northern Ireland-year-old had returned to one of his Early allows, which was painting, and the journey he began taking lessons. As this passion crew, the Army's disapproval hardened until there seem to be a continual as ideological battle going on... For the assistant accident, a blind youth with a rich roast knows, the word, of the word vote artist " was synonymous with " homosexual ", and he quartered me one-day (I was considered to be the evil influence on Gerald (and said desperately: " now look here... I that nothing against our " but couriers are bad... I need it!... Disgusting! [3]

In 80 years previously, we're and eight. Age. Markham, whose fatal obedience and lack of initiative, when confronted with the " in possible order will buy his autocratic superior, vice admiral dry and, resulted in a collision between battleships, seems to have been afflicted with a similar prejudice. " cigarettes ", he was told his officers, " are only four in feminine weak links. " [4]

3. A deeply rooted prejudice towards women who try to adopt traditionally male roles. An early examples a hostility Inc. hour by Florence Nightingale enter after today's manpower wastage from disease and doctrine nutrition during the criterion war. A recent examples a lack of Corporation experienced by Mrs. M. Pratt Joyner attempt at chain information for her book on Victoria crosses. * of this she said, " may bracket regimental associations bracket considered that woman was not a proper person to write such a book. Regiment after regiment I found to disappoint you. " 6

After all of these prejudices it can be argued that the real threat of women who do manage jobs is the income minimizing the role they, by association, emasculated those who normally fulfill. The differences in Outlook between those armies which issued training women for combat roles and those like " the Israeli Army " which do not add straight to this hypothesis, as does also the observation that one of the favorite insult rolled Officer cadets who make a poor showing Teresa Ramon real trail is that the look pregnant. One suspects that this form of abuse is, paradoxically, unknown in those armies where, because they contain women, there may for want to be some truth in the assertion!

Finally, an equation between defense of behavior in feminine seat --

-- -- *Mrs. Pratt died before being able to complete her book, Everest our Aristocracy of the brave. [5]

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the feelings that it is this she to where air protectors or build head covers rather see seat age 55 (-- as undoubtedly cause much unnecessary destruction of the human body. Just male is in many respects last top, less able to let stand pain, more mortal, and, from a purely a now Tom Opel point you, more portable than the female, this equation, though understandable is sadly ironic. It is not unreasonable up on not a unreasonable hypothesis to suggest its most glaring and constant illustration incurred in connection with the issue convoys. In the first world work, hundreds of thousands of tons of merchant shipping were lost through the Navy's refusal to adopt convoy system when Lloyd George eventually forced convoys upon and unwilling at 90, losses fell significantly. The lesson was playing for all to see. But in the years between the war is the same irrational dislike of " mothering " of block of ships prevented the development of inefficient escort system. It was not until spring of 1941, after. Lattice losses, but recent triumph once again and the escorting emerging convoys was resorted to Indian in in anything approaching a wholehearted matter. The benefits were once again immediately apparent. But then America entered the war and, unbelievably, in the face of overwhelming evidence, insisted on trying to defeat you both without the use of convoys. Where are does and, America's great Fleet commander the first world war, not only forestall the air of their ways, but appeared to grasp the underlying motivation when he wrote call: " it therefore seems to go without question the joy course for us to pursue is to revert to the ancient practice of the convoy. This will only this will be purely on offense is back in offense of action because of we concentrate our shipping in the convoy and protect it will for naval forces we will thereby forced the enemy, in order to carry on his mission, to encounter naval forces. Seven (the talus italics mine (

But despite the admirals gallant attempt to convince his kids minted the need not feel ashamed of the pending convoys, his words went unheeded. Between December 1941 and the following March American losses of merchant shipping grew to the staggering monthly total of 500,000 tn.. Eventually, the price of aggressive masculinity embodied in the so-called patrol and hunting operations on isolated warships proved too costly, and convoys were instituted between Houston and Halifacts. Losses on this route promptly dropped to zero. But Southold Boston ships still sailed independently until by June the number of ships on reach the all-time record of 700,000 tn. In a single mom! Transport convoys were rotten to the Caribbean without

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One ship being lost. At last lesson had learned. But as McIntyre remarks, "at what cost ". *

2004 EDITOR: the anti-effeminancy continues today! Its not "macho" enough for infantry & armor units in Irag to escort and clear truck convoys supplying the the very things that keep them alive (fuel, food, water, amunition, mail etc.)---Army doctrine is that undertrained/underequipped Military Police (MPs) in flimsy HMMWV trucks are to secure main supply routes (MSRs) on today's lethal, non-linear battlefields; so while the egotistical "combat arms" narcissists with 9mm pistols strapped to their legs as a prop up for their small penis size/vulnerability knock down defenseless civilians in the middle of the night playing wannabe "Delta Force" (unit on top of macho pecking order of ego) the roads are not cleared of command detonated landmines and guerrillas with RPGs, AKMs and molotov cocktails. When the "underclass" truck drivers are killed the survivors grow up and realize dolce dolce decorum est is a fatal dead end, they stick up for themselves and demand armor protection and armament but they are told to drive to their deaths of face UCMJ court martial action! Yet another reason why we need an ADULT PROFESSIONAL military filled with strong adults who know who they are and don't have psychological chips on their shoulders..like the Israeli Defense Force (IDF)...

In touching on this topic, jet which makes the point that " **the call to manliness and toughness associated with junior officers " in the American forces " bracket is often a reaction against profound feelings of weakness**."it is hardly coincidental that the same writer endorses the view that " the most peaceful men are general ". 8

The argument is simply **the proportion of those used to opt for career in the armed services do so I of underlying fear of being unmanly. Such individuals will be attracted to organizations would set upon than the seal of masculinity. But he admitted to assist our men bent upon the most primitive manifestations of maleness cash violence and aggression -- individual cheesy reassurance he requires. But to maintain this reassurance he will in turn have to contribute, by word and deed,to the elaborate defenses against the pendency of this adult as she has entered.**

Proposal military incompetence this cool "Butch" element in the armed forces", whatever its origins, may well have two disastrous consequences. Firstly, we shall find positions of imports billed by some of them cold peaceful General's " of lunch at which rights, men who startled light, a compensation for feelings of in fury, tucked into the top but didn't serve them kill in the rule generalship. The classic examples that of Sir Redvers Buller, and it is outward trappings, such as his large size and powers deeds, proclaimed his "masculinity will, but who concealed beneath them a soft and passive personality.

That a second unfortunate consequence is a since military organizations constitute you're really proving grounds they give rise to those excesses of drunkenness and over sexuality which happen time to time seriously threatened fighting efficiency. According to John laughing, this outcome is particular to any Armed Forces of United States:

American fighting it wants sex for breakfast, lunch and dinner. When insects make up a large part of the thoughts and speech of any Army, but with the Americans they amount

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* dislike of convoy escort duties is also been described to a preference among some naval officers for membership of a large battle flee. In the light of evidence to be considered presently this preference may well stemmed from the fact that ship commanders in the battle plate have in fact far less skilled for personal initiative that had escort commanders of merchant convoys. Knight

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to an obsession. Opposites particularly have seemed more interested in women than in getting on with their workshop: private Soldiers of complaint this since the days of the Revolution... They bracket the Japanese bracket were soon convinced that only two things matter to American servicemen -- Sex and liquor. [10]

The third and no less disastrous consequence is that by selecting and promoting on the basis of such "Butch" criteria as size, strength and physical Kurdish and promising games, the Armed Forces tend to ignore other attributes which really may be of greater importance to senior commander -- intelligence, I educational level, resistance to break down under stress and substantial reserves of moral purge.

There is of course account argument, namely the general should be wrote leaders, which would necessitate them have at least some of the aforementioned "Butch" traits. Sheer physical size, position of decorations for bravery and off-line rubber record would, according to this argument, confer invaluable leadership qualities upon top military commanders. Unhappily this very does not stand out. Firstly, the causal relationship between leadership and "Butch" traits is at best one-way. Natural leaders may well have made good captains of the buying XP, but being good rocker in no way insurers the best qualities military leadership. Secondly, while physical stature, and so on, are certainly advantage in this to a would-be leader, so-called masculinity attributes count for very little in comparison with personality and knowing one's job. Good leadership is synonymous with inspiring confidence in those who follow, and confidence is born of results. Thirdly, the most cursory glance at military history suggests that many of the really great military naval commanders -- the polling, Nelson, will, for instance were made a brainy character, not up huge bodies with dazzling records in the field to sport. In case these views would seem here at a cool let it be said that they record with those expressed by at least one military man of some repute. A generalship, Montgomery says: while the science and art of command... Bracket involves bracket in intimate knowledge of human nature... A commander must take two stages ahead. Old he speaks glowingly of the physically quilt frail " wool and Nelson, describing the latter has a quilt brilliant semen and most original, intelligent and courageous fighter, ". In that same many can be comments on the quilt flexibility"" brilliant intellect world of Napoleon. But nowhere does the field marshal dilate upon the advantages of mine physique, Harry

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Masculinity, and a reputation for long-distance running, Polo or boxing. [11]

The fourth point is this: in days gone by, when physical straight count for more the battlefield and mental ability, to senior commanders could exercise their road powers by leading their troops into action, the physical aspects of their road leadership were no doubt important. But in modern war generals and admirals are rarely if ever seen by the vast majority of their men. Under such circumstances to road leadership Moscow for rather less than managerial and technical ability.

Since the foregoing section has clearly been treading on very sensitive ground, the history trace the argument to make sure but no unjustified injury has been done.

We are concerned to relate and explained to indisputable phenomena: so-called quilt peaceful generals called the wind times of stress revealed themselves as passive, depended in a decisive; and the antifeminist eat those it is all military organizations. That leads back to the following points were made:

1. Some men, for reasons rooted in the early family situation, have serious doubts about their sexual adequacy and/or physical straight in size.

2. such men may deal with their feelings of inferiority by adopting a competent Orient style of light in which the Stryker reassurance in some suitably symbolic role.

3. The prevailing eat those of many military organizations provides his reassurance.

4. Hence a percentage of men will seek assassins by the Armed Forces simply because such acceptance is to Warren T. of their masculinity.

5. Once in, they're continuing an underlying fear other than effective tendency rather see synonymous with adequacy in the minds of this particular group practice these predicted that well-known pattern of behavior which we have turned quilt Butch quilt.

6. But this competence at Torrey compensate story behavior is itself highly valued in the Armed Forces. Hence the individual not only profits by, but also contributes to, the antifeminist sea of his parent organization. It is India's interest to do so.

7. the significance of all this for military competence is that quilt "Butch" characteristics are not perhaps the most important criteria for top let level leadership. It is therefore examine this last point.

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Chapter 20

Leaders of men

"Oh how credibility to lead depend on the ability to follow? You might as well saved the ability to float depends on the ability to sink. "

-- L. J. Peter and are. Whole, The Peter Principle

Whatever its other causes, military incompetence supplies of diary leadership. This is hardly surprising. The psychological problems which beset military officers Felix E. is severity those associated with leadership. In this respect they never Corps required to fulfill incompatible roles. They're expected to show initiative, yet remain in the and by regulations. They must be aggressive, yet never in subordinate. They must be a situation carry for their men, get maintain an enormous social distance. They must know everything about everything, it never appear intellectual. Finally, as we saw in the last chapter, they may well have been selected for attributes almost totally unrelated to the tasks they are expected to perform.

Discussion that leadership is so often overlooked with day but you don't be motive ideas than one is hard to what tool nailed the concert now. To cut through the monopoly of such cause a moral and unexceptional bull associations as cool patriotism, will play out the play the game ", the " never asking your men to do something you wouldn't do yourself " formula, will not getting in (or out ", the " square job Frank I. steadfast gays"formula, (as a lender look (and the " get... You'll be a man"recipe, one comes to **the simple truth that leadership is no morbid exercising such an influence upon others that they tend to act in concert towards achieving the goal was they might not have achieved so readily had he been lifted their own devices.**

The gritty ingredients which bring about this agreeable state of affairs are many and varied. At the most superficial level they are believed to

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Include such factors as voice, stature and appearance, and impression nominations, trustworthiness, sincerity and bravery. At a deeper and rather more important level, leadership depends upon a proper understanding in the needs and opinions of those one hopes to Lee, and a context in which leadership occurs. It also depends in good timing. Hitler, who is neither on the sheet, trustworthy nor sincere, whose stature was unremarkable and his appearance occurs on the repellent, understood these rules and exploited and the full advantage. The same may be said of many good comedians.

In short, there is nothing mysterious, romantic or necessarily laudable about leadership. Indeed, some of the most effective leaders have been those who, merely to having more than their fair share of cycle pathic traits, were able to release antisocial behavior in others. Their secret is that by setting an example they release a way of acting that is normally inhibited. This gives pleasure to their followers, thus reinforcing their leadership.

In military organizations leaders are usually of a rather different kind. For start, they are pointed rather been emergent. That is to say, the needs of the individual Soldier play almost no role in deciding sort of leaders that he gets. Secondly, the military leader possesses constitutional power all the magnitude which surpasses that of leaders in most other human groups. If he cannot pull his followers by force of character, he can at least pushed them by force of law.

The very unrelated feature of military leadership is that it is essentially outcry and operates in what modern theorists call a what we own" rather than an all quilt all channel communications net ". **In other words, the flow of essential instant information is to and throw between the leader and his subordinates rather than between all members of the group. Not very surprisingly, but we'll net, though no doubt gratifying to autocratic leaders, produce more errors produces more errors, slower solutions to problems, and reduces gratification to the group than does the more democratic all channel net.**

In the light of these considerations is proud strains at leadership in the British Armed Forces should have been as effective as it has. In dcom on the assumption to the primary function of officers is to get the best other men, the curious how can be brought by the gentlemanly managers of the Brook Dorian British officer corps, and even but is still relatively unprofessional officers of the first world war, deserves considerable respect. Since the Syrian feature of all the campaigns

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So far considered has been remarkable absence of neatness tendencies and quite astonishing degree of tolerance, fortitude and bravery shown by the, Soldier, we have to ask: what is despite or because up their leaders? And the latter, how was it even the most in net and reactionary of them could still touched the hearts of the made a day would give themselves to the fight with a cheerful and destructive energy that could, on occasions, rise to whirlwind proportions.

Even midnight healthy stone, Townshend and Buller, about whose flagrant incompetence in a rule decision maker there can be no possible doubt, earned a loyalty and affection, I'll be far beyond their desserts, which maintain them around fighting spirit of their made almost to the end.

That way of trying to explain his curiosities let's consider a few more findings on the extensive research on leadership. The first point to note is the distinction that has been drawn between trolls of the leader: " task specialist called" social specialist ". As that specialists a leaders prime concern is Dickens achieve the groups a sensible goal; and the case of the military, defeating the enemy. For such a rule, being likable is a rather less important rate than that of being more active, more intelligent and better informed in his followers. In his capacity as " social specialist ", however, a leaders made function is to preserve good personal relations within the group, thereby still maintaining the row as to keep the group and been buried in the military deal used the function of a successful social specialist would prevent kidney and reduce such symptoms of low morale as absenteeism, desertion, sickness in crime. Not very surprisingly, the most important action date of such a leader is that he should be liked. If agency in task ability are of rather secondary important spirit was obvious that many leaders in the British Armed Forces have tended to be social rather been task specialist, we have to ask why do should be.

Is he should answer one part of his question. They were poor task specialist caught because borrowers is traditionally an amateur Army in which professional ability, at knowledge and military player have counted for little. The like good social specialist

2004 EDITOR: armies don't fight to stop the bullshit to keep them honest to reality and their profession

Again moderate researchers shown up was impossible answers. It has been shown that whereas low stress groups, operating in situations that are devoid of painful uncertainties, to best under democratic leadership, organizations like the military in times of war there are subject to stressing ambiguities actually prefer autocratic leadership.

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In other words, the feelings of dependency induced by straps successfully neutralize the persons normal antipathy toward the outcry leader. Want while it may like Townshend would not be likely to survive a very long in a modern civilian firm, his autocratic mean was six lovingly excepted by men whose lives were hanging by a thread.

But even get, given the right circumstances and autocratic mean was in no part of being like, we still need some positive reasons for the extraordinary popularity of otherwise incompetent commanders. There are three such: " risking his ", " social economic status and the past indulgence of the individuals concerned. Other things being equal, a man who is prepared to take risks makes the more popular leader and want not still inclined. Two by taking a risking metaphorically, if not literally, stands on for the group and is perhaps, by so doing, shoulder irresponsibility for behavior in which the group needs, right deceased and wants pride deceased to indulge but for which, if left on their own, they would lack the necessary moral stamina.

2004 EDITOR: he's the first one to seen so everyone else can jump in and emulate

and the dictionary's pleasure in feeling of admiration which we derive from contemplating big gamblers in any walk of life are components of the psychological phenomena.

The less readily inexplicable favor doctor is that of social economic status. Three these are probably at least three components there are probably at least three components to the inflow is of wealth and position. Firstly there is the ", sometimes no doubt erroneous, believe that " he must be better deny" which gives rise to the " therefore I will follow him to the grade of **necessary " feeling. Secondly the judicial good manners and self-confidence of the financially socially secure obviously makes World Cup more kindly inhumane paternalism towards the underdog.**

The officers of the old school earned a love their made by behaving towards them as they might towards cherished pads was possible because the real and enormous social goals which the rank-and-file proceed between sell themselves and their rulers. The time-honored distaste which other ranks have felt for officers who rose from the ranks is all part of the same picture.

2004 EDITOR: narcissistic hero worship of selfish phonies who make no waves instead of embracing the competent mustangs who rose up through the ranks and reach career walls when their truth telling gets them in hot water with corrupt status quo

Finally, the fact their position was assured to their wealth meant a relative absence of those unpleasant straits was are associated with feelings of social inferiority.

Another obvious reason for the likable which eventually it's in good social leadership has been researched by Greer. For this worker showed the successful leadership tended to occur if followers had been told by the leader. This case to tractable nature of the group

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Evidently reflects a wish to return pass papers. By these lines it is hardly surprising that even the most incompetent generals are often effective social leaders. No one took greater risk than Townshend, no one was more concerned to indulge his troops in Boulder, and fewer could outdo such notables as looking, party date and radically we came to a matter of displaying social economic status.

However, to someone who is not had the misfortune of serving under any of these officers in a scene scarcely credible that the riskiness of Townshend, the indulgence of Bull or and the socioeconomic status of the Crimean general's could have compensated for their other characteristics. How, for example, could troops overlook the palpable and city of Townshend and the total quilt on riskiness cloak and Larry incompetence of Butler, and how could they forgive the apparent negligence of Raglan? Currently straight related reasons. Firstly, in war, as in other situations of more threat, there is an inn there is an understandable urge to clutch at straws -- the good aspects of the leader seized upon, the less good keenly denied. We would guess that this anxiety reduction will, moreover, be particularly likely to occur in a situation without degrees of choice. The situation of Soldier, in an organization which allows up no escape, confronted by the threat of imminent destruction, is just one such. To put very simply, he makes the best of a bad job, and this includes wholeheartedly excepting leader even when the latter was not it is choosing.

"It is the nature of military organizations to recapitulate the cycle demand dynamics of an authoritarian family grew, one in which the pattern from mileus can do no wrong. Is not necessary to be an ardent believer and psychoanalytic very to realize that, in times of stress, there is a natural markings back to an earlier source of security.

But there is still want other reason for the extraordinary tolerance shown towards disastrous leaders, -- their " in visibility will. The reputations of many bad generals have survived simply because individuals concerned get out-of-the-way. Like God, they did not often reveal themselves. This analogy between believed in an earthly leader and belief in God may be carried further. Both are sometimes functions of experienced threat, and both may be enhanced by the surrounding industry. Whether they are in fact good or bad, "invisible " leaders like Ragland undoubtedly benefited from not being known and rarely seen by the rank-and-file.

The phenomena is best perhaps illustrated by that most controversial

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All figures, Field Marshal Haig, of we it has been written: " to pricing down as a blundering, heartless incompetent in the prevailing fashion calls for considerable hearty hood on the part of the credit. One fact remains cannot be question: until the echo of the last shot had died away, no condemnation of Hay was ever voiced by the rank-and-file of the 2 million strong Army under his command. " five when it is considered that few of these 2 million ever saw their commander in chief that were confronted daily with the immediate, and fearful, consequences of his generalship, the parallel between blind acceptance of an clue invisible " military leader in the strengthening of religious convictions (regarding heavenly competence print (which follows monumental natural disasters can hardly fail to be drawn.

The ideal military leader is, of course, one who manages 22 combined excellence as a task specialist with an equal flair for the social or heroic aspects of leadership. Since the traits required for these two aspects of leadership a rather different, the so-called " great man " leaders have been comparatively rare. Six amongst the best examples were Wellington, Nelson, Lawrence, and in recent years, Field Marshal Slim. Such leaders managed to two combined extreme professionalism in realizing a military goals with a warm humanity would turn them the lasting affection and loyalty of their man. There have, of course, and other " great man " who, lacking the natural talents of the Nelson or slam for the role social specialist, have deliberately simulate simulated the necessary traits. The prime example does John or is Field Marshal Montgomery. By nature are rather cold, intra verdict and autocratic individual (beside him seen by many of his officers (, he nevertheless had the good sense to apply a somewhat contrived bonhomie, Helfgott with packets as cigarettes and numerous Edges, which undoubtedly did much to ensure morale and group mindedness in the troops which he commanded. Too many people, whether they like them or not, it must seem totally incomprehensible that Montgomery should have been actually criticize for is quite deliberate showmanship, which probably did more for civilian and military morale than any I many other generals beginning warfare. Such shells and unwarranted sniping sing simplifies woman or basic causes and military incompetence, you need a fatal confusion between the practical and symbolic roles and military organizations which results in the sacrificing a military efficiency for the sake of " good form will.

The evident success of some British senior commanders in their role

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As social leaders does not mean that military mishaps have never been due to shortcomings in this respect. Three situations in particular have provided skilled for military incompetence. The first changes upon the fact that though the leisure qualities required at one level of command may result in promotion, they are often not does relevant to a higher level of command. Just as a brilliant general, such as the Oscar audience Sir John Monash, Australian Sir John Monash may have been in different Brigadier, mediocre battalion commander and third-rate platoon commander, so, more seriously, there have been outstanding platoon & Co. commanders who, promoted on the basis of their performance at these levels, and adopt as in that is beloved channels. Such examples of the Peter principle, wherein people are raised to their own level of inefficiency, was never better illustrated than in the case of surrenders buller, who has been described as a " superb major, a mediocre Colonel and an abysmal general ". In this case, high-level military incompetence must be laid at the door object if you wrote leadership, for this was the quality which eventually put them where he could do the most damage to his own site.

The second situation in which the motivational as opposed to the intellectual aspects of leadership may lead to military disaster is where obedience, even vote by a hero worship, loans reason and moral sensibility to such an extent that the group may embark upon behavior which is little short of suicidal. The classic example is to be found in the psycho pathetic behavior of some German units toward Soviet citizens during the invasion of Russia. It is certain the does behavior helps seal the fate of Hitler's forces by turning potentially sympathetic Soviet peasants into bench. A tors. It is possible that the discrepancy between " military " behavior under Hitler's leadership and the older, Prussian coating show every produced a sagging morale and failure of Soldierly pride from which the Corps officers could never totally recover. There's nothing so eroding a morale as to dislike oneself.

Happily, heroic leadership in the British military has usually been confined to younger officers. Senior military commanders, by reason of their unsalable rank in sheltering staff, have often remain so isolated from the rank-and-file but their possession, or lack, if you wrote qualities has passed unnoticed.

There is, however, one further aspect of these more nebulous qualities of leadership which displayed in not in considerable part in story of military incompetence. It concerns the position which an individual occupies into related continuing is: those of boldness two

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Caution, Inc. also this to indecision. Over the years military incompetence has resulted more from a dearth of boldness then from a lack of caution, and more from up all of indecision then from an excess of April 70. The patient Latin committee of General's Warren and Buller XP and cop, which we looked at in a previous chapter, is a good example of this failure of leadership. Another is that of the SoHo operation in the deliberately contained Camel, were " the greatest chance of the war was thrown away by the most object selection of General officers ever congregate in one spot will. [7]

In more recent times, the Norway expedition of 1940 displayed not only short similar shortcomings in high-level heroic leisure, but also the Monte in frequent contrast between the verve and initiative of junior commanders and the caution cautious in decision of those at higher levels of control. Donald McIntyre, writing in these events, records:

The commander-in-chief, hopefully, after hesitate until nearly noon on nine April, detached his cruiser Squadron and destroyer to attack at Bergen, only to have his or an old by the Admiralty the feared the short offenses might by Dan have been taken over by the enemy... What a different approach had been that of war Burton Lee (to destroyer to load to let leader who spirited destruction of German forces at Norfolk earned him a posthumous Victorian across bracket --" intendsattacking at Don! While his initiative and daring had turned are mixed into immortal trapped for nearly half the total German destroyers for strength. It even now the hardest which were burden these sewing at prepared was nearly lost to the British through indecision and hesitation. Not peaked

The saying lack of forceful and decisive leadership of the highest levels of command was also at me in the fall of Singapore right disease see page 139 (, when caution, precipitated partly by the theater of injuring subduing around, resulted in two little been done too late to avert the worst disasters second world war.

One obvious explanation for the Ferrier of the motivational aspects of leisure, and all these instances, is the relatively advanced age of the individuals concerned. Old men are more cautious than young men, and less able to make quick decisions in those whose arteries have not begun the heart and. The refusal by the elderly general per ward to exploit Wellington's crushing defeat of June not at the marrow in 1808 is a classic example of the sort of failure in leadership.

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Doesn't allow Boris voice clearly honorable to his staff Wellesley exclaimed: " Sir Harry, now leisure time to advance. The enemy are completely beaten, we shall be in Lisbon in three days. " Sir Harry hesitated and Wellesley Preston McGann, adding that date of Sir Harry himself taking part in the victor's campaign... The French had in fact flight eastward, leading Torres address and the road to Lisbon open. The Sir Harry had said no wants and he said it began. Another was enough. He'd been created a baronet for doing nothing much at Copenhagen in 1807. Before June not attack he had said no to Wellesley, " wait for more. --, quotation mark he repeated. It was not upon the Apache Woody. Wellesley turned away into scouts, the market to his officers they might as well go issued Redlake Partridge is. Nine

Another possible factor is in many of these instances involved combined operations. Even bull or had a detachment and Naval artillery which, with Ankara bull corridor bull and fatal opposite his seat, he forbade to use against the enemy positions was being top. Arteries perhaps cases where it or service jealousy, like sibling rivalry, effectively deflate in used up the motivational energies of both arrivals Western mark this was certainly true of the Singapore disaster, both in the chiefs of staff corals of 1925 in an lack of effective lies on between Army, Navy and Air Force commanders during the Japanese invasion of Malay in 1941 in 1942.

The door other more fundamental and pervasive reasons for these failures in leadership was to be ascribed to the general psychopathology of military organizations. The common denominator is anxiety. Is a feature upon services at the penalty for air is very much more substantial than the reward for success. Whereas the naval officer who, through an air of judgment on the part of his subordinates, but to ship ground will almost certainly be court martial and stands fair chance of being heavily punished, the reward for taking a bold action which pays off may be no more than a mention in dispatches were some decoration with little no effect upon promotional prose prospects. The net result of this bias towards negative reinforcement will be that fear of failure rather than hopeless success tends to be the dominant motive force in decision-making, and the higher the ranks stronger this motive because there is farther to fall. There are of course other reasons for supported supposing that the anxiety

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Which tends to curb bold initiative will be stronger in the higher levels of command than lower down the hierarchy. The one thing, responsibility is greater and, for another, perhaps the first time, there is no one hot pulp higher up to whom the senior commander can appeal.

Finally, mention must be made of the pieces before by Simon rated which made the oatmeal for the future. It concerns the role false promises in the training of officers, false promises that have their origin is simple and obvious fact: thin expectation of superiority in a leader by those who are led will increase the tendency to follow him. If, on a prior or write grounds, you believe is somewhat is better educated and knows Morgan you do, then you will be more prepared to follow his lead then if you are not party to this bleak.

For years is simple truth has been confirmed by the attitudes and behavior of the ordinary Soldier towards his officers. For years it was the case that since there were drawn from a socioeconomic class was vastly inferior to that other opposite, the rank-and-file took it for granted that their options new what they did and were the very real sense born to Lee, i.e. war, were born into that class from which traditionally the core of officers withdrawn. Even more porn, the opposite for gentlemen, that is say they possessed it effortless and uncontrived capacity the rate eating self-insurance, good manners and the courteous if per Colonel mean towards those of inferior station. However mistaken name may have been in individual cases, the rank-and-file or able lookup assessment is being of a superior cast, on the sheet, omnipotent, natural, preordained leaders, and more often than not, nine father figures (page 234 (.

Since last for all of this heads changed. Officers are no longer recruited exclusively from the upper classes. Compared leaf do hour from landed Gentry or aristocratic families, and many not an even pretended to camp public school. The same token, the rank-and-file or better educated and more sophisticated than their forebears. At first blush this would seem all to the good, giving promise of at Piedmont democratization in the proper mission of arms, a trend that would 1 Day Pl. it on par with most other locations in the civilized society.

Enforcement, according to some Simon rated as pieces, something quite other is happening. Confronted with the necessity recruiting its opposition to section a society would've been unthinkable in years gone by, the military is made what it regards as the best other

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Bad job by insisting debt, **since officers must still be gentlemen, we're no natural gulf exists between those who lead and those who followed this must be artificially inculcated by training.**

2004 EDITOR: snobbery must be preserved at all costs!

The following accept from ravens horrible should make the matter plain. We start with a glimpse of life at the Royal military Academy, and later to school of them to treat war Mr., in the 1950s. According to Raven, the products of this training regimen may be his bizarre as those depicted in the four character studies which conclude this section.

... The saluting its Sandhurst is tremendous. The walk around Sandhurst looking remotely as if you might be an officer, you'll receive an excess and barrage of compliments buried the money boy in PT short. Running, square Soldiers and snap disguising attraction light nice. The elegant young gentlemen in the brown pearl be will lift it from his head with a control juror, true place it in an exact number of seconds later at precisely the same angle. Boys in uniform mistakes, sorts, a rifles for submersion guns will perform a volume of intricate movements, a loan or as a body, for your special benefit. 10

To detach observer be squeaked antics may seem ludicrous, boring or even things embarrassing. However, there will be others so emotionally incapable of distinguishing between compliments paid to the attractions of ranking commission and those paid to themselves as people that they will actually enjoy these two stipulations. But such enjoyment of these mandatory conventions, based upon a highly motivated if understandable misinterpretation of their meeting, many, like effects of even the most transparent flattery, provoke fully unrealistic feelings of self importance.

Other significant features as Sandhurst milieu, according to Raven, are: the pretax system, were cadets of high rank or record to discipline and report upon those of lower status; the mind blunting rules square upon which three. Essentials for career violence -- unthinking obedience, in exquisite capacity for keeping in step and a proper concern for the menu show dressed -- are instilled per hour upon our " until fatigue is wet hangover the mass cadets like Princeton Redstone over Sodom,; and finally the total awesome privacy, and lack of leisure for the following an idiosyncratic interest and pastimes. Taken together, these features of the Royal military Academy

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Are designed to " build character " any new future officers with values proper to their calling.

2004 EDITOR: to brainwash the young so they are subservient to status quo

Any gaps which Sanders might have Latin leave in a total program for the in quotation of officer like qualities are at nearly failed, says Raven, but cause a moral imperatives of war Mr. These cluster round the concept of " that's ", enthusiasm, humor, sociability in responsibility -- traits which every optimum's opposition show.

Well much of the training was inevitably designed to promote physical fitness, there is nevertheless a strongly help lead announcer, what if it or not, should always have so much in the way up) or " that's " proxies that he would never admit to physical inadequacy until he dropped debtor and conscious. This believe, a very significant one, was mystical both in his nature and intensity. During a crippling exercise attended the course two or 3 oz. For a lot of sellout complaining of blisters are other mild into his dispositions. A the teeth instructor, himself a symbolize and self-indulgent man, denounced him in round terms. Announcer he said simply, could not and did not fall out. Willpower, nothing else, should keep in going forever. It was all a matter of " that's ". There was an unspoken implication that " since other rights could indicate fall out, even though they were often physically tougher, the officer blind to superior cast. I found in accepted believe among officers later on the date could perform physical feats are endured physical discomfort without it being in the least necessary for them to train or prepare for such things in the manner required of the private Soldier. Officers for example, it just did not do PT dated 98; they were officers and what endured to the very and, and they stepped right straight onto the field from the Senatorial or probable.

How much, in the last resort, was sought to depend on superior qualities morality and character! The military arts were given precise attention, but it was catch words with cause a moral implications (cool dots " print, " commonsense " (that filled the air as the course one on. Another Warminster virtue was attitude peculiar brand a few of humor. This is not the ability to see oneself and one's activities in a detached an ironical spirit -- that would been fatal. Humor means being carefulof unpleasant circumstances, rallying the man spirits by laughing with

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Them over some slapstick incident, substance admitting " like a good sport will to an unjust punishment given to oneself by the adjutant and " laughing about it after words in the Manas ". This conception of humor (and obvious branch of cool dots " (was in fact is greatly designed to counteract are totally extinguish any tendencies towards an objective (or intellectual (humor that might contain changes of satire or cynicism --for such as saying what a been detrimental to another highly prized virtue, that of enthusiasm. [2004 EDITOR: you have to be able to eat shit and laugh about it like a good little codependent to the status quo]

About enthusiasm I can hardly trust myself to speak. It seemed to mean a sort of blind, uncritical application and to any to ask, however silly or futile, the De Niro assists or panic of a superior might suddenly thrust upon one. Since one of the points of enthusiasm was that you started doing whatever it was straightaway and without wasting time on questions, enthusiasm could involve a frantic expense of time and energy on some trifling project, Lisa Foley because uncritically undertaking, abandoned halfway as irrationally as it was commands. This, of course, was just what great Soldiers of the past wish to avoid when they deplore the indiscriminate use of will zeal ". Why is seal -- condemned alike by von Clausewitz and Wellington -- should now once again be found desirable it is interesting to speculate. I suspect it is because the superior and analytical attitude is considered on Democratic; and that the influences such people as Lord Montgomery has dictated a spirit, for junior officers lease, I'll " mocking and," getting on with the job will. The hardiness, not to say hysteria, implied by such expressions was of course distasteful to the most fastidious and skeptical officers, permit benefit yet another virtue, that of loyalty, had to be invoked. Loyalty meant you were acquired, in the name of the queen and honor the regiment, to conceal any impatience or amusement you might feel when the demands on your enthusiasm became operatic, for seal what is playing in possible fulfillment. **Loyalty, in fact, was a concession often blatantly used to blackmail you into silence when you are faced with the incompetence, injustice or sheer folly of the superior officer.**

And move and sociability was also highly esteemed at war Mr. This, like loyalty, could mean many good things, such as hospitality and the desire to please and social intercourse, but also implied in under unquestioning difference to the convenience and opinions of one's military superiors. That one should obey the orders up such

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superiors, or even be loyal to them during displays a professional ADD, is perfectly reasonable; I could never discover why one should be expected, in a purely social context, to receive as gospel wisdom their views on anything from body lying bulling to revealed religion...

Well courage under fire ", a sort of distilled essence of " that's ", could not exactly be taught, and so had to be taken for granted in all of us, who are tacitly in grimly as soon to possess it. Hence we can pass to a very much boosted commodity -- initiative.yes man's (subject to orders received an unquestioning enthusiasm in the face of these (that oneself must always be ready to devise and sponsor an original course of action. Invaluable military quality, most certainly: but unfortunately in peacetime conditions, engine for the most part in wartime once, communications and now so good any opportunities for genuinely individual action so rare, initiative tends to become a highly contrived then artificially fostered to impress superiors. It becomes, in fact, mere interference with the existing order of things which, to give an excuse for showing keenness and interest, are made out to be in some respects will slat vote or " unsatisfactory. " and genuinely adventure some spirit is one thing, arbitrary exit is it was additions of a viciousness are quite another; and the sort of person who was praised that were Mr. Per initiative gently turned out to be in middle some bully of the type and reports his best friend to his housemaster for immoral behavior -- thereby in cell becoming head prefix in his friends place. Such interference, I need hardly say, is also taking the show responsibility that responsibility, which is the last of the great were Mr. Virtues.

Responsibility is no way the pivot of the whole system. Like the Holy Ghost, is supposed to be everywhere, and anything which is not material for the exercise of Dr. enthusiasm (or one of the other were Mr. Quality's (will certainly cannot be in the realm of responsibility. It covers everything from making intelligent assessments of how to move a division down to being careful not to get drunk in the sergeants mass. It means not gambling for high-stakes, not being late for parade, not sending reports to the brass, and not going to bed with your company commander's wife -- however pressingly invited. 11

Now, according to Raven, these features of Officer Training -- the

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Monastic segregation and disciplinary methods of Sanders followed by the causing moral imperatives that were Mr. -- May, rather surprisingly, even she weight in what he calls unlooked for any immoral results will. He illustrates his outcome by describing four of his erstwhile fellow officers.

Second Lieutenant D. Was a Roman Catholic from a professional family of moderate means, (his father was a lawyer in a provincial town (. He done badly of Sanders, since he had limited intelligence and little application, the had a family connection with our regiment, was an agreeable and well mannered boy, and so was excepted by our Colonel. He was sincere in his religious beliefs, trying to much, was sexually indiscriminate. His other amusements were horses (racing, prompting (, peeled sports in general, gambling. There are

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On is underlying personality structure: moral cowardice, in decisiveness, secretiveness insensitivity to criticism.

Even if he has, like eight, considerable ability, and can learn to overcome the more disastrous products of the week ego, the man who reaches a position of high command of compulsive thirst for personal achievement advancement will attend the lack that creative talent and flexibility mine so necessary modern warfare. This respect he is twice first -- firstly, buys underlying personality, which resulted in his attraction to the military, and secondly by a lifetime of learning to curb initiative and freedom of thought. Freedom of expression and cognitive processes unfettered by inhibitions were not looked upon with favor in military personnel very

It seems and indicates achievement motivation (as with obsessive tendencies (, military organizations attract and then reinforce those very characteristics which will prove antithetical to competent military performance

The side effects of trying to professional is violence are probably less malign in the consequences in yet another byproduct of military organizations: up to their authoritarianism.

Let's therefore, take a brief despite the battlefield for an examination of this thesis

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Chapter 22

Authoritarianism

"is a strange desire to see power into lose liberty "

-- peaking, essays: of great place

In discussing military organizations it was suggested that is idiotic relationship exists between certain characteristics of our services and the private needs of them individual members. And Princess was laid upon the central role in this relationship of anxiety, the insidious motivator of such human behavior. In a military mind, it was way out, anxiety has many sources -- fear of death mutilation, fear of suppression supersession, fear of failure and social disapproval, fear of public disgrace, and, underlying all, that fear of total disorder which is an inseparable product of unleashing normally taboo to institutional forces. Finally it was suggested a special predisposition toward these several sorts of anxiety in the present in some people as a result of the Early childhood. Such people mail may well be drawn towards military organizations because the latter half, of necessity, preset perfected devices buying " bull " and disciplined, highly our keel command structures in rigid conventions which not only allow of aggression without anxiety, but actually reduce anxiety that may have originated at a much earlier period of life.

In light of all this, is encouraging to encounter a substantial part of research for not only provide support for the pieces but also fills in many of the gaps. Is that on the authoritarian personality.

Pretty impetus behind a study of authoritarianism we have to think the founders of proponents of the third right. Very they it was the percentage of the world a phenomenal the like of which has never been since before or stance seen before since -- this is that manic and your current Iraq retires murder of 6 million Jews. To inquiring mind, anti-Semitism on this scale

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We seem to demand, the very least, some explanation. For group of researchers at Frankfurt and later at Berkeley, in the University of California, asked her the fact human prejudice could assume such monstrous proportions suggested the possibility of a particular personality -- tight been implicated in the perpetuation of these dark offense.

There were not alone in her supposition. Some 10 years earlier, the Nazi psychologists -- reported he identified to basic personality types, " asked " and J. ". " asked " types were so called because they manifested suggests you the harmless enough tendency, one might think, to have subjective experiences in one modality and receiving stimulation in another. For cash this artistic gift of being able to experience affinities between ", say collars and sounds amounted to a sort of " perceptual slow-moving as", the careless mixing up a sensory in per impressions. One pressing the matter further, he founded this trait went along with " other regrettable tendencies will. The " ass type was " liberal " in his use and eccentric in behavior. He was also weak, he feminine and prone to hear a chemical care radical believed that people are likely shaped by their environment and education. All this, Janice claimed (largely on the basis of his own prejudices and political leanings (, was a result of interracial contamination and mixed heredity. " ass ", or " antitax " as they're called, included Jews, Orientals and Communists. Fortunately for his racist views, if not for the repute of scientific the rising, change also " discovered " a contrasting class of individual which he modestly labeled the " J. type. " J. types were " good times and would make good Nazis. Amongst their sterling qualities were purity in perception and Mr. Nazi human behavior is determined by blood, soil and national tradition. The " J. type would be a key man, hearty top, a man you could rely on. These qualities would, he said, have been handed down by a long line of North German ancestors.

In their investigation of anti-Semitism and Affleck prejudice the American researchers to also found to contrasting personality types, and these were very like those described by Janet. Needless to say,

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* pours into the second world war, the American Jewish committee set up a Department of scientific research under Mark Hoffman armor, who had previously been directorate Institute of social psychology in Frankfurt. When this distance it was suppressed by Hitler, all of timer and his colleagues air act from NT W. the door no lead to the USA were they teamed up with in this Sanford further research at Berkeley into the authoritarian personality.

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Yet isolated them rather differently. The London correspondent to the " J. type they called the " authoritarian personality. Such a person was and last-minute, rigid, intolerant of indignity and hostile to people are groups racially different them himself. The same token, but polar opposite to this time, he vanish contemptible " antitank bow, was individualistic, tolerant, democratic, unprejudiced and egalitarian. *

They arrived at the distinctions by testing attitudes of over 2000 Americans are many different walks of life. The test provided measures of anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, political and economic conservatism and implicit antidemocratic trends are potential alley for fascism -- the " after scale. This, much of which is based on actual utterances by Nazis, measures and individuals predisposition to words:,

1. Conventionalism, i.e., rigid adherence to conventional middle-class bodies.

2. Authoritarian submission i.e. a submissive, uncritical attitude to words the idealized moral authorities of the group which he identifies himself.

3. Authoritarian aggression, i.e., a tendency to be on the lookout for lookout for and to condemn, rejecting punish people violate conventional values.

4. Anti-interception, i.e., a posted to be of still posted the subjective, imaginative and the tender minded.

5. Superstition and stereo top he, i.e., a believed magical determinants of the individual state, and the disposition to think in rigid categories.

6. Hour and toughness, i.e., a preoccupation with the dominant submission, strong we, leader follower dimension, identification with our figures, overemphasis upon the conventional attributes of the ego, exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness.

7. Destructiveness and cynicism, i.e., generalized hostility, qualification of the human.

8. Productivity, i.e., a believed that wild and dangerous things go on in the world, the projection outwards unconscious emotional impulses.

9. ". Chemical bow for reasons, i.e., and exaggerated concerned with sexual " buildings on".

The final stage in the researched American investigator subject adjustments were very prior very low marks on and no prejudice

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* in many respects, does American research confirmed earlier work in Britain but as snack and others. [3]

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To a number of open-minded projected tasks and clinical interviews. These are aimed at uncovering such factors in a persons past history, and deeper facets of his personality, which make for authoritarian prejudice. What, the ass, underlies a striking differences which emerge from the earlier questionnaires?

Results of the study more men justified in a Jeep which had been put into it. At one level the constituted a fitting monument to the 6 million victims of fascist prejudice. The sensitive reader the pages of the authoritarian personality are opted by the ghost of Belson in our sweats. And another level the sonogram warning process societies beyond that Nazi Germany. As Roger Brown remarks, some of the data will our hair-raising. They suggest that we could find in this country bracket USA Racquet willing recruits purchased Opto. Vote for

Results delineate the authoritarian personality. People who were anti-Semitic were also generally prejudiced and conservative. He also tinted the aggressive, superstitious, putative, top minded and the occupied with tilt on its omission interpersonal relationships. The disclosed to return to its suggested the unique underlying personality structure was borne out by the clinical interviews. It seems that authoritarians of products of parents of anxiety about their status in society. From early as infancy the children of such people are pressed to seek to status after which their parents anchor.

There seemed to be to converging reasons why such pressures produce prejudice any other related traits. The first place, but values Inc. located by status in secure parents are such their children learned puts personal success and the acquisition of power above all else. Their topic has people for their usefulness rather than the likable nose. Their friends, and even future marriage partners, were selected in used in service of personal management,; love in infection take second place to knowing the right people. They are taught to issue weakness in past 70, to respect authority, and to depart despised those would not made a social economic grade. Success is equated with social esteem and material advantage, rather men with more spiritual guide is. Then again, beer in the by their parents with rigid use regarding sex and aggression. Sex is dirty, and aggression permissible which were such albums as Jews, Negroes and law breakers. To complete this gloomy pattern, the sex role stereotypes about "" upright middle-class originally implanted. Boys must be

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Masculine, top and strong, and girls (under respectable cloak of frigid femininity (allied to the possibilities of granting their favors in service of status seeking. Five *

In the second place, the interview data collected by Burke the Berkeley researchers also suggested the parents of their authoritarian sample impose those not use of the heavy hand. It seems that for these families, " the turning of tiny primates into little ladies and gentlemen will was an exercise in punitive repression. Is here but we discover the link between socially in secure parents and prejudice manifested by their children. The extreme strictness of the parents, coupled with the lack of warmth, necessarily frustrated child. The frustration in gender's aggression which is itself frustrated, word is part of the training that children never answerback. Anne's aggression has to be discharged elsewhere, and wear better been onto those very individuals in the parents and cells of openly bona fide -- Jews, Negroes in foreigners -- all those --, in short, blue, being underprivileged, have acquired that red stations in the status seeking society?

In other words, albeit unwittingly, and authoritarian upbringing kills three birds of a single stone. It reduces submission to the authority of younger. It arouse aggression, which is displaced on to it carefully defined how group. But these means by these means the status seekers achieved their underlying goal, for the relatively relativity of status depends upon the existence of it under belligerent privileged how group, and how better to ensure the state of underprivileged and by aggressive persecution? 2004 EDITOR: this is a zero-sum thinking the only way for someone to win is for someone to lose etc.

This theory, based upon the psychoanalytic notions of displacement in projection, explains one striking finding of the Berkeley research, mainly to the authoritarian personalities manifest the monolithic self satisfaction with themselves and their parents, and this despite the fact that no love lost between them during the so-called formative years. This apparent paradox is resolved when one considers the dynamics of authoritarian discipline. The person was anxious about status, is imperative that he that he is, and his parents, shortcomings should be strenuously denied. This is achieved in two ways: firstly, as we've seen, by projecting their undesirable characteristics on the other summer: secondly, by nurturing and impeccable inside the Allies, it wholly false, image of themselves. Like to prejudiced Southern White who projects is what are pressed sexual wishes on the Negroes, or delay in homosexual or

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* from this this aspect of American middle-class life the readers referred to Polly Anders a house is not house in the plane Bill study. Sex

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The leader who devotes his or her life to advocating harsher punishment for homosexuals are progress, the lifestyle of the authoritarian personality is one of finding and person prosecuting and others what he is common to the earnings sell. This example of attack, being the surest method of defense, would be incomplete, however, if the individual did not also entertain highly idealized image of themselves. (is this combination of transparent if unconscious hypocrisy in smug self-satisfied that satisfaction that make such people particularly insufferable. (

2004 EDITOR: narcissistic personality disorder

These tortuous machinations of the authoritarian mining ram applied yet further. Because he is to deny his own shortcomings, he cannot look inwards. He's careful of insight, and strenuously avoids questioning his own motives. The same token, he cannot allow his extra punitive defenses to be threatened by fuming considerations pretty objects of his hostility. At first sight this may seem a useful adaptation to chip relations early childhood. Unfortunate, however, a price is paid -- one which can troop rippling to the human mind. In the place and free ranging, creative and a man of thought, and authoritarians thinking is confined to a rigid formula and in flexible attitudes. He is intolerant of unusual ideas and unable to cope with contradictions. We sit research seven confirms authoritarians preference for ordering simplicity. As Brown is put it will Inc. he has a problem the best thing to do is to not think about it and just keep busy. " a similarly, the authoritarian personality is intolerant of ambivalence and ambiguity. Just as he cannot harbor negative and positive feeling the same person the must the contact how modest reality into love people versus 80 people, white versus black * and juniors eject hour, so also he cannot tolerate ambiguous situations or conflicting issues. To put bluntly, he constructs its constructs of the world and image is simplistic as it is at variance with reality.

In years since it was published, the Berkeley research has been both criticize an extended period can appoint the details such as the possibility of their been authoritarian personality of the political left as well the political right, and whether or not authoritarians are

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* shown quite literally in research by Petty grew at all, wearing pictures of black faces were presented to one eye and pictures of white bases the other. Whereas English-speaking South Africans and colors confuse these pairs of faces into a single combined the person, after cans speaking South Africans invariably manifested binoculars rivalry. They either saw the black face of white face, never a mixture of the two. Nine new in

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Necessarily know a lot, there has been considerable argument, that the main findings at original research standout more important for our present purposes are the subsequent studies which shed light on the implications of authoritarianism. One such as the nine-year research by role cat, another American published a decade after the Berkeley research he is the open and close mind centered on the problem of an individual's capacity jobs or press information. Humanity, it seems, there is considerably in this respect. At one extreme or " "mines, ready and willing to entertain you fact, even if these are incompatible with their previously held attitudes and beliefs; and the other are " close mines, which, as her name suggests, resolutely resist taking in anything the complex with their preconceptions and treasured believes. Not very surprisingly, the possession of a " close mind turned out to be yet another facet of the authoritarian personality. This finding agreed generality. In one experiment, for example, I in low scores and dogmatism, and aspect of the " close mind, were asked to indicate their liking for different pieces of music. The compositions in question differed in the conventionality of structure. The works of bomb, compose according to the traditional conventions of the whereas, no difference was found between the pleasure they afforded " "as opposed to " close mines. But for the music of Arnold Schonberg, who use the 12 tone scale and no key center, a more convergence obtained. The " open mind open mines evenings in increasing pleasure in the unaccustomed sounds: those with " close mines not only instantly dislike, but also manifested in increasing distaste for the strange noises with which their ears were now assaulted. [11]

Before leaving this section authoritarianism, there are several other findings in recent research which are pertinent our present pieces. What he shows the relationship between conformity, authoritarianism in the tendancy to yield to group pressures.

Extreme example this pattern is phenomenal participation in Lynch bomb, where been naturally conform as individual happily yields to group pressure for the perpetuation perpetuation of criminally aggressive act which, both wholly at variance with the ecosystem wider society, cords of his own narrow self-interest. In this instance this consists of finding and underprivileged, low status out group, the Negro, onto making discharges aggression and projects you sexual anxieties.

Another funding concerns you fact of authoritarianism upon the problem-solving

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in a group situation. From their research W. Hawthorne and his colleagues concluded that **"egalitarian subjects [i.e., those low on authoritarianism] were apparently more effective in dealing with the task and problem then were the authoritarian. This reflected in higher ratings of effective intelligence, leadership and goal striving**."[12] On the sorts of leaders to emerge in the group situation, they had this to say: cool emergent leaders in the low F groups [equaliarein] were more sensitive to others, more effective leaders, more prone to making suggestions for actions subject to group sanction, and less likely to give direct orders to others..., a conclusion, incidentally, which accords with the observation that authoritarians are less able to appreciate the effect they have upon others, and may well think themselves more liked and popular than they really are! Even people attracted to a career in an authoritarian organization [i.e., naval cadets] have been found to prefer leaders to score low on tests of authoritarianism -- presumably because authoritarians are less sensitive to needs of others. " [13]

Finally come to something touched upon an earlier section: the psychology of the obsessive of personality. [14] It will be recalled that this type of person, or early, stingy and stubborn, is in reality manifesting the prolonged effects of an early infantile conflict between been dirty and wishing to avoid the rapid parents who themselves having ascites about dirt. He results is conflict by developing the triad of personality traits given above. They represent symbolic defenses against those tendencies which he has had to renounce or, to be more accurate, keep under strict control. Under the circumstances, it is not so surprising that a positive relationship has been found between obsession and authoritarianism. [15]

What is the relevance of all this to military competence?

Firstly, it cannot be stressed too strongly that in talking about authoritarianism we have been discussing people towards one end of the continuum. Between this end and the other can be found people with all shades in opinion on the various attitudes measured. The second general point is this: when discussing authoritarianism no judgment is intended. Few would dispute that, in moderation, many of the traits which make up the authoritarian personality have a value in society. Civilization requires that there should be some repression of sexual aggression, some exercise of discipline, modicum of conformity and ordinance. It is with these caveats in mind that we

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Can take up the matter of military competence in advance the thesis that the nature of military organizations in such as to attract, favor and promote people who might be expected to light towards the authoritarian in the personality continuing. There is, in fact, considerable evidence for this thesis. It can be concluded from recent research not only that positive attitudes to war, believe in military deterrence and a liking for militarism go along with above average levels of authoritarianism; but also that military personnel, including author cadets, to score higher on measures of authoritarianism they do people who do not opt for a career in the Army or Navy. [16]

In some respects, assuming this civilization entails possession of Armed Forces, these findings are to the good. There are aspects of military behavior which requires the constraints in the discipline of the authoritarian personality. Similarly, it is to the good the Soldiers should be anti-interceptors, unimaginative and fatalistic. Even the Tendancy to project aggressive feelings on the others has an obvious advantage for interspecies aggression. The

In other respects, however, the likelihood of above average levels of authoritarianism in military personnel will contribute to working competence, the ticket when the authoritarian has reached level of command were flexibility in an open mind are a cynic [19] of success. To be more specific, the personality traits of authoritarianism, and associated characteristics of the closed minded obsessive of character, they contribute to competence in the following ways.

1. Since authoritarians a been found to be more dishonest, more irresponsible, more on trustworthy, more socially conforming, [17] and more suspicious [18] been on authoritarians, they are unlikely to make successful social leaders.

2. Authoritarians we less likely to understand enemy intentions, and act upon information regarding such intentions as conflict with the police and preconceptions which the commander might hold per Defense following the Camry tank offensive in the first world war and, in the second world war, repeated inability of senior commanders except the possibility of an enemy on offensive in the our dens are cases in point. As Major General Strong has written of the first world war: " is no exaggeration to suggest that some of the inadequacy seen in the course of World War I, the mistakes of general said, the poor strategic planning in many tactical air is, reflected serious inability to acquire intelligence or to make effective

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In professional use of the intelligence that was available. And of advance in the second world war: cool I find it difficult understand how any plan to be made in the absence of a professional assessment of an opponent straight, capabilities in intentions. The Norwegian campaign was neither the first of the last example of this extraordinary syndrome and in Britain, and other countries have not been free from it. " [19] the in 1954 American research showed the people I score on tests of authoritarianism and greater difficulty and not authoritarians in recognizing threatening messages when these were presented visually. [20] to hear later another study confirm this finding with threatening words to were instead of seen. [21]

3. The inability to sacrifice chairs traditions and except technical innovations. The history the machine gun, the tank and airplane contained striking evidence of this disability.

In his recently published modern warfare, Shelford Bidwell has drawn attention to costly facet of this malaise -- the failure of the military carry out experiments. The healing the " uncertainty code of experimentation and suspicious of applying scientific method, the authoritarian mind prefers the cozy is spurious security of believe in dogma. As bid will says of armored fighting vehicles, will what the early history of the tank provides is a Sally Torrey lesson of the merits of numerical and experimental analysis. It was possible to arrive and exchange rate for the tank and that might have led to a different tactical doctrine altogether. Third in war and outs of calculation is were for time off intuition. It also saves a great many lives. " [22]

2004 EDITOR: exactly why they refuse to have Stryker go force-on force against M113 Gavin tracks in experiments, they know their laissez faire wheeled "horse cavalry" cash cow would lose!

4. The under estimation of any ability (particularly when the enemy are colored are considered racially inferior proxies. This ethnocentrism, which cost many lives in the poor war, was also feature is enormous losses a cut in 1916, Singapore 1942 and Vietnam in the 1960s. Needless to say, this tendency to underestimate has not been confined to British and American forces:

Kaman clock, the commander of the German first Army at the outset of the war, cannot bring himself to believe the different Soldier, after days of exhausting retreat in August and September 1914, was capable of turning at the bugle call and forcing the Germans back to the Martin. Nor did the juror general staff believe the British Army was a fighting force to be reckoned with. They failed to appreciate that if the Americans joined the

To under 65 war they would prove effective in combat; a core of a century later been the same error. [23]

Is closely tied up with two other features of authoritarianism: anti-Semitism, and the tendency to categorize people in terms stereotypes. A word about the psychological phenomena.

When considering the nature of cool bull " of SEC page 185 (, the point was made that, by establishing conformity, cool bull " reduces uncertainty in small things, and, to this extent, upsets to greater uncertainties of war.

It is significant, therefore, but authoritarians are also concerned to reduce uncertainty. Running again, Kelvin says:

These tendencies reflect on a type of individual needs to feel that his environment is highly predictable. Record he needs to know where he stands; and silly fasteners on the norms: he does not " let himself go, for fear where it is might lead: he looks to authority is a guy... [he also [relies on very heavily on stereotypes in " [he is [perception of the social environment. Moreover, the stereotypes used by the authoritarian personality tend to be very clear-cut, and characteristic in flexibility of this kind of person these two relative inability to modify the stereotype once it is been formed. [24]

These characteristics are compound significance for the military seen. Firstly, they have undoubtedly been a potent factor in that under estimation of the enemy which has inflicted so many military commander spurred the stereotyping of cool logs cool, wallops", " get those ", " produce ", " go to" and " gap's ", though no doubt reassuring, as did cloud judgment regarding the real characteristics of the enemy. One cannot no one is enemy by stereotyping them. 2004 EDITOR: today we call them "hajis" in Iraq, same snobbery, different fatal under-estimation of the enemy as a sub-human

Secondly, stereotyping has introduced what is probably a totally irrelevant and misleading factor into the selection and promoting a military personnel. But most social stereotypes, that of the ideal military man is to be based on physical attributes which meant nothing whatsoever to do with the suitability as a military leader. Just how misleading us field comics stereotype can be is shown by be. Our. Sapp and field. In the study, [25] people at a rate bases according to degree to which they thought the owner of the face possessed masculine cause qualities. Results show that there was, in fact, not the slightest relationship between stereotype masculinity (a very

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Important stereotyping military organizations (and the actual possession of masculine traits.

Certainly pictures of competent any conferencing commander suggested to stereotype of the ideal military face may well have played a part in the selection and promotion of those who evidently had little else to recommend them. Needless to say, the selection of officers because they fit to stereotype only serves to confirm the stereotype, thereby perpetuating the harmful effects which is advanced in a row the relevant variable.

2004 EDITOR: began form overriding function image becoming reality and expensive reality

And field a significant relationship between authoritarianism anti-Semitism, it would be surprising to stereotype will do " had not featured in military prejudices. In Britain in almost certainly played a part in the sacking of War Minister Hore-Belisha. In France, the Dreyfus case, which did the untold damage to the highly authoritarian French army, was undoubtedly a result of strong anti-Semitic prejudices in the military Italy. [26] in United States, however according to Janowitz, Jews are unpopular because stereotyped as over intellectual. He says the case of Jews of it you who stood second, academically, in his class of Officer cadets. What is photograph was included in the class but, it had to be printed on special perforated paper for easy subsequent removal! [27]

The contribution of authoritarian prejudices to military competence is it includes an inappropriate variable into the selection or sacking of personnel. The telling example was when the CIGS Field Marshal and army Massenburg, pressed for compulsory retirement of the force officers because, as he put, there were plenty of bright men to take their place. Not only was this nice example of authoritarian concern would post sexual goings-on " a complete nonstick letter, was also untrue. As of Cooper observed: " there were very few bright men in any line. " Francie since the Field Marshal Sutton concern for the morals and army occurred only a few years before the outbreak of Second World War, it is just as well his which remained on granted. (

5. In emphasis upon the importance of blind obedience a Multicom to the expensive initiative in innovation, at lower levels of command. The sinking of the Victoria by the camper down during the peacetime maneuver of 1893 when hundreds of lives were lost to blind obedience and ambiguous or; one naval historian has described as " the staggering lack of initiative will shown by British ship

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Commanders during the battle jet limit:; [28] in the failure of encircling force to launch a surprise attack upon the Turkish procedures of cut, -- all these are instances of his disability. The Victoria disaster, which was even the excuse on the grounds orders must be abate, illustrates more clearly than any other mishap the differences, in nature in origin, beginning up the progressive autocratic and reactionary authoritarian, and how the class to these personality types can lead to tragic consequences.

My saddle George Tryon, the man gave the order to " form the fleet in the columns of two divisions, six cables apart, and then reversed course by turning inwards was a product of happy insecure childhood. You supremely self-confident, assertive, outspoken, autocratic, restrict disciplinary, but not authoritarian.

The menu failed to search the question, let alone does abate, the order, Tryon second in command, rear at home or come, had emerged from his miserably unhappy childhood at the hands of partially pure technical parents as a " sensitive, abnormally courteous ", prickly, on student Rick Luce.

Tryon was innovator, bent on achieving professional excellence, dedicated to developing efficiency in initiative in his subsequent commanders subordinate commanders. Markham was anxious, conforming, hidebound conventionals, dedicated to stay no trouble and not displeased the this pleasing his superiors.

Tryon was, in many ways, and an early version of the great " Jackie Fisher -- domineering, warm, sociable and that were going. He was happily married in care deeply for the welfare is men. Markham was a bachelor who seems never to a majority anything approaching physical relationship of a member of the opposite sex. Is in a heat and isn't found expression in talks to his subordinates on the evils of drinking and smoking. The other characteristic of an authoritarian personality, the the repression of his aggressive dry which evidently prevented Markham from asserting itself with his superiors, found out in the slot of wild animals. * as how remarks: " wherever he traveled, Bertie Markham killed."[30]

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* it is reasonable to suppose that his bus men's holiday behavior of killing lower animals and outbreak of peace precludes the slaughtering of high higher ones is symptomatic of those whose otherwise oppressed hostility craves a legitimate outlet. Certainly, such behavior is not uncommon feature of some military men: perhaps the best single example being that of Field Marshal Sir at Linwood of whom is been written:... He is always glad to get away from all to follow the greatest interest and passion of his life Army -- the hunting in slaughtering of wild animals. Hunting, like sex in eating, is a human appetite becoming in moderation, but unlawfully in obsessive. In woods to volume autobiography from midship men to Field Marshal is off recurring hunting reminiscences flow through its chapters like a polluted instinct and strain. These become a self indictment of a " Christian manliness code which Prosser much terror and painted got slower creatures with callous indifference to their sensitivity in beauty. Call [29]

Doubtless there are other reasons for this impulse to kill, though it is noteworthy that an extension in leisure activities and individuals profession responses professional responses does not seem to occur so readily and other walks of life. Dennis dentist reached for the drill whenever someone smiles or upon seeing our opening a piano lid question mark and efficient ship men hanker for facts of boiling oil whenever they visit an aquarium? One suspects not!

(are strict the prevalence Society of those authoritarian traits which under light milk rooms data are reflected in the protests was greeted his book. Batter who it seems, the sickness called Germaine concealed that the people should have their less pleasant traits expose!

Whether or not try and confused radii with diameters of turning circles, [30] were intended market was shipped to pass outside his own, it remains sad irony that the man who sought to instill initiative in his subordinates should have kill have been killed by the lack of that quality in his own most anxious pupil.

In each of these two men was intelligent, dedicated in conscientious, but authoritarianism of the lawn collided with the auto car grassy of the other just as surely as the rigidity of the camper Downs bows collided with and " ruptured the thinner plating of the victorious hole.

Another way in which obsessive of obedience may lead to military incompetence has been suggested by the work of milk rum and his colleagues. [31] program asked the question: if a man is ordered by a person and authority to deliver increasingly severe electric shocks to hapless helpless victim, how power will be built before disobeying the order? The findings were alarming. They indicated ordinary decent men would be sewed seduced by the trappings of authority that they would continue delivering shops of before 50 volts practice these market danger -- a severe shock (quotation mark on the control panel (, and this even when hearing and the agonized traits of the helpless victim " who mitigates dimly see behind a sheet of slivered silvered glass. This readiness to Bay, even when the consequence is obedience was an active outrages in humanity, was extended to me greater in authoritarian personalities than others.

2004 EDITOR: this is exactly what the Abu Gahraib prison crisis has re-showman for us that we people will do in human beings as long as they think they're following orders

Besides providing support for one facet of authoritarianism, this

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Finding has a twofold relevance for military incompetence. Firstly, the effect of obeying orders which they knew to be wrong and which conflicted with the normal set of values left the participants in a severe state mental and physical stress national and hardly conducive to military efficiency estimation more secondly, is justice aspect of authoritarian obedience, exemplified in his most extreme form by Al Eichman, which leased to such atrocities is out of the me lie massacred -- atrocities which, quite apart from the in humanity, did great harm to the prestige and, therefore, he efficiency of the military organization in which they occur.

6. The protection of the reputations of senior commanders, and punishment of those lower in the military car hierarchy if they voice any opinion which, however valuable in itself, implies criticism of those higher up. The following conversation cited by Atmel do war illustrates this issue: [32]

Scene: The cabin... Been sitting at an evil desk. Injured gunnery lieutenant with papers.

Lieutenant. I've repaired report, sir, our new fire control organization with sketches of the voice pipe arrangement. In may be useful to other ships and I thought she might like to submitted to the commander-in-chief.

Captain. That's good. (reached; and after long-lost (do you know who is the control or?

Lieutenant. Gas poop, sir, Captain Jackson.

Captain. The noted he was president of the committee that sat upon the approval of the existing voice pipe communications in your majesty ships?

Lieutenant. No, sir, by suppose he will be interested in reading the report.

Captain. I'm afraid I cannot vote report which suggest that the arrangements which he approved or unsatisfactory.

The tenant. The report shows how they can be improved.

Captain. Yes, but I'm not going to tell him so.

The tenant. Oh, very Goodes, sir.

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Some another ASAP for another a sample from the same source, consider the falling following: only

When the Prince George returned a portion of the president of the or college, rear Admiral Robert S. Lowry, to asked me to deliver a lecture on the Japanese may lead to senior officers course. It's illegal quite well, till near the end. I was explained a different functions of the Ministry of terrain and able staff and had begun to suggest desirability of separating administration from operations are own at 90, when the president asked me to bring the lecture to a man. " the war College ", he said, " is not the place to criticize the Admiral T. " [33]

Such goings on are not, of course, confined in the Navy. Liddell-Hart has related events which occurred when label gave a " forward-looking and imaginative " lecture to the reading that Royal United services Institute. It was on the subject of " training for war ". When he had finished, `archconservative " General Knox roses say be strongly disagreed with the lecture is the use. Then label, a man of greater in lack, instead of defending his position, apologize. " general knowledge noxious knowledge and experience are of course far greater and for wider been my own enters any point on which he and I differ he is much more likely to be right. " [34] 2004 EDITOR: I don't know if this was sarcasm or a righteous man falling down before the wicked but I wouldn't have said such a thing is to buy ground and said was right is right

In considering these examples is important to distinguish between the possibly authoritarian personalities of the individuals concerned and a generally authoritarian ideology of the milieu in which they find themselves. The or Captain Gamble in the first example nor lower label in the last was necessarily in authoritarian personality, but things are you switch grip the former, like to of the latter, work product a system which punishes those who, even in all innocence, it appeared to be critical their superiors. Kay. Sheet. The period the war is explicit on this point. " Lowry was by no means antagonistic to the discussion of new ideas, the like many of his contemporaries he was a firm believer in the principal safety first. He knew the those who oppose Fisher [at a lowered Fisher, first aid lowered, [were liable to find themselves out of a job. " [35]

This distinction between authoritarianism a régime and authoritarian personality has counterpart in estimates of an individual's character. DOS, autocratic leaders like animal Fisher are by no means necessarily authoritarian personalities in strictly technical sense of the term. Indeed, he and denying need of the authoritarian

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Personality to be popular with his fellowmen (i.e. loved (almost precludes them from being a thorough autocratic thoroughgoing autocratic. Conversely, judging from their total behavior, such I cracked leaders as Wellington, Napoleon, Kitchener, zoo called an Fisher were, as we shall see, the very old verse of authoritarian personalities.

7. Closely related to the foregoing effects of authoritarianism is individual to density to blame others for some shortcomings. Few better examples are offered than the close scapegoat in " of lower ranks by hate, paying and smuts at the German counteroffensive at Cambrai. Such a case illustrates how the modus operandi of military organizations reinforces authoritarian tendencies of its individual members. The basically insecure person who is from childhood elaborated that system shown in a psychological defenses to characterize authoritarian personality will have his defenses strengthened rather than reduce by the source of anxieties which service lighting genders carried the great harm can be done to service by this cycle of answers exemplified the notorious case of the royal old court martial, where commander in his Captain were unlawfully punished for writing and [40], respectfully respectively, a letter of complaint against superior officer. Sister Poe defense " was no offense all (indeed they had acted in a strict accordance with the dictates of the Naval discipline and (, the subsequent punitive behavior of the commander-in-chief was both illegal and contrary to requirements of good Naval discipline. Even worse, the adult he, faced with the dilemma of the commander-in-chief who would blunder, compounded his air bike cynically disregarding the law in favor Frank. They `commander-in-chief and framed fictitious charges against the captain who had forwarded the original letter of complaint. By subverting the law and encouraging the perpetuation of the series of irregularities during the actual court martial, the average house she achieve your goal finding the victim guilty. He was duly sentenced to be severely reprimanded and dismissed from his ship.

But the manner did not in the air. An appeal against his miscarriage of justice was dismissed by the adult he the dubious grounds that the trial had been conducted " with great ability inconspicuous fairness ". Then, to avoid recurrence of these embarrassing against the adult he canceled the old regulations on the making of complaint, and issued new ones. This post heart attempts to make the regulations fit the crime in fact and a large class of complaint which had been authorized by the old regulations

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2004 EDITOR: this is typical bureaucratic reaction to a whistleblower fighting for excellence

In the aftereffect of the court martial is that within two years cases of in discipline in the Army reach the level unprecedented in the history of the service, and this despite improvements in pay, food, lead an accommodation. 2004 EDITOR: mansion not live by bread alone

may want to believe in the service therein and if it is unjust and immoral to know not paying benefits is going to erase that this upsurge of meet misbehavior has been described on the one hand to growing cynicism among men who had senior superiors waive the law to suit themselves, and any other to the new regulations on complaints which effectively destroyed in old safety valve for feelings of resentment. Making a complaint against superior officer and always been a risky venture some accord not was professional suicide. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the royal old case, one thing is certain. The whole miserable affair, which racked the careers of three senior officers and did untold damage to a reputation Navy, illustrates a sort of price to human beings at the pay for dedication to a foe to an authoritarian system. [36]

8. The close relationship between authoritarianism and obsessive traits is also played a significant part military competence. This is a matter which we discussed earlier. Suffice it to say that the worst obsessivees of old bull " and the clinging to an economist at ritual of Plato not in considerable part in holding back to military machine.

Here again, however, we must be careful to distinguish between them erotic compulsive behavior of the anal obsessive in the deliberate exercise a what appeared to be obsessiveive traits per the distinguishing feature of the former is its gross inconsistency. " so much attention was devoted to widening the supple core that there was not much left for questions of health and hygiene. When Sonny Mehta training day the hawk listen to sparkle to the water of the ink should see, but she was infested with harassment contaminated food in the entries in the masses. They've overran over the hammocks and swarmed into the gun room white knight. Was made to get rid of them. " [37] one is reminded of the obsessiveive housewife (described that one psychiatrist Brent sees the spent hours polishing or saucepans was unaware remained unchanged for weeks excavation work

In contrast, we have the behavior such men as Wellington, doesn't cough, Kitchener and Montgomery, whose enormous energy and attention to detail might well have appeared obsessiveive but wasn't back part of deliberate and much-needed policy arranging to meet every contingency and a leading nothing to chance -- in short, good planning.

Nine. There is one trait of the authoritarian personality which at first

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Site may seem to have nothing whatsoever to do with military competence currencies believe that supernatural forces. The contrary is in the fact the case the contrary is in fact the case. As a general issue, since military decision should be based upon proper weighing up a facts, the introduction of metaphysical variables in the decision-making necessarily contribute "no lease", which decreases the prostitute probability decisions being correct. Concerned of what the stars worked out, or hopes an occasional fears the divine intervention, constitute prejudices which combines decisions away from realism and worst wish fulfilling fantasies. 2004 EDITOR: this is exactly what the Bush administration does Bush doesn't act on facts he on his prejudices and hawk what's going on in reality consequences began

For illustration of how fatal decisions can result from an obsessive of faith in a benign super nature, there's extraordinary case of rude offenses like to Scotland on May 10, 1941. Seems at this irrational behavior by an arch authoritarian was resultant of two factors -- a wish fulfilling fancy in the part of Hassan Hitler did they could negotiate a piece of Britain, and bearable moral scope supplied it has biased personal astrology. According to Richard Deacon, the worst open-end fact been concocted part British intelligence! [38] there can certainly be no clear illustration of how one-sided war might successfully exploit the authoritarian shortcomings of the other.

The risk, of course, problem here. You would deny the importance of psychology and warfare, and that believe been a benign deity may sustain troops with all her flea help has failed when all earthly helpers failed. What seems to be important, however, is that knowledge of this fact, in the minds of senior decisionmakers, should enable them to make a proper assessment of the factor morale which the themselves have been wish themselves being misled by their own unrealistic fantasies. Research suggested this objectivity will calm more easily to nonauthoritarian minds. Sp " publication of the human." 2004 EDITOR: we need more of these people in the military

10. One of the least attractive aspects of the authoritarian personality is is generalized hostility, what the Berkeley researchers called and even note of dilatation of the human call. This was the trait which was manifested such a extreme degree by members of the Nazi SS that they could commit whole scales were, not just without guilt or shame but, perhaps more surprisingly, with the slightest evidence of revulsion. This cool detachment incomplete incapacity for empathy with other human beings was not only reflected in the believed the omission on emotional title for their task --" the final solution will -- but also a cynic worn on of its tidy execution. At first sight, this mixture brutality in bureaucracy is strange, the same least. After all, is one thing to shoot helpless

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Prisoners in the back, to drive all the women into gas chambers and to hang your " enemies " with piano wire in the hopes -- but quite another to plan such operations down to the minutest detail, to make ledger entries of hair and calcium, wigs and artificial limbs; to stack corpses to extract a goal from their teeth. In fact, of course, this horrific confrontation of trait is an extreme in protest example of the relationship touched on earlier -- the between authoritarianism and any of obsessive personality. It does, however, at a new dimension in meeting to that under valuing of other human beings which characterizes the authoritarian personality.

Now in the context of purely military behavior this in humanity, like other characteristics of the authoritarian personality, could in theory be useful or disastrous. On the one hand it could be argued to senior commander should locate hope the enemy and not be squeamish about sacrificing the lives of their men for the sake of a greater good. Conversely it could be maintained it is not hatred so much as that under standing in the enemy, and not conscious list this squandering but he a humane conserving of his own forces, which are the hallmarks of an efficient commander

Perhaps, as with other aspects of authoritarianism, is just a matter of degree. Certainly such great leaders as Wolf, Wellington, shocker, shallots, Mona Ash and Montgomery not only displayed a general absence of authoritarian traits but also showed a lively regard for the prime responsibility to commander: conservation is Boris and concern for the psychological visible effort was troops. As true valiant Rhoda Wellington: " is fortunate for Britain did once it wasn't that wants a great humanitarian antegrade disciplinary. " in contrast to these highly competent commanders, many less talented military leaders have, along with other authoritarian traits, betrayed a singular disregard for the welfare of their troops and unnerving capacity to remain apparently unmoved by losses. 2004 EDITOR: Schoomaker and the Army's general today in regard to the thousands of people who been destroyed in Iraq because they insisted they drive around in rubber tired trucks

However, the mistrust is not our purpose to level by you judgments about the lack of humanity of particular commanders the rather pointed out that the aspect of authoritarianism which constitute its a lack of humanity makes for military incompetence. Furthermore, humanitarianism is senior commander contributes to military success at least two ways per first it, is the controlling factor in the making of tactical strategic decisions, four seasons a complex process by which such decisions arrived at two important criteria: economy

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A force, and the need for safeguards against the possibility of unforeseen disasters. That's " Wellington had learnt to keep his eye at certain times on the exit... As far back as India, when famine threatened his communication, he'd really dropped any idea going to the assistance of Col. Monson against them on how Toronto's. " [39] very different were the policies of Townshend as he pushed up the Tigers towards the " garage " of Baghdad.

Secondly, humanitarianism is a prerequisite for those pillars of military success, high morale and physical health. From researches in industrial psychology is become abundantly clear that, the workers and any large organization, physical health and mental well-being (and, as a result, productivity (depend rather more upon the workers feeling that they're being cared for by an interested in denying management and upon such tangibles as large wage packets. Even such a " real will benefit as a newly installed air-conditioning system has been found to have more effect upon productivity before being switched on been a had one actually functioning. In other words, it was not fresh air assault affected management had bothered to get them for a share which can counted. If these effects occur in the relatively unstress milieu of a civilian firm, how much more so will the floors when the workers are Soldiers and distresses those of war? Commanders like Wellington, intelligent Nelson, Montgomery or that paragon of military virtuosity, the Zulu general shocker, by according to logistic goal planning the highest priority, achieve not only the affectionate loyalty of their men, but also, as a consequence, standards of helpful out of all proportion to purely physical benefits which their energy conferred. To come as no surprise to those versed in the relationship between psychological stress and psychosomatic illness to learn that the sailors serving Nelson ships in the been unhealthy environment of the West Indies, like shock is Zulu warriors in the unhealthy climbs of central effort, 40 showed a resistance to disease that bordered on the miraculous. These phenomena stand in sharp in short significant contrast to the uncaring weighing which some general sublet their Army's die of cold, misery, disease and neglect or is not run surprising discover that, according to modern research, lack of compassion goes along with moral conformity, having a close mind in the uncreative. 41 Kathryn worried more, writing in the observer Bret deceased can. 11. [69] (, as provided the useful example of this relationship between authoritarian attitudes and a lack of compassion.

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She called sites a letter written to the conservative MP Mr. Duncan Sand these wish, agreeing with you stand on abortion, went on for several pages about the sanctity of human life, and ended " PS I'm with you on hanging two ".

A picture area of manpower wastage additional to those considered above is that of sexual casualties. In every or thousands of man or is a loss of an aerial disease.

To the authoritarians are not good at dealing with this problem is suggested by the rumpus which greet Montgomery's order on how to prevent the heat amongst British troops in France during 1940 42 authoritarian attitude towards his problem is that BDE, like other self-inflicted wounds, constitutes a misdemeanor. BDE, they say should be avoided by Cassidy. Under rate to be different in rather more pragmatic view, namely the BT should be prevented by rapid medical attention after intercourse. 2004 EDITOR: it's it's hypocritical for these general sewer not enough walking die to be telling the troops were to indict that they can have some last fling of Sex before they die the restaurant award have all sex to want in the mid-die to shut the hell up

This order, which made several useful points about prophylaxis, so upset the senior chaplain in the commander in chief that are " our traders general since Wellington " nearly lost his job.

2004 EDITOR: typical today we don't give a crap that our Soldiers are dying/being maimed in thousands in Iraq...we're more concerned about chicks kissing here in the United States, so we reelected the hyper-religious Bush who doesn't act with minimal competence according to facts

The most surprising aspect of this incidence is the unrealism of the authoritarian approach. For active service involves many pride nations. Good food, shelter, comfort, safety, the absence the presence of one's family aren't very degree sacrifice to cause of fighting an enemy towards whom many of the combats may feel little personal animosity. Within this context they are then required to break the sixth amendment. If they obey this injunction to words on Christian behavior they are rewarded, if the disobeying their promise. It falls to the lot of chaplains to attempt to consume. Their task is to reassure the military flock that ", said Scott is underside, the sixth amendment can be waived for the duration. How they reconcile this with the ball is enemy Soldiers are all in all probability receiving an identical of vice from their chaplains Maitland the mysteries of ecclesiastical mind. *

Anyway, presumably with the slacking off of one commander, the church feels it necessary to tighten up another, rather as one might

Anyway, presumably with the slacking off of one commander, the church feels it necessary to tighten up another, rather as one might

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* according to Jay. Hour. Hale, even as long ago as a 17th-century " the church could not reach war without some feelings of any East ". The rationalization of the divines was or will could be a social good, a moral cleanser, gods scored for vice world. [43] it seems that the relationship between religiosity, regression and authoritarianism is a phenomenon some into gritty antiquity.

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adjust different dye ropes on a tent pole. This is, of course, not only bad luck on Soldiers who probably prefer sex to aggression, but in the event of fairly ineffectual attempt to tamper with the laws of nature. Persist in addition inhibition of sexuality, unlike the unleashing of aggression, does not constitute part of the military training, is hardly surprising debt for propulsion of man, porn from their wise and girlfriend, permits is behavior, followed in some cases by BT, becomes one more hazard of war.

This is bad enough for those who glorified aggression and deplore sex, but worse is to follow. For BT interferes with the Soldier's primary task of aggression against the enemy.

This sequence of events is no criticism the core of chaplains, whose record of bravery in selfless devotion to the physical, as well as spiritual, welfare Soldiers remains indisputable. But it is an indictment on authoritarian egos which, in trying to decline the undeniable and conform to conventional middle-class dye is, under wholly inappropriate circumstance, results in military efficiency and a quite unnecessary extra burden for Soldiers were already suffering more than their fair share of discomfort. 2004 EDITOR: denying Soldier's a love life is just yet another harassment in the bullshit authoritarian military culture so they can be more subservient pawns for their weak ego masters to climb in rank at the expense of their lost limbs and flag-draped coffins

Is press worth noting to become region light and in pragmatic approach the problem BDE is rather more humane than that followed by the American forces with their 1000 grow " Willow run " brothel in Korea, and originally medically examined ladies of the official military brothel, "s inner-city ", in Vietnam.

Finally, there is the fact that authoritarianism, is also damaging to military endeavor, will actually predisposed an individual porch entering upon the very career wherein he is restricted personality can wreck the most havoc. For early signs of this predisposition disposition there is the following case study:

Case 19: Cecil or -- an obsessive Iraq

His IQ was in the bright normal range. Personality testing indicated he was very dependent upon his parents, but it they were seen as having been mostly remote and extremely demanding. In Tendancy, he expressed Ron feelings of regression and anger. Or dirt he seemed most interested in the history of worse and in plate war games. He shot darts " with figure in the light, in his therapist playroom and a given a choice would choose war games. Or dirt is parents said he refused to play with other

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Children unless the others G. Zack lately told to do. Cecil said he wanted to grow up, and be a general. [44]

This sad state of pole positive feedback, * together with a brief summary of the sort of personality under discussion, is contained in the following excerpt from a recent paper on the military mind

Reserve officers training course to city University California, compared with student draft resistors, with fountain of experienced to strict gel to discipline in relation to a dominant father figure. They showed a strong concerned about proving their masculinity, use more are all, felt powerless to influence their countries actions, Dell troubled about their sexual inadequacy, defined independence as loss of self-control, pervert well ordered a structured environment, admitted to being self-centered in the testicle, felt shoddy with girls but posted to their fellows of their sexual conquest, plain little real intimacy and poor relationships with the opposite sex, admitted trading females as objects, candidacy dominance dominant submission relationship, and a relatively aggressive, impulsive, irresponsible and not intellectual, with a poorly developed conscience. [45]

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* "positive feedback" is a process whereby the characterization six of an outcome serve to accentuate the same characteristics of future outcomes -- i.e., a runaway system.

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Chapter 23

Mothers of incompetence

"Return the adult was under the Dominican to unilateral respect for the " Elders " and for tradition is really behaving like a child"

--J. C. Piaget, The Moral judgment of the Child

"Ricker there is nothing more common than to hear of men losing their energy on being raised wire position, to which they do not feel themselves equal peer-to-peer "

--C. Von Clausewitz

The reader not previously versed in the psychology of authoritarianism the preceding chapter may come as something of Bishop rise. At first sight the traits of orderliness, tells mindedness, obedience to story, punitive list and the rest may well have seen the very embodiment of hard-hitting masculinity -- ideally suited to job of being a Soldier,. A partially, as represented in the authoritarian personality their own skin deep -- a brutal prostitute offenses against feelings of weakness in inadequacy. The authoritarian keeps up his spirits by whistling in the dark. He is the frightened child who wears the armor of a giant. His mind is a door locked and bolted against that which he fears himself most: himself.

Since the truth of this may be heart heart pill to swallow (were threat to the whole elaborate structure personal defenses (, we shall now describe another piece of independent research which is reached similar conclusions by different row. Like the research of authoritarianism is started with a quite specific aspect of perception -- in this case, beast that to which people can respond analytically rather than globally to the massive information reaching their senses. Want a special instance of this ability is the degree to which people can ignore

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your row of the initial impressions when these conflict with other sources of sensory experiments.

In a simple test of this propensity the individual is seated on a tilted share in a dark room. All he can see is a porous and Rod, and closed within an illuminated frame. Both carotid is frame are tilted out of the vertical. His task is set to rot into vertical position

In very issue be quite easy, for doctors is not prevent one from knowing one's position (and therefore that of other object (relative to the true vertical. He did, walking a dark or without with lies close would be quite impossible. The trick is, of course, that we received a constant stream of information about the gravitational field (and therefore the true vertical (from the balancing mechanisms of the year. Any departures from the vertical or also signal by pressure receptors in the fee and other nerve cells in the muscles of the legs, body intact. Without this complex system of postural reflects as we should fall about the place like Bronx -- Rockwall makes the testicular to the static Sorrento are system in opera (as well as unpronounceable (.

In very, then, the " rot in frame test, Jim easy enough for the " for the normal (over (individual. In practice this is far from being the case. Some people can do it but there are others so dominated by the visually perceived frame the Big 10 to ignore the information from the gravity in postural receptors. For them the rot of the vertical when it is perpendicular to the tilted frame. These people have been turned " field dependent " because they are dependent on the visual field.

Novice, and living aside any notions of Freudian symbolism, there's more like to the rear action the rods and a dark room. So what has all this to do with military incompetence? The answer very simply isn't field dependence have other characteristics which differentiate them from those were adapt with rods and frames. They're less mature, more passive and more conforming. They are also bore off a returning into the value achievement for social approval which he earns rather than for its own sake. In other words, they are generally restricted into transactions with the external world and more determined by feelings of dependency than by the realities of a given situation. As we saw when discussing achievement motivation, authoritarianism and the "" mind, there's plenty here to make for military incompetence.

But the matter may be pressed further. How, for example, to people become field dependent? Id genetic component cannot be ruled out;

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Thus many more women than men are field dependent, a Sheaffer has found that women who lack wanted to ask chromosomes of normal women are extremely field dependent. To

Finally the fact that some monkey share with human field dependence and inability to extract hidden figures from a complex visual display as suggested in evolutionary factor in this is aspect of perception. Certainly a capacity for analyzing out what is important must have, and have had, a high survival the eye. According to this argument, field dependence could be viewed as evolutionary older stage of development.

However, there also grounds for implicated experimental factors. Experiential factors. Field dependence seen to be those who in the early years were car cursed liver strict mothers and the reminded then remained psychologically tied to mothers apron strings -- conforming, obedient, good boys and girls, there are folded dangerous world outside, fearful mothers displeasure and forever watching * mothers space of visual impressions of approval but which their lies were guided. Conversely, their independent counterparts seem not to have been saddled with such anxious in oppressive parents.

All in all, work on this perceptual true typology makes good sense in the light of the foregoing theory of authoritarianism. It supports the believed to include the apparently hard, top, prejudice, hostile, aggressively masculine exterior of the authoritarian posted individual disobedience authority, prejudice attitude, closed mind and sexual Britishness reflected in incapacity legacy of lessons learned at mothers me. It supports the believed to the ability and the ability to analyze a situation, to extract essentials from a complex mass of information, and to be a " bad boy " when the occasion demands -- obvious hallmarks of such company commanders as Wellington, Nelson in Montgomery -- or the product of a personality which either did not experience or manage to rise above the most suffocating constraints of early childhood.

Is hardly surprising ", then, that authoritarianism infield dependency should be related. The common denominator would be seen to be a lasting impact upon the adult personality of maternal pressure on the if it mind -- relatively maligning in the case of authoritarianism,

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* according to research by constant in Foreman, field dependence concerned about the performance and taking a test under stressing conditions look up at the case of their examiner twice as often as do field independent subjects. [3]

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, relatively benign in the case of field dependency. If this maternal pressure is towards achieving status, authoritarianism would seen the likely outcome, but primarily protective been the traits of field the tendency might be more in evidence. After

The two outcomes are not mutually exclusive but could reflect a shift in emphasis can be illustrated by considering and the characters of Raglan and Buller. In both were strongly influenced by their mothers -- page the more pushing, but was the more protective. Both developed authoritarian traits and those minister the buildings which follow from the need to preserve or limits. Both were ambitious to the point of being touchy about their status. But, following on the speculations, there are their past bear their parents divide.

The mother inside hate drooling the command one large as army's world is ever seen, and to do so with remarkable self-confidence. But the mother inside Buller, but mother to whom he had been devoted C* * whose photograph you is carried, Her boy passive independent. Is significant that when Buller married he took a mature and the only woman for his wife. It is significant that when stressed by being placed in top command, with no parental figure to whom he could appeal, he himself took on the traits of his internal has mother, becoming overprotective towards his men. It is significant that when stressed his mind turned to food and drink. He became obese. After * after of obesity in overeating in field personalities is been said:

There in adequately developed sense of separate identities makes it plausible that under stress they would seek comfort in oral activities that have been in important source of satisfaction in the period of close unity with mother. As a technique of Defense for dealing with anxiety, eating is a nonspecialized offense. Is applied indiscriminately and a wide range of stressful situations, and it does not act in specific, directed fashion upon the source

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* other researchers suggested a positive relationship between authoritarianism, perceptual field dependence in general to persuade ability. [4]

** she died when he was 16, which perhaps held to perpetuate his early attachment

*** obesity is probably the Communist psychosomatic disorder. In the US alone accounts for hundred 25,000 tn. Of obsessiveive and boost issue, announced to produce 100,000,000,000 calories of heat. By Mr. Suggested the causes over eating and the fact that the peace or more influenced and are eating habits by such external stimuli as a site and smell of food than by their state of need. [6]

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Oh stress. In particular kinds of persons, it may suffice the organism with an adult pleasure which blur is anxiety. [7]

According to other research, the peace individuals tend to be " obsessiveively passive, depended, intolerant responsibility and unable to express aggression. " eight they tend to be approach any oh " controlling, overprotective, overindulge in cold mothers, 09 police food to compensate for the emotional deprivation suffered by their children 10 and have a pen shone for standardizing their sons.

We cannot, how fortunately, know how Buller would've fared on the " rot inflamed " tests, the following descriptions of this general as the " directed to the fatal battle of: so, taking into account with his other characteristics, suggested he might not have done so well. " he ordered his men to make a direct attack upon the boards. He gobble sandwiches as he watched action while shells burst around him, one killing the staff surgeon at his side. Buller Hughes was himself severely bruised by fragment to show -- but he discontinued observing eating. As more more of his opposite until dead or wounded, but was the sole was strangled by pity. He ordered us to stoop editor assault and withdrawal... British calculation is futile engagement total to 1100. Oh [11]

This excursion into the mysteries of field dependence eliminates features of militarism discussed earlier. It does so by emphasizing an aspect of aggression described by the American analyst CM Thompson. " regression is not necessarily destructive at all. It springs from any tendency to grow a master life which seems to be terrorist arrested of all living matter. " wealth

Expiration, independence, self-assertion, the overcoming obstacles and the domination of component of male sexuality depend upon the positive aspects of his most fundamental drive.

Does it is the repression of aggression which results from a restrictive childhood in pairs those very traits which are required by the professional fighter. It also conflicts with the original purpose of interspecies fighting silicone for lower animals in Gresham is concerned with capturing in holding territory upon which the species depends for its food supplies. Is also the means whereby the strongest males the act is to bring females. The vestiges of these instinct rule goals are to be found in human fighter; the compulsive preoccupation with holding ground (which proves so costly in the first world war (

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And the upsurge of sexual activity which follows victory premises and upsurge to which the Duchess of more poor old retention when she confided that upon returning from battle her lower will pleasure] her [three times with his boots on " (have a long and furry history!

Under the circumstances is hardly surprising to military organizations and military men set such store by the "butch" trappings of masculinity. Nor is it surprising that they should recoil from the slightest suggestion of intimacy. With a long dependency of human childhood and emasculating " Mommy " hovering in the wings they have much to fight before the ever meet the external enemy.

From the foregoing two chapters, will authoritarianism ", with associated traits of the old zest of this and the closed my ", the * emerges as the final product of a massive and largely unconscious conflict between two opposing forces. One side arrange the powerful prices sex aggression, and on the other the strictures of a bourgeois morality implanted in the child by a state status anxious parents. The conflict is chronic and its effect upon mind in behavior restricted to the point of being crippling.

From this we have argued that the psychology of authoritarianism lies at the heart of much military incompetence. **Because organizations which are invested with the task of medicine donations violence develops devices for controlling aggression, they will tend to attract into the ranks people with similar problems of control. Just people will tend to become foremost, conventional and over control. They'll also can seek approval, enjoyed occupying a position in a dominant Sebastian hierarchy, and derives satisfaction from the provision of legitimate outlets for the normal East repressed aggression. There in a short authoritarian. But because the rates of authoritarianism life are back in childhood just people also can demand is best those other resisted use of early socialization: orderliness, personnel moaning and opposite as he -- the so-called angle obsessive triad. Finally, because such people are threatened by the possible breakthrough of institutional impulses they tend to be over control, rigid and possessed of "" as opposed to " "minds. They like to be governed by rules and import what is spontaneous, flexible or unusual**

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* recent research by climbing found significant correlations between authoritarianism, dogmatism, rigidity and anal obsession hourly.

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clearly there's much and military organizations which might be expected to attract such people, until either personality traits will, because hotly consistent with the needs and demands of the group facilitate their promotion.

Such people may be expected to make a number of contributions to military incompetence. Firstly, they will tend to foster, intensifying perpetuate the most restrictive features a militarism. Secondly, because somewhat lacking in humane feelings towards others, they will tend to be wasteful of human life to make poor social leaders. Thirdly, they will tend to be slow to accept unexpected information and will cling to strongly held convictions. Finally, when reaching the top of the pair meant anxiety intended by the unaccustomed lack of higher authority will eventually in an even tighter control of their aggressive impulses.

Besides making sense of all these features a militarism -- cool "bull", and I in tendancy, sensitivity to criticism, " scapegoat" and participation -- which were mentioned in earlier chapters, the major authoritarianism reconciles the old so-called old "bloodyengine fool" theory of military incompetence with the personality based their eat it fancier. As William Eckardt and Alan Newcombe report and a recent paper:

Both authoritarianism and dogmatism were negatively correlated with intellectual conviction [13] and with education, [14] so that the authoritarian, dogmatic militarist is anti-intellectual. Here are equal in those " all that he wants to know. Knowledge is a threat to his ego defensive orientation, and is therefore rejected. What he claims to be " knowledge " is actually a faith, so at the essence of dogmatism is a basic confusion between state and knowledge. 15

Needless to say, this attitude towards knowledge brushes off when those whom he sees as purveyors of this miss dangerous commodity: " he is frequently hostile words in suspicious of " intellectual's " whom he chooses a being too clever to see the plain fact. " [16]

In other words, what some writers have taken to be a simple straightforward lack of intellectual ability of some military commanders was probably due to the crippling effects of anxiety upon perception, memory and thought. To confuse the second of these explanations with the first will be like confusing erratic behavior of an expensive watch this been dropped with the port time keeping of a cheap clock constructed with inferior materials.

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This distinction between inherently efficient mechanism distorted by " know is " and third-rate mechanism which is doing its best is also implied by contemporary studies of the military mind. Similar adjectives tender recurring every case -- " over controlled, aloof, rigid, " [17] " orderly, frugal, Boston, [18] " predictable, punctual, prompt, decisive, weight conscious, simplistic. " 19 these occur in statements about personality, not elect, about cycle pathology, not cognitive disability. As one review of this work has said: " these " anal characteristics. Good. Would suggest her strict it and rigid childhood training, which outfielders was expected to be seen and not hurt, to conform conform without regarding, to fit into the schedule prescribed by authority without question or wonder, in short the same sort of childhood training that has been found for authoritarian in dogmatic personalities. " [20]

If these relationships are valid then we should find them for shadowed in the job experience shouted experiences of some future military officers

Before going on, there is one further point. It concerns to distinction that has been drawn between " irrational " authoritarianism, as dealt with year, and so-called " rational authoritarianism. [21] but latter is meant the readiness to accept unabated dictates of rational authority. And interacting irrational and pithy towards all authority, as evident in some cases of student Milton C., may be just as neurotic and not adopted as a preaches the prickly disposition towards " your rational authoritarianism. 2004 EDITOR: the peaceniks writing against the Vietnam War or just as bad as the weak codependents as the blind obedience lemmings that join the military to go to Vietnam

the common denominator of " irrational " authoritarianism and blind anarchy is a both sides a mock states of mind our temple also and derived from underlying ego pathology.

In fact is distinction between " rational " and your rational " authoritarianism has been implied trap his book per without the exercise acceptance of rational authority, though certain minimal levels of discipline, and even without certain features a " bull ", military organizations which ceased to function. 2004 EDITOR: how much people ships how much authoritarianism this is the weakness of this author is that he hasn't decided where and when crap is to be tolerated I say the whole foundation is crap is crafted an easily thrown out and we need to military is built upon adult maturity not any kind of poll

Is mystery to labor this been because of some semantic confusion regarding but turned " the authoritarian. " dropped his book seems to the " (irrational (authoritarianism of T. W. a doorbell and his colleagues. For so-called rational authoritarianism we prefer of the phrase " autocratic behavior. The terms are not synonymous. Whereas the autocratic exercise strike control when the situation demands, the authoritarian is himself tightly controlled, no matter what the external situation. 2004 EDITOR::: what that means is you have dictatorial tyrants will lease terrorizing the man in peacetime and in war and good leaders only use blind obedience in dictation during times or when it is necessary

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Chapter 24

Education and the so-called "Muscular Christianity"

"the cultivation of bold, independent and imaginative thinking is of the greatest importance to the security of the nation is to be advanced"

---J. Arnaz went and LI a rad weight, Soldiers installers

Vote the root trouble was a low standard of education of the average Army officer -- only the Army and Air Force or worse. "

--Major General Bonham Carter

"These boys were in fact the first for to future ruling class in British history to be subjected to a powerful in uniform old and process all. This itself was at the utmost significance, building the variety, spontaneity and open-minded is that hitherto had been the saving graces of the British upper classes, while the pattern on which these boys were molded compounded the consul consequences of uniform molding itself".

--Per rally Burnett, the collapse of British power

The foregoing account of military organizations missed well toare some militarism -- its fundamental authoritarianism incapacity for ink locating a fear of failure -- which predisposed to worse incompetence.

Whether or not they do so will, the however, depend upon the natural gifts of intellect of personnel the which individual members of military elite bring to their calling. What man was before he entered the Army Navy main theory do a lot more to offset the effects of the system which he now enters. Conversely, and intake of people who

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Ari possess the ways of thinking and feeling which characterize military organizations might tend to amplify rather than compensate for these limitations. 2004 EDITOR::: recruit weak people into the military these are going to make the weaknesses of the military even worse we need to recruit strong a dull people who do not lean on the military for their self-esteem it seems possible at the latter situation has been more usually the case, and disparate to reasons. The first we have or he noted, namely that people are drawn port locations which fit their needs. Even before the days of vocational selection, brown pants tended to gravitate toward circular holes. While this reason is likely to be true for all military organizations, there is a second which may apply only to a few. It concerns the social class and educational background of those who become officers in the Army or Navy.

Just getting ending of the practice whereby commissions could be purchased both the strengths and weaknesses weaknesses as of British commanders must be late in part of the door of the English upper middle-class system of education in preparatory and public schools.

There is hardly an element of militarism which cannot be located in the East Coast of these schools. Even the incessant traits which reconsidered in connection with the phenomena of global " wishing ample encouragement and latter-day versions of the Dole's peace hall. The object of these goals with sternal gentlemen -- traditionally metered males who, without the necessity for soiling their hands, to not require special skills are technical ability. Hence their curricula devoted many hours to classical education, concentrating on Latin and Greek, history and English, with an almost total abject and neglect of science and technology. Want 2004 EDITOR: this is ridiculous you need to know reality you need to be a to know what the men are doing and be a do-it-yourself to have a right in the vision of how to lead them

The reason why these were the subject taught was that by exercising a mind and stretched the memory such as is much his exertions on the sports field stretched the muscles. And Ferry, but suppose intellectual "fallout" from a classical education was enough to silence to start his critic. It was believed that through this study of dead languages the schoolboy would acquire not only the language is, but all sold the history of ancient cultures and the ability to think logically. Unfortunately it is doll full whether most of the children were forced to struggle with the forced the clenching, or grope their way through the translation of Caesar in Britain, " ever achieved anything more been a transient ability to decline or translate. Wherever, without instruction in formal logic, to profess benefits for the thinking process is doubtful. 2004 EDITOR::: to get what you pay for a few what these people to learn out of think teach into or not think even English in modern history are often taught in such a way as to current seed that though the recipient of the instruction inquires an oppressive rote memory for the dates of kings and battles,

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His understanding of their social context remains negligible. The emphasis on against rather than ideas.

The reasons for the stultifying educational program are no doubt many in various, but to deserve particular consideration. The first resides in the believed in forced application to unpleasant, boring tasks " develops character", and a second any truly intellectual exercise, but which is meant the cultivation of independent thinking as opposed rote learning, parts that fine sense of loyalty in obedience with which such schools strive to locate to think is to question and the question is to have doubts 2004 EDITOR::: and we can't have that you need to be a landing and do what the doctor told by the status quo in charge thinking is a threat to the incompetence in charge of the status quo

The light of these fears is hardly surprising that the same schools devoted great deal of time to religion and also to sports, most of which was the boys never play again. Just place of honor which sporting activities hold in private boarding schools cannot possibly be justified in terms of physical fitness or vocational training, what purposes do they serve? For have been suggested. They dissipate surplus energy and a particular are supposed to supplement 8 The Sex Dr. In this respect against constitute a muscular extension of the couples were cold shower before breakfast. Secondly, they instill team spirit, competitors, obedience and loyalty. Thirdly, they are supposed to in your the participants to fear and physical hardship. Finally, because of the measurably greater kudos of sporting, as opposed more scholarly, pursuits, the hell promote and eat those which effectively devalued its intellectual curiosity and the products of creative imagination. 2004 EDITOR: society wants dumb jocks not intellectual Einstein's they can get the job done and built 300 Lamar trains to cross in coast-to-coast and get actual things accomplished we worship sports stars and rock musicians more than men to get the job done all in all, the curricula of many private boarding schools are based upon the cold of Po muscular Christianity " advocated with hold all we are running zeal by the Victorian writers Charles Kingsley and Thomas used. As applied education, this call to manliness and loneliness was avidly designed to fit boys for shouldering the burden of the heterosexual he deprived white man in far-flung outpost of the Victorian empire, and for shaping up the sorts of leadership qualities recorded Bella, and on the Northwest Frontier. 2004 EDITOR: and other words would brainwashing people to conquer other countries as good imperialistic lemmings

They are, however, rather less suited to these agencies of modern war. In his book, the pretax, Rupert Wilkinson, in fact, go so far as to suggest the intellectual shortcomings of public schools contribute to the two greatest Tigers a British national leadership -- the first world war, was appalling in unnecessarily high losses, and the " appeasement " policies of the 1930s. To

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British calamities. British history to trace in particular must be blamed: the first and absence of curiosity and dislike of new concept, and a second such complete self-assurance as to rule out the likelihood of prudent foresight. 2004 EDITOR::: the schools cannot see ahead what's gonna happen anticipate and prepare so when it happens we can overcome their the blind leading the blind to these must be added several in ciliary traits, including a mystical belief in the virtues of amateurism backed up by the equally optimistic read open a mite on income encumbered with little more than a written their momentary knowledge of the humanities will somehow muddle through, providing its owner has your approachable good manners, unquestioning loyalty, total obedience and a sense of public duty.

Even a propensity for " poll " finds encouragement in the reinforcement obsessive traits which many boarding schools provide. The following account of bowel training in a typical English preparatory school the 1930s illustrates this point. Docile demonstrates how an authoritarian régime may, by and do emphasis on such activities, Foster propensity for lying as a means of preventing anxiety. Is worth noting that this expensive boarding school for boys exemplify, go to the large as small as detail, a régime a totally authoritarian buddy ferrets of just do people -- the headmaster in his wife. While both were authoritarian personalities, with will develop possessed a traits, their roles in schoolwork Typically demarcate. He administered the cane and she the Perkins. In this way, both attacked same area. Like interlocking up to well fitting pieces of jigsaw puzzle, they displayed the two aspects of the anal problem: constraint and performance. Predictably, both were cold, stingy in August it.

Immediately after breakfast the headmaster's wife was set yourself up open a brown exercise book at the long table in school. Each line of her book recorded a day-to-day bowel behavior of the child whose name appeared in the left-hand margin. With a press briefing -- " Smith minor number 60, or promote Forbes Heatherington number 10"-- the children were dispatched to the very school laboratories... His mission completed, each child would return to the command post report, vote yes please ", or no please, " depending on how successful he had been. She would then and result in the appropriate square, they " I " for a gas " and 8000"for " no ".

The system was hardly a success. If boys were way too long, or not long enough, there would be a tightening of the

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Lift, and close interrogation. If they and if they were applied " no, they not only earned or obvious displeasure, but suffered retaliation -- either liquid task are, or, for natural to digital since omission, c* oil. Under these circumstances, is hardly surprising that the boys learn to say " you asked " rather than " no ", nor ", indeed, that many of them became more or less chronically constipated.

There was one other unfortunate byproduct of these events -- one which the headmaster's white like to call " laboratory misdemeanors ". Note out board by having to wait the required. Behind closed doors, the boys would while later time with carving designs in the seat, dismantling the plumbing, it to use the headmaster's words, " deci-creating the toilet roll, Summit: this usually to before pulling out the Center to make several yards of translucent paper telescope. It will also detected pillows were inevitably discovered by the headmaster's white, who displeasure it was to inspect laboratories each day.

It was to say, retribution was swift and harsh. Indeed, so harsh was the punishment, and so deep to disgrace into which the culprit was plunged, the few, if any, there'd own up to their crimes. Under such circumstances the rule is that the whole school should suffer for the sins of the individual, and the entire school would be detained. Three

From the public count, it seems at the link between at a malady and authoritarianism there was fortunate early childhood become strengthened in the sort of preparatory schools from which future Army officers are drawn.

Prickly, Brown's most fatal all of all, the private schools at the honor Fairplay, so admirable in itself, Lisa disaster Soldiers went mistakenly imputed to those like Hitler who play the game by different set of rules. *

For further evidence that at least one aspect of military competence derives from the Victorian attitudes to which the young have been exposed in English boarding schools, there is the interesting case of military intelligence.

The lack of adequate military intelligence, which is better recurring future mostly campaigns considered in the preceding

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* to plot to assassinate Hitler during the 1930s was turned down as " not cricket,"-- the very words used by the government of the day.

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Chapters, reached his meter in the war against Russia. As one writer has put it: " the military blunders and scandals of omission of the Crimean war the field the poverty of Britain's military intelligence. Most most of the catastrophes of that campaign were due to an almost total active information about the enemy. " [4]

This particular witness a military endeavor continue to feature in many subsequent campaigns. Indeed it is no exaggeration to say the Dean absent than absence of adequate Rick and ordering, the refusal to believe intelligence reports and the general horror spine attended to keep our armies wrapped into cousins of catastrophic ignorance.

This fatal preference for honorable ignorance, rather than useful knowledge gained by devious means, was not confined to the Soldiers in the field, but, as an attitude of mine, permit needed the highest levels a military intelligence. The history the very departments of espionage encounter espionage, old " special operations " and the light, is what a badly staff, ill-equipped Cinderella organization struggling to perform the duties in the face of contempt, jealousy in resentment from Army and Navy service cheap spirit societies, any particular the militaries, low opinion of intelligence sources set a vicious cycle circle of third-rate recruiting giving rise to careless work, into resulting in deepening distaste. That's between the war is the secret intelligence service (later at my sex (was launched out by all those two officers wouldn't " asked " from the Navy, presumably therefore made a below-average competence.

The same token, the recruiting of can still be by Guy purchased into the Secret Service, the fact of the director of Naval intelligence between 1927 a 1930, Admiral Sir Berry Dom Bill, was subsequently arrested in 1940 for his role as founder and chairman of the proton see organization ", the link, suggests something quite special in the way of incompetence.

As for the underlying motivation to time this behind his neglect of one of the most important ingredients a foreign behavior, there is revealing case of lower pole portal, during a second world war, starting a planned by the special operations executive (as though we (to ambush acutely troublesome and lawful bomber crew. Portals reason was that he could not associate himself with " and assassins ". As peaked remarks: " here was to made Victorian attitudes towards espionage and sabotage rearing its head again. "

Of course there are other motives for denigrating intelligence services

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As little bomber " Harris called as though he " amateur is, ignorant, irresponsible and many dishes. " he just cannot tolerate a single bomber being diverted for the dropping of as though we agents and materiel.

Another clue to the feelings which underlay the time-honored distaste for gathering intelligence is the study depot had study denial of British military government authorities of their own intelligence services. In 1910 two Junior marine officers voluntary volunteer to carry a survey of German Sea coast defenses. Unfortunately they were captured is that's the four years imprisonment, but, what they were eventually released with orders the Kaiser, instead of treating them as heroes further patriotic venture the adult each other to the shudderingly disowned all venture and refuse to recommends them for considerable financial losses which they incurred. 2004 EDITOR::: the Secretary will disavow any knowledge of you or your men if your cot or captured killed good luck Jim

This " not want to know about shameful going on its emerge again in the 1930s when William Stevenson, the Canadian businessmen as that cut subsequently " the outstanding executive on the British side of the Secret Service of World War II ", discovered that nearly the entire German output of steel was being turned over to our room at spirit vital though this information was only one man, Churchill, listen to Stevenson and prevailed upon him to discover more.

Even as late as 1963 Lord giving, in his report on the prefold scandal, don't move to know that " security the security service in this country is not established by state statute nor is it recognize the common law. In any official secret ax secrets ask do not knowledge stick systems. " five

It seems, then, but it is like a spine was a fairly widespread phenomena in certain sections of society. It not always been so. Wellington had had his own highly efficient intelligence service employ some of the enables men in the Army. DOS in Scouting frigate said a potent weapon in the British espionage activities. The Royal Navy had even played a major role in the deliberate elaborate plot to have the pole in murdered by the outrage husband of the French dictators peril more, Madame forays.

By then, in made Victorian England, Aldus changed: espionage became a dirty word, and the Secret Service something not mentioned in polite society. It could be argued that the change of attitude, which, through the Ito said Victorian Society of schools, came to of such disastrous effects upon some future military leaders, was but within the prevailed expression of one aspect of Victorian through conspiracy prudery -- a defense against the natural curiosity of the child which in the adult is called

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Lawyer risen. Is simply no coincidence to decide a society which frowned on mixed dating, had address its table legs and to close its eyes to dig greatest boom in prostitution the world is ever seen should have had to leave its espionage to such nonconforming and eccentric amateur is as Cavanaugh and burden. What is not have to be an ardent believer in Freudian theory to realize an erotic attitude which center around a particular segment of human behavior quickly generalized other symbolic versions of the same behavior. Porsche will be surprised to learn that burden, one of the greatest Secret Service agents of the Victorian era, combined his espionage activities with the " and system interested sexual phenomena ". The cannot be many spies to of submitted a report on pedestrian!

Finally, it is surely not coincidental the country with our record of the curious disregarding enemy intentions after should also be the want inflicted with attitudes toward tomography which have made as the laughingstock of other nations.

Deter return from this apparent aggression to the factor of educational systems in military competence, the cost of " muscular Christianity ", the taboos of sneaking and the positively directly and measures taken against the mildest incidence of lawyer risen and upperclass boarding schools in planet is set of values singly untuned to that " nasty as " requirement of or -- prying into, and reporting back upon, once enemy.

The notion is some British military disasters may be late, at least in part, at the door of the British English boarding schools system gains support from one other router obvious truth, the lead at the Ito said military organizations complements rather and compensates for the educational background of their members. The public-school boy getting Army's note out made to feel all the discovery to the values instilled him at school are scarcely distinguishable from those which greet him in the officers mass. It follows that the military might receive this particular form for two reasons: firstly, as the natural reaction to the stresses of the job, and secondly, because the core of officers tends to be drawn from the products of a particular kind of educational system. Acting together, is hardly surprising

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* after as Major General Strong has pointed out in his made of intelligence, carriers to gathering utilize military intelligence have not been confined to the British and American spirit

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Eastlake sources of intellect and moral rigidity should have produced the military organization which over the years made up in stand out what it lacked --.

Before leaving the role which English boarding schools play in the psychology of military confidence, there are some further points to be considered. The first concerns a relatively new concept in physiologic logical medicine, data separation anxiety. This refers to the very degrees of permit psychological damage which an individual they suffer as a result of being separated from his or her mother the disease of mother figure (during early childhood parade will bolster its oldest delays is founded Institute light institutionalized orphans, was a degrees of damage can result from such temporary separation doesn't. In the hospital six or being placed in the boarding school at two early in age. In the latter case the ill effects of early separation or greatly exacerbated by a cold affection milieu in which it shall confined to substitute for the orphan security the family light for which he has been torn. Such mildew milieu is, of course, only two typical English preparatory school -- typical because as long been the deliberate policy of the purposes of such schools to " build character " by forcing the child to forgo, not only the security of an indulgent mama, but also all those features of the home with which she has been associated. Dr. nothing are the matrons and boy schools referred to as " asked ".

These are yet other causes of separation anxiety not the least of these to rise to the propensity which English mother sat for heading over the curator protein to a succession of paint hands, a: baby monitors, sitters and in the old days nannies.

The what is a simple fact that, so far as the lease to Solaris two sources of separation anxiety are concerned, the special risk will be the children -- in the case the boarding schools, the male children -- of opera and upper middle-class parents. The parents whose cinders guns to boarding schools are the parents who have, from Victorian times of total ask war, regarded nannies is an indispensable to the household as we should regard fridge readers today. The simply is not without significant 2004 EDITOR:: calling Dixon stuck or obsessive humor is funny he's equating a cold refrigerator with a demanding to doesn't love

Sometimes of course the nanny, like turtles Mrs. Evers, almost completely fulfilled the role of the mother who it advocated. But another case, like Lord Kerr songs Miss Pam, she would, by deliberate on kindness, exacerbate the effects of the emotional void in the young child's life.

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Even his mildest form, separation anxiety has the effect of withering a person's capacity for a factual behavior. Having dealt with the original loss of the loans subject I " switching off " his feelings, it shall find it hard, press dangerous, the switch them on again. In contemporaries psychological jargon he is the unwitting victim of euros or Sobel dramatic avoidance conditioning excavation marked in the scientific language, he is learn to keep a stiff upper lip, that state official composure which signals to boarding school master this character Billy program is running according to plan

Naturally, the psychology of separation anxiety plays into the hands of those parents, headmasters and subsequent Army commanders who sets door process leadership qualities are still was system and apparently unflinching response to situations which threaten physical and emotional privatization. 2004 EDITOR: America gets its culture from the British what we'll learn from the British the Americas at the secondhand

There are yet other satisfactions for the makers of moral fiber. One is that the product of early separation anxiety, was an incarcerated in an all-male environmental boarding school, would not only discover a lasting satisfaction in the Company of members of his own sacks, pool subordinates heterosexual of live to position commensurate with his job. As focused in remarks from talking of the personal price paid by those emerging from the rigors of Victorian public schools: " they make good leaders to poor lovers. " it is not that such maiden is to you the pleasures of sexual or intercourse, the rather that day separate the emotional aspects of this activity from its more athletic components. It becomes a subsidiary pastime, more agricultural than romantic.

The other bonus for those who operate a shot rearing educational system along Spartan lines is it may result in what are to them three admirable character traits: an obsessiveive ambition, a positive preference or being in a dominant submission relationship, and total obedience.

The gets these claims for the system, however, must be laid three disadvantages. The first is he wrote his self-esteem of those two of separate the promotional rejection in the earliest years: the second that the military, because of its internal structure, provides ample opportunity for promotion to the highest levels of just those people who develop competence of Tory traits for the underlying damage; and the third is that such flexibility of thinking and otherwise creative energy, which might have survived the limitations of

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Boarding school education will all probability BV she buys straitjacket of an early figure -- that of putting off a wrong.

Before leaving this section let us be quite clear about the pieces being advanced spirit is not the middle-class boys who are reared by nannies, an intact off the boarding school in an early age, necessarily suffer from separation anxiety, Digital's ego defamation's which eventually and psychological characteristics the profound significance for military competence. No such generalization is intended. What is being detained is the purely statistical proposition that, all those people who reach positions a high command of the military, a sizable number will belong to that section of the community with an above-average chance of being exposed to the constellation of factors which predisposed toward separation anxiety. 2004 EDITOR: calls eight we are building weak people with plugging them into the military they will rise the top and they will screw up and kill a bunch of our people

Obviously not all boys exposed to these conditions manifest the effect of separation anxiety. There are in the considerable, and large unexplained, individual differences. Those boys who were stricken by early infantile, will be the very ones who tend to be have the resulting psychological infirmary in exacerbated rather been reduced by subsequent school experience. These are the children who, being more inclined homes is such behavioral disorders as weeping, fits temper and interest is, after it will be more likely than their fellows to be the plot of ridiculing criticism. There also the children who, if they're not to go under, will develop defenses and compensations for the damaged ego. To such are ambitious driving in the choice of a career which promise this is certain satisfactions and psychological security. As the latter, it may well seem paradoxical the boy who is suffer the attentions of an authoritarian and nonfiction and affectionate nanny, followed by the even Bleecker embrace of the repressive boarding school, will actually choose to enter upon the cover your this so many respects is an extension of a school life. According to psychoanalytical theory, just curious behavior may be explained as a form of or repetition compulsion ", the unconscious first repeat and thereby resolve the hitherto disastrous situation. And not mutually exclusive what offices is that having learn to adapt to a given situation

Paris -- after it into writers school, the 10% a boys you were an erratic were separated from the remainder of the dormitory on the attic floor. This " leper of treatment can hardly of healthy citizens of rejection which put them there in the first place!

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The discerning individual will tend to choose one sufficiently similar for his particular set of adaptations.

Antimissile poetry visit, because of their concentrate on plot and behavior, authoritarian, hierarchy organizations offer little personal security foreign obsessiveive that associated with many more liberal but more cutthroat civilian enterprises.

Whatever the particular motivations, there is a close parallel between those phenomena and predisposition disposition of long-term, institutionalized prisoners to seek to return to present when the current sentence has been completed. Long enforced dependency, however and pleasant its restrictions may have seen, evokes a chronic fear of freedom. 2004 EDITOR: being in the military today is like being imprisoned because you're surrounded by weak codependents who would be told what to do how to do what to do it by narcissistic egomaniac ass holes

It would be a mistake, however, to assume from all this did the Tory and educational system is unnecessary costs of restricted militarism. From their study of American were colleges for officers, Mass. Land in raid weight conclude that " the tendency to conform to prevailing pattern of stock is manifested in a number of ways. " seven just one of these is the importance of outside speakers whose views might be controversial!

2004 EDITOR: or persecuting military reformers that might shake up the status quo by revealing the truth to paragraph says the principal function of these were colleges is to compare senior officers fire command, they " generally strive to cultivate the greatest possible freedom of thought among their students ". But somehow the underlying dynamics of military organizations frustrate their good intentions. According to the same writers: Post to show" unconscious " reluctance to express views are counter to the existing doctrine. Return positions are put Fort rather cautiously. Quotation mark: if too far out there withdrawn and modified. Quotation mark a 2004 EDITOR: speak out of line your career will be destroyed by the status quo tyrants

And on the subject of military intelligence, they found that Post study of the full relationship of intelligence to security planning is neglected at the were colleges ". Nine as Dr. Harvey Jones, onetime member of the intelligence rents the air Ministry, wrote of British practices, will while intelligence was a great significance of the war he was rarely discussed and understood. " can Mass. Land in red weight data further point that " many officers have frowned upon intelligence is harmful to career to its advancement will. 11 ladies considered that the failure to a utilize or understand military intelligence to Pearl Harbor, before the art incidents of the 1944, or at Arden, cost America some 83,000 casualties, these attitude to seem to suggest that the neglect of information about the enemy is to neither to stupidity nor to a lack of experience. And America has in Britain there's been a tendency to

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I off from the military any real serious attempts to garner intelligence. To avoid contamination of the armed services, the " dirty " task is carried out by some other organization, Waterloo's reputation (fairly or unfairly (has sometimes been compared unfavorably with that all will wrong right of ice rink. It America does other organization the is called the CIA.

Do this chapter, which is attempted to show how the education of use input is now called the " private-sector " tended to reinforce rather than compensate for those fixed features of militarism which make for incompetence, concludes those sections of the book devoted to the social psychology of military organizations. People resist psychological explanations of military disasters they will inclined to the view that they can be more gracefully explained in terms of the culture of the day. Within limits their right. The behavior of incompetent military commanders is partly symptomatic of those Victorian attitude which, disseminate to schools and churches, molded the national character. 2004 EDITOR: a man who follows this theory today is Wong at the Army war College who tries to label the generations that populate the Army by their general mentality labeled as "generation x", "millennial generation", "baby boomers" etc.

These attitude were themselves a reaction to what it come before. What travel bar and Waterloo safely with with his travel bar and Waterloo safely behind us, having become top nation in Congress, trade-in sheer quantity possessions, we could afford the indulgence of turning from greedy entrepreneur all aggression to more soothing task of putting our consciousness is indoor.

Likely ever form, because enormously successful, burglar who so freshly put down his Jimmy to take a brothel ties and on the evils of crime, we took out we took to repeat he does very traits -- push, cleverness, ruthlessness and sheer naked aggression -- that put us

were we were. 2004 EDITOR: human nature human nature put humans in authoritarian organization they're going to sale and we were tracked the attract people who want to live by the sales ideas

But this change to believe that what Barnett has called " all that is noble and good " was actuated by the guilty memory of a violent (and disease riddled (past coupled with the shattering have knowledge of such continuing evils as poverty, slavery, child labor in prostitution. His it gave rise to a reaction formation, a disinfectant add mixture of the mentalism and cleanliness. His sale by soap and timeliness, instincts to come to conservatism, rigidity and moon face complacency -- " the classic attributes of an Army about the suffer a catastrophic defeat". [12]

In a word, but cultural explanation which Barnett's collapse of British power offers for industrial political incompetence is absolutely consistent with some of the reasons given in his book for military incompetence. Where we depart from Barnett ceases is in trying to

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Show how culturally determined reactions to guilt, Sachs, dirt and aggression stem from it worked themselves out in the minds of those for whom honor, Fairplay" love thy neighbor, will have to be reconciled with the task of killing thy neighbor; and how the incapacitated features of militarism our product of this reconciliation.

PART THREE

"*there are no bad regiments, there are only bad officers.*"

--Field Marshal Lord Slim

"*too much of history is still written as though men had no feelings, no childhood, and no bodily senses.* "

-- Peter Lowe and perk

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Chapter 25

Individual differences

For centuries civilization has advanced by the subjugation of instinct. But to do so is had to sanction, encouraging even on occasions, compel the very kinds of behavior which is trying to stamp out.

As Freud wrote many years ago: " the warring state permits itself every mystique, every active ounce, as the disgraced the individual man. Oh want under these conditions " thou shalt not " becomes not only " now shalt ", but " will be tied usually a few dull. "

The unhappy instruments of this policy are, of course, military organizations; they're respected to achieve a microscopic scale what the state does macro -- the management of instinct.

To do so payable to stick to your system. The bottom or business and comes the ultimate deliverers of aggression rest of hardware, by tradition the lowest paid inappropriately lease cultivate cultured members -- the common Soldiery. Not for nothing they were called " brutal and lie said she is pool. Traditionally again, this part of the organization was not required to think, feel or be unduly weighed down by conscience -- " fears but to do or die cool. The fact they often died if the kid was compensated for by the knowledge that they would surely die if they did not. Coppedge win a high probability and a certainty, they chose the former.

* The management of this potentially aggressive forces traditionally been vested in a "superior cast" of man; the officers.

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* research recently search amongst American Soldiers in Vietnam shows that new arrivals to this theater believed that they might as well fight because they will be shot by their own side of the dull.

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Not very surprisingly, in groups as individuals individuals to control of the estate may well produced internal stresses and strengths which in turn give rise to symptoms. The cases of armies and babies, the symptoms constitute the causes of military incompetence. 2004 EDITOR: is the only way corrupt societies can order made to kill other man is too inhabit the ranks of the armies and babies with weak people insecure about the penis size you can manipulate to kill other man? No! Look at the adult IDF!

In developing this thesis, emphasis was laid upon those devices were by theories of steel, aggression U-boat in disorder prevented. Military organizations were depicted as sometimes compress and inflexible machines for the harnessing a direction of interest be seesaw still the beneath whose often brightly decorated exterior a psychological process of " below, authoritarianism, codes of honor, anti-intellectual is a, a fantasy, sensitivity to criticism and fear of failure of contribute to incompetence, both directly and indirectly.

These processes make for incompetence because, says her primary object is controlled restraint, they themselves tend to become inflexible and unmodifiable. They resist change, block progress and afterthought. Just as once useful but now irregular irrelevant drills rob over behavior of any birth or spontaneity, so aged rules and regulations, precious formulae and prescribed attitudes become an easy substitute for easy sever British and. 2004 EDITOR: weak people in charge of the current military want canned solutions to everything because they cannot empower people to think and use initiative because they're afraid of the power of their own people will expose their weaknesses; and of course of their own weak instincts

But almost brings up another matter which may have troubled the careful reader: namely the pair contradiction that, so far as this country is concerned, military incompetence in battle appears unrelated to ultimate success in war. If, for example we Miss Manners economy and campaign, bubble the Boer war, produced glaring examples of crap stupidity in the first world war, and were nearly annihilate through archaic military practices in the first two years of the second world war, how is it eventually one these complex, as our particular brand of military incompetence long-term advantages: is not linked through, perhaps the best way to win in the end? 2004 EDITOR::: the several million dead would have us different opinion about this as would those were horribly maimed true leadership would not tolerate this it would forge true military excellence

This is a fair question to which there is no simple answer. The fact we want may well be ascribed to very factors, relatively unrelated to military prowess. (on occasions one of these has been our allies. (and might equally well be ascribed to the special for two, occurred, tenacity, humor is superior fighting qualities of the British Soldier, who despite -- perhaps in some strange ways because of -- the generals who led him when on mud linked through after the rest of stock. 2004 EDITOR: don't count on it in 21st-century with the enemy capable of wiping out cities with a single device the days it was not linked through with a lot of core or a hot large quantities of incompetent landings is over its it frees people and free societies are to survive we better get her head out of her ass and develop an excellent military composed of adults who think who value reality who value of the human beings and it can do it easily done

Then again, it could be ascribed with even greater certainty, as in the case the Crimean war, to the even grosser incompetence of the

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Other side. These to ask the nations of the admirably expressed by JB priestly when writing of the latter campaign:

To to to think save this small, odd, rather absurd British Army, challenging so far from home a gigantic empire, from immediate defeat and total disaster. First, the Russians, with morbidity field, in immense perpetual reserves, were even bigger modelers than their invaders, it seemed to movement of daydream of battle. Secondly, and not for the first or last time, the British oat almost everything to encourage, often see and superb discipline of the regular infantrymen. To

Whatever the reasons, one important factor is that of individual differences between in the military commanders. Certainly every war we have want, but could carry the bad.

2004 EDITOR: what happens if there are any more courageous heroics military man who are competent around to save the day?

Part three this book looks at this question and examines the thesis did good generals differ from bad not in their age, color or intelligence, but in the degree to which they are able to resist a psychopathology of the organization to which they serve. Conversely less than adequate commanders will be those whose mines most closely fit that of the parent organization. For one approximation to this concept of the " military might", there is the C.S. Forrester's fictitious general cruise on three -- cold, strict, unimaginative, humorless, honorable, brave, stubborn, meticulous, Spartan, stole a, loyal, obedient and patriotic. Forrester's share a was also ambitious, arrogant, inpatient, insecure comets as it to criticism, Dole, but intellectual, unscientific, conservative and a moral coward.

This into traits accords with S/P Huntington's finding that discussions of the military might have usually emphasized as low caliber and a tactical intelligence, scope and imagination of the professional Soldier [compare [unfavorably to the intelligence, scope and imagination of the lawyer, the businessman and politician. Grow the same writer applies that " this presumed inferiority is been variously attributed to the inherently inferior talents of the persons who become officers, the organization of the military profession which discourages intellectual initiative, and infrequent opportunities which an officer has to apply actively his skill. " for the same token, there appears to be a consensus of agreement among both military and civilian writers that the military mind is rigid, logical, inflexible, unemotional, disciplined and devoid of intuition.

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but has all of this psychological scratch it but has all this psychological validity, and what is its relevance to military incompetence question are to these traits really distinguish between good and that commanders, and what are their origins in the human psyche? By way of entry these questions last part of this book examines some test cases; first of the concept of authoritarianism and then the particular commanders -- good and bad.

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Chapter 26

Extremes of authoritarianism

"If societies in danger, it is not because a man's aggressiveness but because of the repression of personal aggressiveness in individuals. "

D. W.

When he got to paragraph when considering the validity of a complex theory is often helpful to examine extreme manifestations of the phenomena which the theory is trying to explain. In the case of authoritarianism this is been done in several independent investigations. Two will be considered here. The first involves a series of interviews of packs SS concentration camp guards and other war criminals indicted for mass murder, one and a second, perhaps most revealing of the mall, and analysis of the entries in the diary By the prototypical authoritarian turns now it -- what your Heinrich Himmler. [2]

Himmler

In focusing on such people we are not suggesting that their light are to be found amongst British military commanders. Just as an understanding of mild depression might benefit from a study of suicide, so insight into the nature of " normal " of authoritarianism is deepened by contemplation of its most pathological manifestation. This instance the results from which such as studies support the view **that authoritarian traits are the product of an underlying weakness of the ego.** Thus, from the first study it seems at the SS guards of the Third Reich or not, as partly suppose, ideological fanatics, but in the adequate " Little me" by Linda satisfactions provided by the SS organization were tailormade -- all-powerful father figures, rigid rules of loyalty and obedience," legitimate outlets for their hitherto pen up and murderous hostility

The evidence suggests these men had been a mostly deprived of subject to repressive discipline and accounted. Bowing to that

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use of total obedience, a sexual Britishness and manly decency, they had come to despise those of tenderness, love insensitivity.

The price paid for their love lists unrestricted childhood was insecure and weakened still, the air in dislike of capacity, and a crawling dependence upon the ordering in regulation of their lives by powerful authority.

One underlying problem of such personalities is that they are forced to announce, then details, that very part of themselves most indeed,. As little more, it was much better to be filed as a hardened Nazi and portal were the necessity.

2004 EDITOR: vanity---stop worrying about what other people think and do what is important to honor God and man!.

It work, they were like people who, when they are dying of starvation, come to despise evidence of hunger, porch do otherwise would be to omit (to themselves (to the poor low part were no perilousness of their plight. It was this seemingly impossible state affairs which found resolution by the process of paranoid projection. They hated in others what they could not tolerate in themselves. Hence it was the weak, bold, the underprivileged, but now, and later starving millions of the concentration camps suffered their fearful attentions.

The same token, it was not entirely a contrast was aging, your entirely they're needed justification, which led them to cover that their helpless victims were dangerous enemies, Jewish terrorists, eccentric, who had to be eliminated. For a sense they were they were enemies, not the state, but of their old precariously poised egos.

That most what is excepted the nature of the stunted personalities, other features of their behavior fall the place -- the unquestioning adulation of their superiors, he enthusiasm shown for the enemy on uniform, all-male Society of their fellow guards, and a sexual Britishness is which could coexist alongside the most brutal and obscene of sexual crimes against the bodies of their victims. Significant in view of the relationship between anal character traits in authoritarianism was response of some of these men to the extramarital activities other prisoners. Thus there was the SS argued and sick pay attendant of whom it was written: Hope some of the GM's atrocities, verified in the court, were such that I hesitate to record them here. Essentially they showed that his greatest event went to persons who suffer from diarrhea and were in continent. Her. C* oil was his treatment for all abdominal conditions. You again for bid is Paris to go to the toilet patients to go toward, but be kill the most a soil themselves. Three it needs no great stretch of the imagination to appreciate how the sight of his helpless victims must

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Arouse some deep-seated memory of his own early quilt socialization " at the hands of over demanding parents.

The relationship between eagles anal status of an early toilet training has been well stated by Henry V. Dix:

Withholding as Dole as an act of the clients are passive resistance is a well-known nursery manifestation. Record but also, to be dirty and equally uncontrolled is both disgraceful and week: and it can become a " explosive act of hate, the finance a rejection and earliest war against authority protector malpractice patients who are frustrated in a rage of me are with outside persons have developed a media diarrhea or vomiting or both. So far then GM's hate laden interval world can be seen to contain this primitive theme. [4]

The frequent employment by the SS" indeed, other military organizations of such euphemisms as disinfectant, ", " cleansing will" mopping up hope to describe their work is not without significance in the context of the anal origins organized aggression. The use of such phrases contrived cloak even the most flagrant act murderous distraction with the mantle of clinical necessity. 2004 EDITOR::: there also equating humans with feces and humanizing them and in looking upon them as scrap which is immoral

So much for the lassez-faire hierarchy in the SS hierarchy. And a further doubts as to the concept of authoritarianism tend to dissipate when we contemplate their leader, Heinrich similar. So well does this will primitive paste the face ask chicken farmer will exemplify the general theory of authoritarianism that is worth spelling out the details. 2004 EDITOR: the chicken is a very dirty animal so if Hitler was a control freak of chickens I could see the connection

The theory supposes that authoritarian personalities are the product of status pages and repressive parents. Hitler's father, a small-town petty dog" terrible small " (by its pattern. The ferry maintains a fear of parental retribution for any display of sacs are aggression these were mass of blocking of those device those drives and are intended emotions. Hitler's diarrhea, unlike that of most a normal adolescents, is emotionally flattened, cold and colorless.

The ferry contends that authoritarian shell to sustain this suppression of their motions are refusal to look inwards. The entries in Hitler's diarrhea or confined to the most mundane details of his daily life, and lack any statement as to how we felt, or thought, about even those trivial issues. His writing is bearing of emotion: devoid of rage or love, or any searching of the soul.

According to the ferry, and individuals fear of his own sexuality

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Lisa projection. He'd used to others what he cannot tolerate himself and then, with smug self-righteousness, condemns them. Though appropriate which Hitler's he'd Hitler heaps on homosexuals another sexual deviance is little doubt as to the nature of its origin in his own their Range sexuality

Hitler's tarry also gives evidence of another classic means for preventing the breakthrough of accidental impulses -- a compulsive preoccupation with time. As a following excerpt shows, it reads like a railway timetable is life seems to been regulated by the clock, leaving no unfilled moments for dangerous spontaneity of action.

8 o' clock got out. Grandparents. Newspaper

9 o' clock to Horwitz

1145 eight at Horwitz

1220 hrs to meet father at the train station, but only get there at 1230.dot dot joint father in a parlor car in dark out. Three clock arrived in eagles start

For clock into the Center City, mother and Gerard meet us. Drink coffee. Six to paragraph

2004 EDITOR: people that call their dad "father" in their mom "mother" are cold, different and lack love and emotion

As Lowenberg points out, this successive programming of the days events is one more example the relationship between authoritarianism as so-called anal traits, for could well be the strict toilet training with bowel activity restricted to particular time of day forces the job to are not only rigid sense of timing also the tendency to equate worthiness with temp oral regularity.

Is adjusted to the enforced control which is necessary to consequence of strict well-trained they give rise, the one hand, to the lasting trade a stinginess and any other to greatest dishes and towards psychosomatic disorders of the gastrointestinal tract. He was showed both of these effects. Early daily each daily entry in his diary concluded with a careful ledger of the days expenses, and all his life he was played with disorders of the bowel.

It will be recalled anxiety over status plays a significant role in authoritarianism. Once again the right furor was true to form. Like his father, he was a terrible small, so possessor status imposition that everyone referred to it in his diary is meticulous the prefix by its correct right tile.

In accordance with the theory, Himmler's diary contained striking

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Evidence of strong " reaction formations " Pratt disease i.e. unconsciously determined counter Tendancy's (against his suppressed hostility. He describes himself as moved to tears beside a young girl coming into conflict with " prime yielding an stiffnecked father ", and is similarly stricken on another occasion by up were old woman's poverty and hunger. Any doubts one might have as to the real reason for the sentiments tend to weighing what is remembered what to say individual did individual did do some millions of young girls of battle elderly women 2004 EDITOR: why can't he have any compassion to these people and not to the Jewish people the same situation?

And so does. There is hardly a feature of the American theory which is not exemplified by Hitler. In some respects, of course, in the extent of his anti-Semitism and cold hostility, he is a grotesque character of the authoritarian personality which they describe.

Get other aspects he'll strict appointment elsewhere proxy speech to 78 (, the little weight which or authoritarian personalities are drawn towards ideologies, organizations and relationships which promised to fulfill their erotic needs. For Hitler there were three such: a rigid self-control, the denial is underlying proximity, and the need to quell doubts about his masculinity -- and anxiety clearly expressed in the equation which he made between weakness in a fantasy.

Under the circumstances it is hardly surprising that he prospered in the tough, aggressively masculine world of the SS. As uniform police chief, with power of life-and-death over millions but always under the shadow Hitler: in an organization rigidly controlled by schools and regulations: working in the hierarchical and bureaucratic world of military administration with its schedules, registers and DOS these -- every facet of this demand damage personality found expression and reward. 2004 EDITOR::: a week I quest be told what to do what to do and how do it once put in charge he asked like it at egomaniac tyrant

For such a man, Nazi ideology acted like a magnet. " for Hitler masculine identity meant fighting, wearing uniform and being in the military character to the force quality of his values of strenuousness, hardness and impulsive over activity indicate that their underlying purpose was to were off feelings of passive it eat, weakness and Don been. Seven " is also likely, as Dick's has pointed out, that the cult of " manliness " which the mother fostered in the SS oh to one hand quite a lot to his own physical imperfections, the weak jazz, narrow shoulders, fatty contours and my open eyes: and any other, something to his thinly veiled whole mower erotic tendencies. This cult, are grotesque character of true manliness, was not distilled similar informant origin to " muscular Christianity ", which we considered in an earlier chapter. Both were the

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Product of the authoritarian eat those of both served to gratify homosexual inclinations in the name a central higher " ideology. It is perhaps worth noting that both lease calls, one so malignant, the other relatively benign, exemplified extreme versions of the ubiquitous phenomena of male bonding. According to Lionel Tiger, the tendency for men (as opposed to will women, (to form close-knit all-male groups, whether the state to form of men's clubs, lodges military masses or such largely predominately male institutions as the stock exchange, has its origin in one very clearly undisputed both talent of the male: his superiority is hunger. Eight under the circumstances, it is perhaps hardly surprising that the colt a manliness and hunting a human Corey (were equate " killing on the stock market (should be so closely intertwined

What the least attractive characteristics of authoritarian sister preoccupation of punishment, and any capacity to feel concerned for the human rights of persecutor minorities. In Hitler these traits were well developed. His lifelong interest in torture chambers and similar corrections went along with a sadistic status and towards his fellow men that will is never been surpassed. For him, the colt a manliness cheerfully condone, indeed encourage, the utmost brutality attachment, but certainly when this, like the notorious host by treatment, involved destruction of the human body via its gastrointestinal tract. But even here, in this monstrous dealings, the other side of the authoritarian personality, its restrictive as `, was clearly evident. The osseous extermination the Jews at first to be " legalize ", by the simple expedient of changing a lot regarding Jewish right spirit that this force the goal maneuver was something more been superficial soft to public opinion was evident from his personal reaction when actually witnessing the less pleasant antics of his followers. To adapted initiating mass murder, the site of people actually being shot or club to death was more than he could bear, personally because to close they confrontation with the Colfacts " was to close a confrontation with his own repressed psychopathology. 2004 EDITOR::: he could stand his ownership when he saw

All in all, the history of humor, like that of many of his contemporaries in Nazi Germany Germany, is not lay a cautionary tale for all so-called civilization which aimed to achieve their hands by a mixture of punitive morality, militarism and repressive controlled or citizens in the earliest years, but is a compelling of unpleasant illustration for the concept and theory of authoritarianism. Such evidence, more over,

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Russia's light on to other sorts of military incompetence: that which results from the over controlled aggression, and that which it arises from delusional thinking.

When discussing the World Trade Organization is the point was main that one of the greatest problems facing such groups was not so much display as the control of aggression. Sister stock in trade his violence, their task, from a decision-making point of view, becomes one of deciding when and where and how much to release. Have also to a rack elaborate safeguards against recoil their own destructive tent distracted tangential upon the cells and innocent by Canada's bystanders. This, it will be recalled, is one of the purposes of militarism.

Now what is true the group is also true the individual. We all have the problem of exercising appropriate control over aggressive impulses. Main difference between the group and individual is in the latter's case the controls are largely internalized. All this is fairly self-evident, consider now the plight of an authoritarian. First art he is fond of aggression is likely to be greater than most, is defenses against over hostility are like an army which, though it is been grossly provoke, and possesses an immense capacity retaliation, has never less nevertheless been given the order will hold your fire. He is subject to extreme internal tension, poison easily between forcing counterforce. It is in this state of unstable equilibrium that some authoritarian spear between the violent hostility and rigid over control in their certainly did so. 2004 EDITOR: these are hotheads in the military now they cannot tolerate anybody who gives them unpleasant troops just like Jack Nicholson character said in the movie a few good men; "you can handle the truth!"

Obviously such instability is hardly conducive to rational leadership. Affected by an unconscious conflict proxy between the urge to express hostility and the fear of doing so premises, the decisions which authoritarians make will be influenced less by cool considerations than by moment to moment fluctuations of impulse over control.

Incidentally, is Brown's worth noting that analogous state of affairs may operate in connection with the other great drive the causes trouble to authoritarians -- Sex. No better examples of Fort and that of the missionary in Somerset moms rain. One moment he is the rigid over control him. And condemning Sadie Thompson to eternal damnation, the next season that over, and the next he is cutting her he is cutting his throat. Some would say a symbolic c*tion.

In practice, military incompetence as more often resulted from over control then from its converse. Hence the observation: " in the

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Army of political democracy the most peaceful men are the genitals. Or as Brigadier Bidwell remorse in his book on modern warfare: vote no general ever won a war whose conscious troubled him or who do not watch " to be is enemy too much". [9]

Clearly we are dealing with us confluence of three factors, cash age, conscious and conscience and aggression. Since with them each a man's hormonal balance may change, producing unwanted and such external signs as obesity and the other a decline in the central sexual and aggressive tendencies, restricting effects of conscience will be more apparent. One aspect of the seesaw relationship has been well stated by Janowitz. The entire process of training in career Dolan takes place up makes places a premium on the ability to curb, or at least repressed, the direct exercise of aggression. The coal a manliness atop this associate with junior officers is often a reaction against profound feelings of weakness. Such aggressive pressure can diminish [italics mine " that: as jobs are developed actual competence, and Nancy advances in rank and organizational authority. [10]

Take the case a Redvers Buller. As it shall he was renowned for the extreme violence of his temper but later as an adult, "what struck me most of blower was... The perfect control he had over his temper, so indeed still great indeed I wondered if he had temper are not." [11]

It seems that, presumably block but a gentleman injunctions of his anxious mother, the lawyer's natural aggression had to be rerouted, four, as a young man in junior officer, he became none for the brave in violent way he said about those various dark skinned races wound without distinction E. label " savages. But even when than the underlying conflict showed" his motherly forgiveness was sought. As John Walters has remarked: " letters that red for Rivers wrote to his wife reveal the for him, fighting brought relief to a terrible loss for which he candidly confess Shane [italics mine [. Like a virgin youth blurred into a profitable, he suffered agonizing remorse after shooting killing had apparently given him a formal orgasm, the emotional or physical [12]

But when, years later, he was sent to command the British Army in his campaign against the blowers all but this was change. His old loss for killing mysteriously evaporated. Gone now is the grass was his aggressive leadership. The erstwhile " veritable God of battle ", so to use wool's description, dropped into the role of an overcautious in vast leading

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Old woman, as harmless to the enemy as he was embarrassing to his own side. Age in the mother had claimed in many and!

This pattern of psychological processes no indictment of Buller. Its best and worst aspect may be found, respectively, in the nicest a nasty as the people. Compare the kindly calm, lovable Retzer red first, whose personalities, so valuable in the sphere of administration or form, served in so badly in the role of commander-in-chief, with that of partial authoritarian camera. Both had a lust for killing and resources of murderous hostility when set against " inferior peoples. Both had a great capacity for efficient Minister administration. Both showed signs as sexual inhibition. Both were prone to fits of compassion and obsessiveively overprotective feelings toward certain other people. In humans can still use these apparent we tender feelings extended to young girls of old woman. The objects of blower solicitude were his mother and the troops serving under him. Both manifested a compulsive desire for status and social approval. (in this connection, is been suggested that bullers ardent dislike of General Gordon after it was apparently inspired by his jealousy of Gordon's ever greater popularity with the British public. [13] to bear up (and both in time distressed use food and drink as an ode dying for anxiety. This regressive habit took the form of a penchant for green cakes in the case of him or, while bull or consume such gigantic meals of rich fare washed down by quantities of be of political to the wagon train of food in Champagne which followed him on active service became a by word in the Army.

Finally, both these men displayed delusional, unrealistic thinking when things went wrong. In Hitler's case this was precipitated by Hitler's demise and employers by his appointment as senior commander in South Africa. The common denominator of these precipitous is that in both cases these minute suddenly found themselves bereft of that one is essential for authoritarians peace of mind, -- someone higher opt, and all powerful " parent figure. "

All in all, the symptom of over control in an authoritarian person may be likened to what happens one nervous learning driver in a powerful forest suddenly deserted by his instructor. He slams on the brakes exhibition Mark

After when the idea rescuing Gordon, besieged in Khartoum, was first Moody, bullers, was: " Batman isn't worth the camels. "

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Chapter 27

The worst in the best

" in old or from which so much human air had been eliminated by technological masses alone, human air was still the principal factor in determining the worst outcome. "

John straw suit, Hitler as military commander

We have considered the various examples of military competence, the nature of military organizations, and the psychopathology of those who are attracted to, prosper in an ultimately disgraced military organizations, when not consider some test cases. If our views are contra correct, they then specific instances of the competence and the possession of authoritarian trade should be related. The lease competence should have a personality which manifests profound disturbance of the ego, rigidity, dogmatism and fear of failure motivation. Conversely the striking characteristics of highly competent commander should be their absence of authoritarian psychopathology, in oversell confidence in general bosses of the ego.

A half and the first group there's no better example that Adolf Hitler. On the grounds that, under his direction is commander-in-chief, Germany suffered the most devastating defeats of all time, we should be justified in assuming that, though some respects a brilliant tactician and political strategist, in the Oslo been on occasions grossly incompetent. The daily looking more closely at this his record, it becomes clear that he was, and that forms the forms of military competence for precisely those predicted by the theory. What is same token his psychology as studied by William Langer present some were applying a mall them of those factors operating in less infamous military competence who were considered earlier.

Incompetent commanders, is been suggested, are often those two

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Were attracted to military because it promised gratification of certain a rot needs. These include a reduction of anxiety regarding real or imagined loss of Trilogy/potency/masculinity; defenses against anal tendencies; boost for sagging self-esteem; the discovering of loving mother figures and strong father figures; power, dominance and public acclaim; the finding a relatively powerless out groups on to whom the individual can project those aspects of them self which he finds distasteful; and legitimate out was four, and at drink control all his own aggression.

By these lights life in the Army and the subsequent plea the role of commanding the most authoritarian military organization this world is ever known muscle drawn Hitler like a magnet. According to minors researchers, Lon Hitler's and the rot needs can be attributed to a confrontation of factors which included an inadequate father whose unstable personality oscillate between that of a pompous, pretentious small-town official and (went on Tommy (that of a drunken bully; and anal obsessive and overindulgence mother; the birth of a younger brother; and watching his parents copulate. This latter experience the size intensifying hatred of his father, let Hitler disgusted at his mother's disloyalty to them self, and mortified by his role of impotent bystander.

As of all this were not enough, Hitler's discover that he was monarch known or kick ass trick seems to confirm his feelings of inadequacy. According to G. Elway, Hitler showed all the characteristics usually associated with this condition: " in patients and hyperactivity, suddenly development of learning difficulties and lack of concentration, distinct feelings of social inadequacy; chronic indecision; tendency to exaggerate, to lie into fantasize, identification of the mother as the person responsible for the defect... Concern about bowel training and c*tion fantasies. -- " to such people or defensively criticize, believe they are post special people with an unusual mission to perform well, and are given to fantasies a revenge and mental maniac daydreams. In his early years as a postcard pair and later in his preoccupation with the plans for grandiose buildings, Hitler showed another documented symptom of the monarch at -- " a passion for creativity, redesigning and reconstruction.

With his with his psychological background is hardly surprising that the

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* according to the historian R. L. weight ", the lack of one testicle was confirmed by an autopsy on Hitler's body which Russian doctors carried out in May 1945.

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Opportunity for military service was enormously attractive. But Hitler wrote " to myself those hours came like a redemption from the vexatious experiences of my youth."

The Army provide him with the strong, masculine father figures which he craved. He reacted to them with typical authoritarian submissiveness,. As Langer Notes " the one thing that all his comrades, it commenced on was a subservient to superior officers."

... During his career in Army we haven't asked what example of Hitler's willingness to submit to the leadership and strong males were willing to got human protective. Throughout his Army life there is not a shred of evidence to show it Hitler was anything but the model Soldier is for submit the submissiveness and obedience are concerned. The psychological point you life in Army was a kind of substitute for the whole life he'd always wanted that could never find. Three ([italics mine [

2004 EDITOR: this is exactly the shameful situation which people from broken homes are attracted to the All Volunteer Force (AVF)

Sound familiar? "Until 1916, the British Army was an all-volunteer organization"

www.strategypage.com/articles/default.asp?target=BritVictArmy/BritishArmy1.htm

The British Victorian Army in 1854

By David Hood

The British Army during the Victorian era was caught in a time warp. As was usual for the British, the army was always ready to fight the last war, and until the 19th century this was a reasonable attitude. The Army was almost exactly the same at the beginning of the Crimean War as it was after Waterloo in 1815. But during the Crimean War, a new class of officers would emerge and herald the start of a new era in the British Army. Men like Garnet, Redvers Buller and Evelyn Wood would breathe fresh life into the staid British Army. But in 1854, one of the problems in the British Army was the men who would lead it into the Crimean war were also the men who had led it at Waterloo over 40 years before. They felt that if it was good enough to defeat Napoleon then it was good enough for the Russians now.

Until 1916, the British Army was an all-volunteer organization, and the dregs of society were the ones who joined. The pay rate of a private was one shilling a day, out of which the uniform and food costs were deducted. By comparison, the rate for a bricklayer was almost four shillings a day. Also, the term of service was 21 years or until invalidated out. Many did not live this long because service was often in very unhealthy climes overseas. Conditions were harsh, and a painful flogging was often the punishment for the most trivial infractions. At home, if you were mistreated on your job, you could quit, but in the army, quitting was punishable by death for desertion. The food was even worse. In the mid-1830s the daily diet was three-quarters of a pound of beef and one and a half pounds of bread. The meat was weighed with the bone in, so if you got a piece that was all bone, it was just bad luck, It wasn't until the reforms undertaken after 1854 that the meat was weighed with the bone out. As a result the men in the army were of the lowest sort, those escaping poverty, criminals, tramps, and fools. As Wellington noted: "What is the consequence? That none but the worst description of men enter the regular service. You can hardly conceive such a set brought together."

Due to the small size of Britain's population in comparison to the rest of the continent, the manpower shortages of the army were a constant problem. The losses from combat and disease further hampered the recruitment of new men. Recruiting officers had to use their imagination to get the lads to volunteer. One of the recruitment incentives was that a man was excused of all debts up to 30 pounds upon joining the service. Thus many a bodebtors prison was emptied upon the threat of war, or to replace heavy losses. Another way was to take ever-increasingly-younger recruits. Several of the handbooks of regiments allowed that they could take boys of sixteen as long as they appeared older. There are many cases of boys being taken at thirteen and younger due to their size. During most of the 18th century the forced enlistment of vagrants was also used to swell the ranks of the army. And in the early years there were still "crimpers', men who made a living stealing men and selling them to the recruiting officers. In 1797 thousands of orphan boys were inducted into the army and placed in experimental units to teach them their future duty.

One of the other traditions of the British Army that helped with recruiting was the regimental system. Each regiment was assigned to a county or area and had their base there. This was done to attract the local men to join that regiment out of loyalty to their locality. This also led to the easing of fears of leaving home as the men could join the local regiment with others they knew and thus not be completely out of touch with home when they were shipped off for long periods of time. This became one of the unique features of the British Army.

On the down side, the British army was not a unified army in the sense of divisions and corps sized units. It was made up of separate regimentsthat were assembled together into divisions based on the need of the time. But the independence of regiments also had the effect of increasing the loyalty of the men in a regiment. They based their loyalty on the regiment and not on the army. The regiment was their life and not the army. Thus, being kept in their local units throughout their service, they developed an undying loyalty to that regiment. Often, sons followed their fathers into the same regiment, making the recruitment easier. Sons grew up with a military life and thus the training was often easier for them and they understood the need for the discipline.

Being sexy in 1884 and 2004: same mentality; different empire!

There were also two other items that helped with recruiting, but sometimes caused as many problems as it solved; uniforms and weapons. The uniform was a powerful draw in the recruiting of young men. It was common for boys being drawn to the army after seeing a regiment march down the street resplendent in their flashy uniforms. The uniforms were also attractive to the young girls. Many novels of the time have images of the young ladies swooning over a man in uniform. Often a young man went home in his uniform after joining to impress his family, and the ladies, and to show that he did amount to something. Recruiting posters also mentioned the "highly attractive clothing and accoutrements" that could be had by joining.

Drill was another item that the army inflicted upon the Soldier in great and intense measure. Drill was often done three to four times a day, especially during the first couple of months of the Soldiers training. This was often accompanied by to music. When on parade, the Soldiers' movements were perfectly coordinated to the others and to his dress. This was repeated over and over again until the Soldiers, upon hearing drill music, instantly changed their bearing, even off the parade ground, The drill and uniformity were carried down to the smallest detail. The feeling was that if the drill and uniform were taken seriously then men would not get into trouble when off duty. Also, the Soldier had to spend so much of his time keeping his uniform perfectly turned out that he would not have time for drink and brawling. It didn't always work out that way.

The attention to the details of the uniforms and the constant drill were required to mold the men into the fighting machine that was disciplined amidst the chaos of combat. The idea was to make the Soldiers obey, instinctively, each and every command. In the confusion and fear of the battlefield, it was essential that Soldier instantly obey orders. It could mean the difference between winning and losing a battle. Thus, the Soldiers were drilled and dressed for the effect that it had on them. The message was basic to the Victorian army: that systematic uniformity and implicit obedience were essential. This was so effective that the Soldier was unable to maintain a unSoldierly appearance even when out of uniform. Walking down the streets in England old Soldiers could always he spotted, as they would still walk with a military bearing.

No discussion of the British Army would be complete without mentioning the British East India Company; the John Company, for short. A Royal Charter incorporated the Company on December 31, 1600. In 1610 the Company started to set up trading posts in India. But it was Charles II who gave the Company the power it would wield for the next 300 years. He allowed the John Company to acquire territory, build forts, raise armies, make war, coin its own money and set up its own laws and courts. By the end of the 19th century fully half of British military strength was found in the John Company army. Most of the Company regiments were native units with British officers, but some were mercenary units from Europe. The Company would also hire regular army units for duty in India. These units would serve in India for twenty years or more and often he used in conjunction with the Company and native units. Officers in the "Queen's" regiments looked down on the "Indian Officers" who were regarded as little more than mercenaries.

The other element that made the British Army what it was, was the officer corps. These were mostly drawn from the upper classes in British society. This was for several reason: one was that the British felt that the nobility was born to lead, and the other was that the lower classes could often not afford to maintain the lifestyle required of an officer. The uniform, the mess and other costs often required more cash than some members made in a year. The British officer was often in debt, especially to his tailors. The officers were required to pay for the food and wine that was consumed in the officers' mess and often they had to provide certain comforts to their regiments. Many officers were appalled at what their men were forced to eat and wear and supplemented these out of their own pockets. The British felt that the world was in need of British customs and leadership. They felt that everyone wanted and needed British guidance and, as such, the nobility was not only the ones going to give it to them but also to lead the regiments into battle to bring the English way of life to the rest of the world.

The entry of Great Britain into the Crimean War brought to the forefront a new class of British officers, The army was still being run by men who had fought in the Napoleonic wars of 1790-1815. The army had not made much progress in the intervening years. The thought was that if it had been good enough then it was good enough now. War, though, had changed a lot in the 40 years since Waterloo. The guns had gotten better and so had staff work on the continent. The British Army still felt that the bravery of an officer was the determining factor in whether a battle was won or lost. In an unconscious way, the high causality rates of the officer corps were seen as an indicator of how good the officers were. All this was about to change, a new group of officers was coming on the scene. The bravery factor would still he there, but careful planning would begin to replace sheer courage.

This, then, was the army that entered the Crimean War in 1854. As usual, the army was set to fight the last war. Nut this was a different kind of warfare. Even though the British Army had been fighting continuously since the beginning of Victoria's reign, they had not fought a European-style war since 1815. Even though their junior officer corps were experienced fighters and used to commanding men, they would not be allowed to join the expedition to the Crimea. This was because the commander of the army going to the Crimea was Lord Raglan, and he had an undying hatred for "Indian Officers." That they were the most experienced men in the British Army had no effect on him and he would not have any use for them. This would come back to haunt him throughout the campaign.

The dismal failure of the old generation of officers in the Crimea led to a new generation of officers gaining prominence for the rest of the 19th century. Even though the British would make many more mistakes in the coming years and wars, they never again fought a war based on the last one. The new officers brought new reforms into the army and began to turn it into the fighting force that would take the field in World War I, a much different force than had fought at Waterloo. With the death of Victoria in 1901 there ended an era in the British Army that was both glorious and sad. It brought many great men to the forefront but also cost a lot of young men their lives fighting in places that most of the public had never heard of. But through all the trials, the British public was proud of its army and the men who both commanded it and fought in it. It was the height of British strength and pride. Never again would Britain rule the waves and soon after the sun would set on the Empire.

It also equipped them were strong defenses against his underlying a melody. He welcomed " poll " it is so doing was transformed.

2004 EDITOR: good grief!

It is pure tribute interesting to note considerable change in his parents. The dirty, greasy, cast off close of Jews and other charitable people he was now privilege to wear uniform. Men, one of his comrades, tells us that when Hitler came out of the trenches and back from an assignment is made hours cleaning his uniform and boots until he became the joke of the regiment. Quite a remarkable change for one who almost seven years refused the Eastern them self just a little in order to pull itself out of the pitiful conditions in which he lived among the drags a society. [4]

Go relatively undistinguished as a Soldier in the first world war, Hitler's underlying authoritarianism was well satisfied by this new social environment in which he found so. While subservient immigration into those above them, he, like the cadet under officers of whom Simon Raven writes (page 224 (, was not averse to informing on those below him. 2004 EDITOR::: sign of about the dehumanization is when you turn on your own people and humanize them

One Hitler illustrates less pleasant aspects of authoritarianism, Hitler provides clear his illustration of the relationship between authoritarian psychopathology and military incompetence.

Wherever LC may have been (he Langer describes him as an erotic

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Cycle (, Hitler was nothing if not authoritarian period of the defining traits described by a door known as college colleagues, he possesses five in an extreme form and a remainder to an extent far takes guests obsessive of that enjoyed by the average normal person. After a center, violently anti-Semitic, obsessed with notions of power and dominance, demanding of complete acquiescence in submission by those under him while contemptuous of, and on occasions in orderly hostile towards, out groups, Hitler was also superstitious (i.e. he believed in mystical determined seven individuals they (, anti-intercepted (i.e., opposed to the imaginative and tender minded (, and destructive, cynical and without compassion for human suffering. By the same token he was a master a projection, computing to others the aggressive intentions which in rally were his own, and sexually inadequate.

Hitler also had, in full measure, those other traits which tend the gallant of authoritarianism. Rarely was zero mine so "" and rarely a personality so clearly marked by impulses of anal obsessive time to as the latter, Hitler was caused the beyond the leave and it's a particular sexual perversion so ass trick showed the mixture of intense anal interests and robbing submission which be token some more than usually disturbed anal erotic.

In the matter of achievement motivation Hitler manifested a profound fear of failure and the various traits normally associated with the state of mind. In the light of his personality and underlying psychopathology Hitler's brand particular brand of military incompetence is precisely what one would expect:

1. He showed a total when concern for the physical and psychological welfare of the men in his armies. As General Ziegler, chief of the General staff, wrote after Stalingrad: " pulses report effected him not all. The figures the dead and wounded... Let them totally unmoved. Even dramatic descriptions by eyewitnesses of the hell that was raging near Stalingrad, it was becoming more atrocious everyday, left and quite poll. " [5]

2. This imperviousness to human suffering which resulted in such enormous waste of his own forces was a contemporary factory in his stubborn refusal ever to relinquish ground again. As Stalingrad, in North Africa and subsequently Northwest Europe, Hitler's philosophy of " victory or adapt ", and his insistence that " there can be no

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* he enjoyed being defecated on by a woman.

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Other considerations say that upholding fast, of not retreating one step, of throwing every Gannett every manager the battle amounted on many occasions to gross military incompetence.

3. From his extreme ethnocentrism came another wealth long known form of military incompetence: that which results from a gross underestimate nation of the enemy and in particular of the ability of civilian populations to withstand the effects of war.

4. while many a Hitler's decisions were militarily disastrous, is underlying ego weakness in fear criticism if enjoyed it in several other traits which are undesirable, to say police, in a senior military commander. He promoted his aides advises for the sick open sea rather than their ability -- Joel and title work to such. You refuse to accept, believer even listen to unallowable intelligence. And when things went really long he was the first five scapegoat.

As General Ziegler recalls: " when Hitler learned that the counterattack pipe enter core to had failed, his fury knew no bounds. Turning to field marshal title, was in charge of disciplinary procedure within the Army, he shouted: " since the core commander once, to her office outlets, and Roman detail. It's always fall. " [7]

5. Like his henchmen Himmler even Hitler could on occasion show that overcontrol aggression, that procrastination which is incapacitated some other authoritarian military commanders. Perhaps his most disastrous decision of the world was when he halted the German advanced before Don Kurt, thus allowing the British to skate per equally inexplicable in the light of the military rallies of situation was his value to seize the most favorable opportunity for crossing of the Neva. There was a chance to join up with the fins and seal the fate of Leningrad, once again he held back until was too late

In 1944, after the Allied landings in France, Hitler again interfered the curb German aggression, this time by halting the advance on con of two printer divisions which been called up by Ron Stead. According to Lt. General Zimmerman, Hitler's rationalization but his political the particular arrow judgment was at the division should be retained in reserve, in case the main division invasion which it to come from another quarter. Suffice it to say that by the time he was persuaded to let the advance continue it was already too late.

6. Finally, on April 22, 1945, " Hitler failed as a military commander in a way which is never he never feel before. In the getting responsibility

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* an exception was when Hitler halted the retreat from Moscow. [6]

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He betrayed his command... A furor abandoned leadership and duty alike. " [8]

All in all, then, Hitler fits or 30 pretty well. If not the most incompetent the military commanders easterly approach that distinction (of the which seems to have been held by most of his General's (. As straw puts it: " Hitler's achievements as supreme commander in the second world war were inferior to his achievements as an ordinary Soldier in the first ". Though capable such ruthlessly correct decisions is that halting the retreat from Moscow, he could also commit enormous blunders, and these, when they occurred, seem to last the product of stupidity than others total, sustained, all pervasive authoritarianism. While this total, sustained, all pervasive authoritarianism there can be no question.

But what of the other side of the coin? Are the most competent of commanders also the least authoritarian? *

As a first step towards entering this question, those military enable commanders about whose competence there has been complete agreement were studied for their possession or absence of authoritarian traits. Results of this analysis are outlined in the following notes and sketches.

General Sir James Wolfe

"00! He is mad, is he Russian mark than I wish he would bite some other of my General's. " this retort by George the second to one who complained that the wolf was insane understates the case. General Sir James wool stood for out from his fellow General's first humanity, open-mindedness and military efficiency.

Two other features of this remarkable General confirm that he, like our other great commanders, did not Manas best those defects of personality which characterize authoritarianism. Firstly, he was bitterly (and then fashionably (opposed to what he called those " spirit breaking tactics of harsh punishment and real (. Secondly, as is very remark suggests, he did not court popularity and was quite ready to deviate from the accepted norms of the military elite of his day.

2004 EDITOR: sound like the guy that we need today

Thirdly he, he light Nelson, was quite prepared to dissipate worse if these conflicted with what he knew was right. After colliding, General Hawley, " the hang men, to his troops, found the young Charles

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* in the tactical sense in which this term has been used throughout this book stomach own not to be confused with autocratic ".

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Fraser up in girl all she lined Allied among the bodies of his fellow clansmen. He turned wolf and ordered him to shoot " the rebel dog ". Wolf refuse, " offering his commission and Hawley found the Soldier who killed in girl of she without screw poll vote very night

Welsh moral Kurt enabled him to achieve standards and military efficiency which were rare that era. Does ES Turner has described him as " the most enlightened regimental officer of his day. " and at the risk of making soft unpopular, he forces officers to attend to the welfare of their men, to visit their living quarters, have regard to their health and generally get to know them his fellow human beings. These are not the hallmarks of authoritarianism.

Wellington

It is significant the dismay demand and many would regard as one of the greatest military commanders all-time was totally devoid of those traits which characterize the authoritarian personality, and a complete stranger to those imperfections of character which signify up logically weak ego and impaired achievement motivation.

Wellington did not even signs of emotional restriction, did not remain unmoved by human suffering, did not seek popularity, was unimpressed by cool bull cloak, and did not seek scapegoats for his military setbacks.

He was the command of the proficiency in the welfare of his army above all personal considerations, a man of whom Pavilion could write: called it was fortunate for Britain that Wellington was at once the great humanitarian and agreed disciplinary and. "

On a list of Longford writes: called self-confidence gave him the decision. Richard [he [felt that the sacrifices he made in popularity were repaid in the ultimate perfection is army. Richard [he [s spurned the decorations authority -- the Lord staff, centuries, gold braid, Cox feathers. Richard when he heard that the price what also permit him to bear a " Royal augmentation, in the Dexter quarter of the arms of Wellington " he shied away from such ostentation... Your did you wished his son to become an earl unless he should be necessary. " [11]

Wellington self-confidence is also reflected in his refusal to make scapegoats of others. Thus of the brute bird goes fiasco he said: called IC debts the disposition or to exist to blame the government for the failure of the Cedar bird goes... It was entirely my own act. "

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In answer is humanitarian (antiauthoritarian (tendencies: called far from being a butcher " Wellington stood out among commanders for his repeated refusals to sacrifice lies unnecessarily... [he is [feelings in the hour a victory in the days immediately following were something less than joyful. As usual after a battle his neighbor set by the loss is not the glory... On the morning after the siege another Wellington showed himself to his deeply astonished staff. He visited the dead on the glazes and seen so many of his finest men destroyed [he broke down and wept. [12 2004 EDITOR: the best passage in the Bible is "Jesus wept"

That Wellington's humanitarianism is not confined to the battlefield, the block by any ethnocentric sentiments, seems evident from the fact that he was in the forefront of those who pressed for the abolition of slavery. The paragraph six other facets of the Wellington character worth noting. For diversity, he displayed a " open mine to new ideas, was quick to innovate conceded possible advantages of progress in technology. Secondly, well-prepared to pull blaster rate will his officers for inefficiency, he was remarkably lives a fair regarding address, only drawing the line at the carrying of umbrellas on active service. Thirdly, he did not commit that Cardinal Arrow so many military incompetence [underestimation of the enemy -- nor was he prone to that if those centers in which characterizes the authoritarian personality.

Importantly, and this in aspect of high achievement motivation, he took infinite pains in his military planet, planning, but nothing to chance, selected officers for their efficiency, always reckon ordered ground, moved among his troops and, as he put it, will always had to see things from self will. Deftly, he displayed a wit and profunda D. of thinking not readily associated with the restricted confines of an authoritarian mind. Thus, " I don't know what effect these men [afresh draft of troops [one of upon the enemy, but, by God, they terrified me ";"all of the business of lore, and indeed all the business of life;, is to endeavor to find out what you don't know but what you do: that's what I called cool testing what was not the other side of the Hill will:; 12 and there's nothing so stupid as a gallant officer"; called nobody in the British army ever reads or regulation or an order as if it were to be a guide for his conduct, or eight any other manner then in use in an amusing novel. "

Finally, Wellington showed no evidence of that sexual repression which is said to characterize the authoritarian personality. On the contrary, he shared with Nelson up her election for the fair sacs which could on occasion invite some fairly adverse comments from his

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Contemporaries. It is reasonable sort reasonably certain that he, a lease, did not choose to enter upon a military career for the wrong reasons.

Shaka

This is your location and commander-in-chief, our contemporary of Wellington, was in many ways one of the most remarkable all the great commanders.

Corporate estimate of his accomplishments one cannot do better incite any machine comparison drawn by EA Ritter. In 1879, 63 years after shocker, the conquest of Zulu lands took a British force of 220,000, on the breech loading rifles, Canon and rocket batteries a full six months. This achievement also necessitated the use of Colonial Mount troops, thousands of needle in a tall Nativity levies and some thousand drawn wagons. The area conquered a mounted to 10,000 mi.².

Shaka, starting with the nucleus of 500 untrained spears men and fighting the same hostile tribes as opposed British, conquered an area 10 times as great and made his influence felt over an area 12 times greater still. He did it by building up in 12 years one of the most efficient and well disciplined armies the world is ever known.

Obvious generalship is been written"shocked this particular genius lay in his meticulous personnel a tension to detail, and share hard work. If at all possible the always insisted on inspecting everything himself. In everyone it is crucial battles he insisted on personally written ordering the ground and the disposition of the enemy forces. He invariably checked all reports by procuring collateral evidence. He was a firm believer in the maxim, "it is the man's by which makes the cow get fat". 1813 pair

It related area of military competence, the obtaining and use of military intelligence, shocked was no less adroit. The only did you supplies and run a first-rate intelligence service be became a great exponents of surprising deceptive riches. As a tactician he delighted in using defense of actions to blur the enemy into a position favorable to himself, and would scorn that hallmark of so many incompetent commanders: the frontal assault upon the enemy strong disposition.

Shocked invariably made a close study of any dispositions, with resulted his Army suffered far fewer casualties than those of his opponents. This conservation is force, a distinguishing characteristic

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Of the company commander, color all is generalship. On the battlefield he, apparently quite coincidentally, not only adopted the Wellington's famous British ware but in fact when one better by modifying it to a circle, thus avoiding corners, those points of possible weakness in the British version. For military mind to sacrifice to beauty in straight lines for the greater usefulness of circles could be taken to suggest a remarkable emancipation from the near Rodick attraction of cool bull ". * and other example of his flexibility and refusal to be dominated by tradition was shock is banning of sandals for his fighting man. The making and run barefoot, a considerable and by no means popular break with tradition, he invested his Army with the speed of movement foreign obsessive of that achieved by his enemies. The displeasure he incurred through this innovation was hardly reduced by an order to his warriors the day should harden their feet on the Parade ground strewn with forms. Those in hesitated to follow his example in this painful initiation or instantly club the death.

On another occasion the same autocratic run disease but nonauthoritarian (military leader, who would gladly sacrifice popularity for military efficiency, let his entire Army, including his overweight counselors, a force march of 300 mi. in 6 days. That way a sustaining morale, officials layers of what were deputy to slaughter any stragglers. It is interesting to note that nearly a quarter of a century later another great commander, also concerned to improve the well help of his Army, took a leave out of shocked as both. Montgomery's version of the same treatment has been admirably described by Spike Milligan:

1941 a new parking on the scene. Montgomery and estimation part is put in charge Southern command. He moved all the pink fat phase heartened, shooting and fishing showed at page loan officers who are sitting around waiting to see off the boss. To date we done very little physical training. We done on sort of halfhearted miso Mother Brown for five minutes in the morning, followed by conducted coughing, but that's altered prepared one morning a chill of were rented as Jerry tanks. There in part to orders were the words " at 0600 hrs to battery will stumble for five now Ron excavation mark strong runners still thinking to the floor: some lately been under beds [5]

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* in terms of the entropy reducing functions of cool bull a straight line represents less uncertainty in the curved line.

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Miles question mark there's no such distance! 5 mi. excavation mark quotation mark exhibition mark notation marked that wasn't Ron that was a did the portage and! Heard prey. So to the great Ron. Hundreds of light shivering things were prorated outside Worthington home. Officers out of uniform scene stripped of all authority. The Jenna Walker looked very much like a bank clerk who couldn't. Now I, like many others had no intention of running 5 mi., all know. The machine pack, they into the background, find quite a stack, wait for the return to rejoin them. Beguiling about that. We were all put on 3 tn. Trucks and driven 5 mi. into the country and dropped. So started. Some, are exhausted having to climb off to Laurie, were begging for the could he great spirit off we went, leather suitcase in front ": in 10 seconds he was trailing at the back. Fast, he cried he, collapsing a ditch. We rested five minutes and then he called, will write, follow me. " 10 seconds he collapsed again. We left in expiring by the road. [14]

Like Montgomery, shocked our could also be humane as well as punitive and care for his Army. To serve it is fighting men were kept warm, well rested in well fed, and orderly was provided for every three Soldiers under his command. No battles spot without adequate supplies of food, water and bark dressings being assembled a strategic points beforehand. And after Battle:

Shaka made another kept around an inspection of the battle lines. All the warriors had turnabout and face him as he strode along the higher ground inside the line spurred prepared from time to time he spoke encouraging words to the lighting wooded in the ranks, and noted with satisfaction that their flesh wounds on arms and thighs were bound up with bark over addressing the luge (to tour the strapped ammonium (leads, which is forethought had ordered the DB2 brain. For shock of newly he need every order, and he did every could do avoid wastage in the Army. Several diluted when he considered to Sears Turkey ordered back to the Central Depot for those previously injured. A badly bandage wooed called for instant censure, and remedial measures. So did any defect in armament. [15]

The was a sort of behavior, the very antithesis of that extended to other Soldiers and other campaigns by their commanders achieve, that accounted for the remarkable health of Zulu forces. When they did

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Deals with fighting in the lateral and dysentery written country the recovery was rapid.

Finally, a word about Shaka's personality. He can be summed up as autocratic, totally non-authoritarian, high in achievement motivation, and a capable great warmth in sympathy. According to Ritter: " he was how the emotional and sentimental behind a decade of iron self-discipline. The fact that he was the finest composers of songs, the leading dancer and Woody is punster suggest the artist who would naturally have a high strong nature, and be more sensitive than the common run of the new gloomy race." [16]

In sexual prowess sack a checkup was athletic rather than authoritarian. With 1200 occupies, he lived in the crawl called the place of love, he outstripped (if that is the work, even Napoleon).

The ticketing significant facet was his rejection of superstition. A well-known feature of authoritarianism is a predisposition towards being superstitious -- the projection onto supernatural entities of repressed aspects of the individuals psychopathology. Think superstitious is in the nature of that a defense against inside he, dances prevalence in early primitive were nonscientific altars were people seek some satisfying anxiety reducing explanation of natural, but otherwise inexplicable, events.

In the lighting these considerations, is remarkable testimony to a man's ego strength in intelligence that he could renounced his superstitious believes in which he been rewritten shouted. Shock at the justice: into the extent of striking at the very heart of the witch doctor system which until his time and held all Zulu's in his often terrifying grip. In this, as in so many other ways, he showed his freedom from the psychopathology whole aspects of authoritarianism.

Napoleon

A bottle parts competence as a general, Peter Kile wrote: "his greatest in this capacity is obvious, from his first amazing successes in Italy to the West Marvel defense on France Zorro in use adversity. The comprehensive view of positions, the eye for the key point, the capacity to read the mind of his opponent, the ability to take quick decisions, a personality powerful enough to impose obedience, all these qualities and Napoleon possessed in their highest form. " [17]

Another writer describes him as a " a man of swift resolve and iron

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Well, a master of the craft of four on its technical side in yet eloquent in imaginative ", will yet other historians have come to mention on a trade which Napoleon shared with Montgomery: " the ability to pick out relevant facts in the general confusion will. The consensus opinion would seem to put Napoleon high on the list of great Captains ".

In how then does he stand as regards authoritarianism in achievement motivation? The evidence suggested though he was ambitious, a ruthless, devious, outstripped us, grandiose, to spot, Machiavelli, dictatorial autocratic, he was not authoritarian. For instance, as regards to those interested the"worst that our generation is had to put this, the persecution of the Jews, had no parallel in Napoleon system. Indeed that system remain true, from first to last, to conceptions of civil equality and human rights which it be oppression or extermination of a group, not on account of ax or even of opinions, but of birth and blood, would utterly incompatible. " [18]

The posts policy, that all members of society should at equal opportunities for education, may be taken as further evidence, a rather more positive con, for his lack of ethnocentric tendencies. His desire to breakdown social barriers is also evident in this passage from the social philosopher year in a row. Court court: " wherever he ruled are placed his rulers, the acquisition, futile rights, all executives boosted principles, were abolished, the number of was reduced, Customs barriers between promises thrown down... Social prejudices which divided humanity in the cast, all sorts of an act inequalities... " [19]

Yet another historian makes the point that Napoleon offered a career opened a talent, holding it wants to be the criterion of democracy and one of the prime secrets a statement ship, so to provide no citizen, however, humble, to be barred by disparagement of birth and connections with the highest from the highest office in minutes in the state ". [20] evident Napoleon's peace of mind did not depend upon the authoritarian defenses structuring his social environment into in groups and out groups.

In sexual or depression stretched at its sexual repression is taken as a measure of authoritarianism, dental Napoleon, like Wellington, Nelson and shocker, scores very low indeed. There are many components to mature adult heterosexuality: a romantic love, susceptibility, lost, jealousy, compassion and generosity. According to Frederick Mason, Napoleon was wanting in that of them. Nor was he a slow starter. " a fortnight after the first

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Meeting bottom part was her " Josephine deep blue artists"back at lover. Record they loved each other passionately. " [21]

Push-up is military duties to not deflect his ardor. " the journey from Paris to nice was accompanied was accomplished in 11 stages: from each of these and from almost every posting house where the General halted for relays, letter was dispatched to the sister we and our part. These letters breathe nothing but passion... At nice, whether issuing his laconic orders spirit.

To the devising a system whereby his exhausted Soldiers may be fed, equipped and disciplined in preparation for that rush upon the Al Spirit.. Letter after letter flies to Josephine. " [22]

Nor did he failed to derive comfort and military motivation from his lob life: " what I am inclined to curse my fate, I lay my hand on my heart and feel your portrait there: I look at it and love fills me with joy unspeakable. " victory was a means of seeing her again, all possessing her, of having her near him, with him always. " [23]

Napoleon's capacity for jealousy, compassionate forgiveness is illustrated by his response to Josephine's infidelity. "

But now while parts personal stronghold had to be storm. After not to repeat at the door, in vein she knelt down sobbing a loud... The scene was prolonged for hours, for a whole day, without any sign from within. Worn-out at last Josephine was just about retiring despair, but are made... Letter back to the door and hastily fetched her children: Eugene and portends, healing decide their mother, mingled their supper occasions with hers. Their upon the door opened: speechless, the tears streaming from his eyes, his face can holes with the terrible struggle that he and rent is hard, bought apart appeared, holding out his arms to his life. Ureter it was pardon, no grudging parting... But reconciliation generous and complete, forgiveness, May oblivion of past errors. Ureter it not only could he forgive the faulty wife, he showed the rarer virtue of my community to her accomplices... He was never know to deprive them of life for liberty. Curator he scorned to injure them even in their fortunes. [24]

Unlike such sexually deranged arch authoritarians as Hitler and Himmler, the cult Napoleon could be the reverse of extra punitive."the fault, he argued, and lay not so much with these men as with themselves. He should get the stricter watch over his wife. A man had been allowed to

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enter the Herald obeying the instance of his sex, he had persuaded, and she had yielded, as it was her nature to yield. " [25]

As to his propensity for more casual adventures, there is the following account of his numerous relationships of a more transient and purely physical nature. Even here, however, to pull a display in intercepted and imagine Terry imaginative capacity quite inconsistent with authoritarian personality straight traits.

But other actresses were admitted to the secret apartments of the true layer, whose business became more or less habitual. They were young women of easy virtue, for whom it was impossible that bought apart should have any serious feeling. Repaired with his passionate admiration for tragedy he naturally addressed himself to the intervertebral yours of tragedy... Figure, Andrew Marsh, if a Genie Inc., Army own worst something more than mortal women: they were supernatural, almost to bind the glorious with all the treasures of poetry in history. His imagination candle at the lot of them, a: the actresses were represent a representative attracted him, not on their own merits, but as embodiments of the characters tapers person that resonated. There is no sense of degradation in intercourse with them, and thus e-mailed to purely sensual satisfaction in the midst of poetic feeling prepared.

Many others... Climb the staircase and peered through. Passed along begin passage buried.. To the small room.. Your it M. Bernard, the core floors, you raised a bouquet every morning for the secret room. The flowers just renewed each day stated less swiftly than the fancy in smart other visitors. Prepared so numerous today become peered peered. Get it would be a difficult matter to give the names of such a multitude. [26]

Of course, sexual activity on such a scale is itself so abnormal as to either suggested Napoleon was grossly oversexed, worried he was concerned to prove himself because of some real or imagination imaginary shortcoming in procreative ability. It seems lateral was more likely to have been the case. Not only were his external genitalia reported to be unimpressive, but as AJ P. Taylor has remarked after most limited spokes blatantly obvious sexual performances. He himself doubted his capacity. When he achieved the job from West Alaska he was amazed and

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* personal communication.

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Took up the idea a second marriage. On the other hand, after he had seduced Marie Louise and are traveling carriage, she said " do it again. " there is no record whether he did. "

The point to notice is that far from showing suppression of his sexual behavior and condemnation of sexuality and others, the pull it all went all out to prove his fears were groundless. If he had problems, they seem to a bit more than that, Golden authoritarian.

Other traits commonly associated with authoritarianism include rigidity, neatness, lack of spontaneity and having a close mine. Judging from the following excerpt, and the polling did not manifest these symptoms of Schindler East Po constriction:

Stern any periods in his business hours, Napoleon was all in ease and sunshine to his intimate. They admired his pleasant wit, he is unaffected gate he, his rich and bring an immoral on political themes. They found him kindly and not inaccessible to counsel, immensely laborers, but always able to command capricious obedience asleep. There seemed no limit to span of his activities and interest. Now he would listen with a staff two launch discoursing on geometry, now in lazy interval he would leave dreams and those stories. His confidence was boundless, visit ascendancy on question. [27]

At the yet he was struck by the appearance of the young girl who professed an enthusiastic worship for them. By his orders a message was sent to her, summing yearning horror to an interview. Repaired the pull it soon discovered that her passionate admiration for him was all the most interested an ingenious description. He gave orders that she should be at once conducted to her home, undertook to find her a suitable husband, and gave her a towering of 20,000 Florence. Such instance of respectful chivalry was by no means unique in Napoleon's career. [28]

2004 EDITOR: he seems similar to Bill Clinton

Finally, like many of the other commanders honor list Napoleon was without the vanity which be tokens a week ego, was notoriously careless about his dress, had a wide range of intellectual interest, and promoted his subordinates on the basis of their efficiency. Nor did he display that deliver dated the debilitating overcontrol aggression which has on occasions paralyzed warlike behavior of less successful commanders. On the contrary, Napoleon, like despair full predecessor

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Biggest con, to be ruthlessly distort the, even apparently probably gate with his own troops, but not authoritarian

Nelson

When Nelson die, a sailor wrote in his letter home: "I'm ever set eyes on him for whom the which I am both starting glad, pretty sure I should like to have seen them, but then, all the men in our ship we have seen them are such soft loads, they have done nothing but blast their eyes and cry ever since he was killed. God bless you! That fought like the double sit down and cry like a wedge. " [29]

The reasons at expediency some authoritarians may cultivate a false bomb Omni, particularly when dealing with those two was approval they see, but, as we saw earlier (page 263 (, authoritarians are often sadly deceived regarding the popularity. Nelson, who has been described as "war, vital, shielding", who was unaffectedly loved by his officers and men, who could maintain a sincere and lasting friendship even with the husband of his mistress Emma Hamilton, and who delighted in the Company of his mid-shipment, was not like this.

Imputed as they are with date material is the guy use of status anxious parents, authoritarians rate their acquaintances in terms of their potential usefulness. Their generosity, but appreciate behavior, the hospitality and their self-sacrifice tend to be reserved for the rich and influential. They did not respond to pass kindness is, they cannot afford to waste time upon those who can give them nothing in return. Prevent people or objects to be used.

Nelson, fool, won his brother Therese died, went out of his way into pride themselves to help Sarah Ford, the blind woman went through his brother have been living, was not like this either.

Does it is to the Navy what Wellington is to the Army call: great amongst the greatest of commanders and quite on hampered by authoritarian traits. The following quotations in Texas from all over Warners a portrait of Nordhausen touch upon those aspects of the man which are a particular relevance to the present thesis. It seems, Princess that, like Wellington, Napoleon, Montgomery and slam, Nelson did not the split compulsive concern with the orderliness of his drafts: ". Your dear when Nelson, the ab Alper moral, came in his barge alongside... His drafts brass was worthy of attention. He he had on a pole H. u: his lake boat on powdered hair was tied in a stiff tension tale, of an extraordinary length: the old-fashioned flaps of his waste code

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Added to the general sweetness of his figure, and produced in the carriage which particularly attracted my notice: bright kerosene anything like it before, nor cry imagine whom the laws, nor that what he came about. " [30]

Nelson did not feel compelled to slot upon or actually his superiors, just because they were his sick seniors in rank. If Atlas Sir Richard sees, he said: " he bows and scrapes to much... The Admiral at all about him are great need these very " [31] it was the wife of this same self Admiral who commented on an aspect of Nelson which we touch about earlier, his behavior towards his mid-shipment, whom he invariably referred to as his children.

Among the number in a reasonably suppose that there must be they must there must be timid as well as bold: the timid he never repute, but always wished to show them be desired nothing of them that he would not instantly do itself: and I have known him say: " well, server, I am going arrays to the masthead, and baggy I'm a meet you dare. " no did not denial could be give it to such awareness, and the poor fellow instantly began as March. His work should never took the least notice with what alacrity he was done, but when he met at the top, became instantly speaking in the most careful matter, and saying how much a person was to be pitied you could fancy there was any " danger, or even anything disagreeable, in the attempt. " [32]

The same token George Matsch and set of Nelson did he was " anxious to give pleasure to everything to everyone about him, distinguishing each intern by some act of kindness, in chiefly those who seem to require most. " [33]

Of the QUALCOMM the quality of his thinking and open-mindedness, Nelson's secretary John Scott had this to say: " his political, able and ready decisions astonished me beyond measure, indeed, all this public business is transacted with a degree of correctness peculiar to itself, nor does the most trifling circumstance escape is penetrating article from a knowledge of his private in secret correspondence I am led to consider him the greatest character I've ever met with, in fact he is a wonderful great man, as great as great. " [34]

Date residual tells what might have regarding Nelson St. them from the crippling effects of the week he kosher be resolved by considering his most famous characteristics, disobedience. " possessing down those moral Kurds, he was himself prepared to disobey if he thought it to

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The edge of his country (or Naples (and he was often right... Nelson was in fact always urging others, even Allies, superiors and officials of the Army to disregard their worst, if necessary, in what he thought to be the general interest costs. " [35]

Nelson sold view this matter was uncomplicated. Has he said to the Duke of Clarence: " to serve might gain, and to destroy the front, I consider as the great war of all, from which little on spring; and if one of these little on debilitating against it (for who can tell exactly a distance? (, I go back and a baby greater order and object. [36] coupled with this healthy disregard for blind obedience went great physical Kurds in that aggressive spirit which knows no faltering are holding back

It probable that Nelson to absence of those traits which have led to much military (enable (incompetence may be laid at the door of his security happy childhood, is devoted parents, and the remarkable Miss Black at col who, upon his mother's death when he was nine, became Nelson's nerves. It can be attributed, in part of these, to the court General Neil you all the country directory, where the cultivation of intellectual pursuits to love of reading were considered more important than the striding for the goals of status anxious parents. And it's doubtless those something to the fact that, because his family were hard up, he and his siblings were Kurds take up various implements at a relatively early age that it being incarcerated in those sorts of schools in which later generations of status anxious parents like to pour away their offspring.

Fisher

As a man's influence for good upon the fighting services taken as a measure of his greatness," Jackie Fisher's impact upon the Navy of his day qualifies him for a high place in British cable industry.

In the words of Richard Howell: "in an age when the grip of patronage and privilege was still exclusively tenacious, Fisher brashly on his way through to become at the age of 30 of 63 the Comptroller of the most powerful single forces instruction in the world. [37]

In fact, this ab rolled Lee and for see lower during the first world war not only controlled but was larger responsible for the very existence of this force.

Like the other great captains considered in this section, he was totally

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Three of those defects of personality which spring from Ito weakness. And add you let man, with enormous self-confidence, he manifested a host of traits consistent with four pieces. He was a progressive technocrats, and this in a service with a well-earned reputation for resisting every anything that smacked of progress. In the not have been a great strategist but was eager for responsibility, articulate, incisive and, in his search for efficiency, not police perturbed by the enemies which he made on his way. Apparently devoid of modesty, he showed none of the shrinking from publicity which characterize pathology of achievement motivation.

As might be expected elemental for Ito will positively take like proportions, 2004 EDITOR: a battleship like proportions! Fisher suffered little or regression of Sex or aggression. He was not a peaceful man but neither was equal. I great womanizer, and love by women to return, his warmth in humanity extended far beyond the confines as sex and marriage. In the words of battle Bacon: " he always had at heart the comfort of the officers and men under his command. " others of written of his " his emotion and kindness towards younger officers and Mideast. " [38]

Autocratic but not authoritarian, a highly motivated to achieve but not deflected by the fear of losing the approval of others, Fisher quite consistently showed a dearth of such needle traits as neatness over money. The always relatively poor and totally without private means he had a well dirt deserved reputation for generosity.

All of all, Fisher, like Nelson, was well-equipped to use his intellect intelligence and drive in the pursuit of naval efficiency. He was apparently quite on hampered by those feelings of infantile inferiority which have crippled other military enable leaders. It was not without insight did he wrote: " I attribute my present vitality to the in bidding of my mother's milk beyond the legal period of nine months. "

T.E. Lawrence

All these generalship little heart wrote: "Lawrence can Bear comparison with more Perot or your Napoleon in a vital faculty elite to generalship, the power of grasping instantly the picture of the ground and situation, of relating to want to the other, and the local to the general. In deed there is much to suggest that his top graphical geographical sense was more remarkable that mayors. " 39 2004 EDITOR::: this is the crude the ale understanding of everything at once a glance

In like getting Lawrence to more Perot, "are most representative"

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military genius, open the Liddell-Hart considered that Lawrence also showed the same cool profound understanding of human nature Corps, the same cool power of commanding affectionate welcome any energy hope and the same cool consummate blend of diplomacy would strategy quilt. " to Lawrence, by the verdict of those are seen in a crisis in confusion, may aptly be applied the words with which poultry are described more world: well he had to degree above all other generals of his time that calm purge in the midst of palm, the serenity of soul in danger, which the English call a cool head, does perhaps this quality, the greatest gift of nature for command which formally gave the British so many advantages over the French."[40]

The Lidell-Hart also considered to Lawrence, quilt the most widely read of General's ", was quilt more steeped in knowledge of more than any of the journals of the last war. " in the light of latter evidence the L. Hart probably overstated case but even today few would dispute `Lawrence's military skill... Argument place among the great guerrilla leaders. " [41]

In personality, Lawrence is perhaps the least authoritarian senior commander the world is ever know. He's totally without personal ambition, refuse promotion, honors are wars on and deplore the " pomp, vanities and ritualized the howling and scraping which will associate with the power structure of your article higher chill command systems. The fact that he could renounce his name for that of Ross, and later shock, and happily resumed his role a lowly rancor after achieving worldwide fame, indicates a degree of selfish basement quite unique amongst military men.

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* contrary to a characteristic predisposition of authoritarian individuals, Lawrence dislike interfering with other men's feelings. He dislike getting worse in fact exercised effective command largely to the tendering of advice. The advice was acted upon suggest that, buys personality, receive the level of leadership rarely attain my military commanders. He himself was prepared to obey foolish words the dislike passing Nissan to others.

Is that as little heart remarks: Hope in war such orders often result in the useless sacrifice of men's lives. In peace they often contribute to the sterilizations sterilization of men's reason. Oh

Lawrence was a great respect to reason and considered that the possession of knowledge was a primary importance for military leader. In his opinion " the perfect general would know everything in

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Heaven and Earth. Quilt the same token does most open-minded man deplore the closed and vacuums minds others military compatriots, many displayed a cool fundamental, crippling in curiousness hold. For his part, a Lawrence made a point of studying in making so proficient with the technology of war -- whether this involved learning how to use different types of automatic weapons, flying, were designing a successful air-sea rescue launch.

In earlier chapter we examined relationship between anti-intellectualism and militarism, a relationship which reaches most depressing proportions in the burning of books but he uncultured and anxious leaders of the Third Reich. In Britain leads seen how the fashionable contempt a military man for intellectual pursuits at its origins in the "muscular Christianity", as fostered by English problem schools. And reconsider how the psychology of cool "Butch" behavior, was exaggerated and quilt beat the colt masculinity and its degrading of the tilt of nationalism within feminist, sprang from the anxieties with which men with weak egos via their own passivity.

It is in this context of what has almost come to be accepted as a fact of nature, a sort of secondary sex characteristic, that the actual behavior Lawrence and many other competent military leaders needs to be viewed. For Lawrence, perhaps even more so than any the others, demonstrated with shattering finality just how false is the believed intellectual is an necessarily be tokens of feminist, cowardice were weak leadership in military affairs. Suffice it to say that Lawrence, poet and scholar, sometime fellow also worse, Oxford, author of one of the finest books ever written English language and able to speak six other languages, lacked nothing in the way of Soldierly virtues -- nothing, that is, except a taste for all call.

Not authoritarian,, and achieve or professional excellence, and totally seeking of social approval, this most remarkable man showed three other traits consistent with our theory of military incompetence. He was liked by many, love by some and agitated by others -- and this from common Soldiers and their craftsman at one and two imminent generals and politicians at the other. He had a warm quilt gentle leg pulling cool sense of humor, and he was the antithesis of mean. He was left out was without so-called and obsessive traits and, presumably as a consequence of his relatively secure childhood, did not conceal Bonita somewhat insignificant exterior a week or damaged ego. No doubt he was competent person and possibly

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homosexual, but even his fabrications and other shortcomings revealed by nightly incense and in the secret lives of Lawrence of Arabia [42] can be ascribed to such not authoritarian traits as an over fertile imagination and great natural sensitivity.

Allenby

This man, of whom T.E. Lawrence wrote: "Allenby was morally so great that the comprehension of our littleness came slow to him cool, was outwardly much like any other British general of his day -- date, red face, cleric and in actively dressed. Thus did Lawrence C. M. on their first encounter. In fact a point of fact at least one promising appearance quite belied his nature.

For star, his mind was neither cool" nor narrow. In military affairs he was flexible progressive. His readiness to adopt new technology, such as the armored Carver doesn't warfare, was only less remarkable any apparent ease with which he incorporated Lawrence into his plans. For Alan B., is evidently justified means, however scruffy infinitely cool bulls she quilt these might beat. His off-duty activities, which included yachting, naturalizing, collecting in pressing wildflowers, archaeology and reading poetry, covered a range of interest which not only extended beyond that most military meant to include hobbies other less security does might well considered insufficiently masculine. (is been even suggested that he gave up the money because of his love of wildlife. Per deceased

Illustrate discipline their individual Army explosions of rage, Allenby was not authoritarian. He managed to combine almost Wellington in attention to detail and the concern for military efficiency with great emotional warmth. From his letters to his wife one gets impression over I'll and affectionate man with a sense of humor quite unrestricted by authoritarian defenses.

One good measure ego strength in inner confidence is the degree to which a person could risk pot on popularity when you occasion demands. Though a fact not there, not only with his men but also of his officers (itself to prepare generally rare combination (, the Allenby, like Wellington before him in Montgomery after them, could be blisteringly outspoken and showed little evidence of curbing his tongue if the behavior of others conflicted with what he considered desirable from the point of view of military efficiency. Moreover, unlike those general's

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The preferred to make scapegoat submitted lowly rank, Allenby was quite prepared the time, was can regard rancor station.

Well I have no use for these modern major channels, " he said, and, when referring to senior commanders and double or war: colt genitals with no more Ranger backbone dinner rag doll. "

According to original theory, one striking feature authoritarianism is a chronic state of generalize hostility which may express itself indirectly in the enjoyment of aggressive fancies (see Hitler's the occupational forts and torture chambers describe the pastry and 14. (and Allenby showed no inclination this kind and professed a sincere dislike of war.

Finally, on a matter of achievement motivation, he cannot manifest that cool fear of failure call which has hampered weaker man. He cannot shun publicity and shelter behind a protective cloak of secrecy. He did not confine his activities to always either very easy or impossibly difficult, public prepared to take well considered tasks and risks. Any did not refrain for promoting mean for their efficiency, employing subordinates who, in theory anyway, challenges own self-esteem. Though since did he did not lack self-confidence. He was, moreover a competent channel.

Slim

"he inspired class by simplicity, by his own rugged type of down-to-earth approach to man in advance, is complete naturalness and his absolute lee you genuine humor. He was a great leader, -- true; he was a great commander -- true; but does he was above out, above all, the will of friend of the family. Colt [43]

Well personally, I considered Slim was the finest general second world war produced. Colt [44]

Together the locations affirm the pieces of this book.

Except, possibly, otherwise, authoritarian to rarely loves. Gil Marshall Lord Slim was loved by his army perhaps more than any other commander has been loved by his men since Nelson.

Is complete competence as a general, fighting the most difficult and payable or a impossible training unspeakable climate, with army ravaged by disease, there can be no possible down. When he took command of 14th Army in 1943, the daily sick total 12,000, mostly from malaria. Thanks to his efforts in the strict and a malaria

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Discipline which he initiate, casualties underscored were down to one in 1000 by 1945. He also instituted events fill possible pedal facilities neatly behind the front lines in order provide speedy treatment for the wounded, and save, whenever possible, the long agonizing journey back to rear areas.

On the more spiritual aspects of morale his biographer writes:

He cannot subscribe the idea that the average Soldier spots well merely on the discomfort in unpleasantness of the country to which he been sent to fight. He believed the day that D-Day British, Indian, Burke are asking, if they were told the reasons are fighting, the justice of the costs and the importance of beating the enemy, and are In the picture, within the down the security, they would respond with enthusiasm. Do this and he spent a great deal time visiting units, talking to them informally in their lines, and encourage his subordinates to do the same. Naturally, he did not consignee stocks entirely to this been, but inter subjects of a more personal nature such as rations, pay, leave, male and beer, combining needs with the necessary amount of humor. Vote was no cold brass " a bout", wrote General Missouri be buried [45]

Any residual doubts what might entertain about the strength of Slim's ego should be removed by the acid test: his response to failure. Writing of these faulty decision to evacuate gala back in 1940, Slim said: " like so many generals when plans of gone wrong, I could find plenty of excuses, but only one reason -- myself. When two courses of action were opened me I had not chosen, as a good commander should, the Boulder. I taking counsel of my fierce ". [46] there is no evidence here that telltale defense -- projection -- and this even though he had ample opportunity for making scapegoats of those subordinates who had given the advice which ended in failure.

If further pros were needed the great generalship depends upon absence of authoritarianism, Slim provides them. Is no exaggeration to say bigotry trades without which the outcome of the permit campaign might have been very different. Firstly, he was not even ethnocentric and thereby therefore able to achieve the most of the almost impossible, but vitally necessary, goal of maintaining a good relationship with his Chinese allies, however frustrating beanie on occasion have been. By the same token, his brilliant lee successful leadership of Burke is,

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Africans Indians, as well as Europeans, what it been impossible head there existed a trace of Aptos entries them in his makeup. It is absolutely essential good relationship with the typical general still an even more difficult General Wingate depended upon a lack of that Darryl prejudice, towards people who are odd or " different ", which has disfigured so many authoritarian military commanders. Between Slim many American forces in southeast Southeast Asia there existed none of that friction which tainted Anglo-American relationships in Europe after D-Day.

Reference to Wingate brings up another index of Slim's inner strength: his absence of petty jealousy. When Wingate was killed, a Slim wrote:

As the hours past and no news of any sort arrived, Clooney descended upon us. Any costs sense of loss distraught, like a blow, even those who had differed most with them from him -- and I was not one of these -- was a measure of the impacting me.

There can be no question of the seriousness of our loss. If out his presence to animate, special force would no longer be saying to others or to itself. He created, inspired, defended it, and given it competence; it was the offspring of his vivid imagination and ruthless energy. He had no other parent...

And this of the man whose last words to Slim had been: cold you are the only senior officer in Southeast Asia who doesn't wish me dead! Oh [47]

Of the same genre, and a striking contrast to the miserable relations that had existed between the Air Force and Army in Singapore Pratt C. C. page one and 32 (, was Slim's whole art use an enthusiastic support of Allied air forces -- enacted depreciation a local rival " service which led in air Marshal Sir John Baldwin to write: " Slim was quicker to grasp the potential alleys and value of air support in the jungles of Burma than most Air Force officers buried directly to the understand what the air required and was always ready to us understand it difficulties and limitations. Colt 48 compare this with the troll the sibling rivalry and costly bickering that had occurred between the three services between the two world wars.

Earlier in his but we noted that for the non-authoritarian, unconventional Soldier to reach the highest ranks he must be good. Slim exemplifies this proposition. When he was a staff College nearly failed to get a good report because it is lack of aptitude for, and

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Interest income deans. It is to the internal credit of his command, and that the despite the serious shortcomings of up for potential staff officer he received the highest grating. In view of a subsequent performance, exceptional powers are leadership and notice physical resilience, we might well consider this is sorry below the proponents of "muscular Christianity."

Firstly finally, because weak egos can be likened to fragile balloons which Pol Pot would deflate with every transient change of pressure, there is this tribute by another great and discerning commander, peeled Marshal Sir Claude often lack: " success did not in-flight him nor misfortune depressed them."

Rommel

"Germany produces many ruthless efficient generals: the almost stood out amongst them because he overcome the rigidity of the German military mind and was a master improvisation. " from this comment by peeled Marshal often lack we might conclude did Rommel, Germans Germany's milk crates military commander to second world war, not displayed as personality traits which we have associated with military incompetence.

At propose a president pieces, the single most significant feature of Rommel's personality laying his attitude toward Hitler and the Nazi régime. For Hitler, his feelings of admiration and respect change to disillusionment and distaste. The Nazi party he never had much sympathy. Later, wondered keys became known to him, he fell loathing in revulsion for them.

The loyal and patriotic Soldier, his open-mindedness and absence of authoritarian traits in able to hinder it the utterly the idea ideology of the ruling party in the very country would which he served. There is no question but did this man put his goal of complete military efficiency about stocks of personal advantage. He steadfastly refused to sacrifice his own values for expediency, even notice eventually cost him his life.

A feature of authoritarianism is a composed or to submit to higher authority, coupled with 10 tendency to ingratiate oneself with powerful father figures. Rommel showed neither of these traits. Is well-known in cordial dislike of Hitler, title in Jewell, suggested he at least was not mesmerized by the power structure on which his own security depended.

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Like is equally famous counterpart, Montgomery, Rommel's outspokenness converter pond attack less. When, in 1935, the plans for an inspection of his battalion of all the single file of SS men, standing out from his own troops for Hitler's protection, he flatly refuse to turn his battalion out. This threat of cool disobedience " resulted in the interview with Hitler at which Rommel won his point. The SS guard did not materialize.

On another occasion Rommel did not come up so lightly. He was at a conference in 1944.

Rommel did not improve the atmosphere by protesting to Hitler against incident wealth or adore -- Sir -- delay, which at accurate week before. Here the SS division, DOS right, had, as a reprisal for the killing of a German officer, driven the woman the women and children into the church and then set the village on fire. As the men and boys emerge from the flames., they know them down with machine guns. Afterwards they blew up the church and some 600 women and children with it. It was unfortunate, they admitted, that there were to village's name or adore and that they had inadvertently picked the wrong one. Still, every reprisals had been carried out. Rommel demanded to be allowed to punish to division. Cool such things bring disgrace on the German uniform,"he said. Cool how can you wonder at a straight to the French resistance behind us when the SS drive every decent freshmen into joining it? Oh

" that has nothing to do with you, cold snaps Hitler. Cool it is outside your area. Your business is to resist the invasion. " 49

2004 EDITOR: Hitler---quite the ass hole

Such demerit he on Rommel's part, particular time when Hitler's mirrors are becoming increasingly freight, the tokens ego on a paired by authoritarian weakness.

2004 EDITOR: go Rommel!

Take into account with his other traits -- his wharf towards his family, his absence of rigidity, is parsimony with Allies of his men, his ability to improvise, is not clear it with his troops in relative lack of concern regarding his popularity with his equals, it should come as no surprise learned it is this show or us, autocratic and most efficient journals, enjoyed a happy childhood apparently unmarred by the stresses and strains which may weaken the killer stock the personality.

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Marshall Zukhov

Like all, Marshall Zukhov, George Russia's greatest general, was that remarkable phenomenon: the not authoritarian who for awhile prospered in authoritarian régime. Unlike Rommel, he eventually came degree through his refusal to accept limitations of his particular régime.

As Marshall Kona said at the time as the cost dismissal from the Ministry Defense: " the across mistakes were made worse by certain statements it made about Soviet military science and the development of the Armed Forces: to call that stated Soviet military regulations plated negative role in the education the commanders and did not help them develop creative initiative. " [50]

Even before becoming Ministry Defense, so-called of all not with his boss, Stalin. To begin with, he did not shrink from the most reprehensible although combines " in authoritarian organization, that venturing back. " on July 29, so-called toll Stalin key at would have to be surrendered... Stalin asked: " what current nonsense is this? How could you surrender he had to the enemy? Or unable to restrain himself, is to caulk retorted: " if you think that I as the Chief of Staff can only talk nonsense, then I have no business here. I asked to be relieved instead to the front. " Stalin applied it to caulk built that way, what we can do without you. "

Authoritarian to not are you with their fighter father figures, particularly bite so doing they jeopardize some position the power which the weak ego craves.

Ash the to the second reason for zoo cause fall from grace was no less significant -- used for two popular. As a fellow Soldier, coral ants and off, remark: " Stalin never tolerated around in people in the party ranks who are very popular, as you cough had undoubtedly become. " 51

Since Duke off with a harsh disciplinary and aggressively are chronic, get with all extremely popular, which is safely conclude that he did not suffer from those afflictions of the ego which underlie authoritarianism.

Other features of this remarkable man support this conclusion. His character traits were the exact opposite of those which to find the authoritarian personality. He was unconventional, unorthodox, calm flexible rather than rigid, war, impetuous and on reactionary (e.g. he was an enthusiastic proponent of tanks and (, concerned that welfare is troops in against taking a necessary risks of heavy casualties. He was uninhibited

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In Sexual aggression, unsure tackle, creative and intellectual. Perhaps most important of all, she, like Rommel, Montgomery and slim, radiate self-confidence: and, like Kitchener, Fisher and Trencher, was prepared to drive is this to the sacred webs of protocol and hierarchical administration.

So much for a highly represented as that of the great captain school. The list is not exhaustive. In need of all the commanders to his amplified the principle that will confidence is a free exercise a dexterity and it'll intelligence and the completion of tasks on a paired by infantile inferiority ", none do so better infield Marshall Earl Alexander of Tunis. The product of happy childhood, free from the curbs of the press of parents, 50 to use compassionate, versatile, Suite nature, courageous and temperate, he is a perfect social leader and a highly competent supreme commander.

Enemy and he and there were preparing, General Sir Richard O'Connor infield Marshall often lack, and on the other side of the world is psychological counterparts -- the Japanese Admiral Yamato Yamamoto, picked her up role armor Harbor, another unconventional, not authoritarian, the thinking inhumane where its reputation as a troublemaker in high circles rivaled that of Montgomery; and Douglas MacArthur, who, with all his pulse and to " some people, obnoxious militant a glow maniac on points, were made the great, I'll be radios, impossibly are chronic, it totally not authoritarian military commander. This most colorful generals establishes reputation as individualism the first world war. "... Even then his costume was is notorious is his tactical skill: a floppy, are riding crop and often the sweater with the huge wool multiple around his neck -- all unorthodox and but attention producing. " is not worry that in 1935, the British high command were increasing allocation of forces to Army officers (see page 116 (, MacArthur's report at the end of his term of office is Chief of Staff expressed a key interesting armored warfare. " any Army ", he wrote, " but fails to keep the step with this trend is far from making necessary progress toward modernization, coin steadily into revocable the backwards. " [53]

Of course their Mac may well be non-authoritarian generals who worked also hopelessly incompetent -- such as well into drunken and dull Witt it General Erskine -- but what is hard put to find a great general around all who was conforming, submissive to authority, punitive,

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Sexually inhibited, overcontrolled, as no center, and a intellectual, assailed by Dallas as to his gorilla the, the old assessor, superstitious, status hungry, rigid, possessed a cloak will close mine, and, as Fisher said Jill Coe, " saturated in this "-- in short, authoritarian.

Ash the on the grounds the criticism should start at home, most examples of military, incompetent seven drop in the British scene. It will be noticed however, that for our common denominator living, linkup competence we have looked at senior commanders from widely differing backgrounds and countries. Discovery the discovery of similar personality characteristics among great military leaders, whether they be British, Zulu, Japanese, Russian or French suggest that the central thesis of this book is why generality. This view strengthened by another list of competent commanders American this time -- compiled by Janowitz per wedding of what he calls will the elite nucleus " in the Armed Forces he produce provides evidence for the proposition the effectiveness of military leaders tends to very conversely with their exposure to her routine iced military career, and so doing makes the for the pointed among those " rule breaking military leaders called the comprised the top one half percent of the United States Armed Forces hierarchy the men who made the larger contribution" are characterized the even more pronounced unconventional now at the career lines will. [54]

The nearest we've come the Janowitz is list of highly competent, civilian iced generals is a man described by Taylor has " the only General of creative the rigid now the produce by the first world or ": the Australian Jew, General Sir John Monash -- lawyer, civil engineer, archaeologist, botanist and part-time Soldier. Begin only as soon that the, like Janowitz is great Americans, was lucky to have escaped the blind blunting, routine iced career a large mercenary military organization, where the real skills demanded by the complex task of generalship are gradually exposed by Orthodox militarism.

2004 EDITOR: in another words become brain-dead in the mindless daily grind of Garrison B.S. military

Because before concluding a section on the personality characteristics of great commanders, there is one final point authoritarian military competence correct, inefficiency of high levels of command should you function not only a minute of individual personalities, but of the those other parent organizations. Not only do high a highly authoritarian armies tend to attract equally authoritarian officers: they will also serve to grip the style and hinted the promotion of unconventional commanders.

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It follows, therefore, but military efficiency should be relatively higher in organizations which are not suffice with the inhibiting values of traditional militarism. Specific evidence in favor of those a these propositions is not hard to find. Give 40 considered one example in chapter four, that of the boar war, where the large regular Army Great Britain, highly regulated, steeped in protocol traditions going back 1000 years, was made looked utterly ridiculous is secession of resounding defeat spans of the band appeal dress civilian farmers who just come together for the purpose of defending their homeland.

In contrast to the aristocratic, stiff neck in a Mac elite turned out British channels, the boar is were served by quick thinking, resourceful but untidy may increase farseeing mines in concern for the well further people enable them to run rings around her adversaries. And when the boars were eventually put into place, it was always are the efforts of two atypical British commanders: the Commoner who would served this time in the hunters teaches Indian Army -- Lord Roberts -- and man notorious for flaunting a military conventions -- Lord Kitchener.

In the second and contemporary illustration, there is the Israeli army, a David to a half-million Jews who in six days defeated the Goliath of 100 million air. By its competence and vastly superior direction does miniscule Army, drawn from a country port resources and greatly disadvantage by geographical position, managed to defeat in anything countries possessing in exhaustible resources and reserves of natural wealth (including one half of the world's hydrocarbon reserves to (.

In a second and contemporary illustrations, there is the Israeli Army, the David of two and a half million Jews who in six days defeated the Goliath of 100 million Arabs. By its competence and vastly superior direction this miniscule army, drawn from a contry poor in resources and gravely disadvantaged by its geographical position, managed to defeat an enemy from countries possessing inexhaustible reseves of natural weath (including one half of the world's hydrocarbon reserves).

Developed from a small group of watchmen at the turn of the century, the Israeli Army is an infant by European standards. Like its parent military organization, Haganah, the Israeli Army (IDF) is civilianized and free of obsolete army tradtion. It had, until recently, no time for "bull", retaining only such military conventions as are minimally necessary for discipline and efficiency. According to Yigal Allon: "its attitude to these matters, was (and remains) strictly functional." 55 In the eyes of ilitary traditonalists the Israelis, like the Boers, present an incomprehensible paradox of efficiency without authoritarianism. As Robert Henriques ("d by Allon) wrote in his A Hundred Years to Suez (1957):

Although Israeli units can be extremely smart on a ceremonial

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parade, there is very little discipline in the normal sense Officers are often called by their first names amongst their men, as amongst their colleagues; there is very little saluting; there are a lot of unshaven chins; there are no outward signs of respect for superiors; there is no word in Hebrew for 'Sir'. A Soldier genuinely feels himself to be the equal of his officer -- indeed of any officer -- yet in battle he accepts military authority without question. I cannot explain, I cannot begin to understand, how or why it works. All my own military experience in the British and American Armies hastaught me that first-class discipline in battle depends on good discipline in the barracks. Israel's Army seems to refute that lesson. [56]

Yisreal Galili (1947) put it this way: 'It is said the our men are somewhat deficient in the usual forms of discipline. But against that they have the virtues of responsibility and courage. Any loss due to lack of military discipline is more than made up for by the self-reliance, the initiative and the spirit of our men.' [57]

Of the several issues raised by contemplation of the Israeli Army, two are of particular relevance to the present discussion. Firstly, like guerrilla forces in various parts of the world, and unlike the armed frces of the great democracies, the Israeli Army is itself a democratic institution. As Yigal Allon put it: 'Since it is the product of a popular movement in national liberation, directed by democratically elected civil institutions, it is perhaps not surprising that the new Army should have inherited from the Haganah its democratic values.' 58 Since it is itself democratic, as opposed, say, to the British Army, which though theoretically elected by democratic institutions is in fact controlled by an authoritarian elite, the Israeli armed forces can dispense with those artificial devices whereby authoritarianism and mediocrity are maintained. Moreover, since promotion is based on merit rather than class or money, its senior commanders, being actually of superior ability, do not require that their positions have to be shored up by the myths of infallibility and the professed virtues of blind obedience.*

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*An apparent exception to the characeristics of the Israeli Army occurred with the appointment of General Tal to command of the Armoured Corps. He announced his arrival with hitherto unprecedented imposing of discipline upon armoured personnel.

In fact, Tal's 'tightening up' was essentiall practical and not moviated by compulsvie uge towards 'bull'. The point is illustrated by some remarks which he made to members of a Kibbuts who had criticized his new approach.

'Last week I attended the funeral of a tanker at one of the Kibbutzim. Your people eulogized him as a hero, but I could only feel the pity of it all. That boys did not die a hero. He was killed accidently during a simple training exercise, merely because he was not brought up on the principle than an order should be carried out because it is an order. The Armoured Cops rules that shells must not be stored in tanks without their safety clips, for the simple reason that the static electicity inside the tanks might set the shell off. Therefore the order is quite cateforical. Sheels are to be stored in tanks in no other way, and this order must be carried out regardless of whether or not a solder is convinced of its logis. This particular Soldier did not do this,and was killed as a result.' [59]

Pehaps the most significant feature of this episode is that such a dialogue could and did take place between a general and his civilian compatriots.

2004 EDITOR: if you waste your follow-my-orders powers on BULLSHIT you whither them away so they will not be there when you really need them on life/death issues. Remember the Aesop fable of "Crying wolf!"...

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If there is saluting and respect, it is for the deserving individual, not some such vague concept as the King's Commission. By the same token, with their minds free from stultifying effects of ancient traditions, these same commanders achieve a level of fexibility and expertise conspiciously lacking in the high command of many other armies.

A second factor which seems to have contributed to Israeli military competence is, paradoxically, the enormous odds ranged against them. Unlike the armies of Britian and France, they have had to maximize their potential in waging war and have therefore not been able to afford the luxury of honourable but outmoded strategy, and a glorious by impovident attachment to horses and ceremonial parades. Hence their emphasis on the strategy of the indirect approach, on achieving surprise and on technical mastery. Regarding this latter point it could be argued that since, from the highest to the lowest, they are imbued with patriotic fervous and are fighting for survival they are without guilt, and therefore mercifully free from mock heroics and those aggression-inhibiotors such as notions of fair play with have so incapacitated the British Army. Not for them the sort of thinking wich led us to forego use of machine-guns as weapons only for use against savaes and other 'inferior peoples'. Nor have they, for the same reason, had to invoke the Almighty with such simple faith as have the generals of other armies. The Israelis, as indeed many guerrilla fighters, regard war as rather like surgery -- an unpleasant but sometimes necessary business which, if it has to be waged, should be swift, efficient and precise. Again, because their leadership is superb but unassuming, they have

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had no need to glorify war for the purpose of urging on those who do the fighting. All in all, their attitude seems remarkably mature.

Finally, the forces of Israel are also free of that crippling anti-intellectualism and curious anti-feminism which have been such a feature of other military organizations. They are not a refuge for the dim nor a place where "Butch" young men can "prove" their virility. Needless to say, according to anecdoctal evidence, even the Israeli Army is not without its problems. Two are particularly pertinent to our central thesis.

The first concerns administration. Since the Israeli Army puts a low premium on obsessive behavior, its administration tends to be disorderly: letters get lost, forms are wrongly filed, and Moshe get the call-up papers meant for Josef. In other words, the flexibility and battle discipline of a near-perfect fighting machine are evidently bought at the price of minor breakdowns on the bureaucratic front. It seems that you cannot have everything.

The other, related problem is that from time to time officers, and N.C.O.s are charged with the 'scandalous offence' of imposing "bull" it seems, upon the men. In this 'Alice Through the Looking Glass' army, "bull" it seems, is rather like V.D. in less enlightened services--something that Soldiers are liable to catch, unless due precautions are taken. Even in Israel, it seems, the management of intra-species aggression tends to excite anal-obsessive defenses in people who are perhaps naturally inclined that way. The difference between our army and theirs is that an inhibitory trait which we applaud is regarded by them as a little short of a disaster for military efficiency.

A comparison of the best with the worst of military commanders supports the view that military incompetence results from those defects of personality associated with authoritarian and disordered achievement-motivation. When all that is natural, creative, flexible, warm and outgoing in the human spirit becomes crushed and constricted, such qualities of leadership as compassion, bold decisions and military flair give way to conformity, sycophantism, indecision and fear of failure.

While the relationship between competence and an absence of authoritarianism appears to hold across cultures and to be connected in a complex way with the parent organization, our study of great commanders emphasizes that competence depends upon emancipation

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from the restrictions of militarism. Like children who can free themselves from familial pressures, great commanders are those who can rise above and even criticize their parent organization.*

It cannot therefore be maintained, as some would have it, that military disasters are explicable solely in terms of the culture of the day, of -- i our case -- the stranglehold of Victorian morality. The set of values and attitudes which this morality comprised, inculcated through school and religion, may have provided the content for some disastrous thinking. But whether or not they did so depended upon the robustness of individual personalities.

So far, then, a study of great commanders makes the theory of incompetence seem pretty watertight. But there are exceptions to the rule? The next chapter examines three such possibilities.

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*As exemplified by general Chaim Herzon's analysis of what went wrong in the Yom Kippur War of 1973. (Far from weakening the central thesis of this book, the general's indictment shows how, given time, even the best of armies may succumb to the hazards of professionalizing violence. The syndrome he describes -- underestimation of the enemy, a clinging to once useful practices, in decisions and the misreading of intelligence -- recapitulates a pattern seen so often in the past. But two curious facts remain: firstly, despite a bad start and the enormity of the odds ranged against them, [60] the Israelis were not defeated; secondly, a man who was until recently a senior member of their military hierarchy could then set about exposing what went wrong. It is perhaps the second of these phenomena which most clearly helps to explain the first.)

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Chapter 28

Exceptions to the rule?

"*One must not judge everyone in the world by his qualities as a Soldier: otherwise we should have no civilization.*"

--Field Marshal Rommel to his son

And there are grounds for adding to our list of highly competent commanders three who might at first adjusted total litigation of the proposition that authoritarianism and confidence are negatively correlated. These are among the Montgomery, Kitchener and Haig.

As popularly used the apathetic " authoritarian " might seem applicable to all three; for all tended to be cold, ruthless, dictatorial in ambitious -- as different, as one might think, from in Mike Lawrence, Snelson and slim as is possible to be.

After their military competence, they have the distinction of being controversial figures. Unlike the others, all three have had their detractors as well as devote teas.

The question arises: were they in fact authoritarian in the technical sense (i.e., did they betrayed underlying pathology of the ego (and, if so, did this lead to incompetence in their military career as? None

In answer I propose to show the in fact these men fit our theory very well, and this and three at respects:

Firstly, they suggested the relationship between personality in competence is not confined to those who work strain in their ineptitude that may operate on a continual military excellence from the worst of the best a senior commanders.

Secondly, the military shortcomings of Montgomery, Kitchener and hate and their positions along the dimension that authoritarianism are perfectly correlated.

Thirdly, the precise nature of their particular lapses from competence

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Are exactly what one would expect from features of their underlying psychopathology.

Us consider them in descending order of achievement.

Montgomery

There's one great benefit, which generals confer upon mankind, that is rarely touched upon my military historians -- their entertainment value. Even generals under whom it may have been far from Jolly to serve can arouse considerable interest when viewed from afar, and this whether they elicit morbid fascination are merely provide comic relief.

Client list of these absorbing character stand those like Kitchener and hate, who have engendered not only entertainment (in the form of films, shows, anecdotes and first (but also serious controversy over the precise value of their military performance. It could be argued that Montgomery is well to the forefront of this group on both accounts.

And he should change in no firstly, there must be generals there must be few generals with done more to lead the tedium of war than did Montgomery was now famous order on the prevention of Rainier ill disease practice these see page 277 (. For what other order, in history of warfare, has its parts is elevated dog role as this?

Morris and maturity

The general is worried and was very ill at the East,

He was honored by the subject of an aerial disease;

For 40 and 44 Soldiers was a detail he had to tell

Elaine among the deeds and love not wisely but to well.

It was plain that population was atomic for the board,

But the gallant British Soldier was an innocent abroad;

So air heat takes his pleasure with an amateur were or more,

He missed learned away from officers you've tried the path before.

No kind of doubt exist it it all the Major General's head

The demand who really give the gain of love from eight to see

Were his curls and his gadgets and those above the rock,

For the higher up an officer the batter he can path F--K.

The curls and the majors were not a bit dismay,

They gave orders for the holding of the unit (eight,

And the added its bite number showed exactly how it's done,

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How not to be a casualty and still out lots of fun.

The edges explained that Capote did not need a copy,

That refreshment horizontal must be taken standing up,

They told the troops to work at love according to the rules

And after digging into taper caution with their tools.

No general is happy and perfect Ids,

No longer as he troubled with an aerial disease,

This problem solved, is Soldiers cleaned (their badges now adult (,

He has burned across the Venus, are general of love.

" Cupid " (well chorus signals practice these

When I read how much hasin this of the move move move to secondly, there must be few general soda spar such controversial comments on their the and Genesys as these;" our best general since Wellington called (little in (; and " the most rate general World War II"(below Munson (; " a great Soldier, great in my opinion, not only by the standards of his generation but NEI of history " (Atlee (; " overcautious, had written and systematic " (on runs dead very (.

His biographer R. W. Thompson, in his but Montgomery, the field marshal, is also critical. " the field marshal's failure to seize Antwerp entire, and to advance across Alpert Canal to cut off to the glands -- and the German 15th army -- is most agonizing dire. In battle beguiling at his feet firmly on the ground, two (rooted to the ground. But it is our victory, in his sense of Malaysia, a new endearing Montgomery was manifest -- in words."

It is not my purpose to debate Montgomery's greatness. Suffice it to say that will not without blemishes he was in the main I probably commander and, as such, these be considered in the present context. Does the air does not support the hypothesis that competence depends upon absence of authoritarianism in its associated trades?

In fact, but v of alum main represents the interesting possibility that went in cheap need is sufficiently high it may not find those authoritarian pretenses which, as we've seen, interfere with the role generalship. Ronald Littleton has drawn attention to this process referring to Montgomery's reticence in his memoirs about the period between 1939 in 1934 when he was a battalion commander in Alexandria. " Montgomery ran his battalion as of Alexandria was a city line between somewhere between Sodom and Gomorrah. Certainly in that

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Early " thirties that age-old siren offered every possible temptation to both officer in man. Conscious of this, and with a harsh self righteousness, Montgomery used to firm grip -- and used it to net tactlessly. " to

At first sight is apparent concern with hope sexual goings-on, " one of the distinguishing characteristics of the authoritarian personality, coupled with the evident need for approval suggested by its omission from his memoirs, might seem to imply an authoritarian cast the mind. But in his memoirs we find him cheerfully admitting that in 1939 he got into serious trouble, including a " proper backhander " from his core commander, for issuing the order, already referred to, on the subject of an aerial disease. In used in this order, core into its author: " I analyze the problem very frankly and gave my ideas about how salt." [3]

Thanks to his brother Brian we now know what order said, and that, unlike his superiors, the future field marshal did not set himself up as a moral R. Berger of his men but applied himself to the primary task of a commander -- comes conservation of his force!

The order is neither Paris and, the continent or ignore incomprehensible, but listed, memorable and demanding attention. It establishes him as a leader who care about welfare is men, to a human and possess assisted humor. It also suggested he possess them that much lauded feature of leadership: initiative. He may have been unbearable top chronic but he was not authoritarian.

New Montgomery subsequent career confirms the reality of these traits.

1. When commanding the southeastern (anti-inpatient disease Army in 1941 he ordered all officers family should leave the area divisions which at an operational role in rappelling the invasion. Hour this episode he wrote: " I was told the good officer would never give a single thought to his family and life in such conditions: his whole mind would be on the battle. I said that I did not believe it." [4]

It has been suggested that Brian Montgomery that this apparently harsh were stemmed from jealousy and a sort of anger against date constant once upon the loss of his wife. But the fact remains that this same order implies three other characteristics of Montgomery: his grasp of reality, is prepared us to accept on popularity, and the implication that he, at least, understood what heterosexual lobe and loyalty are all.com. These are not the characteristics of an authoritarian personality.

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2. By same tilting the following excerpts from his memoirs say all that needs be said about Montgomery's capacity for those traits so conspicuously absent in the extreme authoritarian personality -- loving humanity:

Here I must turn aside to deal with something much more important than my military career, the 10 short years of my married life...

I met Mrs. Carver enter two boys age 11 and 12. I have always been devoted to young people and I like helping them: possibly because my own on happy childhood...

A time of great happy to then began close; it never before seen possible in such love and affection could exist. We went everywhere, and did everything, together. I

The doctors did everything that was possible; the nurses were splendid; but the symptoms seen you had gotten a firm hold. Betty died on the 19th October, 1937, in my arms.. Or how it not let David attend the funeral and, indeed, would never let him come and see his mother at any time when she was in great pain and slowly dying. I could not bring myself to let you see her suffering. He was only nine years old and was happy at school, Poland after the funeral I went to school untold myself. [6]

These are not the words of an authoritarian.

3. Montgomery's regard for human life, a potent factoring the overcautiousness of which some historians have caused accuse them, is reflected in his attitude to generals of the first world war. " the frightful casualties appalled me. The so-called " good fighting General's " probable ore appeared to me to be those who had a complete disregard for human life. In this context either council store a (see page 374 proxies on page Chief of Staff Pool, prior to returning to England, decided he would like, for the first time, to visit the passion Del front. That that Chief of Staff of the British army's in Europe should be ignorant of the conditions in which those armies were fighting clearly appalled the young Montgomery.

4. Montgomery's " illegal " hiring out of W. D. land to a fair promoter in order to raise funds for the garrison welfare services could have cost him his career. An officer prepared to jeopardize his career for the sake of the welfare is troops is unlikely to have an authoritarian personality.

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In 1943, during the does a campaign, Montgomery broke new ground by arranging lofty R. A. and see that female nurse to should be employed at the cattle declaring stations and Ford areas. As his brother records: " this innovation was very much appreciated by all ranks and was yet further evidence of his determination to maintain morale in all circumstances. " seven

In army whose prejudices had changed comparatively little since the days when Miss Nightingale encounters at the chilly reception from high-ranking officers during the criterion war, this was a considerable step four.

5. Montgomery also lacked those incessant traits which tend to accompany authoritarianism. He was not particular mean or particular hops tonight and, judging from his own dress any lenient attitude towards that is troops, did not harbor in the compulsive urge for " bull ". In this, as in other matters, his approach was essentially realistic. As his brother remarks: " he simply could not equate a proficiency in the formalities of the parade ground was the skills required of the infantrymen on the battlefield. "

6. The likely feature of authoritarianism is a narrow religiosity and intolerance toward Sex other in one's own. Hence it is significant to find Montgomery's risking his career by Danny formal church parades. On the second point is illuminating to discover that " despite the stricter its Protestantism of his parents, who nursed a " very strong prejudice against Roman Catholic Church", their Field marshals on sleeves nightly, and presumably sound or soundly, under a portrait of Pope Pius to 12, a man for whom he and a very high regard.

It seems, then, but whatever else you may be Montgomery does not see against a well-documented signs of authoritarianism. And yet, even in his case, there remains indisputable fact that for all his greatness as military commander become marine did have serious shortcomings which could not be attributed to a lack of professional ability. A headmaster's report might well a read: " though hard-working, energetic, knowledgeable, intelligent and able to think big, Montgomery does on occasion supervising surprising lapses in judgment and behavior."

These lapses were:

1. Any inability to get along with many as military colleagues buried like Kitchener, he had the knack of making himself enormously unpopular with his contemporaries and preferred the Company of younger and more junior officers. Also as his biographers have pointed

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Now, this failure to achieve up or, even in a situation which demanded perfect teamwork, reached catastrophic proportions in his relations with the Americans after D-Day. According to Littleton: " Montgomery lived inside to cousin, this accounts for much of the personal animosity he aroused, animosity of which he was simply not aware and of which he was incredulous much struck them. Eight

2. Montgomery second shortcoming was that he sometimes allowed his own desire for personal glory to influence is planning. " a military plan tainted tainted by an intent to satisfy the commanders ego is unlikely to be the best plan: an irrelevant factor has been introduced into the calculation. " nine

Some of Montgomery's plans fell into this category. At and fit the bill, in the north African campaign, is he still needs threaten to destroy the Army buried subsequently, in northwest Europe, the Field marshals desire to capture the whole show not only did great harm to Anglo-American relations but also, it could be argued, resulted it isn't working on the costly and aboard an ornament venture in preference to the more mundane, vote vital, task of opening up the port of Antwerp.

The significant feature of these wrong decisions was that they involved operations which were inconsistent with the personality of the man who made them.

All the them, Thompson writes:

of turn the enemy flank in the north, seizing the bridge heads on the way, one of demanded daring of high order interception, in leadership and the Field, and execution. The conception of such a plan was impossible for a man a Montgomery's in a caution... In fact, Montgomery's decision to mount the operation aimed at the suitors he was a startling as it would have been for an elderly and saintly bishops suddenly decide to take upstate breaking and began on the Bank of England. Can

Contemplation of this paradox suggested Montgomery's " lapses will, left his less successful plans, were not just ego enhancing bids for glory but also reactions against an abiding fear of failure. It is also likely that these errors of judgment, by an otherwise highly competent and professional Soldier, were partly a function of another factor underlying military incompetence: interpersonal friction and competition. If, as his biographer

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Suggests, Montgomery irked the Americans bias slowness in caution, coupled with his general mean all the " what good boy I am ", then it is equally certain did the American generals, and Pat in particular, most of the great awning, with their manifestly greater -- and " attack everywhere all the time cold philosophy. What more natural then that he should be goaded into going one better -- the first across the Rhine, the first to enter Berlin, the first to get the plotted so " housemaster " privacy CID has (Allen broke" headmaster " Churchill. It is surely a truism two of her that a proportionate military senior military man act out upon the battlefield their cool Billy lyre " schoolboy fantasies and in so doing find themselves in sharp competition with each other. This is not to belittle their performance but rather to emphasize that one reason for their occasionally anomalous behavior, one potent source of " no waste " in their decision processes, is irritating goes to some long forgotten Smith minor upon some far-off playing field.

3. Montgomery's next shortcoming present something of a paradox. It concerns the matter of communication. For man who was adapted simplifying the apparently complex, whose ability to extract the essentials from a host of irrelevant factors was second to none, you can communicate his intentions and issue orders to his subordinates of lucidity the left no room for misinterpretation, and who could write his memoirs of style that puts most generals to shame, is extraordinary that he should have been most been almost incapable of explaining himself to those above them. It was not simply a question of them not knowing what he was going to do, but often are not even understanding what he was doing while he was doing it. It was almost as if he took a delight in being misunderstood.

Putting the pieces together, one is driven to the conclusion that Montgomery's generalship was marred by the effects of his unhappy childhood.

Like Lawrence, Churchill and occurs on, Montgomery showed the effects of poor relationship with his mother. In his case, become combination of two little affection and too much discipline seems to a venture waited in an insatiable need to prove himself, the desire to create a happy family life (symbolized by a staff of young ladies on officers (which he had lacked as a child, and the Tendancy, as far as his superiors were concerned, to keep things himself. On this latter point, little wind draws up interesting parallel between Montgomery and TE Lawrence, another Irishman who " in dirty mom other. " off his parent

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Lawrence wrote: Poe I have a terror of her knowing anything about my feelings are convictions, or way of life. If she knew they would be damaged, violated, no longer mind. "

It Montgomery's case it was evidently not enough to he remained inscrutable. One gets the impression that he had act out some much earlier experiments by actually contriving situations in which he would be misunderstood. He had, it seems, to provoke the inevitable counterattack.

If he refers back to the chapter on military organizations, the reader will call that these may be "conceptualize this complex devices for legitimizing, handling and controlling aggression. As such they provide admirable vehicles pretty acting out of these provoke aggressive fantasies the center around the part pair of child relationship. Much of Montgomery's behavior becomes explicable in the light of this theory.

There is reason to believe the lives of many adults represent attempts to find ideal parent substitutes -- people, things are activities which provide what was lacking in the original relationship with father or mother, which represent an outlet for feelings that could not be expressed at the time in their original occurrence. Thus it was that Hitler, according to lingerers announces, projected onto Germany the love which he fell towards his mother, and onto Austria the hatred which he bore towards his father.

The currently found to such substitutes -- first, his wife and marriage, and then, when these were lost him, the Army. For him the Army became it wants to good mother and the good family, something onto which he could pour his energy and law and through which he could restore his damage self-esteem. But is also it also became a means for expressing is more negative emotions, a place in which she had to find the bad parent was higher must be aroused and from whom secrets must be capped. Let us examine this theory rather more closely, in the light of certain specific incidents. What follows is in fact an attempt to account for certain recurring features of Montgomery's behavior and terms of what is known of the psychology of identification.

There may well be other site explanations, but it is this one, so it is contended, which must clearly fit all the facts. Well won its taste a question of you put for by his brother Brian, I would suggest that any resemblance between the character of Bernard Montgomery and that of his mother is proudly merrily due to the fact that, from a very Early

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Age, he again if I strongly with his formidable almond, and that anomalies in his behavior were consequence of this identification.

Support for this contention comes from the finding the children tend to identify with the more dominant of their parents. [11] in some cases would appear to have been his mother.

Now identification Intel several components which include adopting the parents views, modeling oneself on the parent's behavior. It Montgomery's case it probably also involved what is technically known as " identification with the aggressor. " this is a defensive identification, and apparent siding with the enemy -- a sort of " if you can't be enjoyed in response, in which the child attempts to cope with the all-powerful and frustrate parent by adopting as his own the very weapons that were used against them. It Montgomery's case the aggressor with whom he done applied was again, almost certainly, his mother. But such identification is are stressful and themselves and is for very one simple reason. It tells me depended upon someone towards whom he feels basically hostile but from whom he cannot break free because the frustrating person is now, incense, inside them -- Inc. part of his own line. Several results might be expected to follow from the state of affairs. Firstly, the individual may alternate between dependence upon, and rejection of, the person with whom he has done applied. Secondly, he might well strive to prove himself as an individual and his own right: yes it will be averse to sharing his achievement with others. Finally, as a reflection of his underlying conflict between dependence in rebelliousness, he will, throughout his life, show periodic regressions of behavior in which he asked out once again the original shelter shrivel.

So much for a theoretical announces, based upon general principles. How does Montgomery's behavior fit this pattern? The following facts reported by his brother illustrate the main points of contact.

The firstly have to incidents, minor in themselves, which suggests the continued identification with the dependence upon his mother. The occasion is summer holiday, one Montgomery took it upon himself to organize the House party " in a proper military manner. " this was a program for the day which he posted out for his various friends and relations:

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Program for today

Date

Timing even remarks

1000 the main well-placed squash

girls will go shopping in the village.

Orders by mother

1100 bathing optional

Betty will pain

: no right sermon

1200 girls will pick flowers for the House

1300 launch don't be late

1430 all to golf course and Greencastle, lastly some and 92 will prepare tea and convey to golf course. RV in clubhouse at 71700

1800 return to new park [12]

Though ostensibly a joke call, its particular form suggest the internalized voice of the dominant and organizing mother speaking through the mind of her son. He will has to, as it were, become her Chief of Staff.

The second incident involves the latter which at, at the age of 38, he wrote to his mother. Yet he confided that the first girl he had ever propose to return them down. As his brother remarks: "... The fact that he confided in our mother about this whole affair, and had written to her as ending, points to the growing influence she is had been and is life. The days of conflict with her were all over, at any rate for the time very been. " [13]

The reference to the early conflict, followed by the dependence, followed in turn by the suggestion of yet more conflict to calm, Guinness at the existence of the much deeper in abiding conflict between the need to lead upon and the need to revolt against the internalized parent.

Buying his knee durable late in necessity to be a person in his own right, something more than the male embodiment of his mother. Thus it was perhaps the drove them into the bizarre position is simply not being able to share with another even the smallest fruits of his greatest achievements.

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Strangely in very regrettably for all those new home well, he was seen to reject perhaps repudiate is not to struggle were (not only his own Chinese and can but also some of his best friends. Astonishingly, the latest victim now turned out to be none other than his trusted cheese of staff equally law. And maybe extraordinary to record that the equally donned head not been allowed to witness to ceremony surrender at tactical headquarters 21 Army group on form 81945; his chief Ed told him not to tan. [14]

Essay in high-ranking officer, who had been Montgomery's right hand manned throughout most war, suffered three for every boss from his erstwhile sheet. Chief. He is not detailed to take part in the victory parade before the King. Here's not given an official seat along the route but had to buy a backseat for itself in his life. Finally, he was not given the job vice chief imperial general staff when Montgomery became CID asked. Despite the fact that six-month earlier the latter had asked him if you accept the job.

Predictably, Montgomery was no less ruthless with his mother. When this lady requested and received, from Newport Council, an invitation to his installation is an honorary freemen of the city, the field marshal intervened and insisted that she should be banned from the lunchroom buried his brother writes " it needs no imagination to appreciate the distress and sorrow that ensued, though in due time our mother fully recovered one was none the worse for it. " [15]

Reading between the lines, one as the impression the Montgomery's mother was herself to stop is all boots and, one might add, just sort of parent would be most difficult to dislodge from the big takeover was years previously had occurred in the mind of her son. No doubt sheet your himself or she yourself increasingly serve to exacerbate this conflict in the mind of her boy by her growing desire to bask in his reflected glory.

We have looked at evidence for identification, dependency in self-assertion, but what about those incidents and got his life which suggests it on occasion he could regress to a much earlier pattern of behavior -- that of the schoolboy who is trying to prove himself?

One of the most revealing occurred while he was a cadet at the RMA Sandhurst. This was the notorious occasion when, as leader of the game, he corner to fellow cadet and set fire to a shirttails. Is victim is so badly burned and sever such agonizing pain that he

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Had to be emitted hospital. When Montgomery was discovered to have been instigator leader of this assault he was threatened from asked with expulsion from the Academy.

You just say, look he received news of this happening is mother sprang into action. A phone call to the, not achieved her first objective -- she was invited to Sandhurst for the night. By morning, so it seems, is incredible woman testing rolled the head of the RMA into retaining her son. Is only penalty for what criminal law now turned " grievous bodily harm " was six-month loss of promotion. While he could hardly be disputed to Britain has much to thank Mrs. Montgomery four, this incident does illustrate several points of pertinent stew of very to the very advanced year. First the act itself, carried out at the relatively mature age of 20, is, however entertaining for all but the victim, certainly juvenile and its conception. Was perhaps more remarkable is Montgomery's almost total lack of guilt, shame and compassion. His only regret seems to abandon a constant six-month seniority. No less significant is the stated reason for the assault: " he was a dreadful chap. " well the more enlightened reader at might well regard is as adding insult to injury, we put only opined that it reveals something of the schoolboy mentality.

It is totality, the episodes involves an interesting and perhaps not entirely coincidental repetition of an earlier relationship between the benign father, the all in developing and powerful mother, and the trouble shall do is to provoke the very parent upon whom he so abjectly depends. Taken by itself, the incident may seem unimportant, but considered alongside other inanimate no anomalies in the behavior Montgomery it does imply, even if it does not prove, the relevance of identification behavior

Of this event Brian Montgomery writes: "but this time he lurches lesson and for good. " in one since this is true -- he certainly worked hard from that time on. But another case it lacks validity. Throughout his subsequent career, entirely continue to show evidence of the unwritten any schoolboy in his makeup.

A typical instance was sick occasion in 1911 when, as the time sports Officer, he was required to organize a friendly football match between men from his regiment and the sailors revisiting German battleship. For diplomatic reasons he was given strict instructions to field a team a mediocre players. Any event, however, he confronted the Germans with the best footballers to decline. The inevitable result

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Was a crushing embarrassing defeat for the Germans by 40 goals to nail. Montgomery subsequent excuse was " I was not taking any risks with the Germans." 2004 EDITOR: I think they mean soccer

This can be viewed into lights. On the one hand and may be regarded as an amusing instant all now Sony and disobedience coupled with ardent patriotism. But on the other is the behavior of a somewhat " shortsighted " schoolboy what one-stroke manages to rebel against authority, appear a hero in the eyes of his followers, avert his own underlying fear of failure" give those rockers as sound thrashing. " he was and 25 years old.

In 1944 he had his portrait paid by the Justice John. To some people his subsequent remark to Col. Dawn any cash " who is this chap? He drinks he, he's dirty, and I know there are women in the background"-- may seem very embodiment of the military mind; anti-intellectual, anti-sacks and anxious about dirt. But Montgomery's case, just in light of his other characteristics, this remark sounds more like the calculated rudeness of the schoolboy whose headmaster has given him a poor report. The report report was of course the portrait, which Montgomery evidently found unflattering. His vanity regarding photographs of themselves lends some countenance to this view.

Then there's the episode which occurred during his term SCI GS after the last war. Returning with this military assistant from New York on the Mauritania, Montgomery stopped again interview with a famous yet fellow passenger, Andre Crow Nico. He was rebuffed, but refusing to take " no cold for an answer hit behind a ventilator and ambush the Russian diplomat during the latter's morning constitutional.

His brother puts the two sides of his behavior very well.

Some of my readers may regard the action I have described as a planned antique, or at least as Boy Scout episode, but I'm dignified and therefore inappropriate for the professional head of the British army and his staff officer, abjectly when the other party involved was a high-ranking Soviet diplomat. The as in many, the sequel surely showed the affair in a different light. The plan worked in all respects!. Heard. I cannot but see this incident as further evidence, not only of that implement shift in my brother, but all sold his resolution never to accept defeat. 16

Three and 67 push him the last illustration giving here is also taken from Brian Montgomery's boat, includes two letters from his brother.

29-5-59 it is intended mail

My dear Brian, you may like to build it will air -- Miller is coming here tomorrow, Saturday, at 430 to have tea with me. He is coming alone!! You were as ever,

Bernard

Something years later, in 1968, he sent me a copy of cancer with a letter in which he wrote:

Using tin mill

Dear Brian,

You may like to region hints answered my speech in the defense debate in the house of lords on Wednesday last. The house was full: members from the comments crowded their place at the bar of the house, in the steps of the throne were filled with pretty counselors!

Yours as ever,

Bernard

Even his critics to marshal will say that letters such as these are evidence of overwhelming two-seat and arrogance; but a reality they sure do so his supreme confidence and judgment in his own ability and opinions. [17]

In many here one less then to differ with the interpretation put on these letters by Brian Montgomery. A superficial level the letters are certainly those of the braggart schoolboy brimming with self-confidence, but a deeper level analysis and in the context of his other characteristics is really rather pathetic in IE pieces of conceit betray an underlying need to prove himself to others and thereby to himself. People who are really self-confidence not need to boast to their younger brothers, particularly when they are intelligent enough to realize that such boasting detract from, rather than enhances, their image in the public mind.

We know this section on Field Marshal Montgomery, foresee trouble with a double tees as well this tractor shouldn't. The former will no doubt be appalled that " our greatest general since Wellington "

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To be subjected to a character analysis which may seem a speculative as it is insulting. This tractors, on the other hand, maybe it displacement analyst of great channels as totally unwarranted, and the excuse and of his less acceptable behavior, on the grounds of factors over which he had no control, as unjustified ex goal patient for what was in effect transparent medical mania.

Be that as it may, the greatest affairs conclusion is surely Montgomery was, in the main, a great in gifted general. Much of his greatness resulted from a confidence a confluence of three factors: sheer hard work, a refusal to conform to do dead hand of military tradition, and the possession of a mind is open, clear and sensitive is that of any sharp eye, Sharp Tong schoolboy of a both average intelligence.

These three factors could resulted from his identification with, and subsequent unsuccessful attempts to free himself from, and the invasive and oppressive woman, his mother. Divert we owe, in for more than any other biological sense, not only the victory at alum alum main but also all those perks of the Field Marshal which have made him one of the most controversial, criticize an entertaining military commanders in British history.

Kitchener

Kitchener, too became Secretary of State in the first world war, hand, according to fill a Magness, " to basic attributes -- an unparalleled thoroughness and an unparalleled dry will he was a " individualist of great conceptions, Bruce hard himself as nature was capable, at times, of kindness, sympathy and even affectionate ". 18 these traits -- is obsessiveive drive to the seasonal workers on once described Kitchener as " is molten massive devouring energy of (, is individualism and refusal to conform, the originality of us thinking, and the occasional flashes underlying warmth and generosity, or hard to reconcile with the notion of authoritarianism. *

The same token, Kitchener did not appear to manifest a need for approval. S. Asquith put it: " he cannot pose for posterity; he never

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* according to Kenneth Macksay, the view that Kitchener's apparent dismissal of tanks as "pretty mechanical toys" showed a reactionary streaking as nature, is mistaken. The remark was apparently motivated by security reasons, to distract attention from a tank development worked was going on. The same writer presents evidence to Kitchener, like a, was active in pressing for the construction of tanks. [19]

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Late himself out even for contemporary our posthumous applause " on the contrary, lightning company he could be exceedingly rude, tackles, irritating, and apparently impervious to others thought of him.

He cannot welcome external constraints, and showed scant regard to rules and regulations when these conflicted with his purpose. Nor did he happily except that sacrosanct feature of authoritarian ideology -- the established " packing water " -- but would " in his boot into any system of administration and. Return " [Rand [in pieces any establishing a command. This system was " in, in reality, indication of any system and his drive prompted lending and sorely decentralized every species of authority in himself. After he done so, he perform your goals of improvisation extracted from subordinates me trusted and occasionally loved much more mundane or anyone else believed they had to give. " wanting

Finally, Kitchener betrayed no trace of the ethnocentric feelings which are associated with a authoritarianism. On the contrary he showed a marked liking for the sorry the Egyptians, perks and Jews.

However, there are reasons for believing that those aspects of his military career which invited unfavorable comment, and eventually brought about is doubtful, sprang from an unresolved conflict between any drive in pure technical conscience. On the one he and the finding " acquiescence with apparent in difference in the continued infliction of outmoded punishments for trivial offenses, such as the lopping off of hands and feet will 21 and on the other showing signs of " unmistakable discomfort " will watching a " somewhat improper French light Opera " in Cairo. " interest in the veiled in decencies was as unintelligible to him as the industry decencies were of themselves intolerable. " 22 by the same token he was obsessiveive, worldly and mean. " one he is table was late for gas, Kitchener invariably inspected himself. Record and to commence pains to ensure no class or vase, and no ninth, support for spitting was a fraction of an inch out of position. "

Obvious mean this Magness says: "... He had a reputation for meanness which was not wholly undeserved record those in Williams superficial he had no contraception of the powerful emotional undercurrents which he at school himself poor press, in which found an outlet in his passion for art and flowers. Return dealers learned closer shops, and fellow collectors to be suddenly in disposed, whenever it was known to the commander-in-chief was engaged upon an artistic brow. " 23

The traits revealed here fit in which much that was good and bad in

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In an his military performance Terry DOS " DOS he is " unparalleled drive, constrained in the channels of administrative thoroughness and military zeal, it she miracles of organization in Egypt and the Sudan. Even his meanness found viable expression in the stringent economies which he imposed on military spending. As Magness remarks: " Kitchener developed his twin authoritarian attributes (go private " and " thoroughness " (to us a unique pitch of obsessional intensity " [24]

But, other necessity, a price was paid. For all his greatness, Kitchener seems to have been a victim of their oppressive forces implanted him as a child, presumably buys more net of a father. His aloofness, is unpopularity with many of his fellow officers, is prior to work as part of the team and, most damaging of all, his latter day in decisiveness and hesitant scene directing the Gallup wholly campaign must be ascribed to defects of personality rather than in intellect.

Bring a critical October days his indecision disgusted his colleagues. Is this insistence upon the obvious, combined with an elaborate display us to Liddy was used to cover his effectiveness in verbal discussion, finally killed Glamour admiration and even the affectionate with which many of his colleagues had previously felt for him. [25]

One final point: is perhaps significant knack, though so alike in their professionalism, their drive, their loneliness, secrecy and their unpopularity, Montgomery in Kitchener differed to corporate soundly in two important ways. Kitchener childhood had been happy; Montgomery said not. Kitchener was so self-confident that he lacked vanity, Montgomery so vain the appear to have enormous self-confidence. Both underway were highly competent wars. Both, when the laps, did so as a result of shortcomings and personality rather in intellect.

Haig

In trite answer the question whether the recurring features a military incompetence derive from aspects of authoritarian personality, even in the commander will ultimately emerged victorious, one cannot do better than consider the case of Douglas eight, commander-in-chief of the British armies on the Western front between 1915 and 1918.

Judging from the war of words which has raged between his

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Detractors in the depot teas, there never was a more controversial military commander!

Well changed, British number one war criminal, expected to Germans to advance in this attack at the same slow pace of his own plums leap land assault." [26]

"Terry.. He seemed to be the most house equipped thinker in the British autonomy. " [27]

oh hey perhaps fail to see the dead man cannot advance, and that to her place in his only to provide another corpse [28]

Using each trades demand is a stubborn as an offensive that all but drilled us on the salt should be from Aunt August 98 not work had become the driving force of the Allied armies. This was so and it must descend on his credit for no manned in the nodded during that authorities of the war he fitted advances and fitted above. Why not pull parity was unimaginative. Maybe he was a competent according to his lights but these were dim; competence of divine approval appeared to satisfy. Nothing to excuse the cavities of the Somme in the past no. 30

By way production is proposed examined role just one battle so Michael Doctor diapers or as commonly called passion Dale. It is concluded that color for great commander may have been another ways at other times, the relationship between events fashioned on the person on the manic simple fight was appointed in his book.

The battle to the art road " achieve little except lost in which Danny repeated earlier history of this heretofore. So for listeners result, so depressing misdirection was his 1970 offensive " the passion Dell has become what Walker in a century before cinnamon our military defeat

30 want to Britain fine sight. Hence we have task of these result of her stable and paid was aware minimize ability this offensive. The following fact suggested he was aware but could not close his mind information which do not fit in with his preconceptions are wishes;

1. Lloyd George and plumbing so try to restrain them but without success. Even for fall spot the plant dessert.

2. Mitterrand Google advises want to weather conditions would be unusually bad with abnormally high levels of rainfall. Memo to GH could take a course reported warned the Art R. Kelly bombarded

Presented to

Destroy the Belgian land raid system that will revert was want. Haiti nor these items of information.

3. Taken to officers knew the Germans expected the offensive. Hey evident aid was evidently dismay.

4. Eight net opposition to his plans to rationalization. He pointed fighting continued as president as the enemy run out of man. This forecast exceeded that even his own optimistic intelligence service. Secondly, he was supported by the Navy maintaining of their continued existence printed upon clearing the Germans from about it goes. As a chief of takes intelligence staffer more core " no one believed is rather amazing view. "

All in all, hates optimistic believed to defeat the Germans single-handedly in Flanders and given rise to plant was unfounded on Faith Rather and reason.

All, hates optimistic believed he defeat the Germans single-handedly in Flanders the given rise to plant was founded on Faith Rather and reason. In total disregard of the evidence regarding land drainage, he started the offensive of bombardment of four half-million shells (the cost of 22,000,000 lbs. (. The spectacular release of energy provided for entry quarter tons of high explosive for every yard of font. It continued for 10 days. Predictably, the drains collapse, the rains came and ground subsided into his seat liquid mud.

Into this oddly lunar landscape paid launched well divisions. They advanced a veteran sure rain. On the left mind that may progress but on the right minute tank simply did disappeared into the mud.

So hopeless was a situation and so appalling losses that even the impetuous General Dow, one of takes Army commanders, advice going off the offensive. He was disregarded. Attacks went on well into October. From being what one were corresponded described as a " great bloody experiment -- a huge gamble " the "total an expensive failures ". The rifles another weaponry made useless by the mud, the attacker struggle for only to fall and be replaced by others. And steelhead, bleed up of lofty optimism, could not let go, he'd put pushed ever more minute to the battle, into what had by now become one enormous swamp of running flash.

The phone to Scripps to the battle probably say all that remains to be said in the present context about 30 a Ypres. The first is by a private Soldier, the second by military historian.

While I and others were taking supplies into the lining a Ypres, we

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Waiting to mud all the way. It was very necessary to keep following leader strictly in line, for one fall step to the right or left sometimes meant plunging into dangerous in the mud pools. Government was unfortunate enough to step outline and fell into what are these models. Knowing from past experience quick action is needed fewer save him from quick sinking, we did the old as Anza tried to pull now. This did not produce much result and we had to be careful not slip in with them. We finally produced a rope and managed a stupid securely under his armpits. He was now gradually sinking until the mud and water reached almost where shoulders. We tugged at the rope to strike the desperation an attempt to save them. But it was useless. He was passed in the mud and beyond human name. Reluctantly, the party had to leave into his fate, and that state laws -- gradually sinking inch by inch and finally sign of suffocation. The poor fellow now you he was beyond all aid in begging issued him rather in bleed him to die a miserable death by suffocation. I do not want to do this, but thinking of the agonies he would endure if I left into this horrible death, I decided to quick death would be a merciful ending. I'm not afraid to say therefore my shot this man and isn't owned most urgent request, releasing income of four more agonizing and. [32]

Perhaps the most damning comment on the plant which plans the British Army does Pap mud and blood is contained in incidental revelation of the remorse of want who was larger spots before. This highly placed officer from GH to was honored his first visit to our front -- at the end of the four months battle. Drawing increasingly uneasy as the car approach to swamp like edges of the battle area, he eventually burst in the tears, crying " good God, to be released in many ending to fight in that? " in which is contained applied to the ground is far worse ahead. If the exclamation was a credit to was hard it revealed on what a foundation of delusion and inexcusable ignorance is indomitable " defensiveness " had been based. [33]

So much for the battle. The question hour rises: did hate events those character traits that are associated with authoritarianism?

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He certainly had most of them. For start he was conservative, conventional and, this attitude towards the French, ethnocentric. His diary in dispatches suggested he was on emotional and totally in anti-intercepted (i.e., not wonder reflect upon his own motives (. He was manifestly lacking in compassion toward his fellow man. He was a confirmed believer in the direction advanced by supernatural powers (according to research, coral at of authoritarianism (, and reserved to the point of being verbally almost inarticulate. 2004 EDITOR: this is exactly how Bush quasi-thinks

Haig also betrayed that try at of traits which, according to contemporary research, defines the incessant character is correlated with authoritarianism. He is obsolete, orderly and mean.

About his office and see little further needs to be said. The beginning to end, his handling of third-year Ypres be token synopsis see all the statue ask proportions.

As for the second-rate: in his dress, and habits in appearance hate was immaculate, orderly and quite probably be the cleanest man of the Western front. And contemporary a visit Clifton remembered him predicament for his cleanliness, unremarkable attribute to be recalled of a fellow schoolboy.

And for an example of his love of global " there is this excerpt from a Calvary men's letter: " he a personal escort consisting of all troop of his own regiment. There are easily the smartest thing in France. Not to a lot of plays, stripes and gold pretty NCO's, great silver poached golden Crossbow"... " 34 other writers of commented on his meticulous attention to detail my new detail, and his habit of planning each day according to set pattern.

Like many incessant, in or out of banks, page love the task of handling other people's money but Haiti parting with his own. The Parliament voted in the grant of 100,000 lbs., he never let compassion overrule this personal thriftiness. As Sergeant secret records of indigent exiled surgeon came to see Haiti after the war: " never up any did they get from Lord hate! That was one thing he would not do; he would never par with money to them. I seen hundreds of cases were man had told the most distressing tail, and wound up with a request for small " granting a " only to be disappointed. " 35

While many rationalization steady advance for the withholding a private charity, the following episode, in which takes personal servant for 3025 years seeks a modest rising wages, it is not so easily explained:

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All the long years I was with Earl hate, though I held the rank as Sergeant it was only acting unpaid rank. RC 30 shillings a month for years until the war increases came. Then, when I came out of the Army with 20 years service and attention of 19/6 a week the Earl gave me 65 lbs. A year. It was impossible to marry on that. I hoped he would have seen my point, but he was essentially conservative in his arrangements I believe he thought in his heart I would never break away. Return when I told them he scarcely realized. He hesitated, throughout his heels, took them back in, through them back out, embarrassed, awkward. So was on... I knew he was on the point of offering something that would have made the break-in necessary, but he cannot bring himself to do it. 36

Further comments seem superfluous.

From research into the nature in etiology of authoritarianism it was diluted to the condition to rise in the impact on the child of status anxious parents. Subsequent research is confirm the relationship between sexual repression, militarism, religiosity, aggression and having a restrictive mother. Hate fits his parent pretty well. His early development presents the picture of an unusually solid and aggressive child being pushed resolutely forwards and upwards by restricting pure chemical mother. The sad thing is that the strength of her motivation to work success was more been matched by the extremity of his intellectual backwardness. Under circumstances is hardly surprising that, though remaining devoted to mother, he became somewhat ambivalent towards women, an uneasy, the same police, about the whole subject of Sex. " the only persons, if one may use such a definition, whom he ever introduced to Oxford, were brothers, and he never (as far as I'm aware (entertain any women except his sister, though I seen his face set in silent at Austin protest, against any luge jokes about women. " [37]

To the description of his proposal, and subsequent honeymoon, certainly according to ferry did hate was no Don long. " we looked for a quiet seat but not finding one he blurted out " unless propose to you standing ". This was very abrupt and I may say unexpected, but I excepted him (bridges. Return to set only two weeks lead before we were due to set sail for India and during this time we amuse ourselves are writing about the countryside. " [38]

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Sir George Arthur release to hate is typically authoritarian attitude towards Sex.

Is not appear to intrusively into the arena of a man's life to allude to its austere purity, to suggested in this respect our man upon occurred to shrink back from something like all or from certain forms of evil, to whom it would be ashamed even to speak of those things done a secret... He low, of course, for no moral utopia but no name, know that nor effort, was subscribed more hardly been to his to the famous memorandum in which offices were to encourage and their man a believe in leading a good and healthy life, and in every way -- not least by themselves setting an example of self-restraint -- two to protect them from a great been devastating evil. [39]

Is existing to compare visit number is enlightened in equally famous memorandum on how to prevent VP in the Army (page 277 (.

As for aggression, it is no exaggeration to say that hate to presents a classic picture of the visit to two to tan the aggressive driving authoritarians. Naturally aggressive himself wheeled, hate, White Montgomery, encountered heavy opposition from his mother. In haste cases conflict with mamma appears to tell with by what analysts call introduction and repression. He incorporated his mother hasn't idealized authority figure, and are partially pure chemical precepts began his own parade with his inner strength he evidently achieved fairly massive repression of his sexuality in a rerouting of aggression which is legitimize, and in the encourage, by the teachings of the Scottish church. These ancient outlets include hard work, a believe any inevitability of punished for wrongdoing and preoccupation with the concept of discipline. " Soldiering was his first and main consideration and rats not the least attractive part of it was the discipline of mind and body of all -- discipline was so ingrained that the neglect of it in any walk of life was intolerable to him. " [40]

As hate himself wrote: " discipline is never had such a vindication in any war as in the present one, and it is their discipline which most distinguishes our new armies from all certainly created armies of the

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past. At the outset the lack of deep-seated and instinctive discipline placed our troops at a disadvantage compared with the methodically trained Army. " [41]

Even when teaching his children to ride, Jagr might remain the Austin disciplinary leading emphasis upon the fact that wrongdoing (i.e., teasing the ponies (would be punished sooner or later. The guilty would be thrown off.

Predictably, hate's writings, dire reason dispatches are greatly lacking in any emotional for a. Indeed they have been described by one historian as " less exciting than the average laundry list. " though praising the loyalty and discipline of his armies, he really manages to fearful casualties for which these Army suffered, and no sign of genuine war for compassion Levens the otherwise flatly factual pros. The only time that he shows a ripple of excitement is when discussing any losses. Such phrases as " are lowered guns did great execution among his retiring column's ", " magnificent fight " and " repulsed with great slaughter " carry nuances of the curious were less which are markedly absent from the rest of his writing.

In terms of style, hate's writing has much in common with the diary of timely camera. Both may go reading of one, in haste cases way, were world shaking events. Both showed that preoccupation with time which characterizes mental its assets and old assassins: " lowered derby called the seen the 9:45 a.m. call. But we took the children to the parent to mind... The play began at 1:30 p.m. and lasted till 5:30 p.m. ". " I attended a meeting of the work habits at 11:30 p.m. " " at 3 p.m. I attended a conference on the supreme or console adverse eye. Return the conference to do breakup till 6:30 p.m... We got back to Paris by 7:30 p.m.. " 42 (for comparable excerpt from Hitler's diary, see page 312. (

Both direst seem to delight in criticism of others. " he [Lloyd George [is a real badly. The other members of the work and the seen afraid of them. Milner is a tired to suspect old man. Kurzweil, gas bag. On our law equals bone or law. Smarts has good is think but lacks knowledge. " " many [Wilson in Rawlings and [are both humbugs. " " I found flow should no selfish and opposite. " " I thought Pershing was very opposite and stupid. " acid content of these criticisms, it is a feature of authoritarians the day into to others their loan less pleasant traits. Hating him were shared to other characteristics. To begin with, neither could dare to witness the suffering of others. " he

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[J. [felt he was his duty to refrain from visiting the casualty clearing stations because these visits medium physically ill. " [43]

The second, and related, common denominator of these two men with their tendency to find a psychosomatic outlets for their surplus aggression. In Hitler's case, as we saw earlier, the favorite outlet was those disorders of the gastrointestinal tract. In he hate's case it was asthma, a psychosomatic complaint which according to some authorities results from repressed aggression. Suffice it to say that hate suffered one of these worst attacks of this malady before the ill-fated battle of lose, which, large the thanks to the incompetence of Sir John French, Costa British 50,000 casualties.

The evidence so for suggest that, whatever his virtues as a general, hate possessed well marked obsessiveive and authoritarian traits and the DZ explain much of the behavior fastened on by his detractors. It remains to add that hate appears to have possessed for other characteristics which, as often as not, go along with authoritarianism. He had " a close my ", our need for social approval, some pathology of achievement motivation and, to " a GPA PE Taylor, " a total lack of imagination ".

It will be recalled according to roll teach people differ along a continuum of open-mindedness. The one and are those who are open to fresh ideas, and at the other those who find hard to accept and act upon information which is not accordance their systems a believe. Hate, like many authoritarians, seems to have belonged to latter territory. Certainly is behavior before and during 30 Ypres appeared to reflect the working so mind it was impervious to contrary information. Shorty make up nor did he make up for his " closed mind by having it fertile imagination; for about Haiti's lack of this the faculty there has been almost complete unanimity of agreement. Lloyd George and no illusions_when he wrote: " I never met anyone in a high position or seem to be so utterly devoid of imagination."wobble described hate is having " a one track mind "; and even hate's chaplain, Duncan, whose adulation for his chief port on the sycophant, was forced to omit that there may have been grounds for supposing hate to be unimaginative. In a charitable attempt to make a virtue out of necessity goes on to stress that hate " recoil from strategical conceptions were not in a court of military principals " and that he is " targeting flexibility prepared the way for final victory ". [44]

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Finally, we come to the complex issue and ship achievement motivation. The others suggest that hate's burning ambition to succeed overlay a pronounced fear of failure, itself a product of childhood. Since he is devoted to his mother is reasonable to suppose that her bitter disappointment over his intellectual backwardness causing considerable anguish. He fell perhaps that he had builder, and, predict after her death, work towards proving itself. In the light of research (described earlier (by Bernie and his colleagues he showed several traits associated with pathological achievement motivation. He was ardent seeker of social approval, predict from the king. He disliked publicity and nursed in an reasoning dislike of newspaper reporters. He preferred the Company of his interiors to that of his equals. Though possessing a great believed in the value of loyalty, he rarely had a good word to save as military contemporaries and was quite ruthlessness machinations against his erstwhile cheap, Sir John French.

Finally, he showed a predisposition toward persisting in past were so difficult of failure seems inexcusable. As the Dow Hart wrote of 30 Ypres, he chose a spot " most difficult from cells and least vital to the enemy. "

It seems then, but had possessed more than his fair share of traits associated with or terry. He was conventional, conservative, unimaginative and rigid. He had a call close mind, was pathologically ambitious, intercepted in punitive. He was superstitious, militaristic, obsessive and avoid appeal compassion. Finally, not very surprisingly view of his other attributes, he was never popular. He commanded respect in adulation but lack that warmth which elicits in action for one's fellow man.

Not whether or not the third battle the Ypres, which was described by AGP Taylor as " the greatest the blind a slaughter of a blind war, while " in which cost the British over 300,000 casualties for " trivial gains ", he simplifies incompetence is perhaps debatable. People are still divided on this issue.

What is certain is that hasty seating of this battle, his conduct of the fight in his impaired inability to let go or consistent with this personality of the man and not a triple, a somewhat inhabit, to stupidity.

Besides providing a particular start illustration of this relationship between military behavior and human psychopathology, the case of eight .sup three other issues are some pertinent. First it supports

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The cycle analytical notion of " acting out. Whether by accident or by design, the events of third you Ypres -- enormous release a destructive energy, the churning up of ground until the overlapping craters collapsed into one great Ricci Swamp, and the expulsion into his this morass of more and more yet both thecal bodies -- constitute the acting out of additional fantasy of the impressive proportions. The apparent denial of what would happen as a result of such mundane causal determinants as bad weather in shattered lane drains, the opposite straining until the last Soldier had been expelled in the cesspool of passion Dale, and the gastrointestinal pain experience by the progenitor of these excuses obsessivees (Manas on other occasions the court-appointed results of his aggression (force the conclusion that acting out was not so much coincidental as deliberately, if unconsciously, motivated. The second issue, and one of great relevance to the general theory of incompetence, concerns the relationship between personality and promotion. What results and failings, hey did exceptionally well in his race to the top. He set particular is particular set of traits, opts tendency will, orderliness, personal ambition and underlying aggression, abetted by Machiavelli and is a in conformity, where ideally suited to the requirements of the military organization. Far from hindering the physics as sent, his early intellectual backwardness serve to provide the that initial wound to his self-esteem which had to be redressed.

The remains one issue somewhat wider psychological interest: the astonishing cleavage of opinion between those who champion and those who condemns her Douglas Haig.

Thus in contrast to what the Dell are not about third you Ypres -- liking it for deaths of military ineptitude to the notorious wall terrain is in addition -- we find Marshall Cornwall, in 1973, defending Haiti gets his critics. This general, who served under Haig is a junior staff officer in 1917, defends Haig's conception and handling of third you per 15 main towns: 2004 EDITOR: general's have to stand up and defend other general's

1. The offensive was forced upon Haig to the need to liberate the Belgian ports, the striking the below the German submarine fleet.

2. He was so also moved to take the load off the French, whose armies were debilitating by mutiny's following were down.

3. He was misled regarding German strength by his overoptimistic teeth of intelligence, Brigadier Tartarus.

4. Third you Ypres was justified the fact that the 400,000 casualties

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Sustained by Germany outnumbered the two and 40,000 suffered by the Briton British the Briton.

5. Haig's prologue of the battle after October 3, 1917, which cost British a further on hundred thousand casualties, safety is troops from mentoring in flooded Marshall and under the domination of any observation post on higher ground.

The Marshall Cornwall makes no mention of the evidence which Haig had received regarding rainfall, and the likely affect open bar meant on the Belgian lane drains. 45

The light of these arguments is interesting to consider AG JP P. Taylor on the same events.

They manufactured excuses why the yet Ypres campaign had to be made. He may out that baton pleaded urge British offensive in order to divert the Germans from his neatness Army. This was not true. The time wanted small actions to keep the Germans busy, not a great offensive which might reduce the German British Army to the same stated the moralization is his own. Began Haig recruited yellow coat to insist that all stand and said Ruby must be taken if the German submarines were to be checked. This, too, was not true. Most German submarines operate from home ports, not from all stand and said Ruby. Haig in South knew that the argument was unsound. He regarded yellow coat as a " an old woman "; but every argument for the offensive was welcomed to him. Haig also made out that this was a last chance for British to win the war before the Americans arrived. This, too, was an afterthought, and the not want, when the British claim the day in the Americans were fighting for the same cost. The truth was simple: Haig had resolved blindly did this was the place where he could win the war. He disregarded the warnings of his own intelligence staff against the mud. No one else shared his confidence... Criticism only made Haig more opposite. [46]

On the subject of casualties Taylor has this to say:

British casualties were something over 300,000 Summit: the Germans under 200,000... 30 years later, the British official history turn these figures round: British losses, 250,000; German 400,000. No one believes these for so-called calculations...

Then Haig stopped. The campaign and served its purpose. What purpose? Nine. The British lines dropped stock out into sharper and more

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Awkward salient than before the battle began. All the trivial gains were bandied without a fight in order to shorten the line, when the Germans attacked in the following year. [47]

Is difficult to believe that the loyal junior staff officer and the imminent historian are writing of the same events. Since it cannot both be right several interesting questions arrays. On the one hand we have to ask of loyalty can distort judgment, and on the other if repugnant same compassion at the intensity of the losses which hate to sustain can warp historical objectivity. Thus, when Marshall Cornwell writes: " hate was certainly not the man because his troops are necessary casualties will is this, too many people surprising, opinion the product of misplaced generosity towards an old shaft chief?

What is look at a tried and should another historian who finds no harming hate. In his book the Western front 1914 to 1918, John terrain argues that had hate been appointed commander-in-chief of the be shaft in December 1917, in time to meet the Germans spring offensive in 1918, and then gone to achieve the victories is culminated in the arm this armistice, is unlikely that there would be any argument about him. 48

His place in history as a great commander would've been assured.

Is final dispatch of March when he first, 1919, hate road: "... Neither the course of the war itself to the military lessons to be drawn therefore can properly be comprehended unless the long secession of battles commenced on the Somme in 1916 and ended November of last year on the Somme are viewed as forming part of one great in continuous engagement. " terrain observes": " is entirely characteristic that, in asserting his final victory, he should identify himself completely with all that had preceded: and it is precisely what proceeded that has done most hot to his memory. " 49 he implies that it is to base credit did he did not disassociate itself from the huge losses (420,000 men in four months in the Somme and 300,000 men if their dipper's (, the great suffering and a small apparent gains of their dipper seating years.

But there are perhaps other ways of looking at these data. First, take did not become commander-in-chief to 1917 to 1915, and this is a result of some fairly ruthless and, some of said, disloyal machine is Jane's machinations against his superior, Sir John French. What might be thought of Haig had he not become commander-in-chief until December 1917 is hypothetical and irrelevant.

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As for associate himself with the dire advance of 1915 to 1917, since they were his doing he really had no option. Moreover, the act was fully consistent of what is known of his character. Only by advancing the pieces that his successes in 1918 were result of preceding advance could he hoped to place the latter in a more favorable light. It might be thought that takes last dispatch only serves to confirm the very edge here was a man who, Bill possessing military virtues, was also adroit in cover himself against criticism in improving his image.

The risk, moreover, another argument which need to be considered. Suppose that Haig had inherited the situation of December 1917, without having been responsible for preceding events, would successes of 1918 demonstrate his brilliance is a break commander? The answer cannot been in an equivalent gas. For F. as, as terrain in Haig insults imply, the successes of 1918 were natural consequence of the situation existing in December 1917, then there was not the remark: about his realizing this natural consequence in the last year the war. With the Germany half starved, and her army led by a equal man who has was intellectually crippled by physical illness, * he could hardly help win.

According to terrain, the consensus of opinion did find Haig " in sensitive, on receptive, opposite and unimaginative " is largely mistaken. He bases his conclusion on four examples of " grand scale imagination code shown by Haig between 1916 in the end of the great war.

First of these occurred when Haldane, bent upon her form of the Army, sought takes advice. Haig opined that what was needed was a citizen Army, because the next war when the team would be April extracted struggle involving the rotor sources of the whole country. Not only does terrain regard this is showing " are rare vision " but he also suggested Haig must have been a great thinker, otherwise Haldane would hardly have bothered to consultant. As examples of imagination, on any scale loan the grand scale, these points are not totally convincing. After all, sizable or war was only four years over, even the least imagination a man must realize that the next war

After according to let team 50 looking door had been suffering from toxic goiter since 1914. The mental disturbance which results from this condition would have been quite enough to explain that indecision in constant change of plans which doomed to failure the German offenses of 1918.

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Will be a protected and call for all resources. As for the notion of a citizen Army, this our minority been implied by Lord Roberts call for national service. Finally, the Haldane should have felt impelled to call on Haig perhaps does no more men reflect upon the intellectual level of the Army at that time. The choice was, after all, relative one, as terrain himself makes clear.

Many fine theories [regarding the incompetence of Haig [might go *y: if it should also proved to be the case the no general in any country at that time was able to avoid similar slaughter under certain conditions, while the best achievements of any in them or Fayette fully matched by Haig's, then what might find oneself drawn to the more sober conclusion of Sir Winston Churchill `he might be, Shirley was, unequal to the prodigious scale of plans: but no one else was discerned as his equal or is better. " [51]

This "best of the bad bunch" argument certainly does not military begins the arguments they takes particular shortcomings were true to bull to those features of personality which are endemic to the military scene.

The second important insight, according to terrain, was when he became convinced " that the French would not be a the lawn shoulder in the main burden of fighting Germany on the West for long, and at the French would have to take most of that burden off them will. [52] having said this, terrain that allows the " Lord Kitchener glimpsed it [the same truth [but recoil from the consequence is [and Sir William Robertson " approach did but never with Haig's clarity ". In other words, it was not so much the unique insight, nor did it show a very great gift of imagination. Indeed he could be argued that was an ugly fact which Haig saw clearly because it fit in with his own driving ambition toward self advancement and whatever the cost.

Presumably to quell the insurable thought that Haig might have welcomed the great burden on the British forces because its what on timely we down to his credit, terrain cites evidence which suggested a " selfless prod minded recognition " of the fact that we should still have to submit to the general control of the operations by the French. Began this picture of self and the nation in the Allied cause has been disputed. Important fact Haig, like his Chief of Staff cable, Arbitron prejudices against the French and strongly resisted any questions of domination by them until his own reputation was in such

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Jeopardy that he was only too glad to shift responsibility onto someone else's shoulders. The German breakthrough on March 21, 1918, Haig " belatedly appreciated the virtues of the Supreme command which he had previously opposed ". [53]

A third occasion upon which Haig's stock to a revealed evidence of the superior imagination was in August 1918 when he told Churchill: "... We ought to do our utmost to get a decision this autumn. "

However, since by this time to endorse last great German offensive spent itself, thereby wrecking German hopes of final victory, haste pronouncement might well be considered more of a foregone delusion than a brilliant prophecy. Issues of the words poke ought to " is Brown's revealing. If he, rather for the French other Americans, was be hailed as the final architect of victory in the sooner the war was ended the better. He was not one for sharing prizes with his fellowmen.

All terrain as examples of Haig's imagined Ryan's lapse is the hardest swallow -- his founding of the British Legion. Of this terrain says: "

This human quality, the working of the same insight through the channels of compassion and feeling, are revealed in his developing awareness of the nation is duty towards citizen Army when that Army was disbanded, and the ball ball to those who had been maimed in the service, and to descendents of those who would die. By the middle 1916 he was becoming aware of the scale this problem: all through the harassing preoccupation is a 1917 it was in his mind. In February that year he dressed the Army Council on the subject, and along and carefully thought out memorandum... After the armistice... He gave the remaining years of his life to the formation indictments of the British Legion... An everlasting mockery of the notion that he was " insensitive " to the sufferings and virtues of the man whom he commanded.

In these respects, courting to terrain, " Haig was out ahead. " 54

Just a period of Haig's generalship between 1916 and 1917 cost Britain over 700,000 casualties is hardly surprising that he became cool aware of the scale of this problem cool, nor but it remained in his mind to the end of the war. Nor is it so surprising that, since the

battle all the

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Somme wasn't " redeem defeat " he should never have been fought, and that of their Eucharist " the of this slaughter of a blind war for which he bore the greatest responsibility " 55 he should become aware of a slight doing of his image in the minds of his compatriots. And, since the peace of mind the enemy public opinion depending in large measure upon their public image, is hardly surprising that he should have set up bow rehabilitating self. What better one-way than by founding the British Legion? He can also be argued that this act was entirely consistent with age records as an astute military politician. Canton personal god manage. and with the other not mutually exclusive hypothesis that even he might have felt some guilt at big been nor but he of the price didn't pay, in other people's lives. In the of the 1914-18 war, the Field Marshal was to be found in the front line trenches, not in the safety of his command post, but under their victims. Such behaviour is, incidentally, entirely consistent with what is known of the psychology of authoritarianism – our reaction to the misery of obsessions but to rationalize aggression. 2004 EDITOR: the same can be said about awarding medals and orders to people that were main been killed-in Iraq to the military incompetence of having Soldiers drive around in unarmored Humvee trucks

However, there are also several other locations of which Haig's imagination had an immediate impact operations they are.

1. The short been boarded a new shop whole. In fact is wasn't operations staged by Sir John French in which shortage of shells necessitated ashore bombardment. As a result of this fortuitous occurrence the Germans were taken by surprise and British infantry broke through. for the only time in the war. However as Taylor records: the British hesitated to interval hold it may. They waited for reinforcements: and not a time there he these arrive, German reinforcements had arrived also. The gap was close. The British want on battening to no purpose. 57

The relevance of this event to Haig was the failed to learn the lesson surprise. In the years which lay had hundreds of thousands were doomed to lose Allies because the commander-in-chief chose to ignore serendipity is to do this occurrence of ashore bombardment.

2. The dawn attack on the Somme on July 14, 1916. Despite the lesson the new should Powell, haste tactics continued to follow the rigid inexpensive formula prolonged bombgment, followed by a pauses got is increased a range, followed by any country a salt. During a hiatus between the lifting of the barrage in the infantry attack German machine gunners emerge from their dugouts and establish themselves in the craters which British artillery had so

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Considerately supplied. Then came the British infantry, each man weighed down with 66 lbs. Of equipment, we slowly in extended blind – a target impossible to minutes. " the Bullets ran across the front in a steady Sprite. The 1st British life altered in fall, a 2nd followed it, a 3rd, and than a 4th, all to no avail. By the early afternoon the survivors were back in the trenches. " 57

Applied to the first day of the battle the Somme, haste formula cost 60 7000 casualties, of whom 20,000 die – " the heaviest loss ever suffered in a single day by British army or any Army in the first world war ".

It is against this background that must considered the events on 1 July, 1916, the infamous battle of the Somme. Haig's conception of how to win a war another fortnight of it can impact comparable carnage, at last decided on attack on the cover of darkness. He acquiesced to the plain only after a night of argument with his support it commander. In the event the assault was launched at 3:55 a.m. and, because it achieve surprise, succeeded in overriding two lines of German trenches. Unfortunately gain could not be exploited because not hampered the arrival a reinforcements.

Certainly a dawn attack was refreshing change from what had gone before, but the idea was not Haig's and, even if it had been, would hardly constitute the product of a brewing imagination.

3. The first British tank attack on September 15, 1916. It Haig invented tanks, or even the idea of using armored fighting vehicles, some credit could be due to them. But he did neither of these things buried on the contrary, in the face of considerable opposition he insisted on using the few tanks than available. It takes Ron tried to some broken down, leaving water to to penetrate the German lines. Not only did Haig achieve little by this respect a attack but he lost forever the surprise are really heavy tank attack. Certainly, as six Smith points out, " it is doubtful if the production of suitable tactics for military and tanks will ever have been possible without battle experiences ". 58 as an example of imagination is not terribly convincing buried "

Haig's real impact on the battle of the Somme lay in his insistence that " every yard of lost French must be retaken by counterattack will buried about this the last asd if better, for constant British nearly half a

" on the other hand, it is takes constant credit could be consistently encourage the development of tanks.

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Million casualties in avail done nothing beyond the fact that it hopes that the picture by which future generations solve the first world war. prayed helpless Soldiers; laundering outs in the generals; nothing achieved." 59

4. The battle in his scenes. On June 6, 1917, German defensive positions on the scenes rich were destroyed that explosion of 1,000,000 lbs. Of high explosives that been placed in 19 mines, beaten the whole kill side. Haig was not responsible for the success. On the contrary, credit for the enterprise, which took two years to repair, belongs to surfaced Herbert Plummer, described by Taylor has " one of the few sensible British commanders of the war ".

5. The first mass tank attack a camera a, tob the stunning surprise of August 8, 1918 ". Following upon the useless an enormously expensive battles of the Somme and their dippers, Haig allowed tanks to be used a camera a. If after four years of mindless distraction to successful though temporary gain can be described as a success, that " of an imagined general and the world lost the learning.

Terrain tested it out Haig appeared in 1964. For more recent and some may picture were summing out there is John Watters. Aldershot review:

One Star the first world war, he with the fetus is still the seat, always insisted that a must last for long time. He believed in the inevitability of " long fluctuating battles ", of the process of " wearing down " the enemy by the relentless and remorseless sacrifice of the lies of his men. " Generalship is, therefore, " he declared, " not to be worn down by obstinacy. Tact is the chief requisite. " 60 Buried. He directed the " battery " from luxurious chateau in city isolation from the scene about buried.

From this grand headquarters hate me great big strategic decisions, involving Allies of hundreds of thousands of Soldiers, without consultation with the ordinary fighting officers and men were at the scene of the battle... [bass] more than 90,000 menus, but fight is to British manhood, perished in the battle, her slaughter like cattle in the stock yards of Chicago. [60]

It will be recalled the disk somewhat linkages to aggression in which we have considered the use of no less than five historians took ill of contemplation of a curious phenomena – the fact that even half

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A century after the event opinions about Haig still remained extraordinary intense and strikingly divided.

What conclusions, then, can be drawn about origins of all this in celebration? The first, rather obvious point, is its figures like a command last interested because they symbolize, and in their role act out, the divided forces was being each one of us. It is just because they are neither wholly good normally bad, but perpetuate colossal destruction within the bounds of a mobile acquiescence conscience, that they fascinate and cannot be left alone. They're increasingly frequent reemergence in place, films in both years after the event is also a special instance of the importance of the finding that longer the time since the major war of the great or interest in large-scale military aggression.

The second, perhaps less obvious, point is that the division of opinion regarding a man like a perfect complex precisely the two sides of his major [Calais butcher versus genius gentle intervertebral heat endowed with massive self-control.

The third point, rather hypothesis, naturals follows naturally. It is simply this: the people were primarily conserved the preserving the constraints and forces in society have a soft spot for authoritarians. Those who art do not. This hardly to be wondered at phenomenon is a nonsocomic personal and the general those that people are drawn towards organizations or individuals who can provide defence against the very anxieties to which they themselves upright. To demolish hay is to demolish the very structure upon which their own peace of mind pans. How else can exert explained the disbursement league pitcher you like attacks upon those who dare to " explain " some long dead individual for whom the attacker cannot surely still entertain a passionate affection? 2004 EDITOR: today you see this with the knee-jerk support in America for hard-line Israeli "pull yourself up by your bootstraps" response not to become a general in the American military this myth the doesn't know the true facts of the situation of American corruption in the military insist that the men who are generals and admirals in our military art and good men who deserve to be there and the competent

By the same token it will be interesting, if painful, to witness the rage brought forth by comparing the personalities of Haig or Hitler. On this latter issue, and by way of sparing the feelings of the cohesive hay (not to mention admirers of ambler, let us be quite clear. We are not saying that the both the armies on both sides are psychologically the same. What is necessary identify between two outcomes of authoritarian psychopathology. Cleary Lee in the case of these two men be outcomes were very different. But we are saying is that in a terms of etiology, underlying psychopathology in certain manifest rights there were remarkable similarities. We are also said he did those

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Ways in which they were so competent – their orderliness, thoroughness, tenacity in singleness of purpose – and those ways in which they were in competent stem from their underlying authoritarianism, not from intellectual brilliance or stupidity. If anything Hitler was rather more competent in his job than was Haig and he is. This is merely because, vocationally, extreme authoritarianism is more compatible with the task of a bureaucrats on your account ties extermination of the " inferior race it is with waging war against the relatively free, relatively flexible and equally matched enemy.

Having read so far, the reader may, with some justification, asked why he is included all our short list of great controversial commanders.

There are two reasons. Firstly, he has been acclaimed as a " great Captain " by some were presumably qualified to judge total performance. Secondly, it could be argued given the conditions of the first world war is authoritarian traits were not without value. He's driving ambition, his opposite his see, his stick city of purpose, is orderly mind even his imperviousness to the tragedy of human sacrifice of the gargantuan scale added up to at least one way of winning assets less conflict. It is psychopathology he was the very embodiment of the sort of world in which the ends justify the means. It also he was the war of tightly controlled aggression in which distracted forces, of others hitherto trend of violence, were hurled against the constraints of mud, wire, protocol in ordered lines of trenches.

He had to be the man he was, to be the perfect figurehead for such a fight.

From the foregoing account a three controversial commanders three conclusions may be drawn:

1. By far the greatest of the three, Montgomery, was also the least authoritarian, and by far the most controversial; he was certainly the most authoritarian. Kitchener lies somewhere between them on both counts.

2. Even the gale in the case of Montgomery those aspects of his military performance for which he has been criticized or clearly attributable to features of his personality whether to you and then to any intellectual shortcoming or lack of professional expertise.

3. Whereas Montgomery in Kitchener weeks positions of supreme power despite their relative absence of authoritarian traits and

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Because of this abundant dry and military excellence, hate scaled the same heights largely through his authoritarianism. In contrast to Montgomery Kitchener, his conformity, obedience, anti-intellectualism and thinly veiled well controlled regression to do need to eat those of the organization to which he belonged – " as a hand fitted glove. [61]

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Chapter 29

Retreat

"Hair", retreat the honorable heroes, Hail!

Despite all your generals you prevail."

– lard or, "The Crimean Heroes "

"this difficulty of seeing things correctly, which is one of the greatest sources of friction in war, makes things appear quite different from what was expected."

—C. Von Clausewitz

In the introduction to the park it was suggested that for someone to take up and said a enormous military incompetence would be as unjustified as a devote either keep complaining about a book on dental carries. Now that we are trying to a close the point needs reemphasis, for a work devoted to the site topology of the system tends to leave the impression that dysfunction is the rule rather than the exception. 2004 EDITOR: I disagree— the majority of the people in the United States military are mentally ill with NPD

It is not the intention to leave the comparable impression of generalship, but rather to show that, just as the nature of their job predisposed is key to decay, so the nature of interest PCs aggression predispose as the leaders of armies and bables to certain sorts of error.

Far from diminishing the nature of even military commanders, the existence of this predisposition makes the performance of the majority of Soldiers and sailors doubly credible. They are, to continue with the dental metaphor, like teeth which survive despite the hazards of plaque, Jim divide us and calcium deficiency – stalwart fangs indeed!

We have dealt to the problems a militarism but here again, as the following lines suggest there is another side to the point:

I like about the British Army is that during my lifetime is almost always thought for good reasons, and almost always

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It disciplined fashion. It has done so do it is done no tolerate in feathering but I know of, the not know pregnant women that I know of, blown the faces off no shop girls I know. It is not chosen to kill any fathers in front otherwise in children. It. I write this with a fairly extensive knowledge is of the charges of brutality that of the double that the troops in Ulster. Want

2004 EDITOR: U.S. military hasn't learned this from Vietnam to the current Abu Gahrab crisis in Iraq our troops without moral compass have done atrocities and will continue to, until we develop a military but is based on a morally sound ethos acted out by a mature adults not adult children who feel that they can get away with murder

The ferry advance in his book starts on the position that bike is very nature military incompetence cannot be attributed to dull most of intellect. The risk, it seems, a recurring pattern to military mishaps which defies any explanation in terms of the " body to the full " theory.

Its debt is to an oblique suggested that the syndrome occurs through the enormous difficulties of professionalizing interstitial activity of interest PCs passing. This professional station entails the growth for authoritarian, that collection of rules and conventions thereby whereby hostility control and anxiety modified. The militarism organizes military behavior is a special instance of the general principle that attempt to minimize the side effects of event tend to hinder its main effect – rather as a silence or reduces the efficiency of an internal combustion engine, or preservatives impair the flavor of GM.

The nature and effects of militarism have more been coincidental similarity to those psychological defenses which individuals Iraq to get the personal anxieties. These acted do with sex, dirt, regression, self-esteem and death.

Not very surprisingly, a military career attracts a majority of people with the sorts of anxieties. Within a military organization to uncontrovertible needs are gratified. They, for their part, helped to reinforce those very aspects of militarism which are so congenial to the requirements. In return, as a work, for fitting in so well, they may rise to positions in considerable power. Once there, however, they become incapacitated by the very characteristics were chastened their ascent. These traits – need for approval, fear of failure, being data on passionate information, and the rest – are probably accented actuated by their larger responsibilities, and the fact that there is now no longer anyone higher opt to whom they might appeal. There also oder, for generalship, a like anthitis, is something which beset the man as he approached old age.

These speculations gained support from a number of phenomena associated with military organizations: " bull will, codes of honor, anti-intellectualism, antifeminist insensitivity criticism. They also

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If you in fitted in of research data on leadership, achievement motivation and the authoritarian personality.

Finally, study of highly competent versus incompetent commanders seem to confirm the believed ego weakness in authoritarianism, rather stupidity, underlie most military ineptitude. The light of this constant conclusion is perhaps a truism to her that while the seed to military incompetence are sown in very childhood, they may all much to such subsequent and painful influence as separation anxiety, restricted mothers, status conscious fathers, monastic schools and the Tory in cold of " muscular Christianity.

So much for a very based on past history. Has any relevance for the future? Since armies and bables have changed out of all recognition, perhaps sorts of military incompetence described in these pages are no longer likely to occur. In fact, the evidence suggests this to be a fortress. Some of the best examples of military incompetence to be a blighted the lives of Soldiers 100 years ago. In Vietnam, in three weeks in 1968, the 10 offensive and over Americans 500 dead in the South Vietnamese 185,000 dead with 2 million refugees. Why did it happen? One reason was the inability to respond to unexpected military intelligence. 2004 EDITOR: as long as fallible human beings are in the military and have not been regenerated they will continue to exhibit military incompetence unless we create a system that does not reward and promote "yes-men" and bootlicks but promotes independent critical debate

But there are other reasons for a continuance of military incompetence, which, paradoxically, came about with the transition from old time to modern generalship. Far from diminishing the possibility of error, this transition opens up vistas of potential ineptitude hitherto denied to professionals and violence. It also has results which tend to obscure the precise source staff of incompetence. 2004 EDITOR: the digital age opens up new opportunities for out of touch generals to order people to their deaths in stupid ways

In the words of contemporary American: " one of the chief differences between ourselves and agents lies not producing unfortunately (in human nature, but rather in the proliferation of our skills, and our institutions, and therefore in a number of Nietzsche's in which the incompetent can now installed themselves as persons of consequence. " to

To be more specific dirt three factors which predispose towards errors and modern generalship. Firstly, thanks to Marconi in a for Fermi valve, larger armies can now be controlled from much farther away by mind which might still have been selected and trained from an earlier age of warfare the now permitted by sheer distance from attaining any real feel for the battle. Secondly, the complexity of modern war has meant larger staffs with a consequence multiplication of the sources of the distortion in the flow of essential

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Information. Finally, there is the said irony that the best intentions of modern generals, particularly at the level of commanders and cheap, maybe has to sheer wealth of technological resources now placed at their disposal. 2004 EDITOR: people now think that techno gadgets can get us out of any problem, but we are wrong

The first computation of these three factors occured in the First World War, with terrible results. In this war, generals, shielded by distance understands, their hands on state by witnessing the outcome of their orders, could send thousands, even millions, of men to their doubts without any feeling of being wasteful, and say from retribution. In short they lacked incentives to act otherwise than they did. 2004 EDITOR: the same facts exist today Soldiers are being killed in Iraq by military incompetence and Bush will not fire nobody in U.S. military doing this war

Dan, a like an old person with week are, they might be deliver kept in ignorance of unflappable facts. For example, what other reasons for the costly aftermath the camera a offensive in 1917 was at Hagan been grossly misled by a staff as the German strength. It seems that the effects of unbelievable casualty rates. Sometimes, it was so necessary to ignore small staff officer with documentary evidence to the German division from Russia and other reinforcements were riding in the camera area. On charters orders this is giving it fact was kept from hatte" he did not accept the evidence, and in any case did not wish to weaken this commander-in-chief's resolution to carry on with the attack " three (my italics]

As the light hatred of retain the man who could perpetuate such deceptions, one can only point out the to preserve loyalties and affectionate ties within the group (in this case his staff practice east at the expense of disasters for an out group accords with what is known of the authoritarian personality. Unfortunate greater relationship to a junior subordinate whom he knows personally into accept the death of an army who wanted whom one does not. Hate evidently lacked this particular brand the moral Kurds.

But all this, product though it was at the factors which distinguish modern from old-fashioned generalship, happen many years ago. Perhaps they were only the TV paintings of modern generalship? It seems not.

Any doubts as to whether the three facets of remote-control, swollen staffs and a wealth of resources make for incompetence are removed that a contemplation of Vietnam. In his most ill-conceived in horrible hone there was the commander-in-chief, Lyndon Johnson, he buys advisers, dreaming of policies in the disliking targets at an icy distance of 12,000 m.. And there was the man on the

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spot, General Westmoreland, a by no means unintelligent military commander but being used by the sheer weight of destructive energy and aggressive notions supplied by his president. Together, but not give Eileen Valley in mind of the wanted, coupled with the traditional military mind of the other, produced a pattern of military martial lunacy so abject and appalling that eventually did for both of them.

Lladro or Modern A confusion, the military mind is not helped in this connection by the fact that it is a closed world, with its own unique language and customs. Unfettered by traditional militarism, lacking in obsessive of brute force, without an obsession with capturing real estate, Helene G. app relied on poor men strategies – surprise, deception and the ability to melt away. They relied on the fact Westmoreland would expand his energies wanting wherever they had been heard of well they got ready disdain him somewhere else. And as Lyndon" West expat maker, sold it was vast tracts of Southeast Asia reeled beneath their rage, the North Vietnamese in the Vietcong slit it around them and threw them, pressing out of American support.

This brings up yet another hazard a modern war — government by committee. In the long history of earlier disasters it might wealth inmate while have been concluded that all future military decision should be left to committee's rather than to individual commanders, if only to limit the effects of unbelievable personality traits. Unfortunate such a conclusion would probably be fatal. According to a study by I. L. Janice, before the mobile were still carry disasters in the risen 6 recent military history are directly or tradable to the psychological processes which attend group decisionmaking.

In analysis at events which led up to the day it takes fiasco, the destruction of Pearl Harbor, America's participation in the Korean War, and the escalation in the war in Japan and Vietnam, Janice draws attention to the staggering staggering irrationality which can be set in the thinking of otherwise highly competent, intelligent, conscientious individuals what he began acting as a group.

Take a decision to invade Cuba with a group of Cuban ask else. It really the CIA plan, Canadian is key advisers meet six assumptions. Each was wrong.

They assume that no one would guess the U.S. government was responsible for the invasion.

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The art content for the Cuba Air Force they assume it would be annihilate before the invasion began.

They assume that the small invasion force led by unpopular ask officers of the Batista regime will be more to match for Castro school week will army of 20,000 well-equipped Cuban troops.

This in the invasion would touch off the general but behind Castro's lines.

They assume that even if unsuccessful in the primary objective the XL force pinhole open: up in Cuba and reinforce anti-Castro guerrillas.

In the event each assumption proved gross miscalculation. Nothing went as planned. Nobody believed the CIA cover story. The ships carry reserve ammunition for the invasion force billboard rhymes – two were sunk into fled. By the second eight invaders were surrounded by 200,000 army and by the think they never dead or behind bars bycatch months later was leader cover at was left to their invasion force for ransom price to Castro a $53 billion. Kennedy was thinking: " now could I been so stupid as to let them go-ahead? " he asked. As Sorenson wrote: " his take wish anguish with doubly deepened by the chronology to rest of the world was asking the same question. " Arthur Schlesinger Jr. noted that " Kennedy would sometimes referred in courageously to the Bay of pigs. wondering how rational meeting could have become involved in so ill's start an adventure ". Others who had dissipated in the initial decisions were similarly afflicted. Dulles offered to resign his head of the CIA. McNamara publicly knowledge is personal responsibility from his guiding the president.

On all, it had been " and operations so ill-conceived among illiterate people of the world the neighbor the invasion site has become the very symbol of perfect failure polled. For

if the Senate Central share delusion in the Bay of pigs action was " the planned cannot fail, that which sealed the fate of Pearl Harbor was "it can't happen here!"

Sunday, December 7, 1940 wanted to be set aside by adult camel practise brave commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet (for friendly game of golf with his colleague general shore, 96 ships of the American Fleet slept at anchor in the harbor, American planes stood wingtip to wingtip on the tarmac, American servicemen were off duty into a weekend leave. By into the to a Pearl Harbor, with

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Its ships, planes and military installations, have been reduced to smoking ruins, 2000 servicemen had been killed and as many more missing or wounded. By the end of the day Campbell was offering to resign. Later he was court Martial, reprimanded and demoted to position he was when he was commander-in-chief. Admiral Kimmel was similarly demoted.

Through or old friends the neglect of intelligence reports and gross underestimation of enemy capabilities, coupled in this instance within the city was in this interpretation of warning signals from Washington and amiable dedication to the task of mutual reassurance regarding their vulnerability, had led to the worst military disaster in American history. Because the state of such supine complacency that the product on themselves post the worst disaster in American history. " 2004 EDITOR: this is all written before September 11 to doubt someone on that day the military incompetence led to 3000 Americans killed and no one was fired for their incompetence

Pearl Harbor, like the Bay of Pigs, confirmed once again but military incompetence is more off the product of personality – characteristics been of intellectual shortcomings. The these American disaster show very clearly that even the combined intellect and specialized knowledge of Washington's military experts was not sufficient to prevent the tragedy resulting from the tactical agility of even those who made them. 2004 EDITOR: unless you have a military where the smart people can blow-the-whistle without UCMJ persecution on the people who are doing stupid things for their psychological stupidity for their little hangups over having a small pens, stupid things and disasters will still happen

far from diminishing the chances of ineptitude, the group actually accentuate the effects of those very traits which million lead to incompetence and individual commanders. The symptoms of this process, which Janice turns polled groupthink will, include:

1. An illusion of in vulnerability to become shared by most members of the group.

2. Collective attempt to know or rationalize the way items of information which might otherwise lead the group to consider to reconsider shaky the cherished assumptions.

3. In unquestionably in the groups inherit morale the, thus enabling members to overlook the ethical consequences of their decision.

4. Stereotyping enemy is either to evil for negotiation or to stupid in people to be a threat.

5. A share delusion of the emanating into majority viewpoint, augmented by the false assumption that silence means consent.

6. Self appointed GoldMine barge " to protect the group from adverse information that might shatter complacency about the effectiveness and morale either decisions.

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Not very surprisingly is been suggested that those most susceptible to polled groupthink will will tend to be people fear full of disapproval in rejection. " just people give priority to preserving friendly relationship to the expensive achieving success in the groups work tasks. By contrast, the person is the sort of person who, as we've seen, makes the best military commander – the outspoken individualist – clearly cannot give of his best in the group situation. If he fails to hold his time, he runs the risk of being ejected by his colleagues.

Yet another factor concerning groups, particular relevance to the arguments advanced in his book, has emphasized by Richard Barnett in the economy of data (cited by Janice [is a common social and medical it is common social and educational backgrounds of the group Washington. It as the assumption and not to be questioned that " to low interaction cohesiveness " could lead to " poor interaction decisions ". 2004 EDITOR: Exactly! these weaklings are the wrong people to be trying to fight a war on adaptive terrorists!

The syndrome include such attitudes as religious dogmatism, ethnocentrism, intolerance of minority groups, putative news, anti-heat is on, conformity, conventionality, superstition, resistance to scientific progress, and the liking for militarism. In other words, the

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The syndrome is scarcely distinguishable from the berkeley concept of authoritarianism. Seven

It has been argued that this constellation of attitudes functions as ego defense against feelings of in theater ready in security. It reflects what glenn wilson has called " a generalized susceptibility to experiencing threat or anxiety in the face of uncertainty vote. It works by " simplifying, ordering, controlling the uncontrollable, making more secure, both the external world (to perceptual processes proper). Premises and internal world (needs, feelings, desires, eccentric). Porter is opposed upon other needs and feelings by 17 them to rigid and simplistic external codes of conduct (rules, laws, morals, duties, obligations, in each ec. (does reducing conflict and averting the anxiety that would accompany awareness of the freedom to choose among alternative modes of action. " eight

Desirable though they need be another context, the defenses, which, as we've seen, characterize the military mind to attract those who possess them to the comforting control the military organizations, are obviously at odds of the requirements competent generalship buried for that they will be activated by the uncertainties of war – the greater the uncertainties the stronger to defenses. Secondly, besides exerting a prolific effect upon decision processes they will predispose towards a delusional understand summation of the enemy (they " magical " attempt to minimize the external threat to [, a failure to seek out, user act upon military intelligence (denial in perceptual blocking a threatening information (, and in placable resistance to the " uncertainties " of innovation, novelty and new scientific each to

To seek it is indeed ironic to one of the most conservative the professions to be called upon to engage in activities of our the very up first of conservative mental traits. It is rather like expecting the pope to run an efficient birth control clinic buried in, what is considered the military profession is the simple logical conclusion of a long sort from which in office or cadets are drawn, the findings from a very recent study by teasing as neck, which point to a hereditary factoring conservatism, is hardly cause for jubilation! 9

The potentially dangerous situation implied by the above considerations is faster beta by another factor – the military organizations might now be called upon the way street quite different sorts of wars: nuclear, conventional and what frank kids and has called " low intensity operations per disease i.e., defensive measures against subversive elements in the civilian population (2004 EDITOR:: subnational conflict or fourth generational warfare as we call today the terms change but they're still talking about the same thing

one hesitates to typically on the psychology of

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Such a crucial issue but, justing again from past events, the are grounds for believing to the types of warfare require management by very different personalities. 2004 EDITOR:: to win we need smart adult people fighting wars not weak codependents narcissistic egomaniacs concerned about the lack of penis size

Does the controllers of nuclear weaponry should brass be relatively obsessive, rigid, conforming an overcontrol – in short, not lead authoritarian. To sydney problem here is the prevention of accidents, the world cannot afford the excitement or a trial the trusting its hydrogen bombs to, maniacal who have had to grow still recorded naturally irritable, totally obsessive, the bulls should " enter bosporus.

Together into the scale, palmer for peacekeeping operations like that in northern ireland, the authoritarian The mind would probably be a crippling disability. For such " warfare ", tact, flexibility, imagination and " open mind's ", the very antithesis of the authoritarian traits, would seem to be necessary if not sufficient. Perhaps the military should take a lesson from the police who, and sold one is given to understand, take care to avoid recruiting people of mark authoritarian traits.

One thing is certain: the conventional military has been called the " conservative syndrome, have reactive conclusions are also consistent with for theory of military incompetence.

At the moment many these people [officers commanding units dealing with insurgents] to literally try to present the to their subordinates in terms a conventional war. In the rousing speech is about knocking the enemy for sex, and he indulge infrequent redeployment another activities designed to create the illusion of battle. The quite apart from the tactical disadvantage which accrue, e.g., lack of can continue continuity, the actually managed to aggravate the strains on their subordinates because they're in effect encouraging development of the characteristics which are on city to this particular type of operation, blouse regarding the growth of those which might be useful. In other words their leading their middleweight from the real battlefield onto a fictitious one of their own imagining. [10]

2004 EDITOR: they use computers to create all kinds of mental fantasies that have no connection to physical reality

This brass most difficult to find a suitable prescription for military commanders and financial warfare. Certainly they should possessed " to virtues defined by key h. erickson. The first is " purpose – the kurds doing this each in person valiant goals on inhibited by the defeat of infantile fantasies, i guilt and by the foiling fear of punishment " . It

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Unfortunately the possession of these traits might well deter a man from ever wanting to be a senior military commander.

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
Afterword

Lest the reader should have doubted my qualifications to write this book, let me reassure him that I have authoritarian traits, a weak ego, fear of failure motivation, and no illusions about the fact that I would've made a grossly incompetent general. It takes one to no one!

February 1975

The Author

Private Murphy's View



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